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Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c7.s3.t15: Is Nirvāṇadhātu a Vastu?

Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hīnayāna c7.s3.t15

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Is Nirvāṇadhātu a Vastu?

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On the basis of the Visuddhimagga and the Abhidharmakośa, Prof. La Vallée Poussin remarks that Nirvāṇa is a vastu² (material substance), a reality, which the body touches when in the highest trance (saṃjñāvedayita-nirodha), while Prof. Stcherbatsky, in consonance with his interpretation of Nirvāṇa, says that it is a "reality (dharma or vastu) in the sense of a materialistic lifeless reality" similar to the Prakṛti of Sāṃkhya. The inclusion of Nibbāna in Asaṅkhata-dhātus along with Ākāsa and the comparison drawn between Ākāsa and Nibbāna make us think that Nibbāna is a substance (vastu, dhātu) similar to Ākāsa.³ But the expression dhātu is used in Buddhist works in senses as varied as some of the other terms, like dhamma, khandha, or saṃkhārā; so it is not safe to interpret the dhātu of Nibbāna-dhātu as a vastu or dravya (thing). As for the reason of the Buddhist writers for selecting Ākāsa as an object of comparison with Nibbāna, it may be said that it was done only because many aspects of Ākāsa were identical with those of Nibbāna, but it does not follow that because Ākāsa is a dhātu, Nibbāna is also a dhātu. Like Ākāsa, Nibbāna is inexpressible; it is beyond empirical determination but not a material substance. In the Buddhist works, the term ‘Nibbāna-dhātu’ has been used in such a way that one is likely to take it for a substance like Ākāsa or Samudda. In the Mahāniddesa,¹ a large number of bhikkhus is described as attaining nibbāna without residue (anupādisesanibbāndhātu) but causing no perceptible increase or decrease in the ‘Nibbānadhātu’. The Milindapañha² compares Nibbāna to Ākāsa or Samudda implying thereby that it exists but its form, location, age, or measure cannot be ascertained. It is like space (Ākāsa) without origin, life or death, rise or fall. It is uncovered and supportless and is infinite. Just as birds fly about in the Ākāsa or animals float about in the sea so also the perfect (Ariyas) move about in the Nibbānadhātu. It is like fire without a continued objective existence. Just as fire remains latent unless and until two pieces of wood are rubbed to make it patent, so Nibbāna which is without any continued objective existence is called forth into being when the necessary conditions are put together. The Kathāvatthu³ in connection with the discussion of ‘Amatadhātu’ maintains the same position. It shows that the Theravādins declined to agree with the Pubbase-liyas who held that Nirvāṇa (Amata) is a material object.

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² See P. T. S. Dictionary, p. 176 sv. dhātu-nibbāna. Drs. Rhys Davids and Stede have drawn attention to the fact that dhātu in connection with Nibbāna or Amata does not convey the sense of any thing. It is only a state—the state of Nibbāna, for which they coined the word "Nibbāna-dom or Nibbāna-hood". On the various meanings of Vastu, see Kośa, II, p. 285.

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³ The conception of Ākāsa as made by the Sarvāstivādins may be similar to that of the Sāṃkhyas. Dr. B. N. Seal thinks that "Ākāsa corresponds in some respects to the ether of the physicists and in other, to what may be called proto-atom (prolyle)." See Ray's Hindu Chemistry, p. 88. The Vaiśeṣikas define Ākāsa as "a simple, continuous, infinite substance and is the substratum of sound." Prof. Radhakrishnan, Ind. Phil., II, pp. 192-3.

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¹ Mahāniddesa, I, p. 132; Kvu., p. 124; Mil., pp. 316: Atthi-dhammassa nibbānassa rūpam va saṇthānam va vayam va pamāṇam apaññāpanam. Cf. Saṃyutta, II, pp. 124-6.

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² Mil., p. 320: Yathā Mahārāja ākāso na jāyati na jiyati na miyati na cavati no uppajjati duppasaho acorāharaṇo anissito vihagagamano nirāvaraṇo ananto evam kho mahārāja nibbānam na jāyati.........ariyagamanam.....anantam.

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³ Kvu., ix. 2.

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This inference of the Pubbaseliyas was based, as pointed out in the text, on the well-known passage of the *Majjhima Nikāya*:¹

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¹ *Majjhima*, I, p. 4.

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Nibbānaṃ nibbānato sañjānāti, nibbānaṃ nibbānato saññatvā nibbānaṃ maññati, nibbānasmim maññati, nibbānato maññati, nibbānaṃ me ti maññati, nibbānaṃ abhinandati ti. [He knows Nibbāna as (an object) nibbāna; having so known, he thinks of it; thinks (that he) is in it or away from it; that it is his and that it is worth praising.²]

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² For a comment on this passage see Keith, *B. Phil.*, p. 49; La Vallée Poussin, *Nirvāṇa*, pp. 126, 127. See *ante*. The sense of the passage is that a person who has not truly realised Nibbāna may labour under the delusion that Nibbāna is an object which he has known, and with which he stands in some relation, namely, that he has entered into it or that he is away from it, or that Nibbāna is his or that Nibbāna is an object to be praised.

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Buddhaghosa, in commenting upon this discussion, says that the opinion of the Pubbaseliyas is due to the drawing of a careless inference and that the passage cited above refers to earthly Nirvāṇa³ and not to the real Nirvāṇa and hence it is not conclusive. Buddhaghosa’s view may not be acceptable to all but it makes it quite clear that according to the Theravādins, Nirvāṇa, though denoted by Amata, must not be taken as a *dravya* (thing), though it may serve as an *ārammaṇa* (basis) for meditations.⁴

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³ *Kvu.* A., p. 116: *diṭṭhadhammanibbānaṃ samdhāya bhāsitam tasmā asādhakam*, Cf. *Papañcasūdani*, p. 38: *Tattha Nibbānan ti* “yato kho bho ayam attā pañcahi kāmaguṇehi samappito samaṅgibhūto paricarati, ettāvatā kho bho ayam attā paramadiṭṭhadhammanibbānaṃ patto hotī ti”; see *Dīgha*, I, 36.

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⁴ *Vis. M.*, pp. 680, 681.

Cites (10)