Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c8.s3.t1: Nāgārjuna assails the Śāśatavādin
Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c8.s3.t1
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Nāgārjuna assails the Śāśatavādin
v1.c8.s3.t1.1
As no attempt has been made in the *Brahmajāla Sutta* to refute the above-mentioned views, it will be worth while to turn to *Nāgārjuna's Madhyamakārikās*, in the last chapter of which, he takes up for refutation the various doctrines, two of which are the *Śāśvata*- and *Aśāśvata-vādas*.
v1.c8.s3.t1.2
Refuting *Śāśvatavāda*, *Nāgārjuna* says¹ that if a person of the past could be shown to be the same as that of the present, then only *Śāśvatavāda* could stand, but this is not possible as it would give rise to the contingency of permanency (*nityatva*) of a being as also to the possibility of a being, having a particular form of existence, to assume different bodies (lit. different forms of existence).² A permanent being should not be said to transmigrate nor a human being who was formerly an animal but became a human being through good karma should say that he was an animal, for, *Śāśvatavāda* should insist that a man must remain a man, an animal an animal, and that is absurd.³
v1.c8.s3.t1.3
¹ *M. Vr.*, pp. 574-5.
v1.c8.s3.t1.4
² *Ibid.*, *Ekagatisthasyāpi nānāgatisamgrhitatvaprasangāt*. That is, it would lead to the absurdity of an animal, for instance, (if it is *nitya*) to become a man or a god without passing through death.
v1.c8.s3.t1.5
³ To comprehend the arguments of *Nāgārjuna*, it should be remembered that *Nāgārjuna* uses the undermentioned synonyms of the Real and the Unreal in the absolute sense.
v1.c8.s3.t1.6
The Real: *Nitya* = *Śāśvata* = *Svabhāva* = *Ātmā*, meaning that which is permanent, remains eternally the same without origin and destruction and never undergoes the slightest change, something like the so-called eternal Himālaya mountains, the Sun, the Moon.
v1.c8.s3.t1.7
The Unreal: *Anitya* = *Aśāśvata* = *Niḥsvabhāva* = *Anātmā*, meaning that which is impermanent and undergoes change is really non-existing like the two Moons seen by a person with diseased eyes.
v1.c8.s3.t1.8
One may however question, “Well, how could Śākyamuni say, ‘At that time I was the Cakravarti king Māndhatā’, if Śākyamuni was not the same as Māndhatā.” The object of such a statement, says Nāgārjuna, is (i) to negative the notion of complete separateness (*anyatvapratiṣedhakam*) and (ii) to establish the non-identity (*naikatva-pratipādakam*) of the two existences of a transmigrating being. Admitting that Śākyamuni was not totally different from Māndhatā, what harm is there in holding that he was identical with Māndhatā. Nāgārjuna’s reply is that, besides the objection of *nityatva* (permanency), it would land us in the absurd position that *upādāna* is responsible for the distinction between the two existences and not *ātmā*. The absurdity is shown thus: Let us assume that *ātmā* and *upādāna* are indistinguishable, and that *ātmā* of the previous existence is the same as the one in the present, from this it would follow that *upādāna* (having *pañcaskandhalakṣaṇa*) of the previous existence is the same as that of the present. But this is absurd as no change in *upādāna* in two existences is admissible. Then again, if *ātmā* and *upādāna* be distinguished as the agent and its object, then also it is not proper to say that object (*upādāna*) has changed but not its agent (*ātmā*, i.e., holder, *upādātṛ*).¹
v1.c8.s3.t1.9
¹ For details see *infra*, Ch. VII.
v1.c8.s3.t1.10
Nāgārjuna then points out that *ātmā* is inseparable from *upādānas*, because it cannot exist apart from the *upādānas*. If it is *upādāna* which comes into existence and undergoes change on account of ignorance, *karma*, etc., and not *ātmā*, then one has to say that the existence of *ātmā* is without any cause (*ahetukatvaprasaṅgāt*) and that is impossible according to Nāgārjuna. Hence *ātmā* and *upādāna* are not separable.
v1.c8.s3.t1.11
Nāgārjuna then attacks the position of the *Aśāśvatavādins*.¹ He says that if ‘men’ and the ‘men reborn as gods’ be regarded as different, like the Neem and Mango trees, then only the Aśāśvatavādins can maintain that the soul of the man has been destroyed and a different soul has come into existence; but to maintain such a distinction in characteristics as between the Neem and Mango trees goes against the theory of the characteristic continuity (*saṃtānānuvṛtti*) of beings which is admitted to exist between ‘men’ and ‘the men reborn as gods’ and so the position of the Aśāśvatavādins becomes untenable.
v1.c8.s3.t1.12
¹ Though it should have been dealt with along with the doctrines of *Ucchedavāda* (see *infra*) we cannot help treating it here in order to bring out the force of Nāgārjuna’s arguments.
v1.c8.s3.t1.13
Nāgārjuna, explaining the position of the *Śāśvatāśāśvatavādins* (Pāli. *Ekaccassattikas* = Partial Eternalists), says that according to this class of thinkers, a man when reborn as a god should partially give up his human attributes and take the divine in their place; so by the destruction of one part of his being he is *aśāśvata*, and by the retention of the other, he is *śāśvata*. To hold that one part of a being is divine and the other human is not proper; hence the position of the Śāśvatāśāśvatavādins is untenable.²
v1.c8.s3.t1.14
² Nāgārjuna, it seems, is evading the issue here. The contention of the Śāśvatāśāśvatavādins is that the soul is divine and immortal while the body is not so. Nāgārjuna here is not distinguishing the soul from the body. He is refuting those only who hold that the soul is one of the constituents of the body, or is at least not distinguishable from the body. This, however, is never accepted by the Brāhmanic *Śāśvatavādins*.
v1.c8.s3.t1.15
After refuting the three positions mentioned above it becomes easy for Nāgārjuna to disprove the contention of the *Naivaśāśvatanāśāśvatavādins*. He says that one may use the expression na śāśvata or na aśāśvata only when he has shown that there was something śāśvata which later on became aśāśvata. But it has been already shown that the śāśvata and aśāśvata nature of beings cannot be established; hence there can be no such being as naivaśāśvatanaśāśvata.¹
v1.c8.s3.t1.16
¹ M. Vr., p 585.
v1.c8.s3.t1.17
He now rounds up this refutation by examining whether there is, in fact, any padārtha (thing) going about in this beginningless world, the existence of which (thing) we have supposed on the basis of the continuous succession of birth and death without any beginning. If it could be proved that the saṃskāras,² or, the self is leaving one gati (lit. state of existence) to go to another, from this again, it is going elsewhere, then the saṃsāra (stream of existence) could be proved to be without a beginning. But this is not possible, because a thing which is permanent (nitya) or impermanent (anitya) cannot be said to be coming and going. That being so, is it right to say that the stream of existences (saṃsāra) has a beginning only because of the remoteness and non-perception of the beginning of the chain of births and death (janmaparamparayā atīdirghatvenādyanupalambhāt)? Then again, when no entity can be shown as transmigrating (saṃsartur abhāvāt), how can the stream of existences (saṃsāra) be said to have a beginning or not? So it is quite wrong to hold that there is something (kaścit padārthaḥ) which has been going about in this beginningless world and which can be perceived. There is, in fact, nothing eternal (śāśvata) and so it is meaningless to think of anything as non eternal (aśāśvata), or both, or neither of the two.³
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² M. Vr., p. 586; cf. Ibid., p. 529.
v1.c8.s3.t1.19
³ For Nāgārjuna's position see M. Vr., pp 537, 591.
Cites (2)
- Brahmajālasutta — Pāli
- Mūlamadhyamakakārikā — Nāgārjuna, Sanskrit