Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c7.s3.t15.1

c7.s3.t15.1

On the basis of the Visuddhimagga and the Abhidharmakośa, Prof. La Vallée Poussin remarks that Nirvāṇa is a vastu² (material substance), a reality, which the body touches when in the highest trance (saṃjñāvedayita-nirodha), while Prof. Stcherbatsky, in consonance with his interpretation of Nirvāṇa, says that it is a "reality (dharma or vastu) in the sense of a materialistic lifeless reality" similar to the Prakṛti of Sāṃkhya. The inclusion of Nibbāna in Asaṅkhata-dhātus along with Ākāsa and the comparison drawn between Ākāsa and Nibbāna make us think that Nibbāna is a substance (vastu, dhātu) similar to Ākāsa.³ But the expression dhātu is used in Buddhist works in senses as varied as some of the other terms, like dhamma, khandha, or saṃkhārā; so it is not safe to interpret the dhātu of Nibbāna-dhātu as a vastu or dravya (thing). As for the reason of the Buddhist writers for selecting Ākāsa as an object of comparison with Nibbāna, it may be said that it was done only because many aspects of Ākāsa were identical with those of Nibbāna, but it does not follow that because Ākāsa is a dhātu, Nibbāna is also a dhātu. Like Ākāsa, Nibbāna is inexpressible; it is beyond empirical determination but not a material substance. In the Buddhist works, the term ‘Nibbāna-dhātu’ has been used in such a way that one is likely to take it for a substance like Ākāsa or Samudda. In the Mahāniddesa,¹ a large number of bhikkhus is described as attaining nibbāna without residue (anupādisesanibbāndhātu) but causing no perceptible increase or decrease in the ‘Nibbānadhātu’. The Milindapañha² compares Nibbāna to Ākāsa or Samudda implying thereby that it exists but its form, location, age, or measure cannot be ascertained. It is like space (Ākāsa) without origin, life or death, rise or fall. It is uncovered and supportless and is infinite. Just as birds fly about in the Ākāsa or animals float about in the sea so also the perfect (Ariyas) move about in the Nibbānadhātu. It is like fire without a continued objective existence. Just as fire remains latent unless and until two pieces of wood are rubbed to make it patent, so Nibbāna which is without any continued objective existence is called forth into being when the necessary conditions are put together. The Kathāvatthu³ in connection with the discussion of ‘Amatadhātu’ maintains the same position. It shows that the Theravādins declined to agree with the Pubbase-liyas who held that Nirvāṇa (Amata) is a material object.