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Purva-Mimamsa in its Sources c25: Chapter XX: Extent and Content of Veda

Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources c25

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Chapter XX: Extent and Content of Veda

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the authority of the Veda.—The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that the *Mantra-texts* are meant only to be repeated in their verbal form, they are not intended to convey any meaning; and this for the following reasons:—(a) Because there are separate injunctive texts laying down the use of the *Mantras*; this would not be necessary if the *Mantra* itself expressed any meaning, as in that case the use of the *Mantra* would be indicated by that meaning itself;—(b) because the exact order of the words of the *Mantra* is insisted upon; this would not be necessary if any significance were attached to the meaning of the texts,—as any change in the order of the words would not affect the meaning;—(c) because they speak of things that do not exist;—(d) because the meaning is not always intelligible;—for these reasons *Mantras* cannot be regarded as conveying any meaning.—The Final Conclusion is that being Sentences, like any ordinary Sentence, the *Mantra-texts* should be regarded to be as expressive as any other sentence. In cases where the meaning is not intelligible, it is not that there is no meaning; it is there always, only people are ignorant of it. There are certain *Brāhmaṇa-texts* also which already point to the expressive character of *Mantras*. (*Shabara-Bhā., Trs., pp. 74—86.*)

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Being expressive,—and serving the purpose of asserting and recalling things in connection with the acts enjoined by the Injunctive texts, *Mantras* are clearly helpful in providing the knowledge of *Dharma*. Only those *Mantra-texts* which are not found to serve such purposes are to be used at the performances in their purely verbal form; and even so they serve a distinctly useful purpose in relation to what is *Dharma*.

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According to *Murāri Mishra*, the question relating to *Mantras* is—Do they help the Act by their *utterance* only, or through expressing something useful in relation to the Act to be done; and the *Siddhānta*, he says, is as stated in the ‘*Nibandhana*’; he does not specify which work he means by this title; but it is clear that he means the *Bṛhatī*; as his statement of the *Pūrvapakṣa* is in greater accord with that than with the *Tantravārtika*.—He says—

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सकलदेशनाप्रामाण्याक्षेपेणैव पूर्वपक्षः ।

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In this connection, *Murāri* criticises the view of *Chandra*, an old writer on *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*.

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Mantras have been classed under three heads—(1) *Ṛk*, (2) *Yajuṣ*, (3) *Sāman*. These have been defined under *Sūtras* 2.1.35 et. seq. All these three are found mentioned in the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* 1.2.1.26.

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The *Ṛk* has been defined (2.1.35) as that where there is division into ‘feet,’ on the basis of meaning. That is, that Mantra is called *Ṛk* where there is division into ‘feet’; e.g., (1) ‘*Kētuṁ kṛṇvannakētavē*—(2) *pēsho maryā apēshasē*—(3) *samuṣadhbirajāyathāḥ*.’ (*R.V.*, 1.6.3.) That the division into ‘feet’ should be on the basis of the meaning is not meant to be emphasised. For if it were, then the name *Ṛk*. would not be applicable to those texts where the division into ‘feet’ is on the basis of metre, not of meaning. The exact definition of the ‘*Ṛk*’ therefore is only that it is that Mantra where there is division into ‘feet’. (*Shabara, Trs.*, p. 207.)

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The name ‘*Sāman*’ is applied to the music—says *Sā.*, 2.1.36. The particular music to which a Mantra is set is called ‘*Sāman*’; it is only when a Mantra is set to music and so sung that it is called ‘*Sāman*.’ In this matter, the teaching of the learned is our sole authority. So when the term ‘*Sāman*’ is applied to Mantras set to music, the name stands for the music to which the Mantra (*Ṛk*) has been set; and the name is applied to the Mantra itself only indirectly through its connection with that music. (*Shabara, Trs.*, p. 208.)

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Under *Sū.* 7.2.1—21; (*Shabara, Trs.*, pp. 1252, etc.) also we are told that the various *Sāman-names*—‘*Rathantara*’ etc.—should be taken as denoting music. That this is so is shown by the fact that the name ‘*Rathantara-Sāman*’ is applied also to cases where there is no basic verse at all (*Sū.* 14); e.g., we have the text—‘He sings the *Prajāpati-hṛdaya* without a verse.’ In fact, these particular names are applied on the basis of the difference in the modulations (*Sū.* 16)—The Final Conclusion thus is that the term ‘*Sāman*’ (and its varieties, ‘*Rathantara*’ etc.) stand for the music (not for the words or texts).—(*Shabara, Trs.*, p. 1265.)

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The same conclusion is more clearly reiterated under *Sū.* 9.2.1 et seq. where the *Bhāṣya* (p. 1493) says—‘From all this it follows that the name *Sāman* applies to Music only, not to the Mantra-text set to music.’ Under *Sū.* 3 (p. 1496) we are told that the *Sāman* is only an Embellishment of the words that are sung, because the *singing* (which is *Sāman*) cannot be a primary act, as it subserves the purpose of the words (Sū. 6); *i.e.*, the *Sāman* (music) is clearly perceived to be something helpful to the words.

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*Sāmans* have been divided into several kinds—*Rathantara*, *Brhat*, *Vairūpa*, *Vairāja*, *Shakvara*, *Raivata* and so forth. They have been described in *Mīmāmsābālaprakāsha*. This division appears to be based upon the different methods of singing; *e.g.*, the *Brhat-Sāman* is to be sung with force and *very loudly*, while the *Rathantara* is sung *not loudly, nor with force* (Mī. Sū., 9.2.46).

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It would follow from this that the *Sāman* should not be treated as a kind of *Mantra* or *Rk*.

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On this point Kumārila remarks as follows (*Tantravārtika*, Trs., p. 579).—The *Sāman*, being sung and being a qualification, and the *Mantra*-text being the *qualified*, the word ‘*Sāman*’ denotes the Sung *Mantra* or *Mantra* set to music in the same way as the word ‘Cow’ denotes the Class ‘Cow’ qualified by the Individual; in this same sense the qualifying factor—the *music*—is said to be denoted by the word ‘*Sāman*.’

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If the *Sāman* is only the *music*, and is only an Embellishment,—that is, brought about by the Singer,—to that extent it cannot be eternal, and hence cannot be regarded as Veda proper, which is independent of all sources, human or divine. For instance, the syllable ‘*hā*’ ‘*hau*’ and the like which are introduced by the Singer into the *Mantra* through the exigencies of music, are always variable, being dependent upon the Singer, who may or may not introduce a certain syllable or set of syllables. Says Shabara on Sū., 9.2.29 (*Trs.*, p. 1521)—*Singing* is an act; it gives expression to particular sound-notes produced by the volitional effort of man,—for the purposes of securing the required Music; it becomes necessary to have recourse to (*a*) Modifications of the Syllables contained in the *Mantra-text*, (*b*) to Disjunction, (*c*) to Withdrawal, (*d*) to Repetition, (*e*) to Pause, (*f*) to Breaks and so forth. What therefore is due to the effort of man cannot be eternal.

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In the case of all *Mantras*, whenever they are recited in *praise* of something, they must be set to music and sung in the *Sāman*- form; as the Praise is always more pleasing when it is sung than when it is merely recited. This has been declared under Sū. 9.2.31 (*Shabara*).

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The name ‘*Yajuṣ*’ is applied to the rest of the Mantras—says Sū. 2.1.37; on this the Bhāṣya says:—It is not necessary to propound a definition of *Yajuṣ*, the third kind of Mantra, because by the process of elimination, the nature of the *Yajuṣ* would be understood from the definitions of *Ṛk*, and *Sāman*; i.e., that Mantra which is not set to Music and wherein there is no division into feet, is *Yajuṣ*; i.e., the whole of it is one continuous sentence.—(*Shabara*, *Trs.*, p. 209.)

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There is another name met with in this connection—‘*Nigada*.’ It has been given to Mantras that are in the form of address or praise. They may be considered to belong to a separate class, because they have been mentioned separately in the text—‘The *Ṛk* is to be recited loudly, the *Sāman* is sung loudly, the *Yajuṣ* is recited softly; and the *Nigada* is recited loudly.’ In other ways it is similar to *Yajuṣ*,—but the injunction that it is to be sung *loudly* differentiates it from the *Yajuṣ* which is sung *softly*.—The conclusion on this question is that the *Nigada* is to be classed as ‘*Yajuṣ*’ because it has the same mixed and continuous form as the *Yajuṣ*; and like the *Yajuṣ*, the *Nigada* also is ‘different from *Ṛk* and *Sāman*.’ As regards the different method of reciting it, that is due to the fact of its being addressed to other persons; which serves a distinctly useful purpose. If the *Nigada* were uttered softly, like the *Yajuṣ*, it could not be heard by other persons and hence it could not convey any idea to them. It is for this reason that it has to be recited in a different manner. Thus, then *Nigadas* may be defined as those *Yajuṣ-Mantras* that are pronounced loudly. The different name also is for the purpose of indicating this peculiarity. The name ‘*Nigada*’ cannot apply to *Ṛk-Mantras*, as there is a text which clearly mentions the two (*Ṛk* and *Nigada*) separately—‘*Ayājyā vai nigadāḥ, ṛchaiva yajanti*.’ The very name ‘*Nigada*’ indicates that it is prose (*Gadya*), while the *Ṛk* is metrical.—(*Shabara*—*Trs.*, pp. 210 212).

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The word ‘*Pṛṣṭha*’ is sometimes used to signify the *Ṛgveda*. Under Sū. 7.3.36 (*Shabara*, *Trs.*, p. 1298), it is asserted that the term stands for the Substance, i.e., for the words of the *Ṛk-verses*.

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Again on page 1299—‘The term ‘*Pṛṣṭha*’ stands for the *Mantras*’;—and again, ‘The term ‘*Pṛṣṭha*’ stands for the *Mantra-text*.’

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The *Bhāṣya* (on Sū. 2.1.32; Trs., pp. 202-203) has noted a few details regarding the characteristic features of the different kinds of *Mantra*,—(a) Those ending in ‘*asi*’—‘*Mēdho’si*’;—(b) Ending in ‘*tvā*’—‘*Iṣē tvā*’ (*Vāja. Saṁ.* 1. 1);—(c) Well-wishing;—‘*Ayurdā asi, etc.*’ (*T. S.*, 1.6.6.1); (d) Eulogistic—‘*Agnimūrdhā, etc.*’ (*T. S.*, 4.4.4.1); (e) Expressive of Number,—‘*Eko mama, etc.*’ (*Sh. Br.*, 1.5.5.12); (f) Incoherent talk,—‘*Akṣi te indra, etc.*’; (g) Bewailing—‘*Ambē ambikē ambālikē, etc.*’ (*Vāja. S.* 23. 18); (h) Directory,—‘*Agnīdagnīn vihara*’ (*T. S.*, 6.3.2);—(i) Searching,—‘*Ko’si katano’si, etc.*’ (*V. S.*, 7.29);—(j) Questioning,—‘*Pṛchchhāmi tvā, etc.*’ (*V. S.*, 23, 61);—(k) Descriptive,—‘*Iyaṁ vēdiḥ, etc.*’ (*V. S.*, 23. 62);—(l) Elliptical Extension,—‘*Achchhidrēṇa pavitrēṇa, etc.*’ (*V. S.*, 4.4);—(m) Performance,—‘*Traisvaryam, etc.*’; (n) Capability,—*i.e.*, power of expression. All this, indicated by the *Vṛttikāra* is only illustrative, not exhaustive. There are, for instance, several *Mantras* which have the word ‘*asi*’ in the middle and not at the end; *e.g.*, ‘*Iḍyashchāsi vandyashcha vājin*’ (*V. S.*, 29. 3); also some having ‘*tvā*’ in the middle; *e.g.*, ‘*Tat tvāyāmi.*’ Then again amongst *Brāhmaṇa*-texts also, we find—(a) Well-wishing texts; ‘*So’kāmayata prajāḥ sṛjēya.*’—(b) Eulogistic texts also are found among the *Brāhmaṇa-texts*,—‘*Vāyurvai kṣēpiṣṭhā dēvatā*’ (*T. S.*, 2.1.1.1); also Incoherent texts ‘*Na chaitad vidmo brāhmaṇā vā, etc.*’ (*Mait. S.*, 1.4.11); also Rewailing—‘*Ye mānadhukṣanta, etc.*’; Directory,—*e.g.*, ‘*Amutaḥ somamāhara.*’ ‘Searching—‘*Iha vā sa iha vā, etc.*’;—Questioning—‘*Vēda karaṇaratam, etc.*’ Answer—‘*Vidmo vā, etc.*’;—Elliptical Extension—‘*Hṛdayasyāgrē’ vadyati atha jihvāyāḥ, etc.*’;—Performance,—‘*Traisvaryam, etc.*’; Capacity,—‘*Sruvēṇavadyati, etc.*’;—Thus the description supplied by the *Vṛttikāra* is neither inclusive of all *Mantras*, nor exclusive of all Non-*Mantras*.

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The above classification of *Mantras* into *Ṛk*, *Yajuṣ* and *Sāman* is the main one. There is also another classification based upon the diversity in the character of the significance, of accentuation and so forth. This classification is applicable to the *Ṛk* and *Yajuṣ Mantras*. Of the *Ṛk* there are 273 kinds and of the latter 50. These have been described and exemplified by *Śaṅkara Bhaṭṭa* in his *Mīmānsā-bāla-prakāsha*, pp. 58—70.

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Mantras have also been classified according to their metre. This classification pertains to the *Ṛk Mantras* only. The following are the principal metres:—

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(1) *Gāyatrī*—24 Syllables—9 Subdivisions.

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(2) *Uṣṇik*—28 Syllables—7 Subdivisions.

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(3) *Anuṣṭubh*—32 Syllables—7 Subdivisions.

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(4) *Bṛhatī*—36 Syllables—9 Subdivisions.

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(5) *Paṅkti*—40 Syllables—8 Subdivisions.

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(6) *Triṣṭubh*—44 Syllables—10 Subdivisions.

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(7) *Jagatī*—48 Syllables—8 Subdivisions.

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(8) *Atijagatī*—52 Syllables.

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(9) *Śakvarī*—56 Syllables.

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(10) *Atiśakvarī*—60 Syllables.

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(11) *Aṣṭi*—64 Syllables.

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(12) *Atyaṣṭi*—68 Syllables.

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(13) *Dhṛti*—72 Syllables.

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(14) *Atidhṛti*—76 Syllables.

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Of these the *Gāyatrī*, *Triṣṭubh* and *Jagatī* are mentioned in *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*, 1.2.2.6; 3.4.22; 3.4.4.8; and 4.1.1.8; and others are mentioned in 8.2.2.6.

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For further details about Metre, see *Mīmāṁsābālaprakāśa*, pp. 56—70.

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From the very definitions of the *Ṛk* and *Yajuṣ* it would follow that there can be no metre in the *Yajuṣ Mantras*. But *Piṅgala* in his *Chhandaḥ-Sūtra* has declared that there are metres in these also. That this is a later innovation is indicated by the fact that true ‘Vedic authority’ is not accepted by many old writers (*Karka* among others) to belong to those *Yajuṣ Mantras* that are distinguished and characterised by metres;—and that even those who accept the authority of those *Mantras* (e.g., *Devayājñika*) assert that there is no metre in many *Yajuṣ Mantras* on account of the syllables in them not being fixed. Herein may be found an orthodox authority for the view propounded by some people that the metrical portions of the *Yajurveda* are comparatively modern.

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Among Mantras there arises one difficulty which has been anticipated and provided for by Jaimini (2.1.46—48). In regard to Mantras that appear in the metrical form—i.e., Ṛk—or those set to music—i.e., Sāman,—there is not much difficulty in ascertaining how far a certain Mantra-text extends, as the termination of the text is made clear by the metre or by the music. But in the case of the Mantra-texts—in Prose—i.e., Yajuṣ and Nigada, it is sometimes difficult to ascertain how far a certain Mantra extends. It is in view of this difficulty that certain Principles or Laws of Interpretation have been laid down. These are—(1) Ekavākyādhikaraṇa—What constitutes ‘One Sentence’—The Principle of Syntactical Unit (2.1.46)—(2) Vākyabhedādhikaraṇa—‘What constitutes different Sentences?’—The Principle of Syntactical Split (2.1.47); and (3) the Anuṣaṅgādhikaraṇa—‘How an incomplete Sentence may be completed’—The Principle of Elliptical Extension (2.1.48). We shall deal with these in some detail, as they play an important part in the whole science of Mīmāṃsā and serve a directly useful purpose in all textual interpretation.

(1) Principle of Syntactical Unit—‘Ekavākyādhikaraṇa’

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This principle has been thus enunciated in Sū. 2.1.46—‘So long as a single purpose is served by a number of words, which, on being separated, are found to be wanting and incapable of effecting the said purpose, they form one ‘Syntactical Unit—one complete Yajuṣ-Mantra’.

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This form in which it is stated in the Sūtra naturally appertains to Mantras in the form of Yajuṣ. Hence, the following explanation in the Bhāṣya:—‘One Yajuṣ-Mantra extends to that extent up to which the words serve the purpose of indicating things helpful to the act of sacrifice; to that extent it is one Syntactical Unit. This is what is meant by the words of the Sūtra—‘So long as a purpose is served by a number of words.’ Therefore it comes to this that a group of words serving a single purpose, forms one Sentence,—but only if any one of these words, on being disjoined from the rest makes it wanting or defective. We have an example of this in the case of the Yajuṣ-Mantra—‘Devasya tvā savituḥ prasave, etc.’ (T. S., 1.1.4.2) . . . The assertion in the Sūtra is to be explained and justified as meaning the fulfilling of a single purpose. For instance, the said *Mantra* serves the single purpose of indicating the act of *Nirvāpa* (offering), and hence, the words are taken as *one sentence*. (*Shabara, Trs.*, pp. 213-214.)

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Thus according to the *Bhāṣya*, the Principle is meant to be applicable to *Vedic* words only, in the form of *Yajuṣ-Mantra*. It must be so if the term *Arthaikatvāt* in the *Sūtra* is taken—as it is by the *Bhāṣya*—in the sense of *serving a single purpose*; this purpose being something in connection with the *sacrificial performance*. That this is so is made still clearer by what is said in connection with the next Principle of *Vākyabhēda*, ‘*Syntactical Split*’. *Prabhākara*, in keeping with the *Bhāṣya*, explains ‘*Arthaikatvāt*’ as serving the purpose of indicating or reminding of *what is to be done*; he distinctly says that—‘the term ‘*Artha*’ stands for *Prayojana*, purpose, as the purpose is the most important factor and the words of the ‘Sentence’ must be related to that important factor.’ (*Bṛhatī MS.*, p. 51.)

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Even before *Kumārila’s* time, however, it was felt that this Principle was capable of a much more extended application, and in the *Tantravārtika* (*Trs.*, p. 583) we find an objector urging the argument that the conditions stated in the *Sūtra* are more easily recognised when applied to ordinary Sentences, than in those of the *Vedic* Mantras. *Kumārila’s* work contains such statements as—‘It must be concluded that those words on hearing which we are clearly cognisant of a *single idea* must be regarded as *one Sentence*, and it is only this definition that is found compatible with the character of every single sentence—either *ordinary*, or of the *Mantra* and *Brāhmaṇa*’ (*Tantra-vā.*, *Trs.*, p. 586). And yet so far as the opinion of the *Bhāṣya* is concerned, we find *Kumārila* declaring—‘The *Bhāṣya* explains, the words of the *Sūtra* as that collection of words which is employed as one whole, at a sacrifice, is one *Yajuṣ*.’ (*Tantra-vā.*, *Trs.*, p. 587)—and again (p. 589)—‘The reply given by the *Bhāṣya* is based mainly upon the fact that the word ‘*Artha*’ is taken in the sense of *Purpose* (and not in that of *Idea* or *Meaning*).

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Thus we find *Kumārila* accepting the explanation of the *Bhāṣya* which restricts the Principle in question to *Vedic* texts of the *Yajuṣ* class only,—and yet he is inclined to attach to it a wider signification. And we find among his followers, *Pārthārathi Mishra* favouring the restricted application according to the *Bhāṣya* by taking *Artha* in the sense of *Purpose*, while *Somēśvara Bhaṭṭa* takes the word in the sense of *Idea* and thus admits the wider scope of the Principle.

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The *Bṛhatī* (MS., p. 52A) says—‘The comprehension of the *Mantra* is dependent upon its prescribed *use*. The meaning and purpose of the *Mantra* therefore can be learnt from something apart from itself, and its extent can be ascertained from the metre. The present *Sūtra* lays down the *extent* of the *Mantra*. The term ‘*Artha*’ in the *Sūtra* stands for *Meaning* as well as *Purpose*; both being inter-related; but of the two, purpose is the predominant factor; that is why it has been emphasised by the author of the *Bhāṣya*.

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(2) *Vākyabhēda*—Principle of Syntactical Split—Distinct *Sentences*. Says the *Sūtra* (2.1.47)—*When the sentences are equally independent of one another they should be treated as distinct sentences.*

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On this the *Bhāṣya* (Trs., pp. 216-217)—In connection with such *Mantra-texts* as ‘*Āyuryajñēna kalpatām*’ ‘*prāṇo yajñēna kalpatām*’ (T. S., 1.7.2.1.), there arises the question—Are the two sentences to be taken as *One Sentence*—a single *Syntactical Unit*,—or as two distinct *Sentences*? The established conclusion is that such set of words which stands independently by itself and does not stand in syntactical need of another set of words, should be treated as a distinct sentence; so that the two sets of words—(1) ‘*Āyuryajñēna kalpatām*’ and ‘*Prāṇo yajñēna kalpatām*’—should be treated as two distinct sentences.

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What is meant by this is that when a number of words are found to be such that when taken by themselves severally, each, independently of others, is equally capable of *expressing one complete idea (or of serving one purpose)*,—each should be regarded as a distinct *Sentence*.

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This Principle applies, not only to cases where the actual words of the *Mantra-texts* are found to be so construable, but also to those cases where, even though the actual words of the text are not so separately construable by themselves, yet such construction is rendered possible and permissible by virtue of certain words of the related *Brāhmaṇa-text* bearing upon the use of the *Mantra-text* in question. For example, we have the *Mantra-text* ‘*Iṣē tvā ūrjē tvā*’, etc.’ (*Vājas*, S. 1.’); where the various parts of the text as they stand are not found to be construable independently as so many *different Sentences*; but in the *Brāhmaṇa-text* (Shata-patha—1.1.66; 1.7.1.2; 4.3.1.1.7) bearing upon this Mantra we read—‘*Iṣē tvā iti śākhāmchhinatti*’—‘With the words *Iṣē tvā*, one cuts the branch’ and so on, with the other parts of the *Mantra-text*—on the authority of these injunctions contained in the *Brāhmaṇa-texts*, it becomes necessary to add to the words of the *Mantra-texts*, the words ‘*Śākhām chhinadmi*’ (‘I am cutting the branch’); and with these additional words thus supplied, each of the several parts of the *Mantra-text* becomes a complete Sentence, expressing a complete Idea—‘O Palāsha-wood, I am cutting thee for the obtaining of agreeable food.’ This lends support to the view that the term ‘*Artha*’ in the preceding *Sūtra* defining ‘*One Sentence*’ stands for *Purpose*; each of the completed sentences serving a distinct purpose and hence regarded as a *distinct Sentence*. In this connection, however, it may be noted that a single *Yajuṣ-text* cannot be broken up into many *distinct sentences* in this manner without sufficient authority; such authority as has been shown above, in the form of the *Brāhmaṇa-text* related to the *Yajuṣ-text*. This form of ‘*Distinct Sentences*’ is thus permissible only in very rare cases; in fact, not until it is shown that no other construction is possible,—either in view of the peculiar structure of the text itself, or in virtue of some direct injunction necessitating such split; and the reason for this lies in the fact that in a case where the nature of the sentence is such that it admits of being taken as *one Sentence*,—if we have recourse to splitting up the sentence into several *distinct Sentences* we incur the responsibility of abandoning the natural Syntactical Construction without any authority; and further, when the Sentence, taken as a single *Mantra*, would lead to a single resultant transcendental result, we—by forcing the split—make it necessary to assume a number of such results proceeding from each of the *distinct Mantras* into which the original sentence may be split up. And in cases where we have no direct injunction necessitating and justifying the said splitting,—and where the splitting necessitates the addition of new words,—these words, being supplied by ourselves, without the authority of a Vedic Injunction, cannot be regarded as ‘Vedic,’ and hence, the *Mantra* containing these *non-Vedic* words would no longer remain ‘*Mantra*’ in the strict sense of the term.

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To the foregoing Principle, we have a corrolary to the effect that—*Where different parts of a Mantra-text are found, by their implication, to be meant for serving distinct purposes, each such part should be regarded as a distinct Sentence.* For instance, in the Mantra-text ‘*Syonantē sadanaṁ kṛṇomi . . . tasmin sīda*’ (*Taitti. Br.* 3.7.5.2, and *Mānava-Shrauta-Sūtra* 1.2.6,19)—we find that the first part, by what it expresses, is intended to be employed in the act of ‘preparing the Seat’ for the Cake,—while the last part, in the same manner, is intended to be employed in the act of actually depositing the Cake on that prepared Seat; on this account the *Mantra-text* is taken as containing two distinct Sentences. This has been called ‘the Principle of Distinct-Sentences due to diversity in use’. (*Bṛhatī* MS. p. 79b).

III. Principle of Elliptical Extension—Anuṣaṅga

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This has been thus set forth in Sū. 2.1.48.—*Elliptical Extension should complete the Sentence; as it is equally applicable to all.* That is, in certain *Yajuṣ-texts*, it is found that there are several sentences that stand in need of a certain Word or Phrase or Clause, while the whole of the original text contains only one such Word or Phrase or Clause; in such cases it would appear,—and it has been held as the *Prima Facie* view—that the Word or Phrase or Clause is to be construed and used along with only that one of the several sentences which happens to be nearest to it, and the *Lacunae* in the other sentences are to be filled up by means of words of common parlance introduced by ourselves. It is the possibility of such construction that this Principle precludes. By this Principle, the Word, Phrase or Clause in question is to be used along with every one of the Sentences,—provided that every one of these is of the same type and form; and the reason for this is that the intervention of a similar sentence does not become an obstacle to Syntactical Connection. As an example, we have the text—(A) ‘*Yāte agnē yaḥśayā tanūrvarṣiṣṭhā gahvarēṣṭhā ugram vacho apāvadhittvēṣaṁ vacho apāvadhit svāhā*’—(B) ‘*Yā tē agnē rājaśayā*’—(C) ‘*Yā tē agnē harāśayā*’—Hence, by the principle just stated the Clause ‘*tanūḥ . . . svāhā*’ has to be construed with each of the three sentences (A), (B) and (C) and its connection does not cease with (A); in this way the text in question is taken as three distinct sentences.

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In this text, the common clause to be connected with each of the three sentences forms the principle clause in each sentence; but the principle is equally applicable to cases where each of the sentences is complete in itself; but there are certain words that form a subordinate factor and which need a principle sentence with a verb with which it could be connected,—and the text contains more than one such sentence. For instance, in the text—‘(A) *Chitpatistvā punātu*—(B) *Vākpatistvā punātu*—(C) *Dēvastvā savitā punātu achchidrēṇa pavitrēṇa vasoḥ sūryasya rashmibhiḥ*’ (T.S., 1.2.1.2), the subordinate clause—‘*achchidrēṇa . . . rashmibhiḥ*’—has to be taken with each of the three sentences—(A), (B) and (C)—ending with the verb ‘*punātu*.’ (*Br. MS.*, pp. 51b-52; *Tantravārtika Trs.*, 599 et. seq.)

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Under Sū. 2.1.49 we have an exception to the above. Says the *Sūtra*—‘There should be no *Elliptical Extension* where there is intervention of unconnected words.’—This, says the *Tantravārtika* (Trs., p. 607), supplies a counter-instance to the functioning of mere Proximity in the matter of Elliptical Extension. For instance, there is the text—‘(A) *Saṁ tē vāyurvātēna gachchhatāṁ*—(B) *Saṁ yajatrairaṅgāni*—(C) *Saṁ yajña-patirāśiṣā*’ (M.S.1.2.15); here the singular verb ‘*gachchhatāṁ*’ as occurring in sentence (A), cannot be construed with sentence (C), because the connection between these two has been interrupted by the sentence (B), which cannot be construed with the verb ‘*Gachchhatāṁ*’ of the preceding sentence, as the plural noun ‘*aṅgāni*’ (in B) would need the verb in the plural form—which would be ‘*Gachchhantāṁ*’; thus then, the connection between (A) and (C) is cut off by the intervening noun in the Plural Number; and until there is connection between (A) and (B) there can be no connection between (A) and (C). For this want of connection thus there is a special reason in the shape of the said intervention; and so long as this special reason is there, it is not possible for the complementary word ‘*gachchhatāṁ*’ to betake itself to the third sentence (C). For these reasons, the intervening sentence (B)—which needs a verb in the Plural Number—as also the third sentence (C) whose connection with the verb in the first sentence (A) is interrupted by the intervening sentence (B)—have to be completed by the adding of words of common parlance.—(*Shabara-Trs.*, p. 221.)

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On all this, *Kumārila* has the following remarks—In cases where there is *Elliptical Extension*, the Sentence thus completed forms a regular *Mantra* or *Yajus*; and hence any mistakes in the uttering of this would involve an Expiatory Rite; whereas if the Sentence is completed,—not by *Elliptical Extension*, but by the addition of words of common parlance,—it does not become a regular *Mantra* and hence any mistakes in pronunciation are not serious and do not involve an Expiatory Rite. (*Tantra. Vā.*, Trs., p. 608.)

(B) Brāhmaṇa-Text

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The *Mantra* and *Brāhmaṇa* constitute the *Veda*; of these, the *Mantra* has been defined and described; hence it follows that all the rest of the *Veda* is *Brāhmaṇa* (says Sū., 2.1.33). That is, those Vedic texts which are not found to possess the distinctive features of the *Mantra* are to be accepted as ‘*Brāhmaṇa*’. (*Shabara*—Trs., p. 204.)

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*Kumārila* remarks (*Tantravārtika*, Trs., p. 572)—There would have been no use in having this *Sūtra*, if it were known to all men that the *Veda* consists of only *Brāhmaṇa* and *Mantra*. As a matter of fact, however, there are many people who are ignorant of this fact; and since such people may entertain the notion that they may be a *third* class of Vedic texts, it is necessary to state clearly that in the *Veda*, all that is not *Mantra* is *Brāhmaṇa*.

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No clear-cut definition of the *Brāhmaṇa-text* has been provided, and all we have been told under Sū., 2.1.33 is that ‘those parts of the *Veda* which do not possess the character indicated as distinguishing *Mantras* are *Brāhmaṇa*’—(*Shabara*, Trs., 204). *Shabara* continues—For the benefit of students, however, the *Vṛttikāra* has supplied the following details regarding the characteristic features of the *Brāhmaṇa*:—(1) *Abounding in the particle ‘iti’*; (2) *Containing the phrase ‘So they say’*; (3) *Anecdotal*; (4) *Ratiocinative*; (5) *Explanatory*; (6) *Deprecatory*; (7) *Commendatory*; (8) *Doubtful*; (9) *Injunctive*; (10) *Descriptive of something done by another*; (11) *Historical*; (12) *Transpository*. In connection with this, there is the following declaration:—

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‘There are ten kinds of *Brāhmaṇa-text*—Ratiocinative, Explanatory, Deprecatory, Commendatory, Doubtful, Directly Injunctive, Descriptive of what is done by others, Historical, Transpositional and Analogical.’ (*Shabara*, Trs., p. 204.)

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Shabara, however, proceeds to point out that as in the case of the Mantra, all this is purely illustrative, not exhaustive; as some of these characteristics are found in Mantras also. For instance, we have the Mantra abounding in ‘ *iti* ’ in *Ṛgveda* 10.119. 1)—‘ *Iti vā iti vā manaḥ*, etc.’;—one containing the phrase ‘ So they say ’, we have in *R.V.*, 7.41.2—‘ *Bhagam bhakṣītyāha* ’;—the anecdotal Mantra we have in *R.V.*, 1.116.3—‘ *Tugro ha bhujyum*, etc.’;—the Ratiocinative Mantra in *R.V.*, 1.2.4—‘ *Indavo vāmushanti hi*, etc.’;—the Explanatory Mantra in *T.S.*, 5.6.1.3—‘ *Tasmādāponuṣṭhāna*, etc.’;—the Deprecatory Mantra in *R.V.*, 8.6.23—‘ *Moghamannam vindatē*, etc.’;—the Commendatory Mantra in *T.S.*, 4.4.4.—‘ *Agnirmūrdhā*, etc.’;—the Doubtful Mantra in *R.V.*, 10.129.5—‘ *Adhaḥ svidāsīdupari svidāsīt*, etc.’;—the Directly Injunctive Mantra in *R.V.*, 10.117.15—‘ *Pṛṇiyādinnādhāmānaya*, etc.’;—Mantra Descriptive of something done by others—in *R.V.*, 8.21.18—‘ *Sahasramayutā dadat*, etc.’; the Historical Mantra in *R.V.*, 10.19.16—‘ *Yajñēna yajñamayajanta dēvāḥ*, etc.’

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We have seen that those Vedic texts that are not Mantras have all been classed as ‘ *Brāhmaṇa-texts* ’; and this has been regarded as synonymous with Injunctive texts; the idea being that all these are either Injunctions of acts or assert something in regard to those Injunctions. (See below.)

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These *Brāhmaṇa* or Injunctive texts have been classed under five heads—(1) The *Karmotpattivākya*, the text injunctive of an action—*e.g.*, ‘ One should perform the *Agnihotra* ’;—(2) The *Guṇavākya*, the text laying down the necessary accessory details connected with the enjoined act; *e.g.*, ‘ One should offer the libation of Curds ’;—(3) the *Phalavākya*, the text mentioning the result following from the performance of the prescribed act; *e.g.*, ‘ Desiring Heaven, one should perform the *Agnihotra* ’;—(4) The *Phalāya-guṇa-vākya*, the text which lays down a particular accessory detail as conducive to a specified result; *e.g.*,—‘ Desiring efficient Sense-organs, one should offer the libation of Curds ’;—(5) the *Saguṇa-karmotpatti vākya*, the text injunctive of an act along with its accessory detail; *e.g.*, ‘ One should perform the sacrifice with *Soma* ’.

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Another classification of the *Brāhmaṇa*-texts or Injunctions is under the following three heads:—(1) The *Apūrva-vidhi*, Originative Injunction, which lays down an act which could not be done unless so enjoined, *e.g.*, ‘One should sprinkle consecrated water on the grains’;—(2) the *Niyama-vidhi* or Restrictive Injunction, which lays down the doing of a certain act for a certain result, in preference to other acts leading to the same result; *e.g.*, ‘The corn should be threshed,’ this threshing being the one method selected out of a number of the methods of removing the chaff from the grains;—(3) the *Pariśaṅkhyā-vidhi*, the Preclusive or Specificatory Injunction, which precludes some from among a number of possible alternatives; *e.g.*, the preclusion of the Mantra ‘*Imām-agrbhṇan, etc.*’ from being used in the holding of the reins of other animals, except those of the Horse.—In the *Niyama-vidhi*, Restrictive Injunction (2), that alternative which is specially enjoined is already known as to be done, but only as one of the possible courses of action open to us, and the Injunction serves to restrict the choice to the one course enjoined;—in the *Apūrvavidhi*, Originative Injunction, on the other hand, what is enjoined is entirely unknown as something to be done. This is what is meant by the saying—‘*Vidhiratyanta-maprāptē niyamaḥ pākṣikē sati*.’ In the *Pariśaṅkhya-vidhi*, Preclusive Injunction, all that is enjoined is already known as to be done, along with other acts, but not necessarily as possible alternatives; they may be known as all simultaneously possible, there is nothing that is unknown, all are known; and out of all these a few are chosen and specifically enjoined, as to be done, the others being precluded.

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There are several divisions and cross divisions of *Injunctions* set forth in the *Mīmāṃsā-bālaprakāśa* (pp. 12—41).

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The *Injunctive process* has been discussed in course of the treatment of *Apūrva* (in Discourse II, Pada i, opening *Adhikaraṇa*).

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We have seen that the sole means of knowing *Dharma*, our Duty, what we should do, consists in the Injunctive Vedic texts. The Injunctive text is, however, always a *Sentence* composed of several words;—the question arises as to which particular word in the Sentence it is that denotes the act to be done, and in what way this denoting is done. This question has been raised for the purpose of determining the difference between acts enjoined by different texts. In this connection the whole process of Injunction has been dealt with in great detail.

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We shall take a typical injunctive-text, ‘*Svargakāmo yajēta*’ (‘Desiring Heaven, one should perform sacrifice’); there are two terms, ‘*Svarga-kāmaḥ*’ (‘Desiring Heaven’) and ‘*Yajēta*’ (‘Should perform sacrifice’); the former mentions the result that is desired by the Agent, and the latter lays down the act bringing about that result. This second term ‘*Yajēta*’ is composed of two parts—(1) the verbal root ‘*Yaj*’ (which denotes sacrifice) and the Injunctive Conjugational Ending ‘*liṅ*’, connoting Injunction. Hence the word that directly denotes what should be done is this Injunctive term ‘*Yajēta*’ (‘should perform sacrifice’).

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In the connotation of this word ‘*Yajēta*’ also, there are two factors—(1) *The act of Sacrificing* and (2) *the accomplishment or bringing about, of that act*. ‘All verbs signify the bringing about of a certain act’ says the *Tantra-Vā.* (Trs., p. 474.) Of these two—the Act and the Bringing About,—the Act is signified by the verbal root (‘*Yaj*’), and its bringing about is signified by the injunctive affix (‘*Liṅ*’); this bringing about is what has been given the technical name of ‘*Bhāvanā*.’ Thus it is this *Bhāvanā* or Bringing into being—or Bringing about—that is signified by the Injunctive *Liṅ*. ‘*Bhāvanā*’ is signified by the Verbal affix’—says the *Tantravārttika* (Trs., p. 486).

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This *Bhāvanā* or Bringing About, Accomplishment, which constitutes the Effort or Activity of the Agent—is of two kinds—(a) *Arthī* (Actual, External, Material) and (b) *Śābdī* (Verbal). Both of these contain three factors—(1) *What is to be brought about or accomplished*, (2) *by what instrumentality it is to be brought about*, and (3) *the manner in which it is to be brought about*.

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In the case of the *Arthī* or Actual *Bhāvanā*,—(1) *What is to be brought about* is the Final Result—*Heaven*, in the case of *Sacrifices*; (2) *the instrumentality* by which the result is to be brought about consists of the Act (of Sacrifice); and (3) *the manner* or process of the bringing about lies in the entire procedure of the actual performance of the Act of Sacrifice.

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In the case of the *Śābdī Bhāvanā*, on the other hand, (1) what is *brought about or accomplished* is the Prompting of the Agent to activity, (2) this prompting is brought about by the instrumentality of the Injunctive, and (3) the process or manner of the prompting lies in the idea of the Excellence of the activity, derived from the Commendatory and other texts.

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This *Bhāvanā*, which consists in the *Effort* or *Activity* of the Agent towards the fulfilment of the desired result, is expressed by the affix in the verb; this much of the connotation is common to the denotation of all verbal roots; for instance, in the verb ‘ *pachati* ’ (‘ cooks ’), the idea expressed is ‘ he does the cooking ’; of these two factors of this act of *cooking*—‘ does ’ and (2) ‘ *cook-ing* ’,—the *cooking* as denoted by the verbal root is an *accomplished* entity; while the factor of ‘ *does* ’ is of the nature of something to be *accomplished*,—as is indicated by the affix. Thus then, what is expressed by the phrase ‘ does the cooking ’ is that ‘ one is doing the act that is conducive to the final result in the shape of the *coming into existence of the Cooked Rice* ’; and this doing of the act is what has been called ‘ *Bhāvanā* ’, *Bringing into Existence, Accomplishing*.

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Similarly, in the case of the Vedic text ‘ *Svargakāmo yajēta* ’ (‘ Desiring Heaven, one should sacrifice ’), what the injunctive affix denotes is that ‘ one should bring into existence the final result in the shape of Heaven ’; and this is what is meant by *Bhāvanā*. This *Bhāvanā*—in its *Arthī*, actual or material form,—is made up of the three factors as explained above—(1) what is brought into existence,—(2) by what it is brought into existence,—and (3) in what manner it is brought into existence.

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This *Arthī* or *Actual Bhāvanā* itself, consisting in the *Effort* or *Activity* of the Agent, is something that is brought about by the *Shābdī* or *Verbal Bhāvanā*. In this (1) what is to be brought into existence is the prompting of the Agent to the *Effort* or *Activity*,—(2) the means by which it is brought about is the Injunctive and (3) the *process* by which it is brought about consists of the commendation expressed by the *Arthavāda-texts*—as already explained above.

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[For further details re *Bhāvanā*, the reader should refer to *Tantra-Vā.*, Trs., pp. 475 et. seq. A logical and philosophical discussion on the exact nature and signification of the Injunction is contained in the *Vidhivivēka-Nyayakanikā* and in the *Bhāvanā-vivēka*.]

(C) Arthavāda—Declamatory Texts

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In the *Brāhmaṇa*-section of the Veda there are many texts that do not contain any Injunction; they are purely descriptive or declamatory. We have seen that it is the *Injunctive* text of the Veda that supplies us with the Knowledge of *Dharma*, of what should be done. The question that arises now is—what bearing have these other Declamatory texts upon the knowledge of *Dharma*? Have they any bearing upon it at all?

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The *Prima Facie View* is that not being Injunctive, they can have no bearing upon the knowledge of *Dharma*; because these texts merely speak of things as they exist, not of what has to be brought about. Thus even though these texts form part of the *Veda*, they do not serve any useful purpose regarding the knowledge of *Dharma*.

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The *Finally Established View* is as follows:—It is true that the texts in question do not lay down *anything to be done*; but in almost every case it is found that the text is related, in some way, to another text which is directly injunctive, laying down something to be done. Under the circumstances, if the two texts are correlated and construed together, it is found that the Declamatory text serves the purpose of eulogising and commending what is laid down in the Injunctive text; and in this way it serves the useful purpose of tempting and prompting the active agent to the performance of the act laid down in the Injunctive text. For instance, there is the Injunctive text—'One should sacrifice the White Goat to *Vāyu*',—and related to this is the Declamatory text—' *Vāyu* is the eftest Deity; and this latter text, by eulogising *Vāyu*, serves to commend the act of sacrificing to that Deity—which act has been enjoined in the Injunctive text. Thus serving the purpose of bringing about the activity leading to the enjoined performance, the declamatory text helps in the performance of *Dharma*. (Sū. 1.2.1—18.)

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Nor does this correlation of the two texts vitiate the self-sufficient authority of the Injunctive Text; because so far as the providing of the knowledge of the particular *Dharma*—the act of sacrificing—is concerned, the Injunctive text stands self-sufficient; it is only the prompting of the Agent that is done by the other text.

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The first classification of these *Arthavāda* or Declamatory Texts is into—(1) Descriptive by direct intention,—*e.g.*, ‘ Fire is the antidote for cold ’,—(2) Descriptive by indirect implication, —*e.g.*, ‘ During the day, the Smoke alone of the Fire is perceived, not its light ’,—(3) Descriptive of an Accomplished Fact or Past Event, *e.g.*, ‘ Prajāpati cut out his own omentum ’.

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There is another classificaton by which there are 38 kinds of Declamatory Texts. These have been described and exemplified in the *Mīmāṃsābālaprakāsha* (pp. 448—58). The following are a few of the more important kinds that have been enumerated by *Shabara* (Under Sū. 2.1.33, *Trs.*, p. 204), as having been described by the *Vṛttikāra*:—(1) *Abounding in the Particle ‘ iti ’*, (2) *Containing the phrase ‘ So they say,’* (3) *Anecdotal*, (4) *Stating a Reason*, *e.g.*, ‘ One should make the offering with the winnowing basket, because by that is *Food prepared* ’,—(5) *Explanatory*—*e.g.*, ‘ Therein lies the curdishness of the curd ’,—(6) *Commendatory*—‘ Vāyu is the eftest Deity ’,—(7) *Condemnatory*,—*e.g.*, ‘ His Fires are impure ’,—(8) *Expressing Doubt*,—‘ The Libation should be poured in the Gānhapatya, or the libation should not be poured ’;—(9) *Injunctive*, *e.g.*, ‘ The Post made of *Udumbara* should be of the size of the *Sacrificer* ’,—(10) *Describing what is done by others*—*e.g.*, ‘ He cooks *māṣa*-grains only on my account ’, (11) *Historical*, *e.g.*, ‘ The ancient people came in with flaming firebrands ’; (12) *Transpositional*, *e.g.*, ‘ One should perform as many sacrifices as the Horses he *receives*,’ (where ‘ receives ’ is meant to be transposed by ‘ gives ’).

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The difference between (10) *Parakṛiti* (What is done by others) and (11) ‘ *Purākalpa* ’ (Historical) has been pointed out by the author of the *Vārtika* as that the former is descriptive of what has been done in the past by a single person, while the latter describes what has been done in the past by two or more persons.—(*Mīmāṃsābālaprakāsha*, p. 51.)

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In regard to *Prabhākara’s* view regarding the *Arthavāda-text*, there seems to be some confusion in the minds of students, created by what *Gadādhara Bhaṭṭāchārya* has said in his *Shaktivāda*, to the effect that according to *Prabhākara*, the *Arthavāda-texts* cannot be regarded as a *trustworthy* means of knowledge because they are *inexpressive*; as in accordance with the *Anvitābhidhāna* theory of Verbal Expression only that sentence is really *expressive* which lays down something to be done; and hence under this theory, it is only the Injunctive Sentence that can be really expressive and hence capable of providing knowledge of Dharma. Though this may be true regarding the Arthavāda text taken by itself, it cannot be accepted as the view of Prabhākara regarding Arthavāda-text, as forming part of the Veda; because on referring to the Bṛhatī, we find that the above view is only the Prima Facie View on the question of the reliability and authority of Arthavāda-texts; and this Prima Facie View is demolished in the Finally Established View, under which the Arthavāda-text also is decided to be as Vedic and authoritative as the Injunctive text. The Prima Facie View on this question as put forward by the Bhaṭṭa is simply that these texts are untrustworthy, while as put forward by the Prabhākara it is that they are inexpressive (and hence untrustworthy); and this is the form that has been adopted by the opponent in view of Prabhākara's Views regarding Verbal Expression referred to above. The Finally Established Conclusion adopted by Prabhākara, however, is that the Arthavāda-text is as much ‘Veda’ as the Injunctive text, as like the latter the former also expresses the performability of certain acts, through the commendation that it directly expresses. (Bṛhatī—MS., p. 30.) Though it may be true that, strictly according to Prabhākara's view, the Arthavāda-text cannot be expressive, yet this can be urged only against such Arthavāda-texts as are absolutely incapable of being construed and co-ordinated with an Injunctive text. Most of the Arthavāda-texts, however, are actually found capable of being so construed and co-ordinated. And thus helping, through commendation, the initial prompting done by the Injunctive text, it serves a useful purpose in pointing out the performability of the Action enjoined, and hence it is perfectly entitled to the title of ‘Veda’, says the Bṛhatī (MS., pp. 29-30). ‘Vidhyuddeshādēva kāyāvagatih . . . Yato hi kartavyatāvagamyatē sa vēdaḥ . . . Asmāchcha kāryatāvagamyatē’.

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On this question of the authority of Arthavādas—Declamatory Texts—Murāri Mishra states the Siddhānta, Final Conclusion, as follows, in his Tripādī-Nitinayana:—‘What is to be done needs, for its own expression, the commendation (contained in the Declamatory Text), as aiding the Injunctive Word; and it is not the commendation as expressed by the Declamatory Text that is indicative of the act as to be done. (P. 23, MS)

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The trustworthy and useful character of *Arthavāda*-texts in general has been established. The *Sūtra* (1.2.19—25) takes up the consideration of those *Arthavāda*-texts whose exact character—whether they are Injunctive or *Declamatory*—is not easily determinable. Says the *Bṛhatī* (MS., p. 30) ‘The trustworthy and useful character of the *Declamatory* texts having been established, the question arises as to how to regard those few texts which are found to be capable of being taken as independently Injunctive and also as merely *Declamatory*, related to, and subserving, other clearly injunctive texts.’

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For example, there is the text—‘*Audumbaro yūpo bhavati . . . ūrguḍumbaraḥ ūrḳ paśavaḥ ūrjo’varudhyai*’—(A) ‘The Post is made of *Udumbara* Wood . . . the *Udumbara* is strong;—(B) One obtains strong cattle by using that wood’. Here there are two sentences—(A) stating that the Post is to be made of the *Udumbara* wood, and (B) stating that one obtains strong cattle by using the said wood. Now it is agreed on all sides that the first sentence is directly injunctive; but in regard to the second sentence (B), the question arises—Is the second sentence also injunctive—enjoining that ‘One should acquire cattle by using *Udumbara* wood’? Or is it merely *Declamatory*, meant to be construed and co-ordinated with the preceding sentence (A),—the meaning expressed by the two sentences being ‘One should make the Post of *Udumbara* wood,—it being so powerful as to be conducive to the acquiring of powerful cattle’? This doubt regarding the second text is due to the fact that it has the appearance of an Injunctive text, and yet there is no Injunctive word in it. The *Prima Facie View* (under the *Prabhākara* interpretation) is that the exact signification of the text being doubtful, it fails to be a reliable guide and thereby the reliability of the entire Veda becomes vitiated. The *Established Conclusion* is that the exact significance of the text is *not* doubtful; the Sentence in question is purely *Declamatory*, a pure *Arthavāda*. It is admitted on all hands that so long as we can construe and co-ordinate the sentences occurring together as constituting a single complete sentence containing a single Injunction, it is not right to find in them several Injunctions; as the unnecessary multiplication of Injunctions is always to be avoided. Again in the case of the two sentences in question, even if we regard them as containing two Injunctions, the second sentence would enjoin an action that would follow only from the action enjoined by the first sentence. For instance, the second sentence would enjoin the ‘obtaining of Cattle’ by ‘making the Post of *Udumbara* wood’;—and it is just this *making* that is enjoined by the first sentence. In this manner also the two sentences are shown to be related, as pointing virtually to the same *action*—‘the making of the Post with *Udumbara* wood’. This is thus explained in the *Bṛhatī*—

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साध्यद्वयावगमेऽपि प्रमाणतः सिद्धसाध्यतयैव एकार्थावगतिः। (MS., p. 30b)

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Explaining this passage, the *Ṛjuvimalā* says (MS., p. 332)—

First 88 of 111 passages. Read on

Cites (10)