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Purva-Mimamsa in its Sources c12.s2.2

Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources c12.s2.2

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c12.s2.2

Prefacing the proof of ‘Similarity’ as a distinct category (on p. 110) it says that it cannot come under any of the well-known categories—Substance, Quality, Action, Community, Inherence and Ultimate Individuality; which are precisely the six categories of the Vaiśeṣika. But in regard to the last, Ultimate Individuality, it adds that ‘People learned in this Science do not accept any such category.’ From this it is clear that Prābhākara admits the first five categories of the Vaiśeṣika, and he posits ‘Similarity’ in place of the Vaiśeṣika’s ‘Viśeṣa’ (Ultimate Individuality).—The same work (on the same page, 110) provides the following account of this ‘Similarity.’—It is something entirely different from Substance and the other categories, as is proved by the fact that it enters into our Consciousness exactly in the same manner as any other category, and our Consciousness is the sole criterion regarding the existence of things. This ‘Similarity’ cannot be regarded as a ‘Substance,’ because it is found in Quality and Action also, and no Substance is known to subsist in the latter, though we speak of similar colours, similar actions, and so forth.—Similarity cannot be classed under Jāti, Community; because it does not form the basis of any comprehensive conception (says Bṛhatī, MS. p. 86).—Inherence is a kind of Relation, hence Similarity cannot be classed under that. As regards the Vaiśeṣika category of ‘Viśeṣa,’ Ultimate Individuality, it is only the quality of Separateness, which separates—differentiates—the ultimate substances in the shape of Atoms. Whatever it is, it is quite contrary to Similarity. For these reasons Similarity must be regarded as a distinct category; it is apprehended as subsisting in perceptible things, through the apprehension of such qualities, actions and constituents as are common to the things concerned.