Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon c21.s2.26

c21.s2.26

The Vijñānavāda, of course, did not satisfy the Madhyamaka, and two of the criticisms are of interest. It is impossible, it is argued,² to evade the heresies of existence and non-existence by the device of admitting the bare reality (*vastu-mātra*) of thought and its derivatives, the subject of defilement and purification which is relative or dependent (*paratantra*) reality—thus negating non-existence—and denying their possession of a peculiar nature of their own, which is imaginary (parikalpita)—thus evading the heresy of existence. The theory in fact falls into both heresies, since it denies imaginary existence and affirms relative reality. Moreover, the Madhyamaka views all relative reality as being qua caused without any existence of its own.