Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c8.s3.t1.8

v1.c8.s3.t1.8

One may however question, “Well, how could Śākyamuni say, ‘At that time I was the Cakravarti king Māndhatā’, if Śākyamuni was not the same as Māndhatā.” The object of such a statement, says Nāgārjuna, is (i) to negative the notion of complete separateness (*anyatvapratiṣedhakam*) and (ii) to establish the non-identity (*naikatva-pratipādakam*) of the two existences of a transmigrating being. Admitting that Śākyamuni was not totally different from Māndhatā, what harm is there in holding that he was identical with Māndhatā. Nāgārjuna’s reply is that, besides the objection of *nityatva* (permanency), it would land us in the absurd position that *upādāna* is responsible for the distinction between the two existences and not *ātmā*. The absurdity is shown thus: Let us assume that *ātmā* and *upādāna* are indistinguishable, and that *ātmā* of the previous existence is the same as the one in the present, from this it would follow that *upādāna* (having *pañcaskandhalakṣaṇa*) of the previous existence is the same as that of the present. But this is absurd as no change in *upādāna* in two existences is admissible. Then again, if *ātmā* and *upādāna* be distinguished as the agent and its object, then also it is not proper to say that object (*upādāna*) has changed but not its agent (*ātmā*, i.e., holder, *upādātṛ*).¹