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Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c10: Chapter VII: Doctrine of Anattā

Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c10

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Chapter VII: Doctrine of Anattā

v1.c10.1

Most of the doctrines discussed in the previous two chapters relate to the notions current among the imperfect Buddhists and the non-Buddhists about the nature of the soul and its existence. Buddhism wholly denies the existence of the soul which is permanent, immaculate, unaffected by karma, and in this denial (i.e. pudgalanairātmya) there is no difference of opinion between the Hīnayānists and the Mahāyānists. The Pāli texts aver that the belief in the existence of the soul, or in other words, the heresy of individuality (sakkāyadiṭṭhi) is due to the misapprehension¹ of one of the five khandhas as soul in the following four ways:

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1 Paṭisambhidāmagga (I, pp. 143-150) explains how this misapprehension happens. It says that a person, while meditating sometimes conceives of

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(i) the object of meditation (e.g. paṭhavikasina, āpokasina, nīlakasina, pītakasina) as identical with himself i.e., the object of meditation is he and he is the object of meditation. It is like identifying (advayam) the flame (of a burning lamp) with its colour (yā acci so vaṇṇo, yo vaṇṇo sā acci ti);

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(ii) the khandhas as belonging to the self (attā rūpena rūpavā) just as some say that a tree and its shadow are two separate entities and that one belongs to the other (rukkho imāya chāyāya chāyavā);

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(iii) the khandhas as existing in the self (attani rūpaṃ passati) just as one would say that flower and smell are separate and the smell is in the flower (ayaṃ gandho imasmiṃ pupphe etc.);

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(iv) the khandhas as the container of the self as a casket is of a jewel.

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(i) *attā* is the same as *rūpa*, or *vedanā*, or *saññā* or *saṅkhārā*, or *viññāṇa* (*rūpaṃ* etc. *attato samanupassati*)

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(ii) *attā* is possessed of *rūpa* etc.¹ (*rūpavantaṃ* etc. *attānaṃ samanupassati*)

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¹ *rūpa* etc. = the five *khandhas*, viz *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṅkhārā* and *viññāṇa*.

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(iii) in *attā* there is *rūpa* etc. (*attanī rūpaṃ* etc. *samanupassati*)

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(iv) *attā* is in *rūpa* etc. (*rūpasmim* etc. *attānaṃ samanupassati*)²

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² In the *M. V.*, p. 432 and elsewhere it is shown that the misapprehension happens in five ways, the fifth being that the *Attā* is something different from the *skandhas*; the first four being the same as stated above.

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It appears from the discourse in the *Milindapañha*,³ that among the five *khandhas*, *viññāṇa* was more often identified with *attā* or *jīva* than the rest, but no such distinction is noticeable in the Nikāyas. As a consequence of the identification of *attā* with one of the components of a being, by the non-Buddhists, the texts aver that it can be classified like the beings into three types⁴ thus:

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³ *Milindapañha*, p. 86.

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⁴ *Dīgha*, I, p 195: see also the commentary on *Poṭṭhapādasutta*.

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(1) *attā* of beings of the lower worlds, viz., from Avīci to Paranimmita is gross (*oḷārika*).⁵

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⁵ Oḷārika = Rūpi cātummahābhūtiko kabaḷiṅkārāhāra-bhakkho.

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(2) *attā* of beings of the worlds from Paṭhamajhānabhūmi to Akaniṭṭhabrahmaloka is *manomaya*,⁶ i.e., material but very subtle like the mind, and (3) *attā* of beings of the worlds from Ākāsānañcāyatana-brahmaloka to Nevasaññānāsaññāyatana-brahmaloka is *arūpa*¹ (*non-material*).

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⁶ Manomaya = Rūpi manomayo sabbaṅga-paccaṅgī ahinindriyo.

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¹ *Arūpa* = Ārūpi saññāmayo.

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According to the Buddhists, *attā* does not exist, it is only a word of common usage² and does not correspond to any real entity, hence no question should arise as to its existence, not to speak of its identification with one of the khandhas.

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² *Digha*, I, p. 202: lokasāmaññā lokaniruttiyo lokavohāralokapaññattiyo; cf. *M. Vr.*, p. 345: nāmamātrakam evātmānam.

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The *Milindapañha* raises the question whether *attā* is something different from the khandhas and whether it is an active agent living within the body and acting through the organs of sense. This is refuted by Nāgasena by the argument that as its activity ceases when the organs of sense cease to work, so it cannot be said to have a separate and independent existence of its own.³

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³ *Milindapañha*, pp. 55, 86.

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The Pāli texts refuse to admit the existence of anything in a being besides the five khandhas. Life (*jīva*), according to them, is dependent on *āyu* (span of life), *usmā* (heat) and *viññāṇa* (vital principle) just as the sound of a conch-shell has no existence of its own, but is dependent on the blower, his exertion, and the wind blown into it.⁴

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⁴ *Digha*, II, p. 338.

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In his works, Nāgārjuna also takes up the same position as indicated in the Pāli texts, and proceeds in his own way to show that *ātman* is not the same as one of the skandhas nor has it a separate and independent existence of its own apart from the skandhas. The stanzas on the point in the *Madhyamakāvatāra*⁵ run thus: —

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⁵ See *M. Vr.*, p. 434.

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स्कन्धेष्वात्मा विद्यते नैव चामी मन्ति स्कन्धा आत्मनीतीह यस्मात् । सत्यन्त्वते स्यादियं कल्पना वै तच्चान्यत्वं नास्त्यतः कल्पनेपा ॥

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[The soul is not in the skandhas, nor are the skandhas in the soul; had they (soul and skandhas) been separate, then one holding the other could have been imagined; but as there is no separateness between the soul and the skandhas, the statement that one holds the other is pure imagination (i.e. false).]

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इष्टो नात्मा रूपवानास्ति यस्मात् आत्मा वत्त्वार्थोपयोगो हि नातः । भेदे गोमान रूपवानप्यभेदे तच्चान्यात्वेऽरूपतो नात्मनः स्त: ॥

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[As the soul is not made of rūpa (matter),¹ its existence cannot be admitted, and for the same reason, it cannot be said that the soul possesses attributes of its own (vattvārthopayoga). If the soul and rūpa be regarded as separate, then the relation between the soul and rūpa would be like the cowherd and his cows, and if they are regarded as not separate (abheda), the soul would be made of rūpa, hence neither identity (tattva)² nor difference (anyatva) of the soul and the skandhas can be established.]

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¹ Rūpa here also is not form but matter. It is referring to the skandhas in general by a concrete instance. The translations given here are in the light of their Tibetan renderings. See Madhyamakāvatāra (Tibetan ed), p 265; M Vr., p. 435 fn. 1.

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² See M. Vr., p. 439: tattva = ekatva.

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All the controversies about attā whether in the Pāli texts or in the works of Nāgārjuna rest on the fact that the constituents of a being, if analysed, cannot be shown to have anything called soul, apart from the five skandhas, which include, as they do, all the elements that compose a being.

Two lines of argument

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The Buddhists therefore take to two lines of argument, viz., that the soul should either be identical with one or more or all of the skandhas, or be wholly different from the skandhas, the stock Pāli expression for this is tam jīvam tam sarīram or aññam jīvam aññam sarīram. The Pāli texts assert without giving sufficient reasons, that both the above propositions are wrong (micchādiṭṭhi), while Nāgārjuna has recourse to his usual line of reasoning, viz., reductio ad absurdum to show that it is absurd to suppose a relation of identity or difference between the soul and the skandhas. We shall state here concisely Nāgārjuna's arguments:

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What is the Ātman—the basis of the sense of I-ness (Ko'yam ātmā nāmeti yo'haṅkāraviṣayaḥ)? It should be either the skandhas themselves (skandhasvabhāva) or something apart from the skandhas (skandhavyatirikta). That is, the relation between the soul and the skandhas should be either one of identity (ekatva) or difference (anyatva). Both these positions according to Nāgārjuna, are untenable on the ground:

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आत्मा स्कन्धा यदि भवेदायव्यायभागभवेत् ।
स्कन्धेभ्योऽन्यो यदि भवेद्भवेदस्कन्धलक्षणः ॥

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If ātman be the same as the skandhas, it would be subject to origin and destruction, again if it be different from the

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1 In the case of anyatva again, the question of the relation of the container and the contained (ādhāra ādheya) arises, viz., whether Ātman is in the skandhas or the skandhas are in the Ātman See ante, p. 84; also M.yut., p 268 skandhas it would be without the characteristics appertaining to the skandhas (phuṅ. poḥi mtshan. ñid med. par ḥgyur).¹

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¹ M. Vṛ., p. 340.

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Hence, it is not possible to establish any relation of identity or difference between the soul and the skandhas.

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(1) Identification of the Soul with the Skandhas how faulty?

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The following are some of the untenable positions that would arise by the identification of ātman with the skandhas:—

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(a) ātman, which had no existence before, comes into being, so it becomes an object constituted (kṛtaka) and hence impermanent, but ātman is regarded by the opponents as unconstituted (akṛtaka) and permanent;

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(b) ātman requires a creator but a creator of ātman, apart from the ātmā itself, is not known. If the ātman be conceived as the creator of itself, then the contingency arises that the world has a beginning and that a being which did not exist before can appear, and so ātman becomes constituted (kṛtaka);²

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² M. Vṛ., p. 581.

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(c) ātman originates without any cause (sambhūto vāpya-hetukaḥ). If it be said that ātman had no existence before and there was no creator, and then if its present existence be admitted, it would be admitting origination of an object without cause, but this is not permissible;³

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³ M. Vṛ., p. 581.

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(d) ātman has momentary origination and destruction like the skandhas or upādāna-skandhas, but that is not acceptable;⁴ (e) upādāna (the material cause) and upādātṛ (the agent) become one. Upādāna requires an agent in order that it may be given a shape. If the agent be the same as upādāna, then it would lead to the oneness (aikyam) of the agent and the thing produced by the agent, e.g. between the feller of the tree and the tree, the potter and the pot, the fire and the firewood; but this is not admissible;¹

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⁴ Further, at the moment just preceding Nirvāṇa, the destruction and origination of ātmā would take place according to the doctrine of momentary existence (kṣaṇikavāda). If the agent has been destroyed, who is it that enjoys the fruit? The contingency that arises is that one acts and another enjoys the fruits.

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¹ M Vṛ., p. 576.

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(f) ātman is many like the skandhas;

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(g) there is no contradistinction (vaiparītyam) between the characteristics of matter (dravya) and those of ātman;

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(h) ātman is extinct (uccheda) in nirvāṇa.

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Thus, it follows that it is futile to establish between the ātman and the skandhas a relation of identity (ekattva) or difference (anyatva), or to give ātman the attributes of permanency (nityatva) or impermanency (anityatva). To say that ātman is permanent (nitya) or impermanent (anitya) would make one either a Śāśvatavādin or an Ucchedavādin, both of which views are condemned in the Buddhist texts in unequivocal terms. Therefore, ātman should not be identified with the skandhas (upādāna-skandhas).

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(11) Distinguishing the Soul from the Skandhas how faulty?

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Having asserted that ātman cannot be identified with the skandhas, Nāgārjuna takes up the counterproposition, viz., whether ātman is different from the skandhas (skandha-vyatiriktaḥ), and shows the absurdities to which this would again lead:

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(a) If ātman be different from the skandhas, then it must not have the characteristics of the dependently originating skandhas, viz., origin, continuity and destruction (*utpāda-sthiti-bhaṅga-lakṣaṇa*). As these characteristics are absent in ātman, being different from the skandhas, and as it is said to be not dependently originated, therefore it must be admitted that it is non-existing like the sky-flower, for no definition can be offered of such ātman. It can only be pointed out as the basis of the sense of I-ness.

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(b) Again each of the five skandhas possesses some characteristics of their own, e.g. rūpa possesses the characteristic of taking forms (*rūpana*),¹ vedanā and saṃjñā that of ascertaining the cause of direct perception (*anubhavanimittodgrahaṇa*) and vijñāna of having detailed knowledge of objects. If ātman be distinguished from the skandhas as vijñāna is done from rūpa, then it should have some characteristics of its own, e.g., it would be something like mind (*citta*) as distinguished from matter (*rūpa*). If its special characteristics be denied, it is meaningless to say that it has existence as something different from the skandhas.

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¹ *M. Vṛ.*, p. 343 n; cf. uppanalakkhaṇam rūpaṃ; rūpa, the object and instrument of nirūpaṇa.

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It may be contended that the non-Buddhists attribute to ātman some characteristics which are different from those of the skandhas, viz., that ātman is not an agent, but an enjoyer of fruits, attributeless and inactive; it is only when it takes something of the world (*prakṛti*) as support then only its distinctions are known.²

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² *M. Vṛ.*, p. 344.

Nāgārjuna's conclusion

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Nāgārjuna is not prepared to accept the contention of the non-Buddhists that a perfectly pure ātman exists without the skandhas, on the ground that any analysis of the constituents of a being does not furnish us with any proof about its independent existence. It has, according to N., for its basis a mere notion, to which the non-Buddhists have attributed existence and qualities.

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So he says that the characteristics, which the non-Buddhists, attribute to ātman, are not based on the actual conception of the form of ātman (na svarūpata ātmanamupalabhya). They do not understand the real basis of the notion of ātman; it is a mere term. Though they cannot establish anything, yet, out of fear, they recede from even the conventional truth and become entangled in pure conjectures, and being thus deluded, they conceive of an ātman and attribute to it some characteristics. Nāgārjuna then quotes a few verses giving his own idea of the ātman. He says: Just as on account of a mirror, an image, which is not real, is seen, so also on account of the skandhas, the notion of I-ness, which is unreal, arises.¹ As without a mirror, an image is not seen, so without the conglomeration of elements (skandhas), the notion of I-ness does not arise.²

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¹ The simile is: I=Image on a mirror; skandhas=mirror.

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² M. Vr., p. 345:

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The topic of anattā forms the subject-matter of Buddha's second discourse to his five comrades (Vin. I, pp. 13-14) and constitutes the keynote of Buddhism. In this discourse, when Buddha denied the existence of attā, i.e., of any permanent substance apart from the khandhas, he cannot be expected to solve the 'indeterminable' (avyākata) problems, as all of them hinge on nature and existence of attā.

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यथादर्शमुपादाय स्वमुखप्रतिबिम्बकं। दृश्यते नाम तच्चैव न किंचिदपि तत्त्वतः॥
अहंकारस्तथा स्कन्धानुपादायोपलभ्यते। न च कश्चित्तत्त्वेन स्वमुखप्रतिबिम्बवत्॥
यथादर्शमनादाय स्वमुखप्रतिबिम्बकं। न दृश्यते तथा स्कन्धाननादायाहमित्यपि॥

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These verses served to remove the avidyā of Ānanda and made him an Arhat.

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