Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c7.s3.t24.5

c7.s3.t24.5

In connection with the discussion on the existence and non-existence of saṃskāras, Nāgārjuna likewise points out that if Tathatā be equated with ‘tathābhāvo ’vikāritvaṃ sadaiva sthāyitā’ (sameness, changelessness and ever-existence),² as is done by the Yogācārins, then he would also assert that that Tathatā is non-existent. By all these negations Nāgārjuna only tries to show that the difference between the Mādhyamikas and the Yogācārins³ consists in the fact that the former, unlike the latter, do not enter into the question of existence and non-existence of the Reality. Candrakīrti, however, apprehends that such a denial of the existence of Buddha or Tathāgata might lead people to the belief that Nāgārjuna preached pure and simple negativism; so he says, “ we do not assert the non-existence (nāstitva) in every way of the inexpressible Tathāgata, for in that case we should be guilty of apavāda (denial)”.⁴ The Mādhyamikas assert that the Reality is beyond determination, i.e., statements like śūnya, aśūnya, both śūnya and aśūnya or not both śūnya and aśūnya cannot be made about it. These statements are used in the texts for the sake of prajñapti (communication). We should bear in mind that whenever Nāgārjuna negatives the existence of Tathatā or Tathāgata or any other synonym of it, he attributes to it the sense commonly accepted by the imperfect bodhisattvas or the Yogācārins. So, in fact, Nāgārjuna does not teach pure and simple negativism. But it should be remembered that there were among the followers of Nāgārjuna some who interpreted Nāgārjuna’s principle as absolute nihilism and we may regard Bhāvaviveka as a prominent exponent of this view. But from this fact it does not follow that Nāgārjuna himself or his followers in general denied a supreme and ineffable reality, Tathatā or Śūnyatā and at least such negativism is not supported by the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* of Nāgārjuna. The object of the *Prajñāpāramitās* as well as of the *Madhyamakakārikā* is to establish a Unity corresponding to the Vedāntic Absolute. The most characteristic mark, however, of the Vedāntic Absolute is that it is of the nature of pure intelligence (cit) and bliss (ānanda). In the Unity of Nāgārjuna bliss at least is totally absent. Śānta and śiva are the two terms which find place in Nāgārjuna’s conception of the Reality; hence it would be assuming too much to find in his conception a full-fledged Vedāntic Brahman—an all-pervading ‘I’ which Buddha categorically denies.¹ According to Dr. Das Gupta, it approaches more the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of mukti, *i.e.*, a state entirely devoid of quality of any sort, either abstract or attributive, in which “the self remains in itself in its own purity, unassociated with pleasure, pain, knowledge, willing, etc.”² The Mādhyamika reality or Nirvāṇa may well, therefore, be said to have a resemblance to the impersonal aspect of the Vedāntic Brahman but not to its other aspects.³