The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c8.s7.t2.12

c8.s7.t2.12

¹²² The question raised above is explicable from the view that the soul as such is a completely indifferent principle, i. e. like God himself (chap. XIV, 3) nirviçeṣha without any difference, and that therefore all its individuality is to be sought in its empirical existential form. But wherein is this individuality to be found?—Not in the Upâdhis for they are only a mechanical apparatus, in themselves dead, which are alike an attribute of all. Therefore if the individual character can neither be found in the soul as such, nor in its Upâdhis, it must be discoverable in some tertium quid, and this is moral determination, which we here characterise by three expressions from Bṛih. 4, 4, 2: vidyâ, karman, pûrva-prajñâ (or as we preferred to say above p. 193 apûrvaprajñâ), knowledge, works, and previous (or newly acquired) experience. We return later (p. 374 ff.) to this question; here we had to anticipate it to make what follows intelligible.