Early Monastic Buddhism v2.c33.s3: Principal seats of the schools

Early Monastic Buddhism v2.c33.s3

Language: English

Principal seats of the schools

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The different traditons about the Second Council indicate that a section of the Vajjiputtakas held another council, Mahāsaṅgiti, at Kusumapura, i.e., Pāṭaliputra, the capital of Kālāsoka. Yuan Chwang also remarks that "the majority of inferior brethren at Pāṭaliputra began the Mahāsaṅghika school."¹ Fa-hien, as stated above, found the Vinaya of this school at Pāṭaliputra, so, it may be safely concluded that the chief centre of this school was at Pāṭaliputra. I-tsing (671-695 A.D.) tells us that the Mahāsaṅghikas were found in his time mostly in Magadha (Central India) and a few in Lāṭa and Sindhu (Western India) and some in a few places in Northern, Southern and Eastern India.² Before I-tsing, both Fa-hien and Yuan Chwang had come across in these localities the adherents of this school though not so frequently as those of the others. The earliest epigraphical notice of this school is found in the inscription on Mathurā Lion Capital (about 120 B.C.),³ mentioning that it had a very strong opponent in Buddhila, an adherent of the Sarvāstivāda school.

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¹ Watters, op. cit., I, p. 269.

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² Takakusu, op. cit., p. xxxiii.

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³ Ep. Indica, IX, pp. 139, 141, 146.

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At Andarab in Afghanistan and its neighbouring places, there were also some followers of this school. During the reign of Huviṣka, one Kamagulya deposited some relics of Buddha in the Wardak vase and presented the same to the teachers of the Mahāsaṅghika school.⁴ The vault which contained the relic-vase was built by the father of Kamagulya.⁴ At Andarab which was three days journey from the country of the Wardaks, Yuan Chwang found the adherents of this school in three monasteries.⁵

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⁴ Ep. Indica, XI, p. 211.

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⁵ Watters' Yuan Chwang, II, pp. 267, 269.

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There was another centre of the school at Karle, in the Bombay Presidency, famous in the history of Buddhist architecture for its possession of the largest and finest cave-temples,¹ which are still standing as memorials of their past glory. That this cave was in the possession of the Mahāsanghikas is shown by two inscriptions at the cave-temples, one recording the gift of the village of Karajaka by Gautamīputra Śātakarṇi to the monks of the Vāluraka caves for the support of the school of the Mahāsanghikas,² and the other of the time of Vāsiṣṭhiputra Siripulumāyi recording the gift of a nine-celled hall to the same school by an inhabitant of Abulama.³ Though the Mahāsanghikas did not receive much attention from the Buddhist writers and donors, the Karle caves show that the school commanded a great popularity in that part of the Bombay Presidency where the caves exist; for, otherwise the cave-temples could not have been so richly decorated with such fine specimens of sculptural and architectural beauty. Its existence and richness prove that there was a series of donors through centuries anxious to express their religious devotion and zeal in the best way that their resources could command.

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¹ See for its description Fergusson's *Indian & Eastern Architecture*, pp. 117 ff.; Fergusson and Burgess, *Cave Temples of India*, pp. 232 ff.

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² *Ep. Indica*, vol. VII, pp. 64 ff.

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³ *Ibid.*, pp. 71 ff.

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The above inscriptional evidences relate to the Mahāsanghikas alone, who as it appears from the evidences were scattered probably in small groups in a few localities of North-western, Western and Eastern India, and had their main centre at Pāṭaliputra or Kusumapura.

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The career of the off-shoots of this school, however, took a different course. They were mainly located in one country, the Andhra, for which they were given in the Ceylonese chronicles the collective name of the Andhakas. We have seen above (p. 52) that their names appear more than once in the Amarāvatī and Nāgārjunikoṇḍa inscriptions. Just as Bodh-Gaya grew up on the bank of the Nerañjarā as a very early centre of Theravāda and a place of pilgrimage for the early Buddhists so also did Amarāvatī (extending to Jaggayapeta) and Nāgārjunikoṇḍa on the bank of the Kṛṣṇā (including its tributary Paler) grow as a flourishing centre of the off-shoots of the Mahāsaṅghikas in the first century B.C. or A.D. and became a place of pilgrimage for the Buddhists of the later days.

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On the basis of the style of sculptures and the palæographic data, Burgess, agreeing with Fergusson, holds that the construction of the Amarāvatī Stūpa was commenced in the 2nd century B.C., and enlarged later and decorated with new sculptures, the latest of which was the great railing erected a little before 200 A.D.¹ It was some time after the completion of this Amarāvatī stūpa, that the stūpas at Jaggayapeta and Nāgārjunikoṇḍa came into existence, their dates being, according to Burgess and Vogel respectively, the 3rd or 4th century A.D.² This estimate of date is based on palæographic evidences and the mention of the king called Māḍharīputa Siri Virapurisadata (= Māṭharīputra Śrī Vīrapuruṣadatta) of the Ikṣvāku dynasty.³ The inscriptions on the āyaka-pillars at Nāgārjunikoṇḍa contain not only the name of this king, but also that of his father Vāseṭhīputa Siri Cāṃtamūla and his son and successor Vāseṭhīputa Siri Ehuvuḷa Cāṃtamūla.¹ It appears from the inscriptions that the principal donor of the subsidiary structures of the stūpa was Cāṃtasiri, the sister of the king Siri Cāṃtamūla, and the paternal aunt (pituchā), later on, probably mother-in-law, of the king Siri Virapurisadata.² Hence, the time of the inscriptions, mentioning the names of the kings Cāṃtasiri and Vīrapurisadata, is the 3rd or the 4th century A.D. It should be remembered that the period mentioned here relates to the subsidiary structures of the main stūpa, and not to the stūpa itself—the Mahācetiya, which must be assigned to an earlier period.

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¹ Burgess, Buddhist Stūpas of Amarāvatī and Jaggayapeta (Arch. Survey of Southern India), p. 112-3.

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² Ep. Ind., XX, p. 2.

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³ Bühler assigns 3rd century A.D. to the reign of king Purisadata. Ep. Ind., XX, p. 2, quoting Ind. Ant., XI (1882), pp. 256 ff.

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¹ Ep. Ind., XX, p. 3.

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² Ibid.

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It is evident therefore that the off-shoots of the Mahāsaṅghikas, viz., the Caitya and Śaila schools migrated to the Guntur district from Pāṭaliputra through Orissa and made their settlement in that region in the 2nd century B.C. During the course of four or five centuries of their residence, they gradually extended their monasteries to the neighbouring hills, becoming one day a place of pilgrimage for all Buddhists.

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The offshoots of this school, the Lokottaravādins and Caityakas, in other words, the Śaila schools, we know from the inscriptions of Amarāvatī and Nāgārjunikoṇḍa, established themselves along the banks of the Kṛṣṇā with several monasteries located on the different hills all round. In the Kathāvatthu-aṭṭhakathā and the Ceylonese chronicles they are given the appellation of Andhakas, indicating thereby that they mainly belonged to the Andhra country.

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In short, the earlier schools (i.e. the First Group) were located at Pāṭaliputra with adherents scattered all over Northern and North-western India, while the later schools (i.e. the Second Group) were concentrated in the south, having their chief centre in the Guntur district on the banks of the Kṛṣṇā.

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CHAPTER VIII (A)

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The Mahāsanghikas & Lokottaravādins

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Our main sources of information for the doctrines of the Mahāsanghikas and the Lokottaravādins are the *Mahāvastu*, *Kathāvatthu* and works of Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinītadeva. In the *Mahāvastu*, the doctrines mentioned are essentially Hīnayānic in character, e.g., the four truths,¹ eightfold path,² theory of *pratītyasamutpāda*,³ impermanence of *skandhas*,⁴ non-existence of *ātman*,⁵ theory of *karma*,⁶ the *bodhipakṣiya-dharmas*, *bodhyangas* and so forth. The doctrines of *dharma-śūnyatā*, *trikāya*, the two *āvaraṇas* (*kleśa* and *jñeya*), the essentials of Mahāyānic doctrines receive little attention. The accounts of the four *caryās*,⁷ ten *bhūmis*,⁸ countless Buddhas and their *kṣetras* (spheres) appear more as interpolations than as integral parts of the original text.

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¹ *Mahāvastu*, III, pp. 331-3.

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² *Ibid.*

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³ *Ibid.*, p. 448-9.

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⁴ *Ibid.*, III, p. 345.

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⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 335-7, 447; III, p. 66.

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⁶ *Ibid.*, II, p. 363. III, p. 65.

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⁷ *Mtu.* I, p. 145, 153-4.

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⁸ *Mtu.* I, p. 144; cf. *Lalitavistara*, p. 65.

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Re. *Buddha and Bodhisattva*. The only Mahāyānic feature of the text is the deification of Buddha and Bodhisattva. A Bodhisattva is described as self-born (*upapāduka*) and not born of parents; he sits cross-legged in the womb and preaches therefrom to the gods who act as his protectors; while in the womb he remains untouched by the phlegm and such other matters of the womb, and he issues out of the womb by the right side without piercing it.¹ He cannot have *kāma* and so Rāhula was also self-born. But it will be observed that such conceptions about the Bodhisattva appear only in the introductory portion (p. 193) of the *Mahāvastu*, and very rarely in the remaining portion of the text. There are occasional references to Buddha as *lokottara*,² but it seems that the *lokottara* conception had not yet taken firm hold of the people's minds. Buddha's acquisitions are said to be all supramundane and cannot be compared to anything worldly.³ His spiritual practices are supramundane and so are his merits, even his bodily movements such as walking, standing, sitting and lying are also supramundane. His eating, his putting on robes and such other acts are also supramundane. It is for following the ways of the world (*lokānuvartana*) that he shows his *iryāpathas*. His feet are clean, still he washes them. His mouth smells like the lotus, still he cleans his teeth. His body is not touched by the sun or wind or rain, still he puts on garment and lives under a roof. He cannot have any disease and still he takes medicine to cure himself.⁴ This *lokottara* conception also appears only in the introductory portion of the *Mahāvastu*; and so it is evident that the text was originally an out and out Hīnayāna text, and that in course of time, the introductory chapters were added, and very probably the addition was made by one of its later offshoots, the Loko-, ttaravādins.

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¹ *Ibid.*, I, p. 148: परिपुर्णे हि च दशमे मासे हि सं बोधिसत्त्वाः मातुः कुक्षौ प्रादुर्भवन्ति दक्षिणं पार्श्वं न च तं पार्श्वं भिद्यते ।

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² *Mahāvastu*, I, p. 48.

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³ *Mahāvastu*, I, p. 159: न हि किंचित सम्यक्संबुद्धानां लोकेन समं । अथ खलु सर्वमेव महर्षीणां लोकोत्तरम् । तथाहि सम्यक् संबुद्धानां समुदागमः सोऽपि लोकोत्तरः ।

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⁴ For the beautiful inspiring account read the *Mahāvastu*, I, pp. 167-170.

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In the *Abhidharmakośa* and its *Vyākhyā*, it is said that according to the Mahāsanghikas, Buddhas appear at the same time in more than one world,¹ and that they are omniscient in the sense that they know all *dharmas* at the same time. The former statement appears also in the *Kathāvatthu* (xxi, 6), in which it is stated that according to the Mahāsanghikas, Buddhas exist in all corners of the world (*sabbā disā Buddhā tiṭṭhanti*). In the *Kathāvatthu* and the *Kośa*, no special doctrines about the Bodhisattva conception are attributed to the Mahāsanghikas.

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¹ *Kośa*, iii. 200; ix, 254.

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*Re. Arhat*. There is a sharp difference of opinion among the various schools on the problem, *viz.*, whether arhathood is identical with *mukti* or not? Those who adhere to the former view state that an arhat cannot recede from arhathood. This was the view of the Śaila schools and a section of the Mahāsanghikas.² From Mahādeva's five points, we have to infer that a section of the earlier Mahāsanghikas adhered to the opposite view, *viz.*, that an arhat may fall from arhathood. In this respect the *Kathāvatthu*³ and the *Kośa*⁴ come to our aid. These texts state that, according to a section of the Mahāsanghikas, the arhats are not omniscient like Buddha (vide *Kvu.*, XXI, 3) and that they are subject to fall from arhathood.⁵ The *Kośa* (ii, p. 210) incidentally mentions that an adept who has attained the *nirodha-samāpatti* (meditation in which perception ceases almost completely), appertaining to the fourth *dhyāna*, cannot have a fall from that state. The Theravādins admit *pattaparihāni* (loss of what is attained) of those adepts who have attained only lokiya-samāpatti (meditation limited to the worldly sphere) and not the higher fruits of sanctification (arhatādisāmaññaphala) while the opponents speak of retrogression of the latter also, but confine it only to those arhats who are samayavimuttas.¹ The basis of this contention of the opponents is a passage of the Aṅguttara Nikāya (iii. 173), in which Buddha says that five ārāmatā (indulgences), viz., in kamma, (deed), bhassa (desultory talks), niddā (sleep) and saṅganikā (frequenting societies) lead to the fall of a samayavimutta-bhikkhu. Buddhaghosa infers from the discussion that the opponents assert that the arhats retrogress up to the Sotāpattiphala but no further and that the retrogression happens only in the sphere of Kāmaloka and not in the higher two spheres, Rūpa and Arūpa, and that also is confined only to the mudindriya or samayavimutta arhats.

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² Vide Masuda, p. 27; *Kośa* (Poussin's transl.), vi, p. 255 fn.

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³ *Kvu.* I. 2: Parihāyati arahā arahattā ti?

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⁴ *Kośa-vyākhyā* (Jap ed.), p. 568-9.

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⁵ *Kvu. Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 35: Ekacce Mahāsanghikā arahato parihānim icchati.

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¹ By Samayavimutta is meant those arhats whose faculties are not very strong; according to the Theravādins these arhats complete their meditational course but have not attained complete self control.

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The Kathāvatthu refers to another cause for the fall of an arhat, viz., (i) kammahetu arahā arahattā parihāyati (an opinion of the Pubbaseliyas and Sammitīyas). It means that the fall of an arhat is sometimes due to the deeds of his previous lives, e.g. of having calumniated an arhat. It also warns the opponents particularly the Pubba- and Apara-seliyas and Uttarāpathakas about impostors passing as an arhat and committing abrahmacariya offences (vide Kvu., II. 1 & XXIII. 2).

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Re. Anusaya (Dormant passion):

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(i) Anusayā anārammaṇā and citta-vippayuttā (IX. 4) (Dormant passions are not objects of thought and are dissociated from mind).

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This opinion is the same as that of the Śaila schools, so it has been discussed along with their other views (see infra.) (cf. Kośa, transl., V, p. 4-5).

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Re. Viññāṇa (Perception):

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(i) Pañcaviññāṇasamaṅgissa atthi maggabhāvanā (X. 3) (Inspite of the perceptions through the organs of sense, a person may progress along the spiritual path). (ii) Pañcaviññāṇā kusalā ti akusalā pi ti (X. 4) and (iii) Pañcaviññāṇā sābhogā (X. 5) (The five sense-perceptions may be good or bad and are “co-ideational” (sābhogā, lit., are associated with mental enjoyment).

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The Mahāsanghikas on the basis of the statement of Bhagavā, “Idha bhikkhave bhikkhu cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā nimittaggāhī hoti...pe...na nimittaggāhī hoti...pe...sotena saddaṃ sutvā etc.,” contend that a person using the five sense-organs may practise maggabhāvanā,¹ by not grasping the object seen or heard (nimittaggāhī) and directing his mind towards nibbāna. The Theravādins argue that if through pañcaviññāṇa one attains sotāpatti and other maggas, then the pañcaviññāṇa and magga should be of the same category, but the former is lokiya and the latter lokuttara, the former is savatthuka (have an object as basis) and the latter is avatthuka (without any basis). In this way the Theravādins argue that by the exercise of the five viññāṇas one does not attain nibbāna.

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¹ Meditational practices which lead to the attainment of the four maggas, viz., sotāpatti, sakadāgāmi, anāgāmi and arahatta.

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The opponents state that through the use of five viññāṇas a person may engender rāga (attachment) is self-evident though the Theravādins may not admit that the five perceptions are sābhogā (X. 5). In the discussion (VIII. 4) whether the five āyatanas are associated with desires (kāma), the Theravādins acknowledge that Buddha said that the five āyatanas may or may not be kāmaguṇas, and explained the same by saying that a person's organs of sense or the objects of the senses are not by themselves kāmaguṇas (associated with desires) but one, who has saṃkapparāga (desireful intention) and does not dissociate his mind from the objects of sense, is not expected to attain detachment from worldly objects.¹ The Mahāsanghikas, I think, hold the identical opinion though it is not so clearly expressed in Vasumitra, it is only the Sarvāstivādins who held the opinion that the vijñānas conduce to sarāga and not to virāga (Masuda, p. 48).

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¹ Quoted in the Kvu, p. 370 from the Aṅg. Nik., III, 411.

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Re. Indriyas (Organs of sense):

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Cakkhunā rūpaṃ passati ti (Kvu. xviii. 9). Sentient surface of the eyes see).²

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² The eyes see and not the cakṣu-vijñāna is also the opinion of the Vaibhāṣikas (Kośa. i. 81-2). See Infra.

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In the Kathāvatthu (xviii, 9), the Mahāsanghikas are said to hold the opinion that the organs of sense perceive and not their perceptive faculty (vijñāna). This is also the view of the Vaibhāṣikas (vide Kośa, transl. i. p. 81-2). The Śaila schools and the Theravādins hold the opposite view (see infra).

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Re. Anupubbābhisamaya (Gradual realisation of the truths):

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The Mahāsanghikas like the Theravādins hold that the realisation of the truths takes place all at once and not gradually (for the contrary opinion of the Sarvāstivādins,³ see infra).

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³ Kośa (transl.), vi, p. 185 fn.

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*Re. Apratisamkhyā-nirodha* (Emancipation without knowledge):

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The Buddhists admit two kinds of *nirodha* one attained by means of knowledge (*pratisamkhyā*) and the other by complete removal of all impurities which cause rebirth, and not by knowledge (*apratisamkhyā*). The Mahāsanghikas hold that the latter is *paścād abhāva* (subsequent absence) of dharmas in virtue of their spontaneous destruction, which are not reborn.¹

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¹ *Kośa* (transl.), ii, p. 280.

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*Re. Kleśa-bīja* (Germ of impurities):

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The Mahāsanghikas state that *kleśa-bīja* is a dharma distinct from *kleśa* (*Kośa*, v. p. 7).

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*Re. Reals:*

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The Mahāsanghikas maintain as against the Sarvāstivādins that the present exists but not the past and future.

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*Re. Vijñapti* (Signs of intimation):

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The Mahāsanghikas hold that *vijñapti* is also an act (*Kośa*, iv, p. 3). (Cf. p. 71).

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*Other opinions:*

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The following are some of the doctrines attributed to the Mahāsanghikas in the *Kathāvatthu* only:—

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(i) Restraint (*samvara*) or unrestraint (*asamvara*) of the organs of sense should be treated as action (*kamma*).² The Theravādins regard it as non-action, their contention being that an action should be defined as the actual functioning of the five organs of sense initiated by mind (*cetanā*). *Kvu.* XII. 1.

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² Cf. *Kośa*, (trasl.), iv, p. 52.

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(ii) All actions (*sabbam kammam*) are accompanied by results (*savipāka*). The Theravādins contend that as *cetanā* is the source of all actions,¹ and as there are avyākata (neither good nor bad) and avipāka (unaccompanied by any result) cittas,² there must be also avyākata and avipāka kammas, hence all actions are not necessarily accompanied by results.—Kvu. XII. 2.

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¹ Cetanāhaṃ kammaṃ vadāmi—Atthas., p. 135

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² See Dhammasaṅgaṇi, pp 87 ff.

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(iii) Sound and other āyatanas (spheres of the organs of sense) are also results of actions (kammassa katattā uppannam). In short, all non-materials (arūpadhammā) are products of actions (kammasamuṭṭhānā).—Kvu., XII. 3 & 4.³

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³ Cf. Kośa, (transl). i, p. 69-70.

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(iv) Acquisition of moral purity is not mental (sīlam acetasikan ti; sīlam na cittānuparivattī ti). Kvu. X. 7. 8.

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The Mahāsaṅghikas imply by the above opinion of theirs that purity in speech (sammā vācā), actions (sammā kammanta) and means of livelihood (sammā ājīva) is a corporeal property and as such is non-mental and requires no ārammaṇa (basis).⁴ The M. mean that the observance of sīlas transforms the bodily constituents of a being in such a way that it can no longer commit any wrong, i.e., cannot be dussīla.

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⁴ Kvu. I, p. 422 See p. 21, re. Anusaya.

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(v) The collection of sīlas (merits) is not associated with mind. (cittavippayuttaṃ sīlopacayaṃ). Kvu. X. 9.

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Buddhaghosa explains this is due to misapprehension of the sense of the passage in the Saṃyutta Nikāya (I. p. 33): ārāmaropā vanaropā ye janā...tesaṃ sadā puññaṃ pavaḍḍhati (the merits of those who plant park and woods increase at all times).

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(vi) Maggasamaṅgissa rūpaṃ maggo ti.⁵ Kvu. X. 2.

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⁵ Transl. "That the physical frame of one who is practising the eightfold path is included in that path." Points of Controversy, p. 244.

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(vii) Maggasamaṅgī dvīhi sīlehī samannāgato ti.⁶ Kvu. X. 6.

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⁶ Transl. "That one who is engaged in the path is practising a

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A maggasamaṅgī is an advanced adept who has reached one of the maggas, i.e., sotāpattimagga, etc., by following the eightfold path, and is engaged in maggabhāvanā (higher meditations). His mental states are transcendental (lokuttara). The question is whether the sīla practices¹ completed by him in the pre-sotāpanna stage and still possessed by him should be regarded as lokuttara or lokiya (belonging to the spheres of Kāma, Rūpa and Arūpa)? The M. contend that the rūpa of a maggasamaṅgī (or maggaṭṭha) remains lokiya while his mental state (citta) becomes lokuttara, hence his sīlas, which belong to the category of rūpa as shown above, remain lokiya. Of the eight factors of the aṭṭhaṅgika-magga, three, viz., sammā vācā, kammanta and ājīva of a sotāpanna are sīlas and as such they are lokiya but the remaining five which are mental (arūpa) may be lokuttara. A sotāpanna therefore is in possession of lokiya sīlas but if he practises sammāsati, sammāvāyama, etc. he may be said to have lokuttara-sīlas. The Th. do not make any such distinction, for, all the eight sīlas, according to them, emanate from mind;² so the sīlas of a sotāpanna, who has lokuttara-citta, are lokuttara.

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¹ See Dhammasaṅgaṇi, p. 60.

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² Cf. Vism., p. 6: Kiṃ silan ti? Cetanā sīlaṃ, cetasikaṃ sīlaṃ. saṃvara sīlaṃ, avitikkamo sīlaṃ ti (quoted from Paṭisambhidāmagga, I. p. 44).

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(viii) Acts of intimation are virtues (viññatti sīlan ti).

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(ix) Acts not intimating a moral purpose is immoral³ (aviññatti dussilyan ti). Kvu. X. 10, 11.

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³ See Points of Controversy, p 252. For definition of Viññatti, see Atthas., pp. 83 ff.

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double morality." Ibid., p. 248. Vism., p 6: Silena sotāpanna-sakadāgānubhāvassa kāraṇaṃ pakāsitaṃ hoti. Sotāpanno hi sīlesu paripūrakārī ti vutto, tathā sakadāgāmī.

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Sīla, according to the M., must be positive action and not mere restraint (saṃvara), so any viññatti (intimation) by means of body or speech is sīla. Salutation, rising to welcome, folding hands, etc., are sīlas. The M., in view of their opinion that there may be accumulation of demerits without the association of mind (cittavippayuttaṃ apuññupacayaṃ), contend "that acts not intimating a moral purpose are immoral."

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(x) Insight is dissociated from mind (ñāṇaṃ cittavippayuttaṃ). Kvu. XI. 3.

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(xi) One should not be called ‘ñāṇī’ (possessed of insight) though his aññāṇa (spiritual ignorance) is gone but his thoughts are not conjoined with insight. (Aññāne vigate ñāṇavippayutte citte vattamāne na vattabbaṃ ‘ñāṇī’ ti). Kvu. XI. 2.

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In this controversy ñāṇa means maggañāṇa (insight belonging to the adepts who are in one of the four maggas). The M. contend that at the moment when an adept has cakkhuviññāṇa, etc., he cannot have maggañāṇa. In other words they mean to say that it is only when an adept develops maggañāṇa and stops his sense perceptions (viññāṇas), he may be described as ‘ñāṇī’, hence ñāṇa is not associated with mind (citta = viññāṇa).

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(xii) Akusalamūlaṃ paṭisandahati kusalamūlan ti.¹ Kvu. XIV. 1.

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¹ "That a basis of bad thought is consecutive to a basis that is good, and conversely." Points of Controversy, p. 282.

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The M. contend that the same object may be the cause of both rāga (attachment) and virāga (detachment) and as one may follow the other immediately, it may be stated that kusala is the anantarapaccaya (contiguous cause) of akusala and vice versa. The Th. point out that cultivation of kusalamūla must be made deliberately (yoniso manasikaroto) while that of akusalamūla does not require any such thinking (ayoniso manasikaroto), and also that *nekkhammasaññā* (renunciating thought) does not always follow *kāmasaññā* (worldly thought) and *vice versa*, and so *kusalāmūla* cannot be regarded generally as the contiguous cause of *akusalāmūla* and *vice versa*.¹

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¹ Cf. *Tikapaṭṭhāna*, pp. 168 ff.

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(xiii) *Paccayatā vavatthitā ti*. (One phenomenon can be related to another in one way only). *Kvu.* XV. 1.

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The M. now enter into the problem of *paccayas*. There are twenty-four kinds of *paccayas*, viz., *hetu*, *ārammaṇa*, *adhipati*, *sahajāta*, *anantara*, etc.² They raise the question whether one object can be placed under two or more kinds of *paccayas* of another object, or one can be related to another by one relation only. The Th. hold that one object may be two kinds of *paccayas*, e.g., *viriya* may be both *adhipati* and *sahajāta*; *vīmaṃsā* may be both *hetu* and *adhipati*. The M. do not subscribe to this view.

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² See *Atthas.*, p. 9; *Dukapaṭṭhāna*, p. 3; *Points of Controversy*, App., pp. 390-2; *Buddhist Psychology*, pp. 194 ff.

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(xiv) *Avijjā paccayā pi saṃkhārā, na vattabbaṃ “saṃkhārā paccayā pi avijjā ti.”*³ *Kvu.* XV. 2.

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³ “That whereas actions are conditioned by ignorance, we may not say that ignorance is conditioned by actions.” *Points of Controversy*, p. 294.

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This view of the M. is only a corollary to the previous one. The M. hold that *avijjā* is the *hetu* (cause) of *saṃkhārā* and as such there cannot be any other relation between the two. The Th., however, argue that *avijjā* and *saṃkhārā* are related to each other both as *hetu* and *sahajāta* (co-existent) or *aññamañña* (reciprocal), hence it may be stated that *saṃkhārā* are *sahajāta-paccayā* of *avijjā*, and *vice versa*.⁴ In the *Vibhaṅga* (pp. 156 ff.)

Linked texts (14)

Kathāvatthu — Moggaliputta Tissa, Pāli
Nibbedhikasutta — Pāli
Aṅguttaranikāya — Pāli
Paṭisambhidāmagga — Pāli
Mahāvastu — Sanskrit
Dhammasaṅgaṇī — Pāli
Mahāparinibbānasutta — Pāli
Abhidharmakośa — Vasubandhu, Sanskrit
Dīghanikāya — Pāli
Majjhimanikāya — Pāli
Visuddhimagga — Buddhaghosa, Pāli
Saṃyuttanikāya — Pāli
Bodh Gayā
Nagarjunikonda