Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon c19.s1.13

c19.s1.13

The Vijñānavāda again could fairly argue that its doctrine was a mere legitimate development in an improved form of the conception of the ego-series of the Sautrāntika. The receptacle intellect or consciousness (*ālaya-vijñāna*), as contrasted with the individual intellectual acts (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*), expressed more clearly than could the Sautrāntika the fundamental fact that each moment in the intellectual series is charged with the whole accumulated experience of the individual from endless time. Nor could it be said that the metaphysical conception of the void intellect as the *prius* of all things was wholly incompatible with the Hīnayāna; the earlier Buddhist thought would have denied the possibility of such an assertion, but it did not wholly exclude it.