Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8.243.2

c8.243.2

supra*, 77), we cannot say how early or late its use in the Jain scriptures is. The earlier Jain word for a means of knowledge appears to have been not pramāṇa but *hetu*. We may see this in the classification of hetu-s in the sense of pramāṇas in the Bhagavatī and Sthānāṅga Sūtras as shown by Vidyābhūsana (*op. cit.*, p. 162): athavā *heu* cauvvihe pannatte tam jahā, *paccakkhe anumāne uvame āgame*, i.e the means of knowledge have been declared to be four-fold, viz. perception, inference, analogy and tradition. This is confirmed by the definition of the term in the Caraka Saṃhitā, which as we have shown appears to have preserved an earlier logical terminology current at the time of the Pāli Nikāyas (*v. infra*, 323). This definition reads as follows: Hetur nāmopalabdhikāraṇam tatpratyakṣam anumānam aitihyam aupamyam ity ebhir hetubhir yad upalabhyate tat tattvam (3.8.6.25), i.e. Hetu stands for the means of apprehension, viz. perception, inference, tradition and analogy, what is apprehended by means of these hetu-s is truth. We may note that of the hetu-s *pratyakṣa-* and *anumāna-* correspond to paccakkhe and anumāne of the Jain list, while *aitihyam* corresponds to āgame and *aupamyam* to uvame (=Skr. upamā). It is difficult, however, to say whether the Jains were the first to use the word in this sense.