Purva-Mimamsa in its Sources c19.s1.15

c19.s1.15

This view of *Verbal Cognition* and *Shabda-Pramāṇa* has been set forth in the *Prakaraṇapañchikā* (pp. 15 et seq); where we read—It is only the *Veda* that can be called *Shabda-Pramāṇa*; and that also only when containing an *Injunction*; words of common parlance cannot be so, because the Cognition produced by them is purely inferential. When, for instance, we hear a man saying something, our mind goes through the following reasoning—‘This man speaks of such and such a thing—this he must be speaking of after having known what he speaks of,—hence what he says must be true’. The speech of the man is an effect of his knowledge, and hence from the Effect (Speech) we infer its Cause (the man’s knowledge). Thus all ordinary *Verbal Cognition* is *inferential*, while that provided by the *Veda* alone is purely *Verbal*. It is true that all Words are endowed with an inborn denotative potency, but in the case of the ordinary speakers of the world, this inborn potency of the Word becomes obscured by the suspicions regarding the capacity and trustworthy character of the person concerned. On the other hand, in the case of the *Veda*, there being no speaker concerned, there can be no grounds for such suspicion, and the inherent Potency remains unobscured.