Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c7.s3.t25.13

c7.s3.t25.13

The Laṅkāvatāra then proceeds to elucidate its position by enumerating the different conceptions of Nirvāṇa current among the non-Yogācārins, and remarks in a general way that all these conceptions are defective, because they fall under either the two extremes of ‘is’ and ‘is not’⁴. The conception of Nirvāṇa mentioned last among the non-Yogācāra conceptions, however, appears to be Mahāyānic. It runs thus: There are some who declare that Nirvāṇa is the removal (vyāvṛtti) of citta, manas and manovijñāna by passing from one bhūmi to another till the attainment of the Tathāgatabhūmi, and practice of the samādhi of Māyā, etc., appertaining thereto by (i) realising that everything is a fancy of one's own mind, (ii) not occupying oneself with the existence and non-existence of external things, (iii) ascertaining the true nature (yathābhūta) of things, (iv) non-perceiving subject and object without being deluded by the two extremes which follow from one's own thought-constructions, (v) realising the ineffectiveness of having recourse to proofs, (vi) knowing that the truth is a matter only of self-realisation, (vii) comprehending two nairātmyas, and (viii) removing the two kinds of kleśas (intellectual and habitual) and the two screens (āvaraṇas: kleśa and jñeya). The various conceptions which non-Buddhists hold in regard to Nirvāṇa are their imaginations. Mokṣa (emancipation) and mokṣopāya (means of emancipation), about which they speak, do not really exist but the teachers have vikalpa (thought-construction) about them and think of the action and the actor, existence (sat) and non-existence (asat), and busy themselves in jalpa (useless talks) and prapañca (diffuse talks). Just as forms in a mirror are seen but do not exist there, so also in the mirror of vāsanā¹ foolish people see the citta as twofold (dvidhā)². Not knowing cittadṛśya (citta-image) truly, the ignorant form vikalpas of the seen and the seer, whereas in fact there is only one citta, devoid of lakṣya and lakṣaṇa (percipient and percept). The Laṅkāvatāra then goes into details of this exposition, asserting that Tathāgata or Buddha is beyond predications and cannot be said to be made (kṛtaka) or unmade (akṛtaka), cause or effect, for such predication would be doubly faulty. If the Tathāgata be kṛtaka, he would be anitya and identical with all actions, which are by nature impermanent, and if he be akṛtaka, he would be non-existent,³ and the merits so far collected by him become useless, and he becomes non-existent as a sky-flower. So the Tathāgata should be regarded as beyond four-fold limitations and hence beyond proofs, and is only to be realised within one's own self. When Buddha speaks about things as nirātma, he refers to phenomenal things and not to the Tathāgata. A Tathāgata is neither the same nor different from the skandhas; hence he is neither nitya nor anitya. Similarly he is not the same nor different from mokṣa. In this way, if no statement can be made about the Tathāgata, and if he is beyond proofs, he turns into a word without any origin and destruction and can be equated with ākāśa, having nothing to rest upon (nirālamba) and beyond prapañca.⁴ Though the Tathāgata is called Anutpāda-anirodha, it must not be supposed that ‘Tathāgata’ means only absence (abhāva) of something;¹ this Anutpāda-anirodha is really the name of the Manomaya-dharmakāya² (=Svasambhogakāya) and is not in fact the Reality, the real Tathāgata (=Dharmakāya).