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Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c7.s3.t24: Conclusion of the Prajñāpāramitās and Madhyamakakārikā

Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hīnayāna c7.s3.t24

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Conclusion of the Prajñāpāramitās and Madhyamakakārikā

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Nāgārjuna, we see, leads us through a maze of arguments to the same conclusion that the Prajñāpāramitās have reached by every possible negation. Candrakīrti quotes a stanza from the Prajñāpāramitā itself in support of Nāgārjuna's contention that Nirvāṇa or the Truth is the inexpressible absolute and is different from the Tathatā or Tathā- gata, descriptions of which are to be found in Mahāyānic works. The stanza runs thus:

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Tathāgato hi pratibimbabhūtaḥ
kuśalasya dharmasya anāsravasya,
Naivātra tathatā na tathāgato 'sti
bimbam ca samdṛśyati sarvaloke.¹

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¹ M. Vṛ., pp. 449, 540.

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[Tathāgata is an image of good and pure dharma, there is (in reality) no Tathatā or Tathāgata; only images are visible in all the worlds.]

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In connection with the discussion on the existence and non-existence of saṃskāras, Nāgārjuna likewise points out that if Tathatā be equated with ‘tathābhāvo ’vikāritvaṃ sadaiva sthāyitā’ (sameness, changelessness and ever-existence),² as is done by the Yogācārins, then he would also assert that that Tathatā is non-existent. By all these negations Nāgārjuna only tries to show that the difference between the Mādhyamikas and the Yogācārins³ consists in the fact that the former, unlike the latter, do not enter into the question of existence and non-existence of the Reality. Candrakīrti, however, apprehends that such a denial of the existence of Buddha or Tathāgata might lead people to the belief that Nāgārjuna preached pure and simple negativism; so he says, “ we do not assert the non-existence (nāstitva) in every way of the inexpressible Tathāgata, for in that case we should be guilty of apavāda (denial)”.⁴ The Mādhyamikas assert that the Reality is beyond determination, i.e., statements like śūnya, aśūnya, both śūnya and aśūnya or not both śūnya and aśūnya cannot be made about it. These statements are used in the texts for the sake of prajñapti (communication). We should bear in mind that whenever Nāgārjuna negatives the existence of Tathatā or Tathāgata or any other synonym of it, he attributes to it the sense commonly accepted by the imperfect bodhisattvas or the Yogācārins. So, in fact, Nāgārjuna does not teach pure and simple negativism. But it should be remembered that there were among the followers of Nāgārjuna some who interpreted Nāgārjuna’s principle as absolute nihilism and we may regard Bhāvaviveka as a prominent exponent of this view. But from this fact it does not follow that Nāgārjuna himself or his followers in general denied a supreme and ineffable reality, Tathatā or Śūnyatā and at least such negativism is not supported by the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* of Nāgārjuna. The object of the *Prajñāpāramitās* as well as of the *Madhyamakakārikā* is to establish a Unity corresponding to the Vedāntic Absolute. The most characteristic mark, however, of the Vedāntic Absolute is that it is of the nature of pure intelligence (cit) and bliss (ānanda). In the Unity of Nāgārjuna bliss at least is totally absent. Śānta and śiva are the two terms which find place in Nāgārjuna’s conception of the Reality; hence it would be assuming too much to find in his conception a full-fledged Vedāntic Brahman—an all-pervading ‘I’ which Buddha categorically denies.¹ According to Dr. Das Gupta, it approaches more the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of mukti, *i.e.*, a state entirely devoid of quality of any sort, either abstract or attributive, in which “the self remains in itself in its own purity, unassociated with pleasure, pain, knowledge, willing, etc.”² The Mādhyamika reality or Nirvāṇa may well, therefore, be said to have a resemblance to the impersonal aspect of the Vedāntic Brahman but not to its other aspects.³

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² Ibid., p. 265.

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³ Ibid., p. 275: Madhyamakadarśana evāstitva-nāstitva-dvaya-darśanasyāprasaṅgo na Vijñānavādidarśanādiṣviti vijñeyam.

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⁴ M. Vṛ., p. 443: Na ca vayaṃ sarvathaiva niṣprapañcānāṃ tathāgatānāṃ nāstitvaṃ brumo yad asmākam tad apavādakṛto doṣaḥ syāt.

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¹ Cf. Beal, *Catena* etc., pp. 175ff (from Chinese sources); *Laṅkā.*, p. 78 in connection with Tathāgatagarbha; Reischauer, *Studies in Japanese Buddhism* (1925), p. 63: “Nothing is more striking than the similarities between the Vedānta philosophy and the speculations of Mahāyāna Buddhism; the one is as characteristically metaphysical in its mould as the other”.

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² Das Gupta, *Ind. Phil.*, p. 366 quoting *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 499ff.

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³ Cf. Dr. Barnett’s remarks in his Intro. to the *Path of Light*, pp. 29-30: “The Vedāntic metaphysicians could find no term to predicate of Brahman, the absolute, transcendental Reality but ‘nay, nay’! And it is rather in this sense that we should interpret the negations of the Mahāyāna philosophers”.

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