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Purva-Mimamsa in its Sources c26: Chapter XXI: Smrti and Custom and Other Sources of the Knowledge of Dharma

Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources c26

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Chapter XXI: Smrti and Custom and Other Sources of the Knowledge of Dharma

(A) Introductory

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It has been shown so far that Veda in all its parts—Injunctive, Declamatory, Mantras and Names—is the reliable source of knowledge relating to *Dharma*, and like the orthodox *Mīmāmsaka* Jaimini has declared under Sū. 1.1.2 that the *Veda* is the sole authority in matters relating to *Dharma*, Duty—what we should do and not do;—and yet in actual practice he found that by the time that he systematised the Vedic Exigetics, the *Veda* had become so remotely ancient that it was not found sufficient for the purpose of obtaining the proper knowledge of the whole Duty of man, and the knowledge derived from the *Veda* had to be supplemented by that derived from certain other sources, notably such sources as the works known under the comprehensive name of ‘*Smṛti*,’ and also the *Usage* or *Custom* of respectable people. It was in view of this fact that *Manu* and other writers on works relating to the Duty of Man laid down, at the very outset of their works, that the Source of Knowledge of such Duty consists (in the order of precedence) in the *Veda*, the *Smṛti*, the *Usage* of good people, and even *Self-Satisfaction* (Conscience). It was in view of this same fact that *Jaimini* found it necessary to devote a special Section of his Sutras (*Pada* iii of *Adhyāya* I) to the consideration of the authority and reliability of these other supplementary sources of knowledge.

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The propriety of this consideration may be explained in several ways:—We can form no idea of the knowledge of the *Veda* itself until we have understood it in all its bearings; and it is only with the help of *Smṛti* and *Custom* that it can be understood; it is necessary therefore that the exact nature of these latter should be investigated. Again, finding that *Smṛti* and *Custom* also provide us with the knowledge of the Duty of Man, this fact might be regarded as vitiating the main thesis of the *Mīmāmsaka* that the *Veda* is the *Sole authority* on the subject; in order to guard against this, and to ascertain how far *Smṛti* and *Custom* may be allowed to affect the authority of the *Veda* itself, from which alone they derive this authority. Lastly, the subject-matter of *Mīmāṁsā* having been declared to be ‘Investigation of the nature of Duty’,—of which the foremost and entirely reliable source of knowledge has been declared to consist of the *Veda* in all its parts,—it is only right and proper that the nature of the other likely sources of knowledge should be considered.—Says *Prabhākara*—‘The *Smṛti* also has been accepted by people learned in the *Veda* as authoritative and trustworthy; hence it is necessary to investigate its character.’ (*Bṛhatī*, MS., p. 31.)

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In this connection, *Jaimini’s* conclusion is that wherever it does not contradict the *Veda*, the *Smṛti* is to be regarded as authoritative; but in order to be consistent with his main thesis that the *Veda* is the *Sole authority*, he adds that the *Smṛti* is to be regarded as authoritative only in so far as it is based upon, and derives its authority from, the *Veda*. For instance, in considering this matter, *Shabara* and *Kumārila* have cited the *Smṛti*-text laying down the performance of the *Aṣṭakā*,—a Rite that has not been enjoined in any Vedic text, and inasmuch as the *Smṛtis* are the work of human authors and are dependent upon their intelligence and memory,—which cannot be infallible,—the authority of the *Smṛtis* cannot be inborn and Self-Sufficient, like that of the *Veda*; and yet, on the other hand, the *Smṛtis* are found to be accepted as authoritative by an unbroken line of Vedic scholars from time immemorial; hence it is felt that they cannot be entirely untrustworthy. (*Tantra-Vārttika* Trs., p. 105).—The *Prima Facie View* on this question is that “In asmuch as *Dharma* is based upon the *Veda*, what is *not-Veda* should be disregarded.” (Sū. 1.3.1). The *Established View* however is that ‘the *Smṛti* is trustworthy, as there could be inference of its basis in the *Veda*, from the fact of the agents being the same’—(Sū. 1.3.2). That is to say, in the case of the *Smṛti* (which represents what has been remembered by the writer) of men of the three higher castes, who are Vedic Scholars, there must be actual connection, and basis, for the said Remembrance, in actual Vedic texts. The ‘previous Cognition’ therefore, which is necessary for the validating of Remembrace, is thus traceable to the knowledge derived by the writer from the *Veda*; and it being possible that such Vedic text has been forgotten,—the inference of such a text becomes justifiable. (*Shabara*, Trs., p. 89.)

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(B) EXAMPLE—AṢṬAKĀ-OFFERING.

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The instance that is cited in illustration of the above is that of the Smr̥ti-text which lays down the performance of the Aṣṭakā. The *Prima Facie View* regarding this text is, that the performance not being enjoined in the *Veda*, the Smr̥ti-text prescribing it should be rejected as having no authority. But the *Established Conclusion* is that, it is justifiable to infer the existence of the Vedic Text as the source of the Injunction contained in the Smr̥ti; and thus being based upon the *Veda*, this latter should be regarded as a trustworthy source of knowledge.

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Prabhākara’s presentation of this topic is more consistent. According to him, the question of the authority of Smr̥ti (or Custom) does not concern the Mīmāṃsaka; the subject-matter of the present Discourse is the *Means of Knowing Dharma*; and it has been established that the *Veda* is the only reliable Source and Means of this knowledge; hence the whole of this Discourse should devote itself entirely to the question of the authority of the *Veda* only. In accordance with this view, the text chosen as dealing with the Aṣṭakā and the present enquiry is the purely Vedic Mantra-text—‘Yāñjanāḥ pratinandanti, etc., etc.’—and not any non-Vedic Smr̥ti-text, like the one cited above. This Mantra-text is found to speak of the *Divinity of the Night*, and thus becomes connected with the Aṣṭakā-Rite which has been laid down in the Smr̥ti, in which the *Divinity of the Night* figures as the Deity. Now in regard to this Mantra-text relating to the Aṣṭakā, the *Prima Facie View* is as follows:—“The Smr̥ti-Declaration that the Aṣṭakā should be performed is found to accomplish its purpose of enjoining the Rite, only through the help of the said Vedic Mantra-text;—this Vedic text also as indicating the Divinity of the Night, must have had in view the same Aṣṭakā-Rite in which the Divinity of the Night figures as the Deity, and which has been enjoined only in the work of a human author;—thus the Vedic text is found to be dependent upon the work of a human author,—and this shakes the inborn and self-sufficient authority of the Vedic-text, and thereby the authority of the entire *Veda* becomes vitiated.”—The *Established Conclusion* however is as follows:—When we have found that the person who wrote that the Aṣṭakā should be performed must have found a basis for the rule in the *Veda* itself,—then the Injunction of the Aṣṭakā must be regarded as emanating from the *Veda* itself;—so that the *Mantra-text* ‘Yāñjanāḥ, etc.’ also is indicative of the Divinity that figures in an act enjoined originally in the *Veda* itself;—thus the *Mantra-text* is not dependent upon the *Smṛti-rule*; it is based upon the *Vedic-text* upon which primarily the *Smṛti-rule* is inferred to rest. (*Ṛjuvimālā.*)

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The entire *Mantra-text* mentioned here as indicative of the Divinity of the Night is

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यां जनाः प्रतिनन्दन्ति रात्रिं धेनुर्वायतीम् ।
संवत्सरस्य या पत्नी सा नो अस्तु सुमङ्गली ।

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Here *Aṣṭakā* is spoken of as the Divinity of the Night, and eulogised as the ‘Consort of the Year’;—herein we have a *Vedic* text speaknig of *Aṣṭakā* as an object of adoration,—this is what has been taken to be indicative of the desirability of performing the *Aṣṭakā-Rites*.

(C) Connotation of the Term ‘Smṛti’

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In later classical literature, the term ‘*Smṛti*’ is found to include all *Smṛtis* proper,—such as those of *Manu*, *Yājñavalkya*, *Vashiṣṭha*, *Gautama* and others, as well as the *Itihāsas*, *Purāṇas* and the *Sūtras*—*Shrauta*, *Gṛhya* and *Dharma*. In the present context however the term has been taken by *Kumārila* and his followers to include only those *Smṛtis* that are applicable throughout *Āryāvarta* and to all men resident therein; and under this category, *Kumārila* places the *Itihāsas*, the *Purāṇas* and the *Smṛti* of *Manu* only, (*Tantravārtika*, Trs., p. 244). The other *Smṛtis*,—such as those of *Atri*, *Gautama*, *Vashiṣṭha* and others,—he relegates to another category and deals with them separately under Sū. 15-16 Et. Seq. The following relevant remarks of *Kumārila* are instructive and interesting:—‘Barring the *Purāṇas*, the *Smṛti* of *Manu*, and the *Itihāsas*, all other *Smṛtis*;—such as those of *Gautama*, *Vashiṣṭha*, *Shaṅkha-Likhita*, *Hārita*, *Āpastamba*, *Baudhāyana* and others, as also the works on *Gṛhya*,—are each studied exclusively by only certain sections of *Brāhmaṇas*, and each of these has its sphere restricted to a single *Veda*. For instance, the *Sūtras* of *Gautama* and of *Gobhila* are accepted by the *Chhāndogya* (*Samavedin*) *Brāhmaṇa* only; those of *Vashiṣṭha*, by the *Ṛgvedin* only; those of *Shaṅkha-Likhita* by the Vājasanēyin (Yajurvedin) only;—and those of Apastamba and Baudhāyana by the Kṛṣṇa-Yajurvedin only. It is a matter therefore for consideration whether the authority of these is universal or restricted!' (Tantra. Vā. Trs., pp. 244-245.) (See below under Sū. 1.3.15—23.)

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The Bhāṣya or the Bṛhatī does not state definitely what works are meant to be included under the name ‘Smṛti’.

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With regard to Itihāsas and Purāṇas, Kumārila takes a liberal view. In all these works, direct Injunctions are found embodied in a mass of matter of a purely descriptive character; these latter are relegated to the category of ‘Arthavāda’, being descriptive of acts done by good and bad men of ancient and modern times. These are regarded as Arthavāda, purely declamatory, because, if the stories found therein were really true, then, with reference to these at least, the injunction to recite would be useless, as no useful purpose could be served by the reciting of mere descriptions or stories; hence these have to be taken as implying the praise or dispraise of acts, and they need not therefore be taken as absolutely correct in regard to facts. In justification of this method of instruction adopted in Itihāsas and Purāṇas, Kumārila makes the following remarks (Tantra. Vā. Trs., p. 26):—‘Guided as they were by the study of the Veda, Vālmīki, Vyāsa and others composed their works on the same lines as the Veda; that is the reason why we find in the works of these writers many apparently useless stories and descriptions,—as in the Veda; and as those for whose benefit these works were intended were persons of varying degrees of intelligence, and of diverse tastes, it was only proper for them to introduce every kind of matter in their works, so that they might be of use to all men. Hence it is that in certain parts we find pure injunctions, while, in others, the Injunctions are interspersed with Arthavādas,—the sole motive for this diverse procedure lying in the making of the works attractive and useful to all men.’

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As regards the authority attaching to these works, it has been held that some of the Injunctions contained in them are such as are based directly on the Veda, while some are based upon considerations of pleasure and pain as experienced in the world;—among the Arthavāda or Declamatory passages also, some are those same that are found in the Veda, some are based on ordinary experience, and some are purely imaginary, like ordinary poetry; but all these have an authority due to the fact that they eulogise enjoined acts and deprecate forbidden ones. As regards those passages that are not capable of being thus taken along with Vedic Injunctions or Prohibitions—some are such as give pleasure in the mere reading; to this class belong such descriptions as those of the *Gandhamādana* and other sites;—while others, descriptions of wars and battles serve the purpose of encouraging the brave as well as the coward, and thereby serve distinctly useful purposes for the kings of men. In those cases however where none of these explanations is possible,—e.g., in the Hymns addressed to Deities, —we assume an unseen transcendental result. Then again, the *Purāṇic* description of parts of the earth serves the purpose of distinguishing places fit for the due performance of religious and other acts. The history of families and races of men serves to differentiate the people of different castes and is based upon the memory of men and also on direct perception. The details as to measures of time and space are intended to regulate the ordinary practices of men; so also the sciences of Astronomy and Astrology,—all these are based upon direct perception and mathematical calculation. The description of the future state of things serves to point out the character of the various periods of evolving time, and also the results of righteous and unrighteous conduct. These are based directly upon the Veda.' (Tantra. Vā. Trs., p. 119.)

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So far we have dealt with *Itihāsas* and *Purāṇas*. Now as regards the *Smṛtis* proper,—that is, those that constitute the ‘*Dharmashāsra*’, five hypotheses are possible:—(1) That the author of these *Smṛtis* were totally mistaken in what they said. This view however has been rejected on the ground that it is not compatible with the fact that all these works are excellent compilations containing useful teachings; and also on the ground that this assumption would necessitate further assumptions as to the stupidity of the people who have accepted these teachings. (2) The second possible hypothesis is that the assertions are based upon the personal observations of the authors. This view also has been rejected, as it assumes, in the first place, the said ‘observation’, and, in the second place, the possession of those powers of observation by means of which they could make correct observations regarding *Dharma* which has been shown to be beyond the reach of the ordinary Means of Knowledge. (3) The third hypothesis is that the authors learnt what they have written from other persons,—their authority thus being based upon Tradition. This also has not been accepted, because in matters relating to *Dharma*, no trust can be reposed upon mere Tradition, which, in this case, cannot be trustworthy. (4) The fourth hypothesis is that the Authors have intentionally put forward wrong teachings for the purpose of leading people astray. This hypothesis has been rejected because it involves a number of baseless assumptions, such, for instance, as a motive sufficiently strong to lead the writers to adopt this deceptive course, and also that people have allowed themselves to fall into the trap laid for them and so forth. (5) All the above four hypotheses having been found to be unacceptable, the orthodox *Mīmāṃsaka* has put forward the view that the teachings contained in the *Smṛtis* are all based upon Vedic texts. This hypothesis necessitates only one assumption,—that of the existence, and the subsequent disappearance from our view, of such Vedic texts as are not found in the Veda-texts that are available at the present day. As a matter of fact, for most of the Injunctions contained in the *Smṛtis*, corroborative Vedic-texts are easily found; but there are some for whom we seek in vain for corroboration in the Vedic texts available to us; and with regard to these latter, it has been held that the Vedic texts corroborative of these also were well-known to the compilers of the *Smṛtis*, and have since become lost along with numerous Vedic Rescensional Texts no longer current.—Instead of compiling these Vedic Injunctions themselves, the *Smṛti*-writers had recourse to another method, because the order in which the Vedic Injunctions in question were found in the Veda was found, in the later degenerate times, to confuse the ordinary man; and so the writers set about arranging and classifying the various Duties and setting them forth in language more intelligible to the ordinary Householder.—(*Tantravārtika* Trs., pp. 112—114.)

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As in the case of the *Itihāsa* and *Purāṇa*, so in that of the *Smṛti* also, those portions that bear directly upon the Duties have their source in the Veda; while those bearing upon Pleasure, Pain, etc., are based upon ordinary experience; and as for the stories that are met with here and there, they serve the purpose of the *Arthavāda*—commending the Good and condemning the Evil act.—(*Ibid.*)

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The *Prābhākara* view of the trustworthy character of *Smṛtis* does not differ materially from the above, except in regard to such *Smṛti-texts* as are neither injunctive nor prohibitive of action. On this point, says the *Prakaraṇapañchikā*—‘The *Smṛti-texts* for which direct corroboration is not available are inferred as having such corroboration,—such Inference being based upon the long line of tradition represented by the *Smṛti-writers*, each of whom drew his information from predecessors, and so on and on from time immemorial, to eternity. This eternal corroboration of *Smṛtis* is proved in the same manner as the Eternality of the relationship between Words and their Denotations. (Pp. 100-101). Those *Smṛti-texts* however which do not enjoin or prohibit any action need not be regarded as authoritative on matters relating to *Dharma*. To this category belong the texts that speak, for instance, of the souls being born in vegetable bodies and so forth. In all these cases, the texts may be regarded as having meanings other than those directly expressed by them. (P. 150.)

(D) Vedāṅgas

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As regards the *Vedāṅgas*, *i.e.*, the *Six Auxiliary Sciences*, *Kumārila* makes the following observations, in the *Tantravārtika* (Trs., pp. 119—122):—

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Among the Auxiliary Sciences, there are certain portions that treat of things useful in sacrificial performances, while other parts are useful only in the securing of some perceptible worldly purpose; and these have their basis in ordinary experience. (1) In the *Śikṣā*, Phonetics, we find an account of the organs of Pronunciation, Accents and allied matters. These have their use in the correct recitation of Vedic hymns; and such declarations as ‘the *Mantras* recited with the wrong accent or wrongly pronounced injure the reciter’ are based upon the Veda itself. (2) The *Kalpa-Sūtra*, Ritualistic Science, contains explanations of the real import of the Injunctions deducible from the rules scattered about in the Veda; and these have their source in these same Vedic texts. The rules of conduct laid down in the *Sūtras* for the guidance of the Priests are based upon considerations of general convenience. (3) *Vyākaraṇa*, Grammar, provides the knowledge of the correct and incorrect forms of words, and this serves a perceptible purpose, and has its basis in direct perception itself.

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(4) The case of the *Nirukta*, Philological Exigetics, is similar to that of *Vyākaraṇa* and it serves the purpose of regulating the sense in which a word may be correctly used. (5) As regards *Chhandaḥ*, Prosody, the correct differentiation of the metres of *Mantras* serves a useful purpose in connection with the *Veda* and also with ordinary experience. (6) Lastly the Science of *Jyautiṣ*, Astronomy, provides the knowledge of dates and Asterisms, based upon mathematical calculations. These serve useful purposes in fixing the time for sacrificial performances. Astrology also, which is another phase of the same Science, is based upon the *Veda* itself, dealing as it does, with things ‘unseen’ and also the future. The Science of Architecture stands on the same footing as that of *Jyautiṣ*. The Science of *Mīmāṃsā* is based partly on the *Veda*, partly on ordinary experience, and partly on Perception, Inference and other Means of Knowledge; and like the other main Auxiliary Sciences, this also has been worked upon by a long continuous line of Teachers. The Science of Reasoning has its use in saving men from unrighteous paths. Based upon the *Veda*, in its three parts, Injunction, *Upaniṣads* and *Arthavāda*,—it points out the trend of the ordinary misconceptions from which unrighteous conduct proceeds,—not dogmatically, but in a manner calculated to bring conviction home to the sceptic; it begins with setting forth reasons available in support of conflicting views on a particular issue,—and then, after duly weighing the arguments for and against each view, leads on to the correct final conclusion. If such standard typical reasoning were not available in collected form, ordinary men would find themselves at the mercy of any and every clever man that might come up to guide him; and there would be no standard by which to judge of the absurdness or otherwise of the various views and the reasons propounded in support of them.

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As regards the philosophical hypotheses relating to the Origin of the world and such other matters, these have their source in ideas arising out of certain *Mantra* and *Arthavāda-texts*, and these Hypotheses serve to point out the general truth that the *Gross* has its source in the *Subtle*. And the use of all this lies in the due comprehending of the relation of Cause and Effect, without which the connection between the Act and its Results could not be grasped. The doctrines of Idealism, of Perpetual Flux, etc., etc., have all been propounded for the sole purpose of dissuading people from cultivating an undue attachment to the things of the world.

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Thus all the *Smṛtis* and the *Auxiliary Sciences* are authoritative; they derive their authority directly from the *Veda*. In the case of all these, we find two kinds of results depicted—those to appear in the very remote future, and those to appear immediately in the present; and the texts pertaining to the former kind are based upon the *Veda*, while those relating to the latter kind have their basis in ordinary experience.

(E) Cases of Conflict between ‘Veda’ and ‘Smrti’

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The authority of *Smṛti* in general has been established; the next question that arises is in regard to the comparative authority of the *Smṛti* and the *Śruti* (i.e., the Vedic text); or, as the question has been put in the *Sūtra-Bhāṣya*,—How are we to regard those *Smṛti-texts* which are found to be inconsistent with Vedic texts?

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On this question also, as on every question bearing upon this part of the *Sūtra*, *Prabhākara* (*Bṛhatī* MS., p. 32) turns the *Prima Facie View* on to the authority of the *Veda* itself; he states it as follows:—“Where there is contradiction between a well-known Vedic-text and a *Smṛti-text*, and through this latter, between the former Vedic-text and the Vedic-text presumed as the basis of the *Smṛti-text*, the two must nullify one another; and when such is found to be the case with some Vedic-text, the *Universal* authority of the entire *Veda* becomes shaken.”—The *Established Conclusion* is as follows:—In as much as the *Smṛti* text is not self-sufficient in its authority, needing as it does, corroboration by the *Vedic text*, presumed for certain reasons, whenever a *Smṛti-text* is found to be inconsistent with a *Vedic text* which is well-known and has not got to be presumed, there can be no justification for presuming a *Vedic text* contrary to the one already well-known; which presumption would lead to the nullification of both the *Vedic texts*. Hence when it comes to a choice between the well-known *Vedic text* on the one hand and the *Smṛti-text* not corroborated by any presumed *Vedic text*, on the other hand, there can be no hesitation in rejecting the latter in favour of the former. The two opposite courses of action laid down in the two conflicting texts cannot be regarded as optional alternatives; as such option is permissible only in cases where the two texts are possessed of equal authority. This condition is not fulfilled in the case in question, as the authority of the Vedic text is direct and self-sufficient, while that of the *Smṛti* is indirect and dependent upon corroboration by a presumed Vedic text. Hence the conclusion is that no authority can attach to a *Smṛti* which is in conflict with the Veda. (*Sūtra* 1.3.3.)

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*Sūtra* 1.3.4 has been interpreted by the *Bhāṣya* in two ways:— By the first interpretation, it is made to supply a further argument in support of the conclusion arrived at in the preceding *Sūtra*; this further argument being that *Smṛti-texts* conflicting with *Vedic-texts* can have no authority as they are often found to have their source in the ignorance or greed of the officiating priests.

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Under the second interpretation, the *Sūtra* (1.3.4) is taken as a Topic by itself—dealing with such *Smṛti-texts* as are not in conflict with any Vedic texts, but are found apparently to be due to the ignorance or greed of the priests. For instance, there is a *Smṛti-text* laying down that the cloth with which the Sacrificial Post has been covered is to be given away to the *Adhvaryu* Priest. The conclusion regarding such *Smṛti-texts* is that they have no authority at all. The *Bṛhatī* (MS., p. 32B) adds that what is denied here is, not the authority of all that may be found to have its source in the world of visible effects, but only the authority of those *Smṛti-texts* that claim to pertain to the world of invisible effects, and are yet found to have their source in visible facts. That is to say, the above-mentioned *Smṛti-text* laying down the giving away of the cloth to the Priest has nothing inherently untrustworthy in itself, so far as the mere act of giving is concerned, as bringing warmth to the recipient; but if the said *giving* be regarded as bringing about an invisible result in the shape of *Merit* for the giver, then its authority becomes vitiated by the fact that it has its source in the greed of the Priests.

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The above interpretation of the last two Topics, by which many *Smṛti-texts* become deprived of their authority and reliability,—has not been accepted by *Kumārila*; with his orthodox instincts, he is not prepared to reject the authority of any *Smṛti-text*. In the *Tantravārtika* (Trs., pp. 154—163), he has shown that there is no real conflict involved in the instance cited in the *Bhāṣya*; and so long as there is no such conflict, there is every justification for presuming the existence of Vedic texts in corroboration of the *Smṛti*-texts concerned; and thus the two courses of action, one laid down in the *Vedic text* already available, and the other laid down in the *Smṛti text* as corroborated by the presumed Vedic text—can be reasonably regarded as optional alternatives. In accordance with this idea, Sū. 3 should be interpreted to mean that—‘in a case where we find the *Vedic text* laying down one course of action, and the *Smṛti-text* another,—there being an apparent conflict between the two texts, it is desirable that *in practice* we should adopt the course laid down in the *Vedic text*.’ This does not imply the rejection of the *Smṛti-text*; it lays down a *preference* for what is enjoined in the *Vedic-text*; and that too on the ground of this latter being independent of extraneous support and corroboration.

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There is yet another interpretation of this Topic, suggested by *Kumārila* (Tantra. Vā. Trs., p. 165):—The *Smṛtis* spoken of in the *Bhāṣya* as to be disregarded are not the *orthodox Smṛtis* compiled by *Manu* and others, but those so-called ‘*Smṛtis*’ that have been compiled by the later Secessionists from the orthodox fold. It is interesting to note what *Smṛtis* have been placed by *Kumārila* under this latter category. (1) First of all, comes the compilation of certain texts bearing upon *Dharma* and *Adharma*, made by ‘*Śākya*’, and by the propounders of the ‘*Sankhya*’, the ‘*Yoga*’, the ‘*Pāñcharātra*’, the ‘*Pāshupata*’ and the like,—all of which have a certain amount of support of the *Veda*; they derive strength from certain visible results unconnected with the *Veda*, and from arguments seemingly based upon Perception, Inference, Analogy and Presumption. Secondly, there are those compilations that lay down certain instructions with regard to the securing of livelihood, and treat also of certain incantations and recipes for the amelioration of diseases and other ills, the usefulness whereof is relied upon on the basis of success in a few stray cases. (3) Lastly, there are certain compilations known as ‘*Smṛti*’ which lay down some of the most repugnant practices.

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According to *Murāri Mishra*, the *Smṛti*, contrary to *Shruti*, is to be rejected; he is in agreement with *Prabhākara*, not with *Kumārila*.—(MS., p. 51.)

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Sutras 1.3.5-7 according to *Shabara's* interpretation, embody an independent Topic, dealing with some other instances of conflict between *Veda* and *Smṛti*. Up to Sū. 4, we had the treatment of such *Smṛti-texts* as lay down acts to be done for the purpose of obtaining desired results. Sū. 5-7 deal with those *Smṛti-texts* which lay down such small acts as are performed, not for the purpose of accomplishing desired results, but only on certain occasions during the sacrificial performances. To this category belong the *Smṛti-texts* laying down such acts as the wearing of the *Yajñopavīta* during sacrificial performances, using the right hand at performances, the *Rinsing of the mouth on certain occasions during the performances*, and so forth. The question that arises regarding these is—are the texts laying down these acts to be regarded as being in conflict with the *Veda*? The *Prima Facie* View is as follows:—"They do conflict with what is laid down in the *Veda*; and hence cannot be regarded as authoritative. For instance, when one rinses the mouth in course of a sacrificial performance, in obedience to the injunction contained in the *Smṛti*, he interrupts the sacrificial performance by introducing an act which does not form part of the performance as prescribed in the *Veda*."—The *Established View* is that the *Rinsing of the Mouth* is a positive act, while the *order of sequence* among the sacrificial details is only a qualifying factor of the act; and when there is a conflict between an *Act* and a *qualifying factor*, it is only right that the latter should make room for the former. Hence there is no real conflict in this case; hence the *Smṛti-text* need not be rejected.

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On these *Sūtras* 5-7, *Kumārila* holds an entirely different opinion. Accodring to him, none of the *Smṛti* rules cited in the *Bhāṣya* in this connection—that relating to the rinsing of the mouth, etc.,—is in conflict with any Vedic text. (*Tantra-Vā. Trs.*, p. 178.)

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He argues thus:—It is not quite correct to cite *the wearing of the Sacred Thread (Yajñopavīta)* as an act in conflict with the Vedic act. Because it has been already declared in the *Veda* in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifices that the wearing of the Sacred Thread is a sign of godliness, and as such it has been laid down as a necessary accompaniment of the said sacrifice. The wearing of the Sacred Thread has also been laid down as a general rule in the *Katha*-Recension of the *Yajur-Veda*, where it has been prescribed, not with reference to any particular sacrificial performance, but as a necessary accompaniment of all sacrificial performances, and also of Vedic Study. Similarly, with regard to the act of Rinsing the Mouth, this act has been laid down in connection with the daily Vedic Study; and it is implied that it is to be done in connection with all utterances of Vedic texts; from which it clearly follows that it is a necessary accompaniment of the sacrificial performance itself.

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From all this *Kumārila* concludes that these three *Sūtras* (5—7) do not embody a distinct Topic. He therefore proposes another interpretation of these three *Sūtras*. According to this interpretation, *Sūtras* 5 and 6 do not introduce a new Topic, they continue the consideration of the preceding Topic, bringing forward certain arguments for and against the Established Conclusion; and *Sūtra* 7 embodies a distinct Topic by itself. According to this interpretation, the sense of *Sūtras* 5 and 6 is as follows:—If the opponent argues that "a rule emanating even frm a heretic should be accepted as authoritative when it is found that it is not contrary to the Veda,—such rules, for instance, as one should tell the truth, be charitable and so forth," (Sū. 5),—then we deny this, because the extent and number of authoritative scriptures is limited—(Sū. 6);—the established conclusion therefore is that *Dharma* can bring about its results only when it is understood with the help of those scriptures which are recognised as having their basis in the Veda. As for *Sūtras* 7, it stands by itself, embodying the Topic of the Authoritative Character of the Practices of *Good Men*; the sense of the Conclusion as embodied in the *Sūtra* being that 'those acts which cannot be ascribed to any worldly motive, and which are yet done by Good Men, must be recognised as *Dharma*';—this would be the Established View in answer to the *Prima Facie View* that—"Many practices are found to be repugnant to the Veda, hence no authority should attach to Practice." The meaning of the Established View is that when, in regard to any particular Practice, we find that it is current among good men, and we cannot attribute it to greed or any such sordid motive, we should accept it as authoritative, as *Dharma*.

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(See below, for a fuller account of this *Adhikaraṇa*, which is particularly interesting.)

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There is another interpretation suggested by Kumārila of Sutras 5—7:—Under this interpretation, Sū. 5 is taken as part of the previous Topic, ending with Sū. 4, and Sū. 6 and 7 are taken as embodying the Topic of the Practices of Good Men; under this interpretation Sū. 6 embodies the *Prima Facie View* that "Practices cannot be regarded as authoritative in matters relating to *Dharma*, because the number and extent of authoritative scriptures is restricted to the Veda and its auxiliary Sciences",—and the *Established View* is embodied in Sū. 7 in the sense described in the previous paragraph.

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There is yet another interpretation suggested by Kumārila, whereby all these *Sūtras* 5, 6 and 7 are taken as embodying the *Established View* in answer to a *Prima Facie View* supplied from without, bearing upon the Practices of Good Men. The sense of these *Sūtras* in this case would be as follows:—‘If the Practices of Good Men are not in conflict with what is taught in the Veda and in the *Smṛti*, such Practices can be regarded as authoritative in matters relating to *Dharma*; but when there is the least thing repugnant to the teaching of the Veda, then, as there would be a conflict of authorities, the Practices cannot be regarded as having any authority at all.’ (*Tantravārtika*, Trs., 173—203.)

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Kumārila’s treatment of the Topic of the *Practices of Good Men* is specially interesting (*vide* Tantra. Vā. Trs., pp. 182—200). It is as follows:—

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In regard to the Practices of Good Men and their authority relating to *Dharma* the *Prima Facie View* is as follows:—

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“In the Practices of Good Men we find frequent transgressions of *Dharma*, and also cases of daring excesses, as in the case of (1) Prajāpati, (2) Indra, (3) Vashiṣṭha, (4) Vishvāmitra, (5) Yudhiṣṭhira, (6) Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana, (7) Bhīṣma, (8) Dhṛtarāṣṭra, (9) Vāsudēva, (10) Arjuna and others of old times, as also many good men of our own days. For instance,—(1) We find that Prajāpati fell in incesstuous love with his own daughter, Uṣā;—(2) Indra, and also Nahuṣa in his place, is said to have committed adultery;—(3) Vashiṣṭha, when struck down with grief on the death of his hundred sons, is said to have contemplated suicide, a terrible crime;—(4) Vishvāmitra helped a *Cāṇḍāla* to perform sacrifices;—(5) King Purūravasa contemplated suicide when Urvashī left him;—(6) Kṛṣṇa-Dvaipāyana, who was under the vow

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of life-long celibacy, begot sons on the wives of his young brother, *Vichitravīrya*;—(7) *Bhīṣma* led a life contrary to all caste-regulations, and committed an irregularity in performing sacrifices, though he was unmarried (and hence not entitled to perform sacrifices);—(8) *Dhṛtarāṣṭra*, though suffering from congenital blindness and hence not entitled to perform sacrifices, performed several sacrifices and that too with the wealth amassed by his brother *Pāṇḍu*, to which he had no rightful claim;—(9) *Yudhiṣṭhira* treated as his wife the girl that had been won by his younger brother and told a base lie calculated to encompass the death of his *Brāhmaṇa*-teacher;—(10) *Vāsudeva* and *Arjuna* used to drink, even to excess. Among modern people also, we find *Brāhmaṇa*-ladies of *Ahichchhatra* and *Mathurā* addicted to wine; the people of the ‘North’ carry on the business of giving and accepting in gift, and buying and selling, lions, horses, mules, asses, camels and even animals with two rows of teeth; and they are also in the habit of eating in the same dish with their wives, children and friends;—the people of the ‘South’ marry the daughter of their maternal uncle, and partake of food while sitting upon chairs;—amog the people of the ‘North’ as well as of the ‘South’, there are many such instances of gross transgression as the partaking of the remnants of food left by one’s friends and relations, taking of beetles touched by men of all castes, not washing the mouth after meals, wearing clothes brought in directly from the back of the washerman’s ass, socially associating with people guilty of the most heinous crimes. Then again the Practices of Good Men of various countries are at variance with one another; many of the Practices have their source in such perceptible causes as Greed and the like. Such practices certainly can have no authority on matters relating to *Dharma*. Lastly, those men are regarded as *Good* whose conduct is *Good*,—and again we regard such conduct as *Good* which is practised by those men; thus there is an interdependence which leads us nowhere. As regards *Manu*’s declaration that ‘Practices of Good Men’ are an authority on *Dharma*,—we can place no reliance upon this; as the same writer includes ‘Self-Satisfaction’ also as such an authority; which is surely absurd. These cannot afford any standard for our conduct; as they are so completely at variance with one another. This declaration of *Manu* therefore must mean something different.”

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To the above indictment, Kumārila has offered the following answer, which embodies his *Established Conclusion* on this subject:—*When no motive can be detected, the Practice in question should be recognised as useful.* (Sū. 1.3.7). That is to say, when we find that certain acts are done by good men, and we cannot attribute them to any such perceptible motive as greed and the like, they should be accepted as *Dharma*, as what should be done. In fact, only those acts are to be regarded as *Dharma* which good men hold to be *Dharma* and do as *Dharma*; and this view has been held because the men who do them are the same persons who perform the sacrifices enjoined in the *Veda*. To this class belong such acts as—Charities, Telling Beads, Offering Libations into Fire, Making Offerings to Ancestors, Celebrations like the *Shakradhvaja* and other such festivities in connection with Temples, Keeping of certain observances by married girls, Illuminations, distributing sweet cakes and other foods, festivities on the seventh and thirteenth days of *Māgha* and the first day of *Phālguna*, on the advent of Spring. Authoritative writers of *Smṛti* admit of the generally authoritative character of such of these as are not repugnant to the teachings of the *Veda*. And this idea is based upon the fact that we can always assume Vedic texts in corroboration of these Practices on the ground of the performers of these being the same as those of the acts prescribed in the *Veda*. As a matter of fact, from time immemorial, it has been found that the Practices of Good Men are in keeping with the scriptures.

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The ‘good men’ whose ‘Practices’ are meant here are those only who are inhabitants of *Āryāvarta*—the tract of land bounded by the Ocean on the East and on the West, by the Himālaya on the North and the Vindhya on the South. This limit has been inferred to be based upon the Vedic texts that speak of the ‘Disappearance of the *Sarasvatī*’ and ‘the Dippings from the *Plakṣa-tree*’,—the former expression referring to the place where the *Sarasvatī-satra* was commenced and the latter, where it was completed; and all this has been taken as indicating the tract round *Kurukṣetra*, in the plains of which the river *Sarasvatī* is said to have disappeared.

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These people are called ‘good’, not primarily on account of their good conduct, but on account of their being found to be acting always in accordance with the scriptures; when on this ground, they have acquired the reputation of being ‘Good’,—if they are found to do any other acts, in support of which Vedic texts are not available, it comes to be believed and presumed that the acts concerned must be righteous and good,—otherwise the ‘good men’ would not have done them.

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‘Self-satisfaction’ also is an ‘authority’, only in the case of such men as have their mind steeped in Vedic lore and in the idea that only those acts are to be regarded as ‘Dharma’ which have been enjoined in the Veda. And the minds of such people cannot be ‘satisfied’ on the doing of what is wrong.

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As regards the specific instances of transgression by well-known great and good men that have been cited above,—in the first instance, the passages of the *Itihāsa* and *Purāṇa* that have been understood to be descriptive of the transgressions may have a totally different meaning; and secondly, the laws and rules whose transgressions have been cited may be meant only for ordinary men, and not for superhuman persons like Prajāpati and others;—or thirdly, the acts may be justified on the ground that the persons concerned were superhuman beings and hence not subject to the same limitations of conduct as weaklier human agents;—or fourthly, we may explain the said transgressions in such a way as to clear them of all repulsiveness.

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The following explanations have been suggested:

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(1) When ‘Prajāpati’ is spoken of as falling in love with his own daughter, the name ‘Prajāpati’ stands ‘one who protects all creatures’; and as such, it can be taken as standing for the *Sun*; and it is an ordinary fact in nature that towards morning the *Sun* brings forth the Dawn which is named ‘*Uṣā*’.—and hence this Dawn or ‘*Uṣā*’ is his ‘daughter’, and the phenomenon of the Sun letting his rays fall on the Dawn has been figuratively spoken of as the male approaching the female.

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(2) Indra has been described as the ‘*Jāra*’—Paramour—of ‘*Ahalyā*’;—now, the term ‘indra’ is derived from the root ‘idi’, to shine, and thus denotes one who is *resplendent*; in this sense ‘indra’ becomes the name of the *Sun*. The Sun is the ‘*Jāra*’—not paramour, but the destroyer, in the literal sense of ‘*Jārayati-nāshayati*’—of ‘*Ahalyā*’,—which stands, not for a lady, but for the Night, in the literal sense of ‘*Ahani līyatē*’

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disappearing during the day'; when the Sun rises, the Night disappears; and it is this natural phenomenon that is described as 'Indra' (Sun) being the 'jāra' (destroyer) of 'Ahalya' (Night).

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(3) As regards Nahuṣa, it is true that when he attained the position of Indra, he made advances towards Shachī, Indra's wife; but through this misbehaviour, he fell from his exalted place and was born as a snake all which clearly shows that what he had done was wrong, *Dharma*. And so far as Shachī was concerned, she proved loyal to her husband and rejected the advances made by Nahuṣa, whereby her greatness and glory became enhanced, which shows that such constancy is *Dharma*.

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(4) In the case of Vashiṣṭha, it is clear that what he did was due to excessive grief, and hence no one ever regards it as *Dharma*. It is only what the good men know to be *Dharma* and perform as such that is to be accepted as *Dharma*, while all those acts that are found to have been done even by Good Men need not necessarily be accepted as *Dharma*, when they are found to have been done under the undue influence of Anger, Grief, Greed, Delusion and the like.

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(5) Similarly in the case of Vishvāmitra also, as he had reached a high degree of austerity, we may condone a few minor transgressions on his part according to the maxim that "For a powerful man every thing is wholesome"; or we may absolve him from blame on the ground that he was capable of throwing off the sin through penances. But for ordinary men such transgression would be irretrievably harmful and wrong.

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(6) As regards Kṛṣṇa-Draipāyana, it was under his mother's orders that he begot children on the wives of his younger brother, related to him through his mother, in due accordance with scriptural injunctions. Even if his action involved transgression, it was thoroughly atoned by his severe austerities before and after the transgression.

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(7) Bhīṣma—and Rāma also—performed sacrifices when they had no wife. Though both of them knew how essential it was to have the wife associated with such performances, they did not have their wives,—Rāma not marrying a second wife on account of his great love for his first wife, and Bhīṣma, not marrying at all, because of his great regard for his father to whom he had promised that he would never marry;—and as both of them had paid their debt to their ancestors—*Rāma* through his sons, and *Bhīṣma* through the sons of his Mother,—there was no moral impediment to their performance of sacrifices. Then again, it has to be borne in mind that *Rāma* kept by him at the sacrifice, a golden image of *Sītā*, because through his great regard for public opinion, he could not have *Sītā* herself, and through his anxiety to show his regard for *Sītā* herself, he did not take another wife to himself. As regards *Bhīṣma*, the text of *Manu* lays down that if, ‘among several uterine brothers, even one gets a son, all the rest become *endowed with sons*, through that one son’ (*Manu*, 9.182); so that he became *endowed with sons* through the sons of his brother *Vichitavīrya*; (and under the circumstances, if he had married a wife, that would have been only for the purpose of carnal pleasure);—and yet, for aught we know, he may have married a wife for fulfilling the conditions of the sacrificial performances; as it is inconceivable that a man, who was so scrupulous regarding *Dharma* that he refused to hand over at *Gayā* the offering to his Father into the latter’s own hands (when he appeared before him in person), in obedience to the scriptural injunction that the offerings at *Gayā* must be offered *on the Ground*, should have committed such a blunder as to perform sacrifices without having his wife by him. (See *Mahābhārata*—*Anushāsana Parva*, 84.)

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(8) As regards *Dhṛtarāṣṭra*—We find it related in the *Āścharya-parva* that through *Vyāsa’s* favour, he obtained his powers of vision for the purpose of looking up on his sons; and from this we should be justified in presuming that through the same agency, he was able to see when the sacrifices were being performed, so that he could not suffer from the disqualification of congenital blindness. Or the ‘Sacrifices’ that have been attributed to *Dhṛtarāṣṭra* may be taken as standing for charities and other righteous acts.

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(9) The irregular matrimonial life of the five *Pāṇḍavas* has been explained by *Vyāsa* himself. *Draupadī* appeared in the full bloom of youth out of the sacrificial altar; and as such she is the Goddess of Wealth herself, who does not become trained by associating with several persons; He has described her also as becoming younger day by day;—all which goes to show that she was not an ordinary human being; she was superhuman, and hence her actions are not to be judged by the ordinary standard of human proprieties. It is for this reason that Kṛṣṇa himself promised to Karṇa—who was a brother of the Pāṇḍavas—that Draupadī would go to him on the sixth day, after having been with the Pāṇḍavas for five days. If it were not for his super-human character of the Lady, how could such a righteous person as Kṛṣṇa himself have made such an atrocious proposal?—Another explanation of Draupadī's case is that there were five distinct ladies; but they were all so much alike that they came to be known by a common name. The third explanation is that she was the wife of Arjuna alone by whom she had been won; and yet she is spoken of as being the wife of all the brothers, only with a view to show that there was not the slightest disagreement among the five brothers. Her super-human character is further emphasised by the fact that, when dragged to the Assembly of Kings, though she was not really in her courses, yet, on the spur of the moment she made herself appear so, with a view to expose the action of Dhṛtarāṣṭra and his sons in the worst light. Her character of Lakṣmī too becomes fully recognised when she is regarded as the wife of Arjuna alone, who, in his previous life was Nara, the counterpart of Nārāyaṇa (Viṣṇu). The Brahma-vaivarta Purāṇa (Prakṛti-khaṇḍa) provides another supernatural explanation: Under Shlo. 58, Adhyāya 14, it says that in childhood Sītā, being eager to obtain a husband, asked it as a boon from Shiva; and in her eagerness she repeated the request five times,—Shiva took her at her word and said she would have five husbands; it was thus Sītā, who in her next life, was born as Draupadī.

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(10) Thus too as regards the action of Yudhiṣṭhira in telling a lie to encompass the death of his teacher, some authorities have declared that Expiatory Rites can be performed even when the reprehensible act has been done intentionally; and as the Rites prescribed for this particular transgression consist of the Ashvamedha sacrifice, and Yudhiṣṭhira did perform this sacrifice,—all this shows that he recognised it as sinful, as Adharma, not as Dharma; hence the act cannot be included among the ‘Practices of Good Men’.

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