Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8.243

Language: English

c8.243.1

(243) It is only when the influx of karmic particles is at an end by the complete exhaustion of past karma that the soul shines forth with its natural vision and intrinsic lustre While much of the epistemological material of the Jain texts, judged from the elaborate details into which they go, may be deemed to be later than Early Buddhism it is very likely that the main elements of the theory and the different kinds of knowledge mentioned were known at a time at least coeval if not prior to Early Buddhism. If we consider the ways of knowing recorded in the Jain scriptures as shown above, without the valuation or interpretation given to them in accordance with Jain metaphysics we would have to say that the following means of knowledge are acknowledged in them namely, (1) perception, sensory and para-normal, (2) inference, (3) scripture or tradition. Paranormal or extrasensory perception would include (i) absolute knowledge or omniscience (kevala), (ii) clairvoyance and clairaudience (avadhi), and (iii) telepathy (manaḥparyāya). The Sūtras, however, regard *upamā* or comparison (analogy) as a means of knowledge different from inference. We have seen that the word *pramāṇa* was used in the sense of a 'means of knowledge' in the above quotation from the Uttarādhyayana Sūtra (*v. supra*, 237), but since the word appears to have come into currency in its technical sense during the time of Early Buddhism or at least not very much later (*v.

c8.243.2

supra*, 77), we cannot say how early or late its use in the Jain scriptures is. The earlier Jain word for a means of knowledge appears to have been not pramāṇa but *hetu*. We may see this in the classification of hetu-s in the sense of pramāṇas in the Bhagavatī and Sthānāṅga Sūtras as shown by Vidyābhūsana (*op. cit.*, p. 162): athavā *heu* cauvvihe pannatte tam jahā, *paccakkhe anumāne uvame āgame*, i.e the means of knowledge have been declared to be four-fold, viz. perception, inference, analogy and tradition. This is confirmed by the definition of the term in the Caraka Saṃhitā, which as we have shown appears to have preserved an earlier logical terminology current at the time of the Pāli Nikāyas (*v. infra*, 323). This definition reads as follows: Hetur nāmopalabdhikāraṇam tatpratyakṣam anumānam aitihyam aupamyam ity ebhir hetubhir yad upalabhyate tat tattvam (3.8.6.25), i.e. Hetu stands for the means of apprehension, viz. perception, inference, tradition and analogy, what is apprehended by means of these hetu-s is truth. We may note that of the hetu-s *pratyakṣa-* and *anumāna-* correspond to paccakkhe and anumāne of the Jain list, while *aitihyam* corresponds to āgame and *aupamyam* to uvame (=Skr. upamā). It is difficult, however, to say whether the Jains were the first to use the word in this sense.

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The Materialists are often called the 'haitukas',¹ probably because they used epistemological arguments or arguments based on hetu- in the sense of 'means of knowledge' to prove their theories or disprove their opponents (*v. supra*, 91). They may very well have been the first to use the term in this sense. The fact that the Jains did not use the term exclusively in the epistemological sense is clear from the rest of the quotation of Vidyābhūsana from the Bhaga-vatī and the Sthānānga Sūtra, where *heu* is used in the sense of 'reason' in a formula bearing a close resemblance to the general causal formula appearing in the Pāli Nikāyas (*v. infra*, 771): athavā heu cauvvihe pannatte tam jahā, atthi tam atthi so heu, atthi tam natthi so heu, natthi tam atthi so heu, natthi tam natthi so heu, i.e the reasons (heu) are declared to be four-fold, the reason why something exists because something else exists, the reason why something exists because some-thing else does not exist, the reason why something does not exist because something else exists, the reason why something does not exist because something else does not exist. As the examples given by Vidyābhūsana would show (*loc. cit.*), they are four kinds of possible correlations between causally connected events or things Thus, if x (fire) and y (smoke) are causally connected we can say that x is present because y is present, y being the reason (hetu) why we say that x is present. We may represent the four instances thus.