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Purva-Mimamsa in its Sources c12: Chapter VII: Things of the World

Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources c12

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Chapter VII: Things of the World

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We have seen that the things of the World—the Objects of Cognition—are real. Now there arises the question—What are these things? Under what general heads are they classified by the Mīmāṃsaka? So far we have not met with any systematic account of these ‘Padārthas’ or categories, in the Bhāṣya, or in the Bṛhatī or in the Ślokavārtika or in the Tantravārtika.

(A) Śabara

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The only indication that we find in the Bhāṣya is under Sū. 10.3.44, where ‘kinds of things’ are mentioned as Dravya (Substance), Guṇa (Quality), Karma (Action) and Avayava (Constituent Part).

(B) Prabhākara

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As regards the Prābhākara view, we glean the following from Prakaraṇapañchikā:—

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Prefacing the proof of ‘Similarity’ as a distinct category (on p. 110) it says that it cannot come under any of the well-known categories—Substance, Quality, Action, Community, Inherence and Ultimate Individuality; which are precisely the six categories of the Vaiśeṣika. But in regard to the last, Ultimate Individuality, it adds that ‘People learned in this Science do not accept any such category.’ From this it is clear that Prābhākara admits the first five categories of the Vaiśeṣika, and he posits ‘Similarity’ in place of the Vaiśeṣika’s ‘Viśeṣa’ (Ultimate Individuality).—The same work (on the same page, 110) provides the following account of this ‘Similarity.’—It is something entirely different from Substance and the other categories, as is proved by the fact that it enters into our Consciousness exactly in the same manner as any other category, and our Consciousness is the sole criterion regarding the existence of things. This ‘Similarity’ cannot be regarded as a ‘Substance,’ because it is found in Quality and Action also, and no Substance is known to subsist in the latter, though we speak of similar colours, similar actions, and so forth.—Similarity cannot be classed under Jāti, Community; because it does not form the basis of any comprehensive conception (says Bṛhatī, MS. p. 86).—Inherence is a kind of Relation, hence Similarity cannot be classed under that. As regards the Vaiśeṣika category of ‘Viśeṣa,’ Ultimate Individuality, it is only the quality of Separateness, which separates—differentiates—the ultimate substances in the shape of Atoms. Whatever it is, it is quite contrary to Similarity. For these reasons Similarity must be regarded as a distinct category; it is apprehended as subsisting in perceptible things, through the apprehension of such qualities, actions and constituents as are common to the things concerned.

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As regards Śakti, Potency, Force, Power, as a distinct category—we learn from the Prakaraṇapañchikā (pp. 81-82) as follows:—Everything in the world is found to be possessed of some sort of Śakti, Potency, Power or Capacity; it cannot be perceived, but it can be inferred; for instance, Fire is always seen to bring about a certain Effect, in the shape of Burning; but the same Fire, when under the influence of certain incantations, fails to bring about that effect; there has been no change in the visible form of the Fire that can account for this phenomenon, the visible form of the Fire remaining exactly the same in both cases. This leads us to the conclusion that there is something in the Fire by virtue of which it can Burn, and in the absence whereof it cannot burn. From this we are led on to conclude that in all things there is something which enables them to produce their Effects, being deprived of which they are unable to do so. To this imperceptible something, we give the name Śakti, Potency Power, or Capacity.—In eternal things this Potency is eternal, but in transitory things it is brought into existence along with the things themselves. This Śakti cannot be the same as Saṁskāra, Embellishment; as this latter is ephemeral in Eternal things also.

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Karman, ‘Action,’ also is one of the perceptible categories. When a thing moves, what we actually see is, not the moving of the thing, but only the various conjunctions and disjunctions that the thing passes through with certain points in space; the expression ‘the thing moves’ also refers to these same conjunctions and disjunctions; and yet these conjunctions and disjunctions cannot be regarded as the ‘Action’ of moving, because the Action subsists entirely in the *active* thing, while the conjunctions and disjunctions subsist in outside points of space; and as it is only these conjunctions and disjunctions that are seen, *Action* cannot be held to be *perceptible*; it can only be *inferred* (from the said conjunctions and disjunctions). (*Prakaraṇapañchikā*, pp. 78-79.) This is not admitted by the followers of Kumārila (see *Śāstradīpikā*, p. 50).

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*Samavāya*, Inherence, says the *Prakaraṇapañchikā*, (pp. 26-27) cannot be regarded as everlasting; because it is actually found to be ephemeral; for instance, the Inherence between the Community and the Individual comes into existence when that Individual is produced, and perishes as soon as that Individual perishes.

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As regards *Substance*, we find four—Earth, Water, Air and Fire—mentioned in the *Prakaraṇapañchikā* (p. 24), where also we find the term ‘*Gaganādayaḥ*’; so *Gagana*, *Ākāsha*, would be the fifth; (6) *Ātman*, Soul, is admitted to be a *Substance* under the chapter called *Tattrāloka*, where also (7) *Manas*, Mind, is mentioned as a *Substance* whose contact with the Soul brings about Cognition, Pleasure and Pain etc. Again on p. 84, we find the *Eternal Substances* enumerated, wherein, apart from *Atoms*, *Ākāsha* and *Ātman* (Soul), we also find Time (8) and Space (9). As regards *Tamas*, Darkness, which some people regard as a *Substance* by itself, the *Prakaraṇapañchikā* (pp. 142-145) says it is only absence of *Light*. Of the *Substances*, Earth, Water, Air and Fire are perceptible by the visual as also by the Tactile Organ; *Ākāsha* and the rest cannot be regarded as perceptible, because they cannot be seen or touched or heard. (*Prakaraṇapañchikā*, p. 24.) *Ākāsha* cannot be seen by the eye, because it is devoid of colour; if it had colour, it would also be tangible; as Colour and Tangibility go together, the whiteness that appears in *Ākāsha* belongs to the patches of Fire hanging in the atmosphere; and the Darkness noticed at night is not the quality of anything, it is only *absence of Light*: if it were something positive, it would be visible during the day also. (*Prakaraṇapañchikā*, pp. 143-144.) In this connection it may be noted that as *Ākāsha* is imperceptible, it cannot form one of the constituents of the Body. Though *Ākāsha* cannot be perceived, it can be *inferred* as the Substratum of Sound; Sound cannot belong to the source from which it proceeds, because the organ of Hearing can apprehend only what it can get at, reach, and it can never *get at* the source of Sound. (*Prakaraṇañchikā*, p. 145.)

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The touch of Air is *neither hot nor cold*; its apparent *coolness* is due to the water-particles hanging in the Air, and the *Heat* to the fire-particles floating in it. (*Ibid.*, pp. 77-78.)

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Among Qualities, Colour, Taste, Odour, Touch, Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority Posteriority, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion and Effort are perceptible.—Conjunction is of three kinds—(1) Due to both members, (2) Due to the action of either of them and (3) Due to another Conjunction. (*Pra. Pañ.*, pp. 26 and 151.)

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Composite *Wholes* or *Aggregates* are of four kinds—Earth, Water, Fire and Air; the first three are of large dimensions, and having colour, are perceptible by the senses, by the organ of *Touch* and by the organ of *Vision*. Air being devoid of colour, is perceptible by the organ of *Touch* alone.—The Atoms of these substances are, by their very nature, imperceptible; so also is the compound of *two atoms*; as the large dimension, which is a necessary condition in all perceptibility, is present only in such substances as have *many*, *i.e.*, not less than three constituent particles. —*Ākāsha*, *Time* and *Space*, even though of large *Dimensions*, are not perceptible, as they are devoid of *Touch* and *Colour*.

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This is all we can glean from *Prābhākara Sources*, but a comparatively recent work, the *Sarvasiddhāntarahasya* supplies us with the following information.—According to the *Prābhākara*, there are the following categories—*Substance*, *Quality*, *Action*, *Community*, *Paratantratā* (which appears to be the same as *Subsistence* or *Inherence*), *Shakti* (Potency, Power, Capacity), *Similarity* and *Number*. *Action* is inferred from the disjunction of a thing from one point in Space and its conjunction with another. *Inherence* is not Eternal, because it subsists in perishable things also, and being a relation thereof, it could not be eternal. Nor can it be *one*; it is as many as there are things in the world. *Potency*, *Power* or *Capacity* is the common name given to that by virtue of which, *Substances*, *Qualities* and *Actions* and *Communities* come to be regarded as the ‘Cause’ of things; it is to be inferred from particular Effects; it is Eternal in Eternal things, and perishable in perishable things. *Similarity*, like Potency, cannot come under any other category, and hence has to be regarded as a distinct category. The *Viśeṣa*, *Ultimate Individuality*, of the Vaiśeṣika cannot be a category; because the differentiation among Eternal things—like Ākāśa, Atoms, etc.,—for the purpose whereof the Viśeṣa has been posited—can always be done on the basis of the ordinary qualities of the things concerned.

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Apart from other things the mention in this work of ‘Number’ as a distinct category by itself appears to be clearly wrong; as the Prakaraṇapañchikā (on p. 54) speaks of Number as a ‘Quality’.

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In reference to *Darkness* as a *Substance*, and its perceptibility, there is an interesting verse current among Pandits:—

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तमो द्रव्यं नैल्याद् घटवदिति माने समुदिते
यदीदं रूपि स्यात् किमिह न भवेत् स्पर्शनगुणः ।
इतीमं सत्तर्कं शिथिलयितुमंतर्व्यवसिता
तमोवृन्दं धत्ते कचभरमिषेणेन्दुवदना ॥

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“The Upholder of Darkness as an independent Substance argues—‘Darkness is a Substance, because it is black, like the Jar,’—whereupon the other party puts forward the confutation—‘If it had colour, it should be amenable to Touch also.’—In order to weaken the force of this confutation, says the poet, the fair-faced girl bears the mass of black hair, in order to show that Darkness is both dark-coloured and tangible.”

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(C) THINGS OF THE WORLD—ACCORDING TO KUMĀRILA.

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The *Sarvasiddhāntarahasya* has the following:—

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All categories, according to the *Bhaṭṭa*, are classed under two heads—*Bhāva*, Positive, and *Abhāva*, Negative. The latter is of four kinds—Prior Negation, Utter Destruction, Absolute Negation and Mutual Negation.—Positive categories, there are four,—viz., Substance, Quality, Action and Community. Of Substance, there are eleven—Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Ākāśa, Space, Time, Soul, Mind, Darkness and Sound. Some people mention Gold as the twelfth. Of Qualities, there are thirteen—viz., Colour, Taste, Odour, Touch, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority, Gravity, Fluidity and Viscidity.—Of Actions there are five—viz., Throwing upwads and the rest.—Communities there are two—Higher and Lower. *Śakti* (Potency) and *Sādṛśya* (Similarity) are included under ‘Substance.’ Of Potency, there are two kinds—*Sahaja*, Inborn,, and *Adhyeya* Extraneous, Imposed from without.

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All that we can glean from the original *Bhaṭṭa* sources is as follows:—

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‘Similarity’ cannot be a distinct category by itself; if it were so, we could not account for the varying degrees of *Similarity* between things and things. Nor is there any reason for regarding it as a category; in fact, it consists only in the presence in one thing of the character and conditions present in another thing.’ (*Śāstradīpikā*, p. 52.)

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As regards *Karman*, Action, it is not something to be *inferred* (as held by *Prabhākara*), it is directly *perceived*.—It cannot be regarded as only *Inferred*; because it could be inferred only as the non-constituent cause of the conjunctions and disjunctions of the *active* object with points in space; and as such, it would have to be cognised as subsisting in that thing as well as in Space. As a matter of fact, however, it is cognised in the thing only. Action must be regarded as perceived; we actually see the thing passing through certain conjunctions and disjunctions with points in Space; but the cognition that we have is that what brings about these conjunctions and disjunctions lies in the thing and not in Space; and that which forms the basis of this cognition is called the *Action* of the thing. (*Śāstradīpikā*, p. 50.)

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*Samavāya*, ‘Inherence,’ is denied—(vide *Ślokavārtika* 1.1.4, *Pratyakṣa*, 146—150)—as a relation, between the Community and the Individual, for instance. Because so long as the Individual has not come into existence, there can be no real relation, and there is only one of the two relatives concerned; and after the Individual has come into existence, before the relation has been established, it cannot be regarded as a permanent, inseparable, relationship. In fact the relationship cannot be anything distinct from the things themselves among whom it is supposed by the (*Vaiśeṣika*) to subsist.

Cites (2)