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Purva-Mimamsa in its Sources c38: Chapter XXXIII

Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources c38

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Chapter XXXIII

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INFLUENCE OF MIMAMSA ON LEGAL AND OTHER BRANCHES OF LITERATURE.

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The *Mimamsa-Sutra* has evolved a set of principles for the interpretation of texts. It has based its Discussions on texts dealing with the details of sacrificial ritual; and the reason for this lay in the fact that at the time that the *Sutra* was written, and the principles of *Mimamsa* systematised, the performance of elaborate Sacrifices was a familiar occurrence in the life of the ordinary Hindu. At a later age, when these Sacrifices fell into desuetude the study of the *Mimamsa* was found difficult, and it fell in the popular estimation. But before long it was discovered that though the illustrations chosen in *Mimamsa* Literature, showing the application of the Principles of Interpretation, may not appeal to the learner, yet the Principles were as useful as ever, in other fields, wherever original texts had to be studied and their exact signification discussed. This was specially so in the domain of Law. This branch of study had to deal with a large number of original texts, from the Vedas and from the *Smrtis*; and the range of this study therefore extended from the Vedas down to the most recent *Smrti*-compilations; and as there were some discrepancies in these texts bearing on many points in regard to the practices of men, the only reasonable basis for the explaining away of these discrepancies lay in the Principles of Interpretation that had been worked out by the *Mimamsaka* in connection with Vedic texts bearing upon the details of Sacrificial ritual. We accordingly find all writers of Legal Digests making free use of these Principles of Interpretation.

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We shall cite a few instances from the more authoritative Legal Digests, of cases where the said Principles have been utilised in coming to a conclusion.

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(1) Under 2. 126, *Yajnavalkya* has laid down that after the regular Partition has been finished,—if some property is found to have been surreptitiously hidden away by any of the partners, that property should be recovered from him and divided among all the co-partners in equal shares. In this connection the question is raised as to whether this surreptitious possession is reprehensible or not;—the argument in support of the view that "it is not reprehensible" is that the partner who has been in wrongful possession has also some right over the property concerned, and hence, as he has been keeping the property only under the misconception that it is solely his own, his conduct cannot be regarded as entirely reprehensible;—this argument is based upon what has been argued under *Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra* 6. 3. 20,—where, the question being raised as to the propriety of changing the *Mudga*-corn that has been kept for the making of the flour but has been become spoilt,—the other party has argued that—if the Sacrificer has substituted an equal quantity of the *Māṣa*-corn, under the honest misapprehension that it is *Mudga*,—his action cannot be regarded as a contravention of the rule that forbids the use of the *Māṣa*; because, though he has actually used the *Māṣa*, he has used it as *Mudga*. Under the *Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra* referred to, this view has been rejected, and the conclusion arrived at is that the use of the *Māṣa* under the circumstances certainly constitutes an infringement of the rule that forbids the use of *Māṣa*, *Kodrava* and *Caṇaka*. In accordance with this conclusion the conduct of the Partner who has been in wrongful possession of a part of the common property has been regarded as reprehensible.

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(2) In regard to the widow's rights of inheritance, some writers have argued that—in as much as all property is meant primarily for the purpose of performing Sacrifices,—to which the Woman is not entitled,—she can have no business to inherit the Property;—that the Woman, apart from her husband, is not entitled to perform Sacrifices has been shown under *Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra* 6. 1. 17—21; though in the preceding *Sūtras* it has been shown that she cannot be held to be absolutely not-entitled to such performance, as, in the company of her husband, she has her place at all Sacrifices. (See above).

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The argument against the rights of Women has been met by another reasoning based upon *Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra* 3. 4. 26—30; where it has been shown that the Wearing of Gold by the Sacrificer and the Priests has no bearing upon the Sacrificial Performance;—and on the basis of this conclusion it has been argued that, if all Property were meant for Sacrificial Performance, from where would the gold be got for the said wearing? The Gold worn is certainly ‘property’, and yet it does not have any bearing upon the Sacrificial Performance. The Mitākṣarā on 2. 135 has argued ‘If all Property were meant for Sacrificial Performances, there would be no charity or works of Public Utility, like the digging of Tanks and the like’.

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(3) In regard to the share to which the Wife is entitled, there are following texts:—

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(a) यदि कुर्यात्‌समानंशान्‌ पत्न्यः कार्याः समांशिकाः ।

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‘If the Proprietor effects an equal division of his property during his life-time, he should assign equal shares to his wives’.

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(b) पितुरुर्ध्वं विभजतांमाताप्यंशं समंहरेत्‌ ।

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‘If the partition is effected after the Father’s death, the Mother should receive an equal share.’

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According to these texts, the Wife’s share in the property of her Husband is equal to that of each of his sons.

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Some writers have held that the Wife is entitled to a mere subsistence-allowance, not to any share in the Property; and they have interpreted these texts to mean that—If the Property is extensive, the Wife is to receive just enough to maintain her; but if the Property is small, she is to share it equally with her sons. Against this view, it has been argued that such an interpretation would cause an incongruity in the above texts; as, under the proposed interpretation, the first would mean that she is to receive merely a subsistence-allowance, while the second would give her a share equal to that of the sons. That such incongruous interpretation of Injunctive Texts is not permissible has been shown under Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra 7. 3. 19—25. The argument adumberated under these Sūtras is as follows:—In connection with the Chāturmāsya-Sacrifice, the Vedic Injunction has laid down ‘Agni-Praṇayana’, the Fetching of Fire;—there are two such ‘fetchings’—one connected with the Agniṣṭoma-Sacrifice, which is accompanied by many other details, and the other connected with the Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa, which is simpler, and without any other details;—the question arises as to which of these two Fetchings has to be adopted at the Chāturmāsya; the conclusion is that it must be the latter.—Upon this, there arises the further question—At which of the four sections of the *Chāturmāsya*—the *Vaiśvadeva*, the *Varuṇapraghāsa*, the *Śākamedhīya*, or the *Sunāsīrīya*,—is the said *Fetching* to be done? The conclusion is that it should be done at the second and third sections;—though the *Prima Facie View* is that—"the *fetching* should be done at the first and fourth sections, because the *Fetching* has to be done on the *Uttaravedī*, and the use of the *Uttaravedī* is related to the *First* and the *Fourth* sections only,—this relationship being deduced from the prohibition of the use of this *Vedī* at the *First* and *Fourth Sections*, which prohibition implies the possibility of such use at the said sections;"—in answer to this argument it has been shown that such an interpretation of the texts concerned leads to an incongruity in the text enjoining the use of the *Uttaravedī*;—that is, in regard to the *First* and *Fourth* sections, its use is implied by the Prohibition (as urged above),—and as such, it could be intended for partial acceptance only, while with regard to the *second* and *third* sections, the use of the *Uttaravedī* has been laid down directly and hence permanently;—in this way the *Veda* would be laying down two entirely divergent courses of action,—under the *Prima Facie View*; and this cannot be desirable. This argument has been applied to the case of the above-mentioned texts bearing upon the Wife's rights; and it is argued that so long as a text affords one coherent meaning, there can be no justification for breaking up its meaning into two incoherent parts; hence there can be no justification for the interpretation placed upon the texts to mean that the Wife is to receive only a subsistence-allowance and so forth.

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(4) In connection with the rights of the Parents over the Property left by their childless Son, the question arises as to which of the two parents—the Mother or the Father—has the prior claim. The text bearing upon the question mentions the word '*Pitarau*'—'Parents'; and would therefore appear to leave the matter doubtful; but it has been argued that in as much as the word '*Pitarau*' has been etymologically explained in authoritative Grammatical works as equivalent to '*Mātāpitarau*',—and as in this the *Mātā* (Mother) is mentioned *first*, hers should be the prior claim. This reasoning is based upon *Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra* 5—14 to 7, where it has been shown that the *Prayājas-Samid*, *Tanūnapāt*, etc.—are to be performed in the order in which they are mentioned in the injunctive texts,—in accordance with the accepted Principle that the Priority of mention leads to priority in action. (*Mitākṣarā*, on 2. 135).

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(5) The adoption of a son, has to be done with full *Vedic* rites and ceremonies, even when done by the *Shūdra*, who would be entitled to the performance of such Rites, in accordance with the conclusions arrived at in connection with the '*Niṣāda-chief*'—under *Mī. Sū.* 6. 1. 51,—and the '*Rathakāra*' under *Mī. Sū.* 6. 1. 44; where it has been shown that though as a general rule the *Shūdra* becomes entitled to such performances, and hence also yet in the special cases of the Niṣāda Chief, and the *Rathakāra*, the *Shūdra* becomes entitled to such performances, and hence also to the learning of the relevant *Mantra-texts* and reciting them at the performance. According to some writers, though the special Sacrifices have been laid down for the *Shūdra*, the Vedic Mantras have to be recited by *Brāhmaṇa-proxies* of the *Shūdra* Sacrificer. But the generally-accepted conclusion is that these are to be treated as exceptional cases and thus do not vitiate the general conclusion that the *Shūdra* is not entitled to the performance of Vidic Rites, as propounded in *Mīmā. Sū.* 6. 1. 25.

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(6) In regard to Adoption, it has been declared that the woman can 'adopt' a Son only in the company of her husband, or when permitted by him; as she, alone by herself, is not entitled to perform Vedic Rites and Ceremonies, and the performance of such rites is inseparable from all regular Adoption. The exclusion of Women from Sacrificial Performances has been discussed above, as dealt with in *Mīmā. Sū.* 6. 1. 6. The 'permission' of the Husband has been regarded as implying the 'presence' of the Husband himself at the ceremony of Adoption.

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(7) In connection with Adoption, *Manu* has declared that a child that has been adopted in another family cannot inherit the property of his Progenitor-Father, nor perform his *Shrāddha*; and though the text directly prohibits these two things only, yet it has been accepted as implying the prohibition of other cognate things also,—such as all relationships and connections due to the Progenitor-Father. This is in accordance with the principles laid down in *Mīmā. Sū.* 3. 7. 13 (*Shabara-Bhāṣya*, Text, Page 71, Line 15); wherein it has been shown that the texts—(a) '*Antarvēdi minoti*' (Measures in the central Altar') and (b) '*Jātaputraḥ kṛṣṇakēśō—'gninādadhīta*' ('One should install the Fires after he has got a Son and while his hair is still black'), even though directly mentioning only a few definite characteristics, are to be regarded as implying (a) ‘any place within the Altar, not necessarily the centre, and (b) any particular period of the man’s life, not necessarily the time when his hair is black.

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(8) It has been ruled by the Privy Council that the adoption of an only son of his father is legal. This decision has been sought to be based upon Mīmā. Sū. 1. 2. 26-27. It has been shown above that in this case the *Mīmāṁsā-Rule* has been misunderstood and misapplied. (See in this connection a detailed account of this in K. L. Sarkar’s *Mīmāṁsā Rules of Interpretation* pp. 451 *et seq.*). The case referred to here is the one cited as Sri Balasu Guru Liṅga Swami *vs.* Sir Balwan Ramalakṣamina and others; Rādhāmonhan, representative of Beni Prasad *vs.* Hardei Bibi L.R. 26 I.A. 113, S.C.I. L.R. 21, Allahabad 460.

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The above are only examples—just to illustrate how the Mīmāṁsā Rules have influenced the administration of Law, even by the present Courts of Law. In this connection the Reader is referred to the above-mentioned book of Sarkar’s; Lecture XI of this book is to be read by persons interested in the comparative study of Law; as here Dr. Sarkar has shown the resemblance between the Mīmāṁsā Rules of Interpretation and Maxims and those adopted and used in modern Law.

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The following are a few instances of the use made of the Mīmāṁsā Maxims in other branches of Sanskrit Literature.

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(1) The *Kalañjanyāya* (*Jaimini Sū.* 6. 2. 19-20) has been used—(a) by Ānandagiri in his comment on the *Śārīraka-Bhāṣya* (under 3. 4. 28 and 4. 1. 13);—(b) in *Saṁṣepaśārīraka* (1. 417—20);—(c) in *Śrī-bhāṣya* (1. 1. 4).

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(2) The *Grahaikatvanyāya* (*Jaimini Sū.* 3. 1. 13—15) is used—(a) in *Nyāyamañjarī* (P. 287);—in *Vedāntashikhāmaṇi* (P. 120);—(c) by Kayyaṭa on *Mahābhāṣya* (1. 1. 69); and (d) by Nāgeśa on *Kayyaṭa* (1. 1. 14).

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(3) *Rātrisattranyāya* (*Jaimini Sū.* 4. 13. 17—19) has been used—(a) in *Vedāntakalpataru* and *Parimala* on Sū. 3. 3. 38, and on 1. 2. 24;—(b) in *Pañchapādikāvivaraṇa* (pp. 122 and 134); and (c) in *Tattva-muktakalāpa* (5. 81).

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(4) *Viṣvajinnyāya* (*Shabara* p. 496.) is used—(a) in *Bhāmatī* (1. 1. 4); (b) in *Vedāntakalpataru* (P. 430);—(c) in *Pañchapādikāvivaraṇa* (pp. 134, 137, 164); and (d) in *Nyāyamañjarī* (P. 524).

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Śaṅkarāchārya has quoted and utilised the *Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra* and *Nyāyas*, very profusely. The following are a few Examples. The page-references are to the *Śārīraka-Bhāṣya* with *Ratnaprabhā-Bhāmatī* and Anandagiri, published by the Nirṇayasāgara Press, 1909.

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P. 675—Sūtra 3. 3. 1—*Agnihotranyāya* applied.

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P. 717—Sū. 3. 3. 25—‘*Śrutiliṅga-vākya*, etc.’ (3. 3. 13) quoted and applied.

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P. 724—Su. 3. 3. 26—*Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra* quoted—‘*Api tu vākyasheṣaḥ syāt, etc.*’

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P. 730—Sū. 3. 3. 31—‘*Prakaraṇādya-niyāmakatvam*.’

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P. 737—*Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra* 3. 3. 8 quoted.

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P. 740—‘*Abhyāsāt karmabhedaḥ*’.

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P. 749—under Sū. 3. 3. 4.

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P. 750—under Sū. 3. 3. 42.

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P. 760—under Sū. 3. 3. 49, where the *Vedanta-Sutra* itself asserts ‘*Śrutyādibalīyastrāchchhana bādhaḥ*’.

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P. 762—Under Sū. 3. 3. 50.

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P. 764—under Sū. 3. 3. 53—*Shabara-Bhāṣya* referred to.

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P. 793—under Sū. 3. 4. 20

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P. 797—under Sū. 3. 4. 21.

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P. 803-804—under Sū. 3. 4. 27.

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P. 813—under Sū. 3. 4. 42.

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P. 899—under Sū. 4. 4. 12.

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The following instances of the influence of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* upon several branches of Literature have been culled from Colonel Jacob's *Handful of Popular Maxims*:—

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(1) When there is a crowd of people, and some of them are umbrellas’. It is the maxim which has been set forth in *Tantra-vārtika* (1. 4. 13); and this has been utilised by *Śaṅkara* in his *Bhāṣya* on the *Vedānta-Sūtra* (3. 3. 34), where he says ‘Though the text ‘*Ṛtampibantau*’ speaks of drinking by both *Jīvātma* and *Paramātma*, yet to the *Paramātma* it applies only on the analogy of the Men with Umbrellas, whereunder even though the man is not carrying the umbrella, yet he is spoken of as such on account of his being accompanied by men with umbrellas.

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(2) When rice is being cooked, the cook becomes assured of all of it having been properly cooked, when he presses a single grain and finds it sufficiently softened. On the analogy of this, the condition of the whole class is inferred from that of a part. This is found in Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra-Bhāṣya under 7. 4. 12. It is called the Sthālipulākanyāya.

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(3) As a Post is driven into the ground by repeated efforts, so a proposition is strengthened by the bringing forward of a succession of facts and arguments. This forms, the basis of the maxim styled स्थूणात्रिखननन्याय, which finds place in Śaṅkara’s Śārīraka-bhāṣya, under Sūtra 2. 1. 34 and 3. 3. 53.—This maxim has its origin in Shabara-Bāṣya, on Sū. 7. 2. 1.

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Śaṅkara in his Śārīraka-bhāṣya on 1. 3. 25 says—“The Śāstra, though proprounded without distinction, is in reality, meant for human beings only, and for those of the three higher castes only, because these alone are capable of complying with the precepts of the Śāstra, etc. etc. This point has been explained in the definition of Adhikāra—that is, in the Pūrva-mīmamsā-Sūtra 6. 1. 1—3. This is called the Adhikāranyāya.

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(5) The Vivaraṇapramāyasaṅgraha (P. 247)—speaks of ‘abundance of fruit produced by abundance of labour involved in the effort towards the performance of a large number of Subsidiary details’. This is a paraphrase of what the Shabara-Bhāṣya has declared under Sū. 10. 6. 62 and 11. 1. 5.

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(6) Under Sū. 12. 2. 34, Shabara says—“It is incumbent upon the Pupil to eat out of the plate made of bell-metal; it is not so incumbent for the Teacher; yet whenever it so happens that the Pupil has to eat out of the same plate as the Teacher, the latter eats out of the plate of bell-metal; so as not to disturb the vow of the Pupil”. This has been called the ‘Kaṁsya-bhoji-Nyāya’ which has been used in Bhāmatī (P. 478), Vedāntakalpataru (Pages 314, 425, 502, 517), and also in Parimala (Pp. 462, 572, 666).

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(7) Under 1. 1. 2, Page 6, of the Tantravārtika Kumārila says—“Even if it be necessary to ascend the mountain-peak in order to see an object, that object, cannot be regarded as invisible”.—This has been quoted and used in the Nyāyamañjarī (P. 422).

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(8) *Shabara* on Sū. 2. 4. 20 and *Kumārila* in *Tantaravārtika* P. 16, have declared that—“When a Vedic text condemns the condemnable thing, it is not for the purpose of condemning, but for the purpose of commending what is commendable”. This has been quoted by *Anandagiri* in his comment on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya* 2. 5. 16; and has been utilised in the *Āgamaprāmāṇya* (P. 51).—Another reference to this maxim is found in *Nyāyamañjarī* P. 273.

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(9) *Shabara* under Sū. 11. 1. 60 says—“The lamp, though placed near one person among a number of persons dining together, helps all of them.” This same idea is found expressed in the *Mahābhāṣya* on 1. 1. 49;—also by *Nāgēsha* in his *U’ddyota*.

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(10) Under Sū. 4. 4. 19, *Shabara* has laid down the principle that—“A Sacrificial Act is to be regarded as Primary or independent when a special result is declared as following from it; if, therefore, an act is enjoined without the specification of any result following from it, it must be regarded as Subsidiary to some other *Primary* act.” This occurs in *Shaṅkara’s* *Shārīraka-bhāṣya* on Sū. 2. 1. 14; also used by *Vāchaspati Mishra* in the *Tātparyatikā* (P. 178, line 2); and by *Vidyāraṇya* in *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha* (P. 117, line 11 and P. 147, line 9 from bottom).

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(11) *Kumārila*, in *Tantravārtika* (1. 3. 22) says—“Where a certain conclusion to the contrary has been set forth in an exceptionally powerful manner, if one proceeds immediately to point out the correct view, this becomes a difficult task; hence with a view to lighten the task, *Jaimini* proceeds, at first, to weaken the contrary view by throwing it open to doubt.” This principle has been adopted by the *Nyāyamañjarī* (p. 419).

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(12) *Kumārila* in *Shlokavārtika* (p. 520) says that—“men whose eyes are smeared with the fat of frogs mistake bamboo pieces for snakes”. This illustration has been used in *Tātparyatikā* (P. 314), by *Vāchaspati Mishra*; by *Sarvārthasiddhi* on *Tattvamukta-Kalāpa* (2. 64); and by *Parimala* (P. 43, line 9).

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(13) *Kumārila*, in *Tantravārtika* on Sū. 1. 3. 31 (P. 730) has declared that—“a man who has accepted the teaching of *Shruti* will not allow it to be upset by a contrary *Smṛti*”; and in support of this he has cited the illustration that ‘the Donkey can never get at what has been already carried away by the Horse'. This illustration has been borrowed by *Nyāyamañjarī* (P. 262).

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(14) *Shabara* on Sū. 2. 3. 2, has declared that as a rule, words should be taken in the sense actually expressed by them. This maxim has been repeated by *Kumārila* in *Tantravārtika* on 3. 5. 19. It occurs also in *Bhāmatī* (on 4. 1. 14, and 4. 3. 4); and also in *Nāgesha's Uddyota*, Vol i, P. 574.

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(15) *Kumārila* in *Tantravārtika* (p. 132) says—"Just as in the case of Salt-mines, and that of *Mēru*, the Golden Mount, what is produced therein becomes Salt and Gold, respectively, so also in the case of the inner satisfaction of one who knows the Veda, Vedic authority becomes imparted to whatever is affected by it." This has been adopted by *Vāchaspati Mishra* in his commentary on *Yogabhāṣya* (4. 14);—also by *Veṅkaṭanātha* in *Tattvamuktākalāpa* (5. 28).

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(16) 'What is done at the wrong time is as good as not done'. This occurs in *Shabara-Bhāṣya* on Sū. 6. 2. 25, with reference to the times prescribed for the *Agnihotra* and *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifices. It occurs in the *Nyāyakandalī* (P. 284).

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(17) *Mīmā. Sūtra* 6. 2. 23—26, discusses the Injunction that 'one should perform the *Agnihotra* throughout life', which is taken by the *Pūrvapakṣin* to mean that every moment of one's life should be taken up by the Performance of *Agnihotra*. The Established Conclusion is that the *Agnihotra* is to be performed only in the morning and the evening, as expressly laid down in another Vedic Injunction. This discussion has been used by *Shaṅkara* in the *Shārīraka-bhāṣya* (3. 4. 2).

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(18) *Shabara* (on 12. 2. 27) lays down the principle that—"what is intimately connected has greater force than what is remotely connected". This principle has been utilised by *Anandagiri* on *Shārīraka-bhāṣya* (2. 1. 4), in *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha* (p. 15); also by *Anandagiri* on *Sureshvara's Sambandhavārtika* (Verse 367). This same principle is embodied also in one of the Grammatical *Paribhāṣās* असिद्धं बहिरङ्गमन्तरङ्गे

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(19) 'A thing, though made for one purpose, may also serve another.' This maxim is found in *Shabara* on Sū. 3. 1. 12. and also in *Tantravārtika* on the same Sūtra: It has been used in *Pañchapādikā* (P. 45); and also in *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha* (P. 118, line 9). The *Mahābhāṣya* (on 1. 1. 23) adds another illustration: Where canals are made for irrigating paddy-fields, they also provide water for bathing and drinking.

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(20) ‘*Apachchhēdanyāya*’:—Under Mi. Sū. 6. 5. 40—56, we have discussed the rule whereby, when the Priests are proceeding from the *Havirdhāna* in a line in a certain order, holding each other’s garments, if the line is disturbed by any one, an Expiation has to be performed. This maxim has been employed by writers on Vedānta, in *Vēdāntakalhataruparimala* (P. 10. line 8). It has also been called the *Paurvāparya-nyāya*, in accordance with the wording of the Mīma. Sū. 6. 3. 54. This *Sūtra* is quoted in *Bhāmatī* (P. 5); and by the same author in his *Tātparyaṭīkā* (p. 59). The *Apachchhēdanyāya* occurs in *Sarvārthasiddhi* (pages 210, 359 and 374); also in *Shrī-bhāṣya* (P. 143).

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(21) ‘The Scripture has its use in regard to things not known by other means of knowledge.’ This maxim has been adumbrated in Mi. Sū. 6. 2. 18. It has been used in *Shārīraka-Bhāṣya* (3. 3. 18); also in *Shrī-Bhāṣya* (P. 554); in *Nyāyakandalī* (p. 5); in *Chitsukhī* (1. 7); in *Sarva-darśanasaṅgraha* (P. 69); in *Sarvārthasiddhi* (P. 893 and 263); and in *Tattvadīpana* (P. 544).

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(22) ‘Gourds sink in water—and Stones float’.—Often quoted as an instance of absurd assertion. It is found in *Shabara-Bhāṣya* (1. 1. 5 and 4. 3. 10); and is used also in *Saṅkṣēpaśārīraka* (2. 2).

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(23) ‘The maxim of the red-one-year-old-cow’, mentioned in Mīmā. Sū. 3. 1. 12. It is based upon the Vedic text—‘One buys Soma with the red-one-year-old’, which does not mention the object to which these qualifications belong; and it is argued that according to this text, these qualifications are auxiliary to the act of buying; but only through the object, the *Cow*, to which they belong. This maxim has been used in *Shrī-Bhāṣya* (1. 1. 13).

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(24) ‘The conventional denotation of a word is more acceptable than its etymological signification’. This is used by Kumārila in *Tantravārtika* (P. 150, line 12);—also in *Nyāyamañjarī* (P. 534 line 15).

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(25) ‘How could a sane person riding a horse forget the horse?’ This has been said in *Tantravārtika* (1. 3. 18) in connection with authoritative writers on Grammar making use of ungrammatical expressions. This has been used by *Mallinātha* in his comment on *Tārkikarakṣā* (P. 20). It is found in *Nāgārjunia's Mādhyamikavṛtti* (P. 502).

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(26) 'When Verbs express their meanings, Potency is a contributary cause'. This has its origin in what *Śabara* has said under Mī. Sū. 1. 4. 30. It has been employed in the sense that when the Vedic text enjoins a certain act, the capacity of a person is an important factor. It has been used in *Sureśvara's Sambandhavārtika* (75). See also *Tantravārtika* under 2. 2. 27; Page 558, Line 9.

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(27) '*Kapiñjalanyāya*'—'The maxim of the Partridges'. In *Vājasaneyi-Saṁhitā* (24. 20), there is a text laying down the sacrificing of '*partridges*'; and under Mīmā. Sū. 11. 1. 38—45, we have the discussion as to the exact number of birds to be sacrificed; the conclusion is that *three* should be Sacrificed; as that is the lowest figure representing the plurality expressed by the word of the text—'*Kapiñjalān*'. This has been used in *Nyāyakanṇalī* (P. 50); also in *Parimala* (P. 550, line 3); in *Śikhāmaṇi* (P. 303); by *Kulluka* on *Manu*. p. 105.

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(28) 'The Cleansing of the Blanket'. The practice of dusting the blanket by beating it against one's feet and thus dusting the feet also, has been used by *Śabara* (on Sū. 2. 2. 25), to illustarate the double purpose served by the Curd;—it accomplishes the particular offering and also brings about the desired result. This forms the basis of the well-known saying of 'killing two birds with one stone',—This has been used also in connection with the offering of water to the *Pitṛs* at Gayā, on the roots of mango-trees, in connection with which offering we have the verse—एकाकि याज्ञ्यथकरी प्रसिद्धा आत्राश्च सिक्ताः पितरश्च तृप्ताः ।

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(29) 'The maxim of the Kalañja'. The Vedic text says—'*Kalañjam na bhakṣayet*'. The question is raised in Mīmā. Sū. 6. 2. 19—whether this contains a positive injunction—meaning that 'one should take the vow of not eating the *Kalañja*'—or a negative injunction—meaning that 'one should *not* eat the *Kalañja*'; and the conclusion is in favour of the latter—that the text serves the purpose of the prohibition of an act. It has been quoted by *Anandagiri* on *Śārīrāka-Bhāṣya* (3. 4. 2 and 4. 1. 13); also in *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka* 1, 417; and in *Śrī-Bhāṣya* (1. 1. 4).

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(30) ‘Kāṇḍānusamayanyāya’—Set forth in Mī. Sū. 5. 2. 3—‘When a number of operations are performed over a number of objects,—all the operations over one object should be completed before they are taken up over the second object,—and so on.’ This is used in *Aśvalāyana’s Gṛhyasūtra* (1. 24. 7), where, during the process of the receiving of the Priests, the various acts prescribed are laid down as to be completed with one Priest, before the reception of the second Priest. The reverse of this is the ‘*Padārthānukramanyāya*’. (See below).

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(31) The maxim of the *Base Coin*—is used in *Tantravārtika* 1. 3. 3 (P. 95); when arguing that where the *Smṛti* is found to be in conflict with *Śruti*, it should be rejected;—just as the counterfeit coin is to be rejected as soon as it is found to be counterfeit. It has been used in *Nyāyamañjarī* (P. 162 and 169, 187 and 531).

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(32) The maxim of the *Gārhapatya Fire*, is presented in Mī. Sū. 3. 2. 3-4, where it is concluded that where there is conflict between *Direct Injunction* and *Implied Injunction*, the former is to be accepted. This maxim has been used in *Bhāmatī* under Sū. 3. 3. 25, and also in other *Vēdānta* works.

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(33) The maxim of the *Milking Vessel*—represented in Mī. Sū. 4. 1. 2,—as dealing with cases where a particular rule sets aside the general Law; Water is fetched in ordinary jars, but at the Sacrifice performed for the purpose of acquiring cattle, it should be fetched in the milking vessel. It is found in *Tantravārtika* (3. 6. 43); in *Nyāyamañjarī* (P. 166); in *Śarīraka-Bhāṣya* (3. 3. 42); in *Sureshvaravārtika* on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* 3. 3. 51.

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(34) *Barhirnyāya*—The maxim of the *Kusha*(grass;—The sense of this is that in a case where a word may be taken either in the *primary* or in the *secondary* sense, it should be taken in the *primary* sense. This is the conclusion arrived in Mī. Sū. 3. 2. 1-2. It is found in *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 1. 15, and 6. 3. 46; also in *Śarīra-kabhāṣya* 4. 3. 12; and in *Kalpataru* P. 346, line 3.

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(35) *Grahaikatvanyāya*—The Maxim of the *Single Cup*. This is illustrated in Mī. Sū. 3.1. 13—15, where it is argued that when the text lays down the washing of the Cup, ग्रहं सम्मार्ष्टि, though the word ‘Cup’ is in the singular, yet the washing should be done to all the cups. *Kumārila* has explained this under Sū. 3.1.14. It has been used in *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 287, line 4; in *Vēdānta*- shikhāmaṇi, p. 120; by Nāgeśa in his comment on Kayyaṭa on 1. 1. 14.

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(36) Jāteṣṭi-nyāya—treated by Jaimini under Mī. Sū. 4.3. 38-39; where, in regard to the Sacrifice offered on the birth of a son, the question is raised whether the reward thereof accrues to the Father or the Son, and the conclusion arrived at is that it accrues to the Son. It is used in the Commentary on Lakṣaṇāvalī.

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(37) Tatprakhyanyāya—Embodied in Mī. Sū. 1.4.4, which explains one of the four means for ascertaining that a certain text mentions the Proper Name of a Sacrifice; e.g., the word ‘Agnihotra’ as occurring in the text ‘Agnihotreṇa juhoti’. It is employed in Vedāntakalpataru-parimala, p. 150, line 7; and in Nāgeśa’s Uddyota (Vol. 3, p. 623; under Sū. 2.3.3).

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(38) Tadāditadantanyā—Embodied in Mī. Sū. 5.1. 23-24. This has been adopted in Vedāntakalpataruparimaḷa p. 581, line 9).

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(38) The maxim that—‘a certain thing is sure to appear when a certain other thing appears’;—this has been employed by Kumārila in Tantravārtika (p. 348) in establishing the invariable concomitance between the Affix and the Bhāvanā.

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(40) ‘Tadvyapadeśanyāya’—is represented by Mī. Sū. 1. 4. 5, which sets forth another means of ascertaining that a certain word is the Proper Name of a Sacrifice.

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(41) ‘Acts which impel others to action are not always of the same kind’. This is exemplified by Kumārila in Shlokavārtika (p. 710). ‘In battle, the soldier acts through moving his sword, the commander acts through giving orders, and the King acts by his mere presence’. This has been used by Śaṅkarāchārya in his Bhāṣya on the Muṇḍakopaniṣad.

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(42) The maxim of the Dancer. The Dancer, dancing before a number of persons, gives pleasure to all at the same time. See Nyāyavartika 1.10, and also Tātparyaṭīkā.

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(43) ‘One does not undergo the expense of performing a Sacrifice, for the purpose of recovering a Shell’. This occurs in Shabara, under 4.3.39.

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(44) Maxim of ‘the Cow’s Milk contained in a vessel made of Dog-skin’; based on Kumārila’s Vārtika on Mī Sū. 1.3.7; to show that even a pure thing becomes impure by association or contact with impure things; hence the teaching of sound morality contained in the Scriptures of heterodox people cannot be as reliable as those contained in the Veda. This has been employed in Āgama-prāmāṇya by Yāmunācharya (on page 11, line 8). Cf. Viṣṇu-Smṛti 29.9; and Manu-Smṛti 2.114.

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(45) ‘Man is not so prompted by even a hundred Injunctions as he is by Greed’. This is found in Tantravārtika under Mī. Sū. 3.4.34. This is used in Nyāyamañjarī (p. 361);—also in Nyāyakaṇikā (p. 407); and in Sambandhavārtika (Verses 1040 and 1041); and in Anubhūtiprakāsha (13.277). Cf. Mahābhāṣya 1.3.72.

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(46) ‘If a Potency is not present in a thing by itself, it cannot be produced in it by something else’. This occurs in Kumārila’s Shlokavrtika (2. 47); it is used in Shārīratha-Bhāṣya 2.1.24;—in Nyāyakaṇikā (P. 168);—and in Nyāyamañjarī (P. 165).

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(47) ‘There can be no cognition of the Qualified unless there is cognition of the Qualification’.—Shabara on Mī Sū. (1.3.33). It is used in Kusunājali (3. 21); in Saptapadārthī (p. 2, line 6); in Tānkikarakṣā (pp. 47 and 107); Nyāyasūtravṛtti (2. 126); and in Nyāyamañjarī (pp. 320, 433, 449, 538, 543).

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(48) ‘Maxim of the Niṣādasthapati’. Mī. Sū. 6. 1. 51-52 deals with the text ‘Niṣādasthapatim yājayet’; where a question is raised as to the exact signification of the term ‘Niṣādasthapati’:—Does it mean the ‘Sthapati, king of the Niṣādas’ (the Niṣāda being a sub-caste not entitled to perform Sacrifices)—or ‘the king who is a Niṣāda’? The latter interpretation makes the Niṣāda king entitled to perform Sacrifices. The conclusion is in favour of the latter interpretation, which makes the Niṣāda king entitled to perform the one particular Sacrifice. This explanation implies the Grammatical Convention that as a general rule the Karmadhāraya compound is to be given preference to the Tatpuruṣa. This has been employed by Vāchaspati Mishra in the Bhāmatī on Sū. 1.3.15; in justifying his explanation of the compound ‘Brahma-loka’; so also by Rāmānuja in the Shrī-bhāṣya on the same Sūtra. It is found in the Vēdāntakalpataru and also in the Parimala, on the same Sūtra; it is quoted by Ānandagiri on Sharīraka-bhāṣya on 3. 3. 24, and by Nāgēsha on Kayyaṭa (. 1. 3).

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(49) ‘Padārthānusamayanyāya’. The obverse of the ‘Kāṇḍanusamayanyāya’ (above, No. 30); represented by Mī. Sū. 5.2. 1-2; according to this the whole set of operations are to be performed on one object, before the other object is taken in. See Karka-bhāṣya on Kātyāyana-Śrauta Sūtra 1.114.

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(50) ‘In regard to the external world, the Mind is dependent upon others’. (Vidhiviveka, p. 114); found in Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha (Chapter I); in Chitsukhī (1. 12); in Vidyāsagari on Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya (p. 307).

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(51) ‘Parṇamayī-nyāya’—indicates the invariable presence of something; the Juhū made of Parṇa (Leaves, or the wood of Palaśa tree) being used at all Sacrifices; as dealt with by Śabara under Mī. Sū. 3.6. 1—8. Used in Bhāmatī on 3.3.61; and Parimala, pp. 624 and 626.

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(52) Pāṭhakramanyāya;—the Maxim of Textual Sequence. In the Fifth Discourse of Mīmā. Sū. Pāda 1,—we find Six kinds of Sequence set forth—(1) Directly enjoined Sequence, (2) Logical Sequence, (3) Textual Sequence, (4) Practical Sequence, (5) Sequence of Place, and (6) Sequence of Primary. When acts are performed in accordance with the order in which they are mentioned in the Vedic text, e.g., (1) ‘Samidho yajati—(2) Tanūnapātam yajati, etc.’. we have the Pāṭha-krama, Textual Sequence. Four of the above Six kinds of Sequence are mentioned in Bhāmatī on 1.1.1; which have been enlarged upon in Kalpataru, pp. 32—34; again in Bhāmatī on 4.3.6, where the Sequence of the Sūtras adopted in this explanation is the Logical one, in preference to the Textual one. The Pāṭhakrama is mentioned by Ānandarigi on Sū. 2.3.15.

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(53) ‘The Base and the Suffix conjointly signify principally what the Affix denotes’. A declaration by Śabara on Sū. 3.4.13, and also 10.8.24; and also in Tantravārtika on 3.1.12 and 2.1.1. It is found in Mahābhāṣya also on Sū. 3.1.67. It has been employed in Nyāyamañjarī (P.403).

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(54) ‘Pratinidhinyāya’—‘The Law of Substitutes’; dealt with in Mī. Sū. 6.3. 13—17; where the question is discussed as to what can be adopted as a Substitute for what, at a Sacrificial performance; as the rule is that ‘whenever the prescribed material is not available, a suitable substitute should be used’: Rāmānuja in the *Shri-bhāṣya* mentions this Law on p. 508, under Sū. 3.3.40; where the *Shāṣrīraka-bhāṣya* mentions it. It is referred to as a maxim of the *‘Nyāyavidah’*, in *Mahābhāṣya* on 1.1. 5-6.

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(55) ‘The Subsidiary Act has to be repeated with eah Primary Act’. Dealt with in Mi. Sū. 3.1.7.

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(56) ‘Perception is more reliable than Inference’. This occurs in *Shabara* on 3.1.12. This is referred to in *Nyāyamañjari* (p. 461 and 609); in *Nyāyakaṇikā*, p. 268; and *Tātparyaṭīkā*, (p. 27);—cited by *Shaṅkara Mishra* in his Comment on *Vaishēṣika-Sūtra* 3.2.10.

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(57) ‘Even numerous unseen Inferences may have to be assumed, if justified by reason.’ This occurs in *Tantravārtika* on 2.1.5, Trs., p. 514. It is found also in *Sures hvara’s Bṛhadāraṇyaka-vārtika*, p. 1124 and 1797; also in *Chitsukhī* (1. 23); and in *Khaṇḍana* (p. 74).

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(58) ‘ Even a foolish man does not act without a purpose’. This occurs in *Shlokavārtika* (p. 653); it is referred to iu *Nyāya-mañjarī*, p. 191;—also in *Nyāyakaṇikā*, p. 339. It is quoted in full by *Ānandagiri* on *Shārīraka-Bhāṣya* 2. 2. 1.

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(59) *‘Bhūtam bhavyāyopadishyate’*, ‘An accomplihed thing is prescribed for the bringing about of what has to be accomplished’. For instance, the *accomplished* Sacrificial Act has been prescribed for the bringing about of the *Apūrva*, which is to be accomplished. Found in *Tantravārtika* on Mi. Sū. 2. 1. 5; in *Saṅkṣepa-shārīraka* 1.143, where the Commentator quotes this as ‘the opinion of Jaimini and Shabarasvāmin’;—in the same work again on 1.3.12; and in the *Tattvadīpana*, p. 377.

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(60) *The maxim of the man making drawings of the chariot on the ground*;—this is found in *Shabara* in Mi. Sū. 7.2.15, and again on Sū. 9.2.13; where it is explained that the man who makes drawings of the chariot on the ground does so for the purpose of instructing his pupils as to making the chariot go faster in battle;—so the Teacher recites the Vedic Text for teaching the pupil, and the Pupil repeats it for getting it up.

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(61) ‘Maxim of the lost opportunity’—referred to in *Tantra-vārtika* 3.5.46, page 1060, as indicating Lost Opportunity. ‘What is done after the opportunity for it has lapsed becomes defective’.

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(62) Under Mī. Sū. 1. 3. 8-9, *Jaimini* and *Shabara* have declared that words that are in use among *Āryas*, have to be taken in the sense in which they are used by them; but those that are used only among *Mlechchhas*, have to be understood in the sense attributed to them by the latter people. This is quoted by *Shaṅkara* in his *Sharirakabhāṣya* on 3. 4. 42. It is used also in *Bhāmatī* on 1.3.52; and in *Kalpataru*, pp. 461-462; *Tātparyaṭīkā*, p. 292;—*Kusumāñjali*, Vol. II pages 130 and 154;—and *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 288.

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(63) ‘When the same fault attaches to both sides of an argument, it cannot be urged against one only’. *Shabara* on Mī. Sū. 8.3.14;—*Nyāyakaṇikā*, p. 225; *Aniruddhavṛtti* on *Sāṅkhyasūtra* 1.6. See *Tantravārtika*, p. 947; *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 95; *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 88. The author of the *Khaṇḍana* (p. 53,) attributes the maxim to *Kumārila*.

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(64) ‘When a man has no Son, toys are not made for his son’; this is said by *Shabara* in his illustration of *Jaimini’s* Sū. 10.3.5; wherein it is declared that ‘there could be no injunction of accessories for an act which has no accessories at all.’ It has been used to illustrate futile activities.

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(65) The maxim of the *Rathakāra*. A Vediv Text lays down that Fire-installation is to be done during the Rains, by the ‘*Rathakāra*’;—Who is this *Rathakāra*? Is he the man who has adopted chariot-making as a profession? Or is he a man belonging to one of the mixed sub-castes? This question has been discussed in Mī. Sū. 6.1. 44—50, where the latter view has been accepted. This maxim has been used by *Nāgēsha* in his commentary on *Paribhāṣa* 98, which declares that the conventional meaning of a word (the sub-caste, *Rathakāra*, e.g.) is more acceptable than the one indicated by the Etymology of the word (the chariot-maker, *e.g.*). It has also been used in *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 140,

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(66) *Rātrisatranyāya*. This is presented in Mī. Sū. 4. 3. 17—19; and deals with the Vedic text laying down the *Rātrisatra-Sacrifice*. There is no result mentioned in the text as to follow from this Sacrifice; and the conclusion is that in all such cases, the result is found in the corresponding Declamatory Texts, *Arthavādas*. This has been utilised in the *Shārīrakabhāṣya*, on Sū, 3.3.38; as is clear from *Ānandagiri*, *Kalpataru* and *Parimala*; the last work quoting it again under *Vēdānta Sū.* 1.2.24. It is found also in *Pañchapādikāvivaraṇa*, p. 122, and 134;—also in *Tattvamuktākalāpa*, V. 81.

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(67) ‘*Varchonyāya*’. ‘The Topic of Glory’. Mī. Sū. 3.8. 25—27 discusses the point whether the using of the Mantra ‘*Mamāgnē varcho, etc.*’, brings glory to the Priest who recites it, or to the Master of the Sacrifice; and the latter view is accepted as the correct one. This embodies the principle that the Promoter of an act is the person responsible for it; which, in its variants, has been used in several places.

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(68) ‘The Law of the *Viśrajit-Sacrifice*’. The *Viśrajit-Sacrifice* has been prescribed in a Vedic text which does not mention any result obtainable from it; nor is it possible to deduce any result from the *Arthavāda* texts; the conclusion is that in all such cases, the attainment of Heaven should be taken as the Reward; as this is something that is desirable by all men. This has been dealt with in Mī. Sū. 4.3. 10—16; (and also in Sū. 6.7. 1—20; in a different context); used in *Pañchapādikāvivaraṇa*, p. 134, 137 and 164; and in *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 524.

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(69) ‘The Reward promised in the Scripture is for the Performer’. These are words of Mī. Sū. 3.7.18. Quoted in *Vēdāntatattravivēka*;—in *Tātparyaṭīkā*, p. 296 and 403, and in *Bhāmatī*, p. 28 and 492;—in *Śrībhāṣya* under 2.3.33 and 3.4.45.

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(70) ‘The meaning of an ambiguous Sentence is to be ascertained from what follows in the context’. This is Mī. Sū. 1.4.29. It has been employed in *Śārīrakabhāṣya* 1.3.14; and also by *Ānandagiri* on 3.3.52; and in *Bhāmatī* under Sū. 3.3.34.

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(71) ‘So long as a sentence can be taken as one Syntactical Unit, it is not right to split it up’. These are *Kumārila’s* words, in *Ślokavārttika* (p. 135), in reference to Sū. 1.1.4. It has been quoted in *Bhāmatī*, under 1.1.28; 1.3.13; 1.4.3; 1.4.16; 3.3.57; and 3.4.20;—by *Ānandagiri* on *Śārīrakabhāṣya* 1.2.15; and *Śaṅkara* himself says a good deal on this matter under 1.4.3.

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(72) ‘A qualification is admissible only where one is possible, and where in its absence, there is an incongruity’. These are the words of *Kumārila* (*Tantravārttika* on 1.3.18 or 24). This law has been quoted in the commentary on *Saṅkṣēpaśārīraka* 1.347;—in the *Vidyāsāgarī* on *Khaṇḍana*, p. 401 and 592. It is found also in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya* (6.2.).

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(73) ‘All is right for the powerful’—quoted by *Kumārila* (in *Tantravārtika*, p. 134), in answer to the argument against the reliability of the Practices of Good Men. It is found in the *Shrīmadbhāgavata* (10. 33. 30-31); and in the *Tātparyatīka* (opening part), The same statement is represented in two *Dharmasūtras* of *Apastamba*.

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(74) ‘The Act prescribed in the various Vedic Texts is one and the same’. That is, for instance, the *Agnihotra* enjoined in a text of the *Mādhyandina Shākhā* is the same as the *Agnihotra* enjoined in a text of the *Kāṇvashākhā*. This has been dealt with in Mī. Sū. 2.4. 8—32. It is frequently quoted in philosophical works;—in *Pañchapādikāvivaraṇa*, p. 167;—in *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 256;—in *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha*, p. 169; and in *Shrī-bhāṣya*, 3.3.53.

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(75) ‘If a man with eyes is led by some one else, it means that he does not see with his own eyes.’ These are the words of *Shabara* on Mī. Sū. 1.2.31. This illustration is quoted in *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 286.

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(76) ‘An Injunction in general terms is always indefinite’. These are the words of *Kumārila* in *Tantravārtika* (3.4.47; p. 1020). It has been cited in *Padimala* (p. 253). This lack of definiteness in general statements is alluded to also by *Shabara* on Mī. Sū. 10.8.16.

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Linked texts (33)