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The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c8.s6.t3: 3. The System of the conscious Life: Organs of Relation

The System of the Vedânta according to Bâdarâyana's Brahma-Sûtras and Çankara's Commentary c8.s6.t3

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3. The System of the conscious Life: Organs of Relation

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In accordance with the anatomical theory which makes the brain, as the central organ of conscious life, branch out on the one hand as sensory nerves into the organs of sense and on the other hand as motor nerves into the muscles of voluntary movement, we find the Indians conceive the existence of a central function, *Manas*, and two systems dependent on it; viz. the five organs of perception (*buddhi-indriyas*) and the five organs of action (*karma-indriyas*). In these eleven organs according to Çankara the whole complex of conscious life is included.—How many Prânas, he asks (p. 709, 1), must we assume if we leave out of account the *Mukhya Prâna* (the principle of unconscious life)? Their number is variously stated and passages may be cited which make them seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve and thirteen in number (p. 709, 3—9). The right number is however eleven.

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For there are in the first place five classes of perception (*buddhi-bheda*), according as their object is sound, the object touched, form, taste or smell [as to the order cf. note 97, above p. 237]; to these correspond the five organs of perception (p. 711, 7). There are further five classes of action (*karma-bheda*), speaking, grasping, going, evacuating, and procreating; these purposes are served by the five organs of action (p. 711, 9).

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These external organs [which are limited to the present] have as correlative the inner organ (*antaḥkaraṇam*) or Manas (the two expressions are for Śaṅkara completely interchangeable cf. 711, 4. 21, 4. 666, 5) which extends (p. 711, 10) to past, present and future (p. 723, 9); "by division of the functions some distinguish Manas, Buddhi, Ahaṃkāra, Cittam" (p. 711, 11);—"this inner organ which serves the soul as Upādhi is here and there variously termed Manas, Buddhi, Vijñānam, Cittam; others even distinguish separate functions and term the faculty of reflection (*saṃcaya*, p. 340, 6 vikalpa) Manas, that of decision (*niścaya*, p. 340, 7 adhyavasāya) Buddhi" (p. 666, 7). Śaṅkara mentions these different views without refuting them but also without making use of them; for him there is only one inner organ, the Manas; and even the Buddhi is for him not a distinct faculty but sometimes the activity of perception, sometimes the mind in general (though it occasionally in connection with Kāṭh. 3, 3 appears coordinate with the Manas, p. 638, 11; cf. 263, 8. 389, 2. 265, 6. 787, 10. 1056, 1).—So too Ahaṃkāra is in our system not a distinct organ but means in the first place "the word I" (p. 157, 5), then as a synonym of Ahampratyaya "the idea of the Ego" "self-consciousness" (pp. 672, 1. 2. 680, 5. 6) whose object (*ahampratyaya-viṣaya*) is the individual soul (pp. 73, 5. 78, 6. 672, 1, while on the other hand p. 15, 2 asmat-pratyaya-viṣaya refers to the highest soul); as subject of presentation of the Ego sometimes the individual soul (*ahaṃkartar* p. 73, 5) is mentioned, sometimes the Manas (ahampratyayin p. 21, 5); the highest soul on the other hand is not subject of the Ahaṃkâra, for that involves activity; on the contrary, like all else, the Ahaṃkâra (with its perceiving subject and perceived object) is for the Upâdhi-less Soul simply an object of perception (p. 680, 6). Cf. above p. 321.

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As we have already seen (above p. 314) the necessity of the assumption of the Manas is deduced by Çaṅkara from the fact that while the soul is essentially an eternal cognition, there is no reason discoverable in the organs of sense for their different behaviour at different times; from this would result that we [in a waking state which alone comes in question here] should either not perceive at all or should perceive continuously, unless there were between the soul and the organs of sense the Manas, “by whose attention (avadhânam) and non-attention apperception (upalabdhi) and non-apperception [of the soul] results” (p. 667, 6).

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As the central organ of the organs of perception and action Manas is on the one hand what we term understanding, on the other hand conscious volition. The ideas on these objects are not however further developed. Çaṅkara contents himself instead (p. 667, 7, cf. p. 21, 4) with a reference to the unsystematic information in Bṛh. 1, 5, 3: “My mind was elsewhere (anyatra-manas), I did not see, my mind was elsewhere, I did not hear, so we say; for only with the mind does one see, only with the mind does one hear;¹¹⁵ kâma, saṃkalpa, vicikitsâ, çraddhâ, açraddhâ, dhṛiti, adhṛiti, hrî, dhî, bhî,—all these are Manas; therefore when we are touched from behind, we recognise the fact by the Manas.”—The faculties mentioned are explained by Çaṅkara on Bṛh. loc. cit. as follows: “kâma, desire, the longing for sexual enjoyment, etc.; saṃkalpa, decision, the determination of the character of a presented object by differences such as white, black, etc.; vicikitsâ, doubt; çraddhâ, belief, the perception of the existence of invisible objects, e.g. the gods, by their effects; açraddhâ, disbelief, the contrary; dhṛiti, steadiness, keeping oneself up- “right when the body is tired; *adhṛiti*, the opposite; *hrī*, “shame; *dhī*, cognition; *bhī*, fear.”

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¹¹⁵ Cf. Epicharmos in Plut. Mor. p. 961 A: Νοῦς ὁρῇ καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει, τἆλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά.

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The *Prāṇas* mentioned (*Manas*, *Buddhi-indriyas*, and *Karma-indriyas*) are minute (*aṇu*) which means that they are 1) subtle (*sūkshma*), 2) limited (*paricchinna*), but not that they are of atomic size (*paramāṇu-tulya*), “because in this case the per- “vading of the whole body would be impossible.” ¹¹⁶ Their subtlety is deducible from the fact that otherwise (if they were *sthūla*, coarse, material) they would necessarily be seen at the time of death, when the soul passes from the body, by the bystanders, just as a snake is seen which glides from its hole (p. 715, 6); and they must be limited and not (like the soul free from *Upādhis*) infinitely great, because for the infinitely great no passing, going and return would be possible (p. 715, 7). “If you maintain that the infinitely great can by reason of “its function (*vṛitti*) be at a given spot in the body, we must “remark that the organs [of the soul] are altogether mere “functions; for the function or whatever it is, that brings about “perception we call an organ; the dispute is therefore only “about names and the assumption of omnipresence a purpose- “less one” [the *Prāṇas* enter into the question only in respect of what they are in the body, even if we call them here organs or functions, and assume as their bearers infinitely great organs]. Therefore the *Prāṇas* are to be regarded as the functions or faculties of seeing, hearing, feeling, grasping, going, etc. which, as they cleave to the soul, are not annihilated at death with the corresponding parts of the body but produce them again and again from themselves as seed produces plants.

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¹¹⁶ p. 715, 4; above (p. 310 ff.) on the other hand the possibility of action throughout the body is disputed, not for the soul of atomic size, but for the minute soul (which in the state of *Saṃsāra* has the same size as the *Buddhi*, *i.e.*, the *Manas*). If we disregard this and ask what in the strict logic of our system is the nature of the reciprocal action of the minute soul, “large as the point of an awl,” and the body, we have as answer that it is doubtless brought about by the *Prāṇas* which stand in the middle between soul and body; the nature of this connection however *e.g.* of the function or faculty of sight with *Manas* and soul on the one hand, and with the Ego on the other, is not cleared up.

Cites (2)