Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

Purva-Mimamsa in its Sources c31: Chapter XXVI: ‘Sacrificer’

Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources c31

Language
English

Contents

Chapter XXVI: ‘Sacrificer’

(A) Qualifications of the Performer of Sacrifices

c31.s1.1

*Sacrificial Acts* and their *Order of Sequence* have been dealt with so far. The *Sūtras* in Discourse VI consider the character and qualifications of the Performer. As a rule the Person ‘entitled’ to perform a Sacrifice,—i.e., who is going to perform the Sacrifice—is one who wishes to obtain the result which that Sacrifice is expected to bring about. Hence the first question dealt with is the *fruitfulness* of the Sacrifices,—that is, with the fact of the Sacrificial Acts really bringing about definite results.

c31.s1.2

The consideration of this is prefaced by the consideration of another question :—When the Vedic text enjoins a Sacrificial Act for the man desiring Heaven, this text asserts a certain relationship between the ‘Desire for Heaven’ and the Act of ‘Sacrifice’. Now in this relationship, does the Sacrifice come in as the *Means* or as the *End* to be accomplished? That is, is Heaven the ‘subordinate’ and Sacrifice the ‘principal’ factor? or vice versa? If what is enjoined in the text is the Sacrifice as to be accomplished by the Man *desiring Heaven*, then it follows that the Sacrifice can be duly accomplished only by the man who is imbued with the desire for Heaven; so that in relation to the Sacrifice, the ‘Desire for Heaven’ would appear to be enjoined as (a Means) for the Man. This would mean that it is only the man who has this ‘desire for Heaven’ who can be entitled to, and properly perform, the Sacrifice. In this case, the Sacrifice would be the *End* and ‘Desire for Heaven’ the Means to that End. On the other hand, if what is enjoined for ‘the man desiring Heaven’ is the bringing about of the desired thing,—then *this bringing about of the desired thing* would have to be regarded as qualified by the ‘Sacrifice’; and in that case, the ‘Sacrifice’ would be recognised as the *Means* and the ‘Desired thing’ as the *End*. Thus the text may be construed in both these ways—(*a*) ‘the Sacrifice should be accomplished by means of the Desired thing—Heaven,’ and (*b*) ‘the Desired thing, Heaven should be brought about by means of the Sacrifice’. And yet both these constructions cannot be possible at the same time. Hence the justification of the question. The *Established Con-* clusion on the question is that the Sacrifice is the Subordinate, and Heaven, the Principal, factor (*Bhāṣya* Trs., p. 969). The Text therefore is to be taken as the Injunction of the *act of Sacrifice* for the *Man Desiring Heaven*; and from this it follows that Heaven is the Principal Factor, and Sacrifice, the Subordinate factor; which means that the Injunction ‘should sacrifice’ should be taken as pertaining to the ‘Man Desiring Heaven’; and it thus becomes established that the Text in question lays down the qualification of the Performer. (*Bhāṣya*, Trs., p. 971.)

(B) What is ‘Heaven’?

c31.s2.1

In this same connection, the question has been raised regarding the exact nature of Heaven. Is it a *Substance*—or only a *Quality*, in the shape of *Happiness*? If it were a Substance, then it would naturally have to be regarded as the Principal Factor.

c31.s2.2

The *Established Conclusion* on this point is that the term ‘Heaven’ stands only for a form of *happiness*, and it is only in its secondary figurative sense that it is applied to the *thing or substance* that causes *happiness*.—As a matter of fact, people always describe ‘Heaven’ as *happiness*—says the *Bhāṣya* (trs., p. 967).

c31.s2.3

The word ‘*Svarga*’, ‘Heaven’, says *Prakaraṇapañchikā* (pp. 102-103), is applied to that happiness which is totally free from all touch of pain, and which, as such, is desired by all men. It goes on (p. 149) to explain that *Happiness* or pleasure is not mere *absence of Pain*: In the absence of Pain, what we feel is that ‘there is no pain’;—the feeling being a negative one; and hence from the very nature of the cognition of Negation, it follows that what we are conscious of in this case is the *Soul* by itself, as without pain, and not as *with* a positive quality; on the other hand, when we feel *happy* and feel pleasure, we are conscious of something *positive*, of a positive quality belonging to the Soul.

c31.s2.4

The first qualification thus for the *Performer* is that he should have the *desire* for the Result. The next point is that the ‘Person’ should be a *human being*; as it is only a human being who can carry out the entire details of the prescribed Act—says the *Sūtra* (6.1.5). Hence, it is Man alone who is entitled to perform Sacrifices. Beings lower than the human are not so entitled, because they are not able to carry out the details of the Sacrifice in their entirety; hence for these beings, the Sacrifice cannot be a means of securing happiness. (*Bhāṣya*, Trs., p. 973.)

c31.s2.5

The *Bhāṣya* (p. 973) goes on to add that Deities also are not entitled to the performance of Sacrifices, because apart from themselves, there are no other Deities to whom they could offer Sacrifices,—and there can be no offering to one's own self; in fact, such an act would be no *offering* at all.

c31.s2.6

Nor are sages (Primeval) entitled to the performance of Sacrifices—says the *Bhāṣya* (p. 973); because they can have no *Gotra*; *Bhṛgu* and other sages cannot belong to these same ‘*Bhṛgu*’ and other *Gotras*. Nor is the capacity to perform sacrifices perceptible in Deities and Sages.

c31.s2.7

This view regarding Deities and Sages has been accepted by *Kumārila* (Sū. 6.1.4-5) (see *Ṭupṭīkā*, p. 87); but *Pārthasārathi Mishra* has demurred to this (see *Tantra-ratna*), and has remarked as follows:—*Time*, with us *Mīmānsakas* is beginningless; hence even before one set of sages *Bhṛgu*, etc., there have been other sets of the same sages in other cycles, and these latter would be the *Gotra* of the ‘present’ Sages; hence there is nothing to prevent Sages being entitled to the performance of Sacrifices. As regards Deities also, for those philosophers who, like us, hold that Deities exist only in the form of *words* and they have a purely verbal existence, the reason put forward by the *Bhāṣya* has no force; because the Deity *Indra* also can make offerings through pronouncing the word ‘Indra’. The reasoning of the *Bhāṣya* should therefore be taken to refer to those philosophers according to whom Deities are real material entities.

(C) Deities Not Entitled to Perform Sacrifices

c31.s3.1

It is interesting to note the grounds of expediency that have been put forward in the *Bhāṣya* (Trs. p. 975) against the view that Deities are entitled to the performance of Sacrifices:—‘There is a certain Sacrifice which has been enjoined as to be performed for a thousand years; if Deities were entitled to perform Sacrifices, as they do have such long lives, this Sacrifice could be easily performed by them for a thousand years, and there would be no justification for taking the word *years* as standing for *days*, and thus bringing it within the capacity of human beings (who would naturally become excluded if the word ‘years’ stood for real years).

c31.s3.2

On the other hand, if human beings alone are entitled to perform Sacrifices, there is every justification for taking the word years in the sense of days. (See in this connection, Sūtras 6.7. 31—41.)

c31.s3.3

In the *Brahmasūtra* 1.3.8—33, this question of the Title or Capacity of Deities to '*Brahmajñāna*' has been discussed; we are told there (Sū. 31) that they are not entitled to it, according to *Jaimini*, but according to *Bādarāyaṇa* (the author of the Brahmasūtra), they are entitled. (Sū. 33). *Śaṅkarāchārya* (under Sū. 1.3.25) has also referred to Mī. Sū. (6.1.1) in regard to this *Adhikāra* or Title. Under Sū. 1.3.33, he declares that though it may be granted that Deities are not entitled to the various *Upāsanās*, forms of Worship and Meditation, prescribed in the Vedas; yet there is no justification for denying their title to *Brahmajñāna*, pure and simple. He also declares in favour of the view that Deities are *embodied beings*, and as such they also are entitled to that Supreme Knowledge of Brahman which leads to *Mokṣa*, Liberation.

(D) Are Women Entitled to Perform Sacrifices?

c31.s4.1

In connection with the question of Persons entitled to perform Sacrifices, there have been two wide exclusions; *Women* and *Śūdras* have come to be excluded from the performance on somewhat vague grounds, specially as regards Women.

c31.s4.2

*Sūtras* 6.1.6—20 deal with the case of Women.

c31.s4.3

The question has been raised in connection with the general Injunction '*Svargakāmo yajēta*' ('Desiring Heaven, one should perform Sacrifices'). Is this Injunction meant for the *Man* alone or for *Man* as well as *Woman*?

c31.s4.4

The *Prima Facie View* is that—"As the word used in the text, '*Svargakāmaḥ*' is in the masculine, the Injunction should be taken as restricted to the *Male* alone. This is the view that has been held by the Sage *Aitiśāyana*, says the Sūtra 6.1.6; a somewhat unusual form of stating the *Pūrvapakṣa*.

c31.s4.5

The *Established Conclusion* is that it is the whole Genus, the whole Human Community, Male as well as Female,—that is entitled, under the Injunction, to perform Sacrifices; because there is no ground for distinction; hence the Woman also should be regarded as entitled to perform Sacrifices,—says Sūtra 6.1.8. This view has been stated in the Sūtra as sponsored by *Bādarāyaṇa*.

c31.s4.6

As the question of ‘Equal Rights’ is a moot question even today, we shall devote some attention to the arguments that have been adduced on both sides.

c31.s4.7

The argument against Women's right to perform Sacrifices may be thus summed up:—(a) “To men alone should the title to perform sacrifices belong, as they alone possess property; as a matter of fact, Man alone possesses wealth, not woman; and wealth is necessary for sacrificial performances. Women cannot possess wealth, because they are bought and sold,—sold by their father, and bought by the husband. That is, having been sold by the Father, the Woman does not have any right over his property; and having been bought by the husband, she cannot have any right over his property. The ‘buying’ and ‘selling’ referred to here is in view of the Ārṣa form of Marriage, where the Bridegroom has to give to the Bride's father a Cow and a Bull. There are several other Vedic texts which show that Women are actually bought and sold; there is the text, for instance, which says,—‘If, upon being bought by the husband, the woman has dealings with others, etc., etc.’—(b) It might be argued that the Woman may acquire the required wealth on her own account by means of spinning, cooking and such arts. But what she earns will not be her own; it belongs to her husband;—यत् ते समधिगच्छन्ति यस्य त तस्य तद् धनम् says Manu.—(Sūtras 10-12.)

c31.s4.8

The answer to this argument is as follows:—The desire for results is equally present in the woman also. As regards her having no wealth of her own, this absence of property is based upon the authority of the Smṛti (of Manu just quoted), while her title to the performance of Sacrifices would be based upon the Vedic text—if she fulfils the condition of having the ‘Desire for Heaven’. From this we conclude that if the woman desires the results that have been mentioned as following from the Sacrifices, she should not mind what the Smṛti has said regarding her not having property, she should proceed to acquire wealth and perform the Sacrifice. (Bhā. Sū. 13). As a matter of fact, however, the Woman is actually connected with property—says the Sūtra (14);—this is clear from the following words addressed to the Bridegroom at the time of marriage—धर्मे चार्थे च कामे च नातिचरितव्या ‘In matters relating to Duty (religious acts), to property and to pleasure, she should not be ignored’. All that Manu's declaration—that ‘the woman has no property’—means is that ‘the wife should not behave as if she were independent of her husband’.—(*Bhāṣya*, Trs., p. 981). As regards the ‘Sale’ that has been spoken of in regard to the wife, Marriage is a purely religious function, it is not a Sale in the ordinary sense of the term; an article is said to be ‘sold’ only when its price is a fluctuating factor,—sometimes more sometimes less; in the case of the Marriage however, the so-called ‘price’ is a fixed item—‘a hundred bullocks’ for instance, for the girl, irrespective of her being ugly or handsome. Lastly, there is a Vedic text indicating that Women do have property; this text is पत्नी वा पारिणव्यस्येष्टे ‘The Wife is mistress over the household property.’ (*Sū*. 16 and *Bhāṣya*.)

c31.s4.9

We have seen that the Man and the Woman both possess property and are therefore equally entitled to perform Sacrifices. The next question that arises is—Is the Man alone or the Woman alone, entitled to perform Sacrifices? Or are both to perform them only jointly?

c31.s4.10

This question has been dealt with by *Sūtras* 6.1.17-21.

c31.s4.11

The *Prima Facie* View is that each of them should perform the Sacrifice separately; because the Injunctive Word that lays down the Sacrifice—‘*Yajēta*’—is in the singular number, and due significance must attach to this Number; whereby only *one* person should perform the Sacrifice at a time, and there should not be any joint performance by any two or more.

c31.s4.12

The *Established Conclusion* however is as follows:—*Though both, the Man and his wife, possess property, their action should always be joint, because of the declaration to that effect.* (*Sūtra* 6.1.17). This ‘declaration’ is contained in such texts as (*a*) ‘In matters relating to Duty, Property and Pleasure, she shall not be ignored’; (*b*) ‘Religious acts should be performed jointly’. There are some Sacrifices again which must be performed by the Man and his wife together; such for instance, as the two important Sacrifices of *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* and *Jyotiṣṭoma*; at both these Sacrifices, oblations are laid down as to be offered out of the Clarified Butter that has been ‘examined’ by the Sacrificer and his Wife; and the performance of such Sacrifices would be defective if either the Man or his wife did not participate in it. Nor can the Man performing the Sacrifice associate *any* Woman he likes with himself; because the texts definitely assert that the Man should be associated with the woman who is his *patnī*, and the *‘Patnī’* is his married wife, in regard to which the Man has been exhorted *‘to do jointly with his wife all those acts that need associating with a woman’*. As regards the Singular Number in the Injunctive Word *‘yajēta’*, if stress were meant to be laid upon this Singular Number, how could the Sacrificer associate with himself as many as sixteen Priests? Further, the functions of the Wife at the performance are entirely different from those of the Sacrificer himself; so that by performing her own specified functions, the Wife does not disturb the singleness of the Husband. It is absolutely essential too that the Sacrifice should be performed by the Husband and the Wife together, because the wealth that is used at the performance of Sacrifices belongs in common to the Husband and Wife; hence the Sacrifice should be performed by both *jointly*; or if, either of them is unwilling, it should not be performed at all. There are certain acts in the way of personal Embellishments which may be done by the Man by himself, and no associating of the Wife is necessary there; to this category belong such acts as the shaving of the head, the wearing of the Gold ring and so forth. As regards the argument that the Wife being a purchased commodity, her ‘ownership’ over property cannot be real,—this has been answered already; as a matter of fact, the idea that ‘the Wife is a purchased commodity and is not entitled to own property’ is based upon Smṛti, while the idea that *She owns property* is based on Vedic texts; and further, it is by virtue of her ‘desiring the result expected to follow from the Sacrifice’ that the Wife is entitled to its performance. From all this it follows that both the Man and his Wife are *jointly* entitled to the performance of Sacrifices. (*Bhāṣya*, Trs., pp. 983—986).

c31.s4.13

The next question that arises is—Is the Wife to do all that the Husband does? or are her functions restricted?

c31.s4.14

The *Prima Facie View* is that as the Sacrifice is performed by both *jointly*, all the functions laid down as to be performed by the ‘Sacrificer’ should be performed by the Wife also; because she is as much a ‘Sacrificer’ as the Husband.

c31.s4.15

The *Established Conclusion* is as follows:—To the Wife appertain only such functions as are specifically laid down for her. *She has to do also the ‘Invoking of Blessings’ and observe ‘celibacy’*. (Sūtra 6. 1. 24);—and the reason for this is that the Vedic text distinctly lays down these acts as to be done by her, and in matters relating to *Dharma*, the Vedic text is our sole guide; and for the same reason she is to do also the ‘Invoking of the Blessings’ and also observe ‘celibacy’. The reason given for all this distinction is that *She is not equal* (*Sūtra* 24); that is, *She does not stand on the same footing as the Husband*—says the *Bhāṣya* (Trs. P. 994).

c31.s4.16

From what has gone before, this ‘inequality’ would appear to be in reference to the fact that there are some details that can be performed by the Man alone, and others again that can be performed by the Wife alone. The *Sūtra* does not make any mention of the Woman being not entitled to *study* the Veda. The Commentators however, from the *Bhāṣya* downwards, have explained the ‘inequality’ of the *Sūtra* to mean that ‘the Husband is a Male and hence learned in the Veda, while the Wife is a Female, and hence not so learned’ (*Bhāṣya* Trs. p. 993); and Kumārila goes a step further and offers a different interpretation of the words of the *Sūtra*; he says:—“The term *Āśiḥ* literally stands for those Vedic *Mantras* in which blessings are invoked—such as *Āyurdā agnē āyurmē déhi*; but in view of the fact that the Wife is not learned in the Veda and hence would not be able to recite the said *Mantras* with the proper accent etc., the term ‘*Āśiḥ*’ should be taken as standing for *Embellishments*, such as bathing, anointing, applying collyrium to the eyes and so forth; the term ‘celibacy’ also should be taken as standing for *freedom from passions of all kinds*”. (*Ṭupṭikā*). The *Bhāṣya* (Trs. P. 993) proceeds—What happens is this:—(*a*) There are certain details subserving the purposes of the Sacrifice which have been declared as to be performed by the ‘Sacrificer’, and as in all these texts the ‘Sacrificer’ is mentioned by means of a name in the Masculine Gender, these details would be performed by the Man, not by his Wife; (*b*) then there are certain details subserving the purposes of the Sacrifice which have to be performed with *Mantras*; and these also could not be performed by the Wife, as she does not possess the requisite knowledge; nor can these texts themselves be taken as indicating the presence of such knowledge in women; as such indication would be justifiable only if the performance were impossible in the absence of such knowledge in the Wife; as a matter of fact, however, even in the absence of such knowledge in the Wife, the performance in question could be carried out by the Husband himself; hence there is no justification for assuming such knowledge in the Wife, and thus treating this as an exception to the general rule that prohibits *Vedic Study* for women. Hence it follows that the details requiring the reciting of *Mantras* should be performed by the Husband, not by the Wife. (*c*) As regards the ‘Invoking of Blessings’ and the ‘Celibacy’, these subserve the purposes of the Performer; so that these could not be regarded as complete if done by only one of the couple; because if only one of these did them, the Embellishment of the other would remain defective. In the texts enjoining these details, the ‘Sacrificer’ does not figure as the *Subject*, hence the Gender of the word has no significance; which means that these have to be done by both—the Man as well as his Wife. (*d*) What has been specifically laid down as to be done by the Wife, e.g., the ‘Examining of the Clarified Butter’,—has to be done by her alone. From all this it follows that on account of this ‘inequality’ the Wife does not stand on the same footing as the Husband.

(E) Is the Shūdra Entitled to Perform Sacrifices?

c31.s5.1

The *Shūdra* is not entitled to perform Sacrifices at all. The *Established Conclusion* on the subject has been thus formulated in the *Sūtra* (6. 1. 26). *The Agnihotra and such Sacrifices can be performed by the three Higher Castes only*, as in connection with the *Fire-installation Rite*, these three only have been mentioned; the *Shūdra* therefore can have nothing to do with Sacrifices; specially as the Veda is related to the *Brāhmaṇa* and the other two castes only. The Fire-installation Rite has been enjoined in the text—‘The *Brāhmaṇa* should install the Fires during Spring, the *Kṣattriya* during Summer and the *Vaiśya* during Autumn’; and there is no mention of the *Shūdra*. Thus being without the duly-installed Fires, the *Shūdra* cannot perform the *Agnihotra* and such other acts. The *Ahavanīya* and other consecrated fires being not available for the *Shūdra*, he cannot be entitled to the performance of those acts where these consecrated Fires are essential. (*Bhāṣya* Trs. pp. 995-996). (This view is quoted with approval by *Prabhākara* in *Bṛhati*, p. 111A). Apart from the Restrictive text relating to the Fire-installation Rite, there is yet another Vedic text restricting the title to Sacrifices to the three Higher Castes only—this text speaking of the *Initiation* as to be done to the *Brāhmaṇa*, the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya*,—the *Shūdra* being altogether omitted; and as no one is fit to perform Sacrifices without Initiation, the *Shūdra* should be regarded as unfit for performing Sacrifices, on account of not having been ‘initiated’ into Vedic Study; and hence having not acquired the learning requisite for sacrificial performances. Being without the knowledge of Veda acquired in the proper manner, the *Shūdra* cannot have the requisite capacity and is therefore not entitled to perform Sacrifices. (*Bhā*. Trs. p. 1000). Nor is it possible for the *Shūdra* to acquire the requisite knowledge later on; because such knowledge has been strictly forbidden for the *Shūdra*—the prohibitive text being ‘The *Shūdra* shall not read the Veda.’ If he did read it, he must be only incurring sin, and not acquiring the title to perform Sacrifices. Even if it were possible for the *Shūdra* to acquire the knowledge, he would not thereby become entitled to perform Sacrifices, as he would still be without the Consecrated Fires,—the installing of these having been restricted to the three higher castes (See above) (*Bhāṣya* Trs. p. 1000—1002).

c31.s5.2

*Prabhākara* (*Bṛhati* Ms. p. 111A) says—‘Rightly has the author of the *Bhāṣya* summed up the right view by declaring that it is by reason of his not having ‘installed’ the Fires that the *Shūdra* is not entitled to the performance of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and other Sacrifices’.

c31.s5.3

According to the *Vedānta-Sūtra* (and *Shaṅkarāchārya*) also, *Shūdras* are not entitled to perform Sacrifices.

(F) The ‘Rathakāra’ and the ‘Niṣādasthapati’ are Entitled to Perform Sacrifices

c31.s6.1

There are two exceptions to the general exclusion of *Shūdras* from the performance of Sacrifices,—dealt with under Sū. 6. 1. 44—50 and Sū. 6.1. 51-52.

c31.s6.2

(a) It has been settled above that it is only the three Higher Castes that are entitled to the Installation of Fire. We have a Vedic text however laying down this Fire-installation to be done ‘during the Rains’, by the ‘*Rathakāra*’. Now who is this *Rathakāra*? The literal meaning of the word is the *chariot-maker*. Does then the text refer to Fire-installation as to be done by a person of one of the higher castes who has taken up the profession of chariot-making? or is *Rathakāra* an altogether different caste? The *Established Conclusion* on the question is that the persons meant by the word '*Rathakāra*' are '*the inferior Saudhanvanas*'—says the *Sūtra* (6. 1. 50); this caste is slightly inferior to the three higher castes. This case has been dealt with by *Kātyāyana* in his *Śrauta-Sūtra* (I. 11-12); from which we learn that the '*Rathakāra*' is one whose mother is born of a *Śūdra* mother and a *Vaiśya* Father; and the Commentator on *Kātyāyana* remarks that the Fire-installation by this *Rathakāra* is only for the purposes of purification, not for that of Sacrificial performances.

c31.s6.3

(b) Similarly we have the Injunction—'This *Raudra* Sacrifice should be performed for the *Niṣāda-sthapati*'. The question arises in regard to the exact signification of the compound '*Niṣāda-sthapati*'; does this stand for the 'chief' *i.e.*, king, of the *Niṣādas*? or for the king who is himself a *Niṣāda*? In the former case, there would be no difficulty, as the 'Chief of the *Niṣādas*' may belong to one of the three higher castes and hence fully entitled to the performance of the *Raudra* and also other Sacrifices. In the latter case however, the chief, being himself a *Niṣāda*, would not be a member of any of the three higher castes, and hence not entitled to the performance of the *Raudra* or any other Sacrifice.

c31.s6.4

The *Established Conclusion* on this question is that the word stands for the *Chief who is himself a Niṣāda*; such is the direct signification of the compound; as in this case the compound being *Karmadhāraya*, both members of it retain their natural connotations; such is not the case if the compound is taken as *Tatpuruṣa*, in the sense of 'Chief of *Niṣādas*'. That the Chief of the *Niṣāda*-caste is meant is also indicated by the Vedic text laying down 'a false coin' as the Sacrificial Fee at the *Raudra* Sacrifice in question; as a 'false coin' is of use to *Niṣādas* only. (*Bhāṣya* Trs. p. 1012). This *Niṣāda* is a mixed caste; though he is devoid of Vedic learning, yet, in view of the Vedic text expressly enjoining the *Raudra*-Sacrifice for him, we have to take it that he is to learn up the texts for the occasion, needed for the performance of that Sacrifice.

c31.s6.5

This man however has to perform the Sacrifice in the Fire consecrated for the occasion, as in his case there cannot be the regularly installed Fire of the *Agnihotra*, nor the *Upanayana*-Fire. (Sū. 6. 8. 20-21).

(G) Disqualification for Performers of Sacrifices

c31.s7.1

Jaimini has discussed some other incapacitating circumstances also—*e.g.*, (1) Want of necessary wealth and (2) Physical disability.

c31.s7.2

The case of the man without wealth has been dealt with under Sū. 6. 1. 39-40. The *Established Conclusion* is that the possession of wealth is not a pre-requisite; it is *not right* that the man without wealth should not be entitled to perform Sacrifices; because the possession of wealth is a variablle factor; no one is ‘devoid of wealth’ by birth; there are always ways and means whereby even a poor man can become wealthy; so that the possession of wealth can always be brought about as the need arises. (*Bhāṣya Trs.* p. 1003).

c31.s7.3

The other incapacitating circumstance is considered under Sū. 6. 1. 41; it is that of the man with bodily defect; and the conclusion is that a person with such defect is not necessarily excluded from Sacrifices; as it is always possible that the man may become cured of the defect.

c31.s7.4

But if the bodily defect is one that is congenital, or in any way incurable, then the man is *not* entitled to peform Sacrifices. (Sū. 42).

c31.s7.5

The view of the *Neo-Mīmāṁsakas*—*Mādhavāchārya* for instance—is that it is only the *Prospective* (i.e., *Kāmya*) Sacrifices to which such men are not entitled; they *are* entitled to perform the *Compulsory* and *Contingent* Sacrifices.

c31.s7.6

A third incapacitating condition is considered under *Sūtra* 6. 1. 43.

c31.s7.7

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we have the Injunction of ‘naming three *Gotra-Ṛṣis*.’ If a man is unable to name these three *Ṛṣis*, does he become excluded from Sacrifices? Yes, says Sū. 6. 1. 43.

c31.s7.8

But this does not mean that the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* can be performed only by those who can name three and only three *Pravara-Ṛṣis*; all that is meant is that those who are unable to name three *Ṛṣis* are excluded. So that persons who can recount five Pravara-Ṛṣis become entitled; this is made further clear by the prohibition that ‘more than five shall not be named’. (Ṭupṭikā.)

c31.s7.9

The question as to who is entitled to perform Sacrifices has been dealt with systematically by Kātyāyana in his Śrauta-Sūtra (1.3-12). In Sū. 3 he puts forward the view that all beings—animal, human and divine,—are equally entitled to the performance of Sacrifices. Sū. 4 rejects this view and declares that human beings alone can be so entitled, as it is they alone that can really perform Sacrifices; the Deities cannot do so; the commentator Karka adds—because they have all their desires already fulfilled and do not stand in need of anything which they would seek to accomplish by means of Sacrifices; and also because apart from these Deities themselves, there is no ‘Deity’ to whom they could make offerings; the Rākṣasas and Piśāchas cannot perform Sacrifices, as they are by their very nature, impure and hence unfit for sacrificial performances;—nor can animals offer Sacrifices, as they are devoid of the requisite Vedic learning. The disabilities in connection with human beings are mentioned in Sū. 5. Sacrifices cannot be performed by one who has one or more limbs wanting,—who is devoid of Vedic learning,—who is sexless,—and who is a Śūdra. One who has no legs cannot perform the walking involved in the Viṣṇukrama prescribed in connection with Sacrifices (Vide—Śata-Br. 1.1-2.13; 6.5.2.10; 6.6.4.1);—the blind cannot do the ‘Examining’ of the Clarified Butter; the dumb cannot recite the Mantras; and a Sacrifice in which these details are wanting would be no Sacrifice at all. One who is devoid of Vedic Learning is not entitled, because he cannot know what is to be done and how; the sexless person is not entitled; because the Scriptures have declared such a person to be ‘impure’ by his very nature. The Śūdra also is not entitled. Sūtra 6 declares that the Brāhmaṇa, the Kṣatriya and the Vaishya alone are entitled to perform Sacrifices; because of declarations in the Veda to that effect; the Veda has restricted Fire-installation to the three higher castes only, and no Sacrifices can be performed without these Fires. ‘Absence of Learning’ is not a disqualification for the Śūdra only; as it has been mentioned as a disqualification for all castes. Sūtra 7 distinctly declares that women are as much entitled to the performance of Sacrifices as men; specially as it is found that the Veda enjoins the Initiation of the Sacrificer and his Wife, the former being initiated with the *Mekhalā* and the latter with the *Yoktra* (*Sūtra* 8). *Karka* however adds that women are entitled, but only as associated with their husbands, and not independently by themselves; he bases this disqualification upon a later *Smṛti text*, which declares that ‘there is no independent sacrificing for women’. He appears to have lost sight of the fact that the Man also is not entitled to perform Sacrifices, except as associated with his wife. Under *Sūtra* 11 and 12 *Kātyāyana* has dealt with the cases of the ‘*Rathakāra*’ and the ‘*Niṣādasthapati*’. (See above.)

(H) Sattras—Communistic Sacrifices

c31.s8.1

*Jaimini* has devoted some special *Sūtras* to the consideration of the question as to who are entitled to perform the Communistic Sacrifices, *Sattras*; this question turns upon the question as to who is the recipient of the rewards accruing from those Sacrifices.

c31.s8.2

The question is—Who is to perform the Communistic Sacrifices, like the *Sattra*? Is it each individual person of the ‘Community’ desiring the whole fruit of the Sacrifice? or the whole Community’, as a ‘Community’?

c31.s8.3

The *Prima Facie View* is that no individual singly should perform what has been enjoined for the entire ‘Community’ or Group. The whole Group collectively, as desiring the Result, should be the *Performer*, and the Result should also accrue to all of them collectively.

c31.s8.4

The *Established Conclusion* is as follows:—*Inasmuch as each man helps in the accomplishment of the desired end, the title to the performance should be taken as accruing to each.* (*Sūtra* 6.2.1). As a rule when an act is done by several persons together, each of them helps in the accomplishment of the desired end; and the Result of an act should always accrue to the performer of that act; and in the case in question, each of the persons concerned is a ‘Performer’ of the Sacrifice. So that even though the performance has been undertaken by them collectively, the Result should accrue to each of them severally. (*Bhāṣya—Trs.*, p. 1014.)

c31.s8.5

The *Sattra* differs from the ordinary Sacrifice in that—(1) it cannot be performed by one man (*Sū.* 10.6.45—50, and 10.6.59-60).

c31.s8.6

and (2) all the priests are from among the ‘Sacrificers’ themselves (10.6.51—58), (3) for this same reason there is no ‘appointment’ of Priests (Sū. 10.2.35, Bhā. Trs. 1698); and the services of the Priests at the *Sattra* are not ‘bought’ or ‘exchanged’, for any promised ‘Fee’ (10.2.35—38); and the gift of ‘a mare or a slave-girl or a cow’, which is prescribed in connection with the *Sārasvata-Iṣṭi* (which forms part of the procedure of the *Sattra*) has been regarded as fulfilling a transcendental result, (10.2.44-45), and not the effect of ‘securing the services’ of the Priests.—which is the usual purpose served by Fees. (See 10.2.44). If one of the Sacrificers at the *Sattra* should happen to die during the performance, his bones have to be kept wrapped in deer-skin, and his place at the Sacrifice is to be taken up by a person nearly related to him, and at the end of the year, the Sacrificers should perform, for the sake of their dead partner, a special Sacrifice called the *Samvatsara-yāga* (Sū. 10.2.47-48) All the seventeen persons performing the *Sattra* should belong to the same *Brāhmaṇa* sub-sect; i.e., they should all be followers of the same *Kalpa-Sūtra* (Sū. 6.6.1—11). But at the *Kulāyayajña*, it is possible for the King and his Priest to belong to different *Kalpas* (Sū. 6.6.12—15). *Kṣatriyas* and *Vaiśyas* cannot perform *Sattras*, to which *Brāhmaṇas* alone are entitled; and of these also, only those who belong to the *Viśvāmitra-Gotra*; and of these last, only such as are guided by the same *Kalpa*, (Sū. 6.6.15—26). All persons performing the *Sattra* should be regular performers of the *Agnihotra* (6. 6.27—42). To the *Sāmidhenī* however all ‘Regenerate’ (*Dvija*) persons are equally entitled (Sū. 6.6.36—39). The *Juhū* and other Implements used at the *Sattra* should be kept common among all the Sacrificers, and nothing should belong exclusively to any one Sacrificer. The reason for this lies in the fact that if any implement belongs to any one person, in the event of his death, it would have to be burnt along with his body, and this would interfere with the performance. (Sū. 6.6.33—35.)

c31.s8.7

To the performance of the *Viśvajit* Sacrifice, only such persons are entitled as can afford to give 112 pieces of Gold. (Sū. 6.7.18—20.)

c31.s8.8

The possibility of several performers at the Communistic Sacrifices might lead people to believe that there may be several performers at the *Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa* and such Sacrifices also.

c31.s8.9

But the conclusion is that at all of them, there is to be a single Performer at each performance. In fact, that is the normal law; if at the Communistic Sacrifices like the Sattra, there are several performers, those are special cases, special'y provided for by special Vedic Injunctions; e.g., in regard to the Sattra it has been enjoined that 'there are to be at least Seventeen Performers'. (Sūtra 6.2.3—12.)

c31.s8.10

In regard to Sacrifices enjoined as to be performed for the purpose of bringing about visible results,—such as Rain, Cattle and so forth,—the rule is that when the performance has once begun, it must be carried to its end,—even if the result desired should happen to be accomplished before its completion; as the Veda deprecates incomplete acts and prescribes expiatory rites for leaving Sacrifices unfinished; and also because cultured people decry men who begin an act but do not carry it out to the end,—says Bṛhatī (MS., p. 113B).—(6.2. 13—15). But this rule does not apply to such purely secular acts as the building of a house; because the aforesaid depreciation of unfinished acts is based upon the consideration that when a Sacrificial Act has been begun, an expectation of receiving offerings is raised in the minds of the Deities concerned, and hence if all the prescribed offerings are not made, it becomes a case of breach of promise. Such is not the case with the purely secular acts; specially as the said deprecation is based upon the fact that the Veda has prescribed expiation for unfinished Sacrifices; and this could not apply to the secular acts. (Sū. 6.2. 16—18)—(Bṛhatī, p. 113B.)

(1) Prohibitions—Exact Signification

c31.s9.1

Sūtras 6.2. 19-20 raise an interesting question regarding Prohibitions. The Veda contains Injunctions as well as Prohibitions. We have been dealing with the question of Persons being entitled or not-entitled to the performance of the acts enjoined by the Injunctions. The question raised now is in regard to the Prohibitions. Who are the persons who are entitled to act in accordance with the Prohibitions? Are they persons who desire for themselves certain results expected to follow from the avoidance of acts mentioned in the Prohibitory Texts? Or are the Texts meant for, and applicable to, all men irrespectively of any desire for results? For instance, when the Veda prohibits the Eating of Garlic,—does it mean that here we have the positive act of vowing act—to abstain from Garlic? Or does the text only lay down the Negative act of not-eating garlic?

c31.s9.2

The *Prima Facie View* on the question is that the text should be taken as laying down the positive act, the taking of the vow, which thus becomes a *Dharma*, which, in the absence of the mention of any other result, may be taken as leading to Heaven, in accordance with the ‘*Viśvajit-Law*’ (Sū. 4.3.10). The reason in favour of this view,—according to *Prabhākara* (*Bṛhatī* MSS., p. 113B) is that all Injunctive verbs lay down positive acts for the accomplishing of certain desirable results, and there is no reason why the Prohibitive Injunction also should not be regarded as laying down a positive act, something to be done,—a mere *avoidance of garlic* (in the case in question), which would bring about some desirable result.

c31.s9.3

The *Established Conclusion* however is that in the text prohibiting the Eating of Garlic, the negative word must be taken as enjoining the negative, or avoidance, of the act of Eating Garlic, and not any positive act. All injunctions of Positive Acts lay down *something to be done*; but the Prohibitive text does not lay down anything to be done; what it lays down is the not-doing of a certain act; it cannot therefore be taken as the Injunction of a positive act. Nor would such Prohibition be entirely purposeless; as it would serve the purpose of saving man from the horrors of Hell which would be his lot if he ate garlic. This explanation of the Prohibitive text saves us from the necessity of assuming a Result (in the shape of Heaven) as following from the said *Avoidance*, an assumption for which there is no justification. As to who is entitled to act in accordance with the Prohibition, the conclusion is that it is the person who fears the horrors of Hell and desires to save himself from them; not the Person who desires Heaven. For these reasons Prohibitions have been regarded as not contemplating any desirable positive results, they contemplate only the saving from undesirable results; and from this it follows as a necessary corollary that what is prohibited leads to undesirable results. These Prohibitions do not stand on the same footing as the Prohibition of certain acts for the Religious Student; because the latter is avowedly prefaced by the words ‘*Atha vratam*’—‘Now follow the *Observances*’, which are positive by their nature.

c31.s9.4

As for these Observances and other Duties prescribed for the Religious Student,—the man becomes entitled to these, only after his Initiation, (*Upanayana*),—not immediately after Birth; so they pertain to the three Higher Castes only, for whom alone there is *Upanayana*—(Sū. 6.2. 21-22).—These Duties have been laid down specifically for the Religious Student, only during the period of Studentship. (*Bṛhatī* MS., p. 118.)

c31.s9.5

The *Agnihotra* has been enjoined as to be performed ‘throughout one’s life’. But this does not mean that the performance is to be carried on incessantly and continuously; all that is meant is that the acts prescribed in connection with the *Agnihotra* should be performed regularly every day at the times prescribed for them; and as these times prescribed are morning and evening, the offerings have to be made every morning and every evening. Similarly with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifices also; which also have been prescribed as to be performed ‘throughout life’; in this case the performances have to come only on the prescribed days—which are the Moonless and Full-Moon days. (Sū. 6.2. 23—26.) The performances have to be repeated on every Moonless and Full-Moon day; just as the *Agnihotra* has to be performed every morning and every evening. (Sū. 6.2. 27-28.)

c31.s9.6

In connection with these repeated performances of the *Agnihotra* and the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* on the prescribed days throughout life, the general principle has been deduced that in the case of every prescribed *contingent* act, the act has to be repeated every time that the contingency appears. For instance,—(*a*) there are certain rites to be performed when a pot happens to be broken, or a sacrificial material happens to be spoilt; these rites should be performed each time that there is such *breakage* or *spoiling*, (Eū. 6.2.29);—(*b*) it has been enjoined that the pupil should salute the Teacher when he happens to meet him; and the conclusion is that he should do this on every occasion that he happens to meet him. (Sū. 6.2.30.)

c31.s9.7

This is with reference to the *Contingent* Acts. There are certain Acts which, in the way that they are prescribed, bear the resemblance of *Contingent* Acts; for instance, the Study of the Veda for paying off one’s debts to the *Ṛṣis*, the Performance of Sacrifices (*E.g.*, Soma-Sacrifice) for paying off one’s debts to the Deities, and the Begetting of Children for paying off one’s debts to the *Pitṛs*. The question is—Are these acts to be performed by all persons? Or by only those who have incurred the debts and wish to pay them off, or wish to acquire by their means certain rewards, in the shape of Heaven? The conclusion is that they have to be performed by *all men*; so that they are *compulsory*, not *contingent* or *prospective*; and as such, they have to be performed by all men of the three higher castes, irrespectively of any desire for results.—(Sū. 6.2.31.)

Capacity for Performance

c31.s10.1

The question as to who is entitled to the performance of Sacrifices leads on to the allied question as to his ability or *capacity* to perform them; and in this connection we have to consider the chances of a man completing the undertaken Sacrifice under certain circumstances.

c31.s10.2

In regard to the performance of the *Agnihotra*, the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* and other *compulsory* and life-long acts, it has been held that in case one is not *capable* of performing the act *with all its details and subsidiaries*, he need perform the Principal only in full and may omit the Subsidiary details,—but only in case he is absolutely and really incapable, beyond all help. (Sū. 6.2.1—7.)

c31.s10.3

This however applies only to the *compulsory* Acts; in the case of the *Prospective* Acts—those performed for the purpose of obtaining certain desirable results,—the entire procedure has to be gone through scrupulously; as the omission of the slightest detail would make the action defective and render it nugatory, unable to bring about the desired result. (Sū. 6.3. 8—10.)

c31.s10.4

The capacity or ability to perform a Sacrifice turns also upon the ability to secure the proper materials and things necessary for the performance. In connection with the *materials*, it has been held that in case the material prepared for the offering becomes spilt or otherwise rendered unfit for use,—even in the middle of the performance,—if a prescribed substitute is available and is used for the remaining offerings,—the performance of the Sacrifice cannot be regarded as spoilt in any way. (Sū. 6.3. 11—17.) But the substitute must be something similar to the original; for instance, the *Yava* for the *Vrīhi*. (Sū. 6.3.27.) In case however, another supply of the original substance is available, this should have preference over all substitutes. (Sū. 6.3.35.) But in no case can we substitute a substance the use of which has been prohibited; such substances, for instance, as the *Māṣa*, the *Caṇaka* and such other substances as have been called ‘*Ayajñīya*’, ‘unfit for Sacrifices’. In the case of the offering of *Cakes*, if, in course of baking, the Cake happens to be burnt or otherwise spoilt, another Cake is permitted to be used, but only after certain expiatory rites have been performed. (Sū. 6.4. 17—21.) If the consecrated Fire becomes extinguished, it should be rekindled with all the rites of Fire-installation. (Sū. 6.4. 17—27.)

c31.s10.5

Though substitutes have been permitted in the case of *Substances*, they are not permitted in the case of *Deities* or *Mantras*; if the Deity happens to be wrongly named, or the Mantra happen to be wrongly recited, the whole performance becomes nugatory and cannot be remedied. (Sū. 6.3. 18-19.)

c31.s10.6

Lastly, as regards the *Sacrificer*, if anything happen to him and he becomes disabled from taking part in the performance, then the action fails entirely; as no substitute can be permitted for the Sacrificer. (Sū. 6.3.21.) In the case of *Sattras* however, where there are *seventeen* Sacrificers, if one happen to become disabled, his place can be taken by some one else; the reason for this is that in the case of *Sattras* all the Sacrificers take part in the performance, not only as ‘Sacrificers’ or ‘Masters’, but also as ‘Priests’ (there being no Priests at the *Sattra* apart from the Sacrificers themselves); and as even during the performance, a change of Priests is permissible, the disabled Sacrificer, who has been acting as *Priest*, can, on that account, be replaced by another. (Sū. 6.3.22.) But such a substitute can be treated as a ‘Sacrificer’ only for the purpose of making up the statutory number ‘Seventeen’; he does not partake of the Result. (Sū. 6. 3.23.) The real reason for the exception to the General Principle of the Non-Substitution of the Sacrificer appears to be in expediency; in the case of the usual Sacrifice with a single Sacrificer, his own disability leading to the failure of the performance, such failure would be easily tolerated; but in the case of the *Sattra* where there are *seventeen* Sacrificers, if only one of them becomes disabled, during the performance, the other sixteen would not be willing to forego the elaborate Sacrifice and its much-coveted reward; and further, as there would be *Seventeen* persons concerned, there would be a greater likelihood of one becoming disabled; hence some latitude had to be allowed in this case. In case any one of these Seventeen Sacrificers should wish to retire after the performance has begun, he may do so, but he should have to perform the *Vishvajit Sacrifice* in expiation of his failure to fulfil his commitments. (Sū. 6.5.25—27.)

(J) Initiation

c31.s11.1

The Sacrificer has to undergo Intiation at the very outset. In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa Sacrifice*,—in regard to the Initiation several numbers have been mentioned—‘One, two, three, four and twelve’; which means that the Initiation has to be performed on one day, on two days, on three days, on four days, on twelve days. The question is—Is there to be no restriction and one may choose any one of the numbers? or should the number twelve alone be adopted? The *Prima Facie View* is that “in regard to the extent of the Initiation one may do what one likes”. (Sū. 6.5.28.) The *Established Conclusion* is that it should extend over twelve days. (Sū. 6.5.29.)

c31.s11.2

Such is the explanation provided by *Shabara* (*Bhāṣya*, Trs., p. 1129). Neither *Kumārila* (in the *Ṭupṭīkā*) nor *Mandana Mishra* (in the *Mīmāṃsānukramaṇikā*) accepts this presentation of the Topic. According to these, *Sūtras* 28 and 29 embody two distinct Topics. In the former Topic embodied in Sū. 28, the question is—Must there be twelve days’ Initiation? Or is there to be option? The *Prima Facie View* is that there must be twelve days Initiation. The *Established Conclusion* is that one may do as one likes (Sū. 28); *i.e.*, there is to be no restriction. In the second Topic embodied in Sū. 29, the question is—Does the aforesaid option hold regarding all the Ectypes of the Archetype? Or is there any restriction? The *Prima Facie View* is that, according to Sūtra 28 there is absolute option at the Archetype, and hence there should be the same at the Ectypes also. The *Established Conclusion* is that at the Ectypes, and specially at the *Drādaśāha Sacrifice*,—the twelve days Course must be adopted.

Vishvajit Sacrifice

c31.s12.1

There is an interesting point discussed in connection with the *Vishvajit-Sacrifice*. The Fee prescribed for this Sacrifice is ‘*Sarvasva*’ ‘one’s entire Property’, his ‘all belongings’; and the *Established Conclusion* is that the term 'all belongings' stands for the Sacrificer's *riches and wealth*, and not his parents and such relations; (Sū. 6.7. 1-2); of the *Wealth* also, the *Horse* should not be given away, because the giving away of 'animals with mein' has been specially forbidden. (Sū. 6.7.4);—the entire 'Earth', the Terrestrial Globe, should not be given away by any one, as it does not belong to any one. (Sū. 6.7.3.) When giving away his 'entire belongings' one should give away such things as are actually in his possession at the time, and he should not secure new things merely for giving away. (Sū. 6.7.5.) One should not give away the *Śūdra* who is serving him for the purpose of acquiring knowledge of *Dharma*. In fact, no *Śūdra* can be legally acquired as 'property', against his will. (Sū. 6.7.6.) The term 'all belongings' does not include all that the 'man has possessed in the past, or all that may come to him in the future; it means only what he is actually possessed of at the time of the gift. (Sū. 6.7.7.) Whenever the Veda enjoins the giving away of 'unmeasured wealth', it is only *much wealth* that is meant. (Sū. 6.7.22); and it should be taken definitely as standing for 'more than a thousand' gold-pieces. (Sū. 6.7. 23—25.) Similarly, when a Sacrifice is enjoined as to be performed 'for a thousand *years*', it is to be taken as standing for a thousand days. In connection with this, several interpretations have been suggested in the *Sūtras* as *Prima Facie View*: (1) That the thousand-year Sacrifice is really performed for a thousand years, and is meant for Performers who are *Superhuman*; (2) it should be performed for a thousand years, and by human beings,—but by several *generations*; (3) 'Thousand Years' stand for thousand *months*. All this has been rejected; the accepted view being that 'years' stands for days.

First 71 of 88 passages. Read on

Cites (5)