The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c7.s3.t7.27

c7.s3.t7.27

“Finally we must answer the assertion that variety of knowledge can arise without objects, by a variety of [subjective] appearances (*vâsanâ*). We reply: The existence of appearances is not possible, if, as you take it, there is no apperception of external objects. For the appearances in forms which differ according to the object have their basis in the apperception of the object [p. 578]; if, however, no objects are apperceived, wherein have the various appearances their foundation? If we accept the idea of beginninglessness, like a row of blind people holding to each other, a *regressus in infinitum* steps in, with no supporting basis, thus abolishing the worldly action without proving your position. If, further, he who denies the external world, appeals to the rule and the exception [waking and dream] to prove that knowledge, “in order to come into being, has, as its ground, appearances, and not objects, we must regard this also as refuted, if it is as we said; for without the apperception of objects, appearances cannot arise. And as, further, the apperception of objects can exist without the appearance, while, on the other hand, the appearances cannot exist without the apperception of objects, the rule and the exception [under discussion] serve but to affirm the reality of objects. For appearances are only certain impressions (*saṃskāra*); and, as experience shows, impressions can only be brought about by means of a supporting basis; for you, however, there is no such basis of impressions, because you follow as your guide the axiom that apperception does not exist.”