Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c4: Contents

Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c4

Language: English

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| **FOREWORD** | 5 |
| **PREFACE** | 9 |
| **ABBREVIATIONS** | 19 |
| **I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND I—VEDIC** | 21–68 |

Subsections (*Numbers here denote paragraphs and not pages*). Introductory observations (1–5). The germs of scepticism regarding the possibility of knowledge (6–10) The quest for simplicity (11) and order (12). Scriptural authority as a source of knowledge (13). The rôle of analogy in reasoning (14). The place of doubt in the Brāhmaṇas (15). The importance of knowledge (16–17) and the growth of speculation (18–20). Reason in the construction of metaphysical theories (21–44). The origin and development of the institution of the debate; the study of rhetoric and the elements of reasoning (45–66). The means of knowledge recognized in the Early Upaniṣads—scriptural authority, perception and reason (67–72). Mystical intuition as a new way of knowing in the Middle and Late Upaniṣads (73–76). The interest in one of the main problems of epistemology at the close of the Vedic period (77). The chronological and historical relationship between the Upaniṣads and Buddhism (78–81).

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| **II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND II—NON-VEDIC I—MATERIALISM** | 69–108 |

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Subsections. The rational origins of Materialist thought (82–87). The three main types of Materialist schools according to their epistemological doctrines (88–89). The early existence of the school or schools in which perception only (90–91) or perception and verifiable inference were the means of knowledge recognized (92–94). The nihilist school which denied the validity of all means of knowledge may have had its origin as an early (pre-Buddhistic) rival branch of the realist school or schools (95–118) No evidence from the Nikāyas for the existence of Arthaśāstra Lokāyata (Machiavellian Materialism) (119) The Materialist criticism of the argument from authority (120–121). The kind of reasoning employed by the Materialist (122–129). The empiricist criticism of metaphysical concepts (130–133). The use of the *modus tollendo tollens* (134–135). Experiments devised to test an hypothesis (136–139). The Materialist critique of the claim to intuitive knowledge on the part of the Mystics (140–142).

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III. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND III—NON-VEDIC II—SCEPTICS, ĀJĪVIKAS AND JAINS

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Subsections. *Relation to earlier traces of scepticism* (143–144) The conflict of theories the main motive for the birth of scepticism (145–152) The rational (153–154) and the moral grounds (155–156) of scepticism. Was the logic of four alternatives (the four-fold schema) an innovation of the Sceptics (157)? The first three schools of Sceptics mentioned in the Pāli Nikāyas (158–170) The similarity with Pyrrhonean scepticism (171–174). The fourth school of Sceptics (175–181) Two theories as to the origin of the four-fold schema (182–190) The relation of scepticism to the relativism (syādvāda) of the Jains (191–194). The rational origins of the main concepts of the Ājīvikas (195–200) Their interest in causal arguments (201–208) Their use of reason (209–212) Their claims to mystical intuition (213–215) and belief in tradition (216) The three-fold schema and the three standpoints of the Trairāśika Ājīvikas (217–230). The main elements of the Jain theory of knowledge (231–243)

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IV. THE ATTITUDE TO AUTHORITY

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Subsections. The pre-Buddhistic thinkers classifiable mainly as traditionalists, rationalists and 'experientialists' on epistemological grounds (244–247) The Buddha identifies himself with the last group (248–250). The various forms of argument from authority (251–260) The criticism of anussava (revelation, tradition, report) as a valid means of knowledge (261–283). The Buddhist and the Materialist criticisms of the Vedic tradition compared and contrasted (284–288). The Buddhist criticisms in the light of the later claims made in regard to the validity of the Vedic tradition (289–293). The criticism of paramparā (claims based on the continuity of a tradition) (294–296), of hearsay (itikirā) and non-revealed tradition (297–303). The criticism of the principle of 'conformity with scripture' (piṭakasampadā) as a criterion of knowledge (304–305). The criticism of testimony (306–307). The reason for the rejection of authority (308). The general condemnation of authority (309–311). Authority within Buddhism (312).

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V. THE ATTITUDE TO REASON

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Subsections. Who were the takkī (sophists, casuists, debaters, reasoners?) and what was takka? (313–319). The counterpart of the Greek sceptic-sophist not found in India (320–326). Was Dīghanakha a logical sceptic or a nihilist Materialist? (327–336). The evidence for the existence of vitaṇḍavādins or casuists (337–348). The earliest dilemmas and the study of rhetoric on the part of the intelligentsia (349–359). The debate in Early Buddhist times and the reasoning used in it (360–377). The debated theories, the schools to which they belonged and the types of arguments used in the construction, defence or criticism of them (378–415). Reason in the construction of metaphysical theories; four types of 'reasoners' and the meaning of takkikā (quibblers or reasoners?) (416–418). Takkī as rational metaphysicians, their theories (419–435). The critique of reason; its inadequacy for knowledge (436–442).

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VI. ANALYSIS AND MEANING

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Subsections. The rôle of analysis in the Pāli Canon (443) The critical and analytical outlook (444–451). The analysis of questions into four types (452–458). The categorical question (459–461). The question to be answered after analysis (462–465) or with a counter-question (466–468). The question which was to be set aside, the meaningless question and its modern parallels (469-481). Other senses of analysis (482). The nature of definition (483-496) and classification (497-500) The problem of universals (501-502). The delimitation of terms and the so-called 'applied logic of conversion' (503-515) The four kinds of analysis (catupaṭisambhidā) (516-519) The origins of Indian linguistic philosophy (520-522). The nature of verbal disputes (523-526) The importance of linguistic convention and the linguistic origin of metaphysics (527-535) The concept of the 'meaningless statement' (536-559).

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VII. LOGIC AND TRUTH 333-368

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Subsections. The questions discussed (560) The theory that the four-fold logic violates the law of Contradiction or represents laws of thought (561-563) The four alternatives in the light of Aristotelian logic (564) Recent theories suggested to explain this logic unsatisfactory or inadequate (565-570). The four alternatives and what they mean (571-583) The necessity to distinguish four-cornered negation from four-cornered rejection (584-585). The difference between Jain syādvāda (the seven forms of predication) and the Buddhist catuṣkoṭi (the logic of four alternatives) (586-591). Robinson's theory not acceptable (592) The analysis of statements according to truth-value, utility, pleasantness and unpleasantness (593-595) Truth as correspondence with fact (596) Coherence as the criterion of truth and the senses of consistency (597-598) Is there a conception of 'partial truth'? (599-601) Truth and utility; the pragmatic criterion (602-605) Truth and verification (606) The conception of the 'middle' view as true (607-609) The two kinds of discourse and the theory of double truth (610-621)

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VIII. AUTHORITY AND REASON WITHIN BUDDHISM 369-415

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Subsections The nature of the questions discussed (622-624) That the Buddha uncritically accepts certain dogmas from the prevalent tradition is the view of many scholars (625-626) That such dogmas are not part of Buddhism is another view (627). Both views are unsupported by the historical and textual evidence (629-639). The authority of omniscience not claimed for the statements of the Buddha until the very latest stratum of the Pāli Canon (640-649). Buddhism not a revelation (650). The nature and rôle of belief or faith (saddhā) and its relation to knowledge; provisional belief for the purposes of verification not incompatible with rejection of authority (651-673). Another conception of faith (674-678). The nature and rôle of reason in the Pāli Canon (679). Buddhism not a rationalism in the sense of being an *a priori* system of metaphysics (680-685). Reason has definite but limited function (686-687). Reason in the criticism of other doctrines and the use of the *modus tollendo tollens* (688-701). The anticipation of two theorems of the propositional calculus—the rules of Implication and Contraposition (702-710). Refutation (niggaha) in the Kathāvatthu (711).

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IX. THE MEANS AND LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE 416-476

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Subsections. The emphasis on direct personal knowledge (712-721). The similarity and difference between the way of knowing of the Middle and Late Upanisads and of Buddhism (722-725). The causes and conditions for the emergence of extra-sensory perception or of knowledge in general (726-732). Extra-sensory perception only a means to an end (733-734). The possibility of error (735). Personal knowledge not subjective (736). The Materialist and Buddhist emphasis on perception (737). The objectivity of knowledge and the necessity for eliminating subjective bias (738-740). The recognition of perception, normal and paranormal (741-743) The theory of perception (normal) (744-749). The nature of paranormal perception (750-756). Inductive inference (757-759). The theory of causation (760-782). Inductive inferences based on empirical evidence and causal theory (783-784). Verification (785). The notion of extra-sensory perception does not belong to the mythical or miraculous element (786). Inductive inferences, valid and erroneous, based on the data of paranormal perception (787-791). The Empiricism of Buddhism (792–796). The importance of verification (797). The conception of ‘intellectual release’ without complete verification (798–799) The limits of empiricism and knowledge (800–817)

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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF SCHOOLS 482

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BIBLIOGRAPHY 483–494