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Purva-Mimamsa in its Sources c22: Chapter XVII: Arthapatti—Presumption

Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources c22

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Chapter XVII: Arthapatti—Presumption

According to Shabara

c22.s1.1

Presumption consists in the presuming of something not seen, on the ground that a fact already seen or heard of cannot be explained without that presumption. For instance, it is found that Devadatta, who is alive, is not in the house, and this *Non-Existence in the House* leads to the *Presumption* that he is somewhere outside the house; as without this, the aforesaid fact of his being alive and not in the House could not be explained. (*Bhāṣya*, Trs., p. 16.)

Presumption—according to Prabhākara

c22.s2.1

What ‘cannot be explained’—without the Presumption—is ‘Non-Existence outside’ along with ‘Non-Existence in the house’ (which latter is directly perceived). Hence, the perception of Non-Existence in the House becomes the source of *Inexplicability* of the man’s *Existence* (i.e., being alive) without the recognition of the connection of that Existence with outside. This ‘in-explicability’ consists in contrariness (inconsistency) to other Means of Right Cognition. The process is as follows:—(a) First of all there is Perception of the fact that the Man is not in the House;—(b) so long as the connection of the Man’s Existence with outside is not duly known,—the fact of his being in existence (alive), though well-known, becomes uncertain, open to doubt.—“The Man not being in the House, is he alive at all?”—and (c) the *Existence*, thus rendered doubtful, is finally cognised as connected with *outside*. Thus what is inexplicable is the Man’s Existence (being alive); and this becomes explained by his existence *outside*, which thus forms the objective of the Presumptive Cognition.—(*Rjuvimalā*, pp. 112-113.)

c22.s2.2

Though the *Bhāṣya* has mentioned only two forms of Cognitions—*Seen* or *Heard* of—yet what is meant is whatever may be a fact duly ascertained through any of the Means of Right Cognition. So that the expession ‘Seen or Heard’ is an idiomatic one which is used in the sense of ‘Well-known’; such is the well-established usage.

c22.s2.3

This appears to be in anticipation of *Kumārila*'s view, by which ‘Seen’ stands for what is well-ascertained through all the six Means of Cognition (Perception, Inference, Analogical Cognition, Verbal Cognition, Presumption and Negation), and he finds a special purpose in the separate mention of the ‘Heard’ fact.—(*Shlo. Vā.*, Presumption, 1-2) where we read:—

c22.s2.4

प्रमाणग्राहिणीत्वेन यस्मात् पूर्वविलक्षणा

c22.s2.5

[ श्रुतोद्भवा अर्थापत्तिः ]

c22.s2.6

according to which the *Presumption* based upon Verbal Cognition is in the form of Words, i.e., the words ‘He eats at night.’ This is contested in detail by the *Ṛjuvimalā*, pp. 115—117,—according to which what is presumed is the *fact of the man eating at night*, not the *Verbal Cognition* that ‘he eats at night.’

Kumārila's View of Presumption

c22.s3.1

The above explanation of the process of Presumption is not accepted by the *Bhaṭṭa*. He demurs specially to what has been said regarding the Element of *Doubt*. He argues that in the example cited, if the man's *Existence* (being alive) were at all *doubtful*, it could not afford a sound basis for the requisite Presumption; it is only when the Man's *Existence* is known with *certainty* that it can warrant the presumption of his being out. Further, the doubt regarding the man's existence could be set aside only by the *certain Cognition* of his Existence (in general)—not necessarily by the *certain Cognition* of his Existence *outside* (*Shāstradīpikā*, pp. 53-54). According to the *Bhaṭṭa*, the basis of Presumption lies, not in *Doubt*, but in mental *irreconcilability* or inconsistency between two well-ascertained facts; which inconsistency is removed by the Cognition of a *third* fact; and it is this last Cognition that constitutes *Presumption*. (*Ibid.*, p. 55—There is no *inconsistency* between well-ascertained facts in the case of Inference, and it is in this, according to the *Bhaṭṭa*, that lies the difference betwen Inference and Presumption.

c22.s3.2

The *Shlokavārtika* (Chapter on Presumption) supplies the following definition of Presumption:—(1) ‘When a fact ascertained by any of the six Means of Cognition is found to be inexplicable except on the basis of a fact not so ascertained,—the assumption of this latter fact is what constitutes *Presumption*.’

c22.s3.3

(1) An example of Presumption based upon a *perceived fact* we have in the presuming of the *Burning Capacity* in Fire, which is based on the perceived fact that it burns. (2) An example of Presumption based upon an *inferred fact*, we have in the presuming of the *Moving Capacity* in the Sun, which is based upon the *inferred fact* that the Sun moves from place to place. (3) An example of Presumption based upon *analogically cognised fact* we have in the presuming of the *Cognisability of the Cow* by the Cognition born of the Similarity between the Cow and the *Gavaya*. (4) An example of Presumption based upon Presumption is found in the Cognition of the denotative potency of the Word through Presumption based upon the well-known fact that it denotes certain things,—and on the basis of the said *presumed Denotative Potency*;—which cannot be otherwise explained,—we presume the *Eternality of the Word*. (5) An example of Presumption based upon Negation or Non-Apprehension we have in the case where the non-apprehension of Devadatta leads to the Presumption of his being *outside*. (*Shlo. Vā.*, Presumption 3—8). This last cannot be included under Inference (*Ibid.*, 9—50). (6) An example of Presumption on the basis of a *Verbally Cognised* (Heard of) Fact, we have in the following case:—When one hears the assertion ‘So and so is fat and yet ‘he eats not during the day,’—he is led to the Presumption that ‘the man eats at night’ (*Ibid.*, 51).

c22.s3.4

In regard to the exact form of this last kind of Presumption, there is a difference of opinion: Some people hold that the Presumption is of the *fact* of the man eating at night, while according to others, the Presumption is of the *Verbal Assertion* that ‘he eats at night.’ (*Ibid.*—52). All are agreed in regarding this sixth form of Presumption as not entirely different from *Āgama*, Verbal Cognition. (*Ibid.* 52). And the reason for this view lies in the fact that all cognitions derived from the Vedic text belong to this category; and all these would be ‘Non-Vedic,’ ‘Non-Scriptural,’ if this Presumption were entirely different from Verbal Cognition. (53.) Though the Presumption in question has the character of Verbal Cognition,—being expressed by means of the Words ‘He eats at night,’—yet what we have to consider is the sanction behind this Verbal Assertion. This sanction cannot be held to be provided by Perception, because the presumed assertion is not actually heard; nor by Inference; as no connection of the two has been observed; (pp. 58—60). Nor can the requisite sanction be derived from another Verbal Expression, (72);—nor from Analogical Cognition (74). Thus the only sanction—proof, means of Cognition—for Cognition derived from the heard words ‘He eats not during the day’—lies in Presumption only (76).

c22.s3.5

Such is the conclusion of the philosophers who hold that what is *presumed* in this case is the *Verbal Assertion* (‘He eats at night’), not the *fact* of his eating at night. That is, the assertion that ‘He eats at night’ is presumed from the inconsistency and inexplicability involved in the assertion that ‘Being fat, he eats not during the day’ (Nyāyaratnākara on 76).

c22.s3.6

This is followed in the *Shlo. Vā.* by a long discussion from the point of view—that what is *presumed* is the *fact of eating at night*, not the *assertion* ‘He eats at night.’ And Kumārila comes to this conclusion that as a matter of fact, all Conceptual (Determinate) Cognition is accompanied and preceded by *Verbal Cognition*, and that in the case in question, as soon as the Verbal Expression ‘he eats at night’ appears, the inconsistency involved in the previous assertion (‘Being fat, he eats not during the day’) disappears; and there is no further inconsistency left which could serve as the basis of the *presumption of the fact* as apart from the words expressing it. (*Shlo. Vā.*, *Presumption*, 78.)