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The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c7.s7: XXI. Solution of the Cosmological Problems

The System of the Vedânta according to Bâdarâyana's Brahma-Sûtras and Çankara's Commentary c7.s7

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XXI. Solution of the Cosmological Problems

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The cosmological problems which we gathered together in Chapter XVIII, above p. 250ff., with their respective solutions, are found in the original work in part before, and in part after, the exposition of the doctrine of identity. Our re-arrangement, and the division of the problems into two separate chapters, with the doctrine of identity between them, is justified by the fact that the raising of these problems is only possible from an empirical standpoint, and before the doctrine of identity is put forward, while their complete solution can only be given after this doctrine. If our authors follow a different course, it is because the difference between the empirical and metaphysical standpoints (*vyāvahārikī* and *pāramārthikī avasthā*, above p. 106ff.) so distinctly made by them, is imperfectly carried out in their work. So far as this shortcoming can be supplied by a mere re-arrangement, we have believed ourselves justified in supplying it, and, in doing this, we in no case go further than a translator who adds to a work the improvements suggested by its author; when, however, as we shall see, the solution of the cosmological problems is first sought from an empirical standpoint, and only when this method fails is the metaphysical teaching of identity called in, we do not hold ourselves bound to remedy this; on the contrary, the fluctuations between the empirical and metaphysical standpoints, as we shall see further on, must remain untouched, as historical monuments of a stage through which the philosopher first struggled to fuller clearness, without entirely effacing from his work the traces of the intermediate stage he had passed through. It is also possible, and many indications speak for it, (cf. above pp. 28 ff. 139 and notes 17. 45. 21. 22), that the form of the Commentaries to the Brahmasûtras as we have them, bears the imprint of many hands; but these signs are too vague, and the whole work has too slight an individuality, for us to convert this possibility into a definite hypothesis.

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We give the solutions in the same order as the problems, which can be referred to, point by point, in Chapter XVIII.

1. The Problem of Causality

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Sûtras 2, 1, 6. 7. 9.

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(a) The Difference in Essence between Brahman and the World.—To the objection that Brahman could not be the cause of the world, because the two are different in essence, an empirical answer is first given, by adducing examples in which the effect is different from the cause; thus, from men, who are conscious, hair and nails which are unconscious, proceed; from dung which is unconscious, the conscious dung-beetle (vṛścika = gomayakīṭa) comes forth. But as here cause and effect, in spite of every difference of form, have this in common, that they have both sprung from the earth, so Brahman and the world have both this common characteristic,—Being (sattā). Of what nature is the difference in essence (vilakṣaṇatvam) on the ground of which the opponent disputes the creation of the world by Brahman? Does it lie (1) in the fact that nature does not altogether harmonise with the being of Brahman? Without a certain reaching-forth beyond itself (atiçaya), in the cause, we nowhere find the relation of cause and effect. Or (2) is the difference between the two complete? That cannot be maintained; for the evidence teaches that the Being (sattā), which is the essence of Brahman, is also to be found in the things which make up Nature. Or (3) is it impossible for Nature to have sprung from Brahman because Nature lacks consciousness (caitanyam)? The examples we have given above are opposed to this view; and not these examples only, but also the revelation of Scripture. But it is a mere [unjustified] postulate (manoratha-mâtram) that Brahman, because it is in fact existent (parinishpannam), must also be perceptible by worldly means of knowledge: for perception cannot comprehend Brahman, because Brahman is without form; inference also fails, because Brahman has no characteristic (liṅgam); and if reflection is nevertheless recommended by the Scriptures, it is to be understood of reflection directed to the Scriptures, and not of reflection divorced from them.—Furthermore, we must not believe that because the world is an effect of Brahman, it did not exist before it was created. Even then, it already existed in the form of its causal Self (kāraṇa-ātmanā), just as now it only persists through the power of this causal Self (p. 424, 9 to 429, 13).

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—The last phrase points plainly to the doctrine of identity, as it frees the causal relation from the form of sequence in time, and makes it simultaneous.

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(b) The Contamination of Brahman by the World.—To the objection that, on re-absorbing the world, Brahman is polluted by it, it is to be replied that, according to our experience, a cause, when the effect returns into it, is not affected by the qualities of the latter; thus vessels return to clay; golden ornaments to gold; living beings, to the earth, without the latter being altered by their qualities. For it would certainly not be a true return, if the effect retained its qualities when withdrawn into its cause. Rather (and here our author passes to metaphysical explanations) the doctrine of the identity of cause and effect presupposes that the effect is identical with the cause, but not the cause with the effect. The above objection is taken in too narrow a sense; not only on its return, but also during its existence, would the world pollute Brahman; for in all time, past, present, and future, the world is identical with Brahman; but neither its existence nor its return pollutes Brahman, and this, because the world as effect, along with its qualities, is imputed only through the Ignorance [of the soul]. “As the magician is not affected by “the illusion (māyā) which he himself has created, because “is without reality (avastu), so also Paramātman is not affected “by the illusion of Saṃsāra. And as the dreamer is not “affected by the illusion of a dream, because (Bṛih. 4, 3, 15. 16, “above p. 190) the soul is not touched by sleep, or waking [this appears to be an addition and not authentic]—so also the one unchangeable witness of the three states [waking, dreaming, deep sleep] is not touched by these three changing states. For the appearance of the highest soul in the three states is only an illusion, like the appearance of the rope as a snake. Therefore it is said by the teachers who are learned in the Vedânta-tradition (Gâudapâda ad Mân-dûkya-Up. 1. 16, p. 384):

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When from illusion's sleep that ne'er began,
The soul awaketh, then in her awakes
The unborn One, that never slumbereth.”

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“Consequently, it is false to hold that the cause is polluted by the qualities, materiality, etc., of the effect, if they return into that cause” (p. 431, 1—433, 4).

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(c) The Impossibility of a new Differentiation.—To this objection, the reply is, that, as the soul, in deep sleep and meditation, returns (temporarily) to its original unity, but on waking from these states, because it is not free from Ignorance, it returns to its individual existence, so also is it with the return into Brahman. “For as at the time of the duration of the world, in consequence of false knowledge, the tendency to differentiate in the undifferentiated Parâtman goes on unchecked like a dream, so we must also take for granted that, after the return into Brahman, the force of differentiation, conditioned by false knowledge, still continues” (p. 433, 4—434, 2).

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(d) The Danger of a Return for the Liberated.—From what has been said, it follows that the liberated cannot be born again, for the false knowledge which conditions individual existence, is taken away from them by perfect knowledge (p. 434, 1—2), since, as is said in another place (p. 342, 7), the seed-force (above p. 228) is burnt up, in their case, by the fire of wisdom.

2. The Problem of the One and the Many

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(a) Total or partial transformation.—First, we must bear in mind that Brahman is not wholly changed into the world. For the Scripture, wherever it speaks of the transformation of Brahman, presupposes his continuance; as when it is said that "one part of him is all creatures, three parts are immortal in the heaven" (Rigveda X, 90, 3, above p. 168); when it conceives deep sleep as a return to Brahman, where the transformed Brahman cannot be meant, for we are in Him already; when it is taught that Brahman cannot be reached by perception, which is not true of the transformed Brahman, etc. Moreover, the partial transformation of Brahman cannot be maintained, because the Scripture, which is the only authority here, most strongly insists on the indivisible unity of Brahman.¹⁰⁶ But can the Scripture teach a plain contradiction? And that Brahman is neither wholly nor partially transformed into the world, is certainly one!—To this it is replied that the whole plurality of appearances rests on Ignorance. But a thing does not become divided because Ignorance takes it to be divided. The moon is not duplicated because people with defective vision see two moons. The whole empirical reality with its names and forms, which can neither be defined as Being nor as nothing (*tattva-anyatvâbhyâm anirvacanîya* p. 483, 9, a frequent formula, cf. p. 96, 6. 343, 1. 454, 10), rests upon Ignorance, while, in the sense of the highest reality, the Existent persists without change or transformation. A transformation resting merely on words (above p. 262) can alter nothing in the indivisibility of the Existent.—As the dreamer creates many forms, and yet remains one and undivided, as gods and magicians, without changing their nature, make horses, elephants, etc., appear, so the manifold creation arises in the uniform Brahman, without Brahman thereby undergoing the least change of nature (p. 480, 11—484, 14).

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¹⁰⁶ The conception here repudiated, is further enforced by the simile of cosmic space and the space within vessels, which serves more frequently than any other to make clear the relation of Brahman to individual beings; p. 233, 3: "As the hollows of vessels, conceived "without the determinations (*upâdhi*)—the vessels—are nothing else than "cosmic space, so also living souls are not apart from their *upâdhis*] "different from the highest soul." The same simile occurs: p. 121, 1. 173, 17. 198, 3. 199, 8. 443, 5. 445, 7. 455, 3. 473, 11. 645, 11. 1134, 2. (Space and the eye of a needle:) 175, 2. 836, 12. Its value lies in the fact that it admirably illustrates the fact that Brahman is not affected (*asañ-gatvam*) by the Upâdhis, to which p. 266, 8 refers; cf. p. 176, 5 (Space does not burn with bodies), 690, 2 (does not move with vessels).

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(b) One Brahman with many powers.—Further, the contradiction that Brahman, though without differences, has yet many powers, is solved by the fact that all diversity of form belongs only to the realm of Ignorance. The unfathomable depth of this subject cannot be reached by reflection, but only through revelation, through the Scripture which teaches that (Çvet. 3, 19):

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“It feels without a hand, without a foot it runs,
“It sees without an eye and hears without an ear”

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it uses no instruments, and yet can do all things (p. 488, 1—8).

3. The Moral Problem

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Sûtras 2, 1, 34—36. 22—23.

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That empirical theism (for which the world is real and different from God) is untenable appears nowhere so clearly as in the region of morals. For however the matter be turned, in a real creation, which is seriously taken, the responsibility for evil, and for the sin of the world finally falls on God. This consequence does not trouble the morally undeveloped conscience. Therefore it is said in *Isaiah* XLV, 7: “I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil; I the LORD do all these things.” And in the *Kaushîtaki-Up.* 3, 8: it is expressed even more strongly: “For he makes those do good works whom he will guide out from this world, and he makes those do evil, whom he will guide downwards; he is the guardian of the world, he is the ruler of the world, he is the lord of the world.”—The Hebrews gained a solution of the question more apparent than real by adopting (or rather adapting) Satan from the mythology of Persia, and thereby satisfying themselves. The Indians in a more philosophical spirit recognised the fact that there are only two ways out of this: either by referring the constitution (essentia), and also the creation (existentia) of the world not to God but to an immanent principle, or (idealistically) by denying the existence of the world altogether. We find Ṣaṅkara taking both ways, by bringing forward, as he always does, both empirical and metaphysical arguments for the solution of the problem.

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(a) The Creator of the World as the Author of Evil.—To the argument that God, as Creator of the world, is responsible for the evil in it, the answer is first made that God, in the creation of creatures, does not act arbitrarily (nirapekṣa), but is bound by a certain regard, namely, the regard for the good and evil works of each creature in an earlier birth (p. 492, 6). By this conception, for which, as we saw before (above p. 267), the world is nothing but the scene of atonement for the works of an earlier existence, the rôle of God as Creator sinks into a secondary, and purely instrumental one. The Body may be compared to a plant (p. 492, 10), which springs up from seed, grows, expands, and finally dies; yet not altogether, but so that something remains,—the seed, which, strewn in the kingdom of Ignorance, brings forth a new plant according to its kind. This seed of man (so far as individual determination is conditioned by it), is his works. In exact correspondence to their moral quality, is the form of the new life, because all happiness and unhappiness depend on it under an inflexible necessity, and also, as we shall see, all virtue and vice of the new existence. In this growth of the present out of the seed of works, the task of the Creator can only be a secondary one: he is to be compared to the rain (the chief condition of growth in India), which causes the plants to shoot. That they grow, is the work of outward circumstances (water, soil, air, light, or, as the Indians say, rain), but what they shall grow to be, does not depend upon those conditions which come from God, but upon the nature of the seed: only rice can come from rice, only barley from barley (p. 492, 9).—This concept requires as its unavoidable consequence, the assumption that *Saṃsāra* is without beginning, for, as far as we go back, each existence draws its conditions from some prior existence (p. 494, 1).—This consequence is as yet absent from the older Upanishads; it contradicts their teaching, certainly intended seriously at first, of the Creation of the world from "the One without a Second" (above p. 230), and of the predestination which necessarily follows (above p. 278) from this. In the desire to do away with this contradiction, we must recognise the real motive of the periodicity of creation, already mentioned above (p. 227) the alternating evolution of the world from, and its re-absorption into Brahman, which is not mentioned in the older Upanishads. Çankara certainly manages to indicate it as already in them, when (p. 495, 1) out of the words: "I will enter into these three divinities with my living Self" (Chând. 6, 3, 2, see above p. 231) he drags the meaning that the "living Self" (the individual soul) must therefore have existed before the creation. But this argument is as little admissible as is his reference to the verse (Rigveda X, 190, 3):

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*Sûryâ-candramasau dhâtâ yathâpûrvam akalpayat,*

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which, according to the context, can only mean: "the creator created the sun and moon"—*yathâpûrvam*—"according to their order," not, as Çankara says, "as before" (p. 495, 7).

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(b) The Creator of the World as the Cause of Evil.—We have two answers to the arguments marshalled under this heading, an empirical answer, 2, 1, 23, and one which amounts to the doctrine of identity 2, 1, 22, and, remarkable to say, the former stands second. Even if these two parts were written down by the same hand, it is hardly thinkable that they were originated in the same head. We shall reverse their order, and examine the empirical answer first.—Just as, it is said, 2, 1, 23, the same earth brings forth many kinds of stones, the most costly jewels, as well as the most common stones of the fields; as the same earth produces plants which vary in leaves, flowers, fruits, smell and taste, or as in men from the same essence of food (*annarasa*) spring blood, hair, and nails, all quite different; in the same way, from the one Brahman proceeds the division into the individual and highest souls, and the variety of [good and evil] effects.—Quite another character than that of this empirical comparison is borne by the directly preceding section, 2, 1, 22. It is true that here also our author starts from the separation (only indicated by the Sûtram) of God and the soul, in order to transfer all moral guilt from the former to the latter. Brahman is omniscient and omnipotent, everlasting, pure, wise and free. Because he is free, he can do what he wills; for him, there is neither command nor prohibition, and therefore neither good nor evil.¹⁰⁷ The individual soul, on the contrary, is affected by good and evil (reading *ca* instead of *na*, p. 473, 4), and of it we do not at all maintain that it is the creator of the world.—Without committing himself to the question, unavoidable from this standpoint, "Whence then springs the individual soul, with its good and evil?" our author at once passes on to the metaphysical explanation: "But how is this? Are not God and the soul the same, according to the words: *tat tvam asi*?"—To this it is replied: "When, by the teaching of non-separateness, through sentences like *tat tvam asi*, the consciousness of non-separateness is awakened, then the wanderings of the soul and the creative function of Brahman cease; for the whole tendency of the world of division springs from false knowledge, and is removed by perfect knowledge. Whence, then, the creation? and whence the responsibility for not having brought forth good only? For *Saṃsāra*, which has as its characteristics the doing of good and evil, is an illusion produced by non-discrimination of the determinations (which, produced by Ignorance, consist in the aggregate of the instruments of activity formed by names and forms), and this illusion just as the error (*abhimāna*) of division and separation by birth and death, does not exist in the sense of the highest reality" (p. 472, 14—475, 4).

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¹⁰⁷ For our author, every good thing (*hitam*) is a command (*kartavyam*) and every evil thing (*ahitam*) is a prohibition (*parihartavyam*); therefore the freedom of God excludes both. He knows, therefore, like the Old Testament, only a hypothetical imperative, not, like the philosophy of Kant, a categorical, which only becomes possible through freedom.

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