Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c7.23.2

c7.23.2

infra*, 136–9), who has performed a series of experiments, all based on the assumption that it is possible to verify the existence of a soul by sense-experience This shows indirectly that the Materialists represented, could only be satisfied by the evidence of the senses The argument of the Materialist is stated by his opponent as follows. 'I do not know this, I do not see this; *therefore* (tasmā) it does *not* exist' (Ahaṃ etaṃ na jānāmi, ahaṃ etaṃ na passāmi, tasmā taṃ natthī ti, *loc. cit.*). This is countered by the argument that it is wrong to infer from 'I do not see *X*' that '*X* does not exist'.³ An example is given of a man born blind (jaccandho puriso) who says he cannot see black or white forms (kaṇhasukkāni rūpāni), forms of various colours, the stars, the sun or the moon and argues that since he does not see them, such things do not exist. Pāyāsi is made to admit that such things do exist and that therefore the argument that what one does not see, does not exist, is false. We saw in the above quotation from the Rāmāyaṇa that it was implied that there was no hereafter, since the hereafter is beyond the reach of our senses (i.e. of perception) and therefore the hereafter does not exist. It is the logic of this same argument that is assailed here.