Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c7.s3.t14.6

c7.s3.t14.6

He attributes to the Vaibhāṣikas the comment which follows this passage in the Vṛtti. The Vaibhāṣikas,⁴ as is supposed by him, assert in refuting the abhāva theory of the Sautrāntikas that there is something ‘in which desire is extinct’, and that it is not merely ‘extinct desire’ as the Sautrāntikas think.¹ In the Sanskrit text there is no word or hint about the extinction of consciousness. All that is said is about tṛṣṇā. Prof. Stcherbatsky, however, in his translation says that every desire (also consciousness) is extinct (at final Nirvāṇa).² Probably his addition “and consciousness” in the line was suggested by the line that follows, viz., “yasmin sati cetaso vimokṣo bhavati.” He translates cetaso vimokṣaḥ as “consciousness is quite extinct.” It is difficult to accept his English rendering and it is not at all clear why he should prefer “consciousness” to “mind” as the English equivalent of cetas. The Pāli version of the line, “Pajjotass’ eva nibbāṇaṃ vimokho cetaso ahū ti”,³ was uttered by Anuruddha to describe Buddha’s Nirvāṇa. Buddhaghosa in commenting upon this passage says that vimokkho means the removal of all screens hindering vision, and that the extinction of the flame indicates the state of non-manifestation.⁴ Prof. Stcherbatsky may have other reasons for such an opinion, but it is difficult to agree with him in regard to the fact that the early Buddhists generally, including the Theravādins, regarded Nirvāṇa as an inanimate reality. In the Kathāvatthu and the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, Nibbāna has been qualified as acetasika, the English rendering of which, according to Mrs. Rhys Davids, should be “not a property of the mind”, or according to Prof. Poussin, “where mind does not function any more”.⁵ Here acetasika does not mean inanimate substance, but it is a state where the individual citta (=manoviññāṇa)