Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon c21.s2.28

c21.s2.28

A second point of criticism is the assumption of the power of consciousness to know itself (svasaṃvitti, svasaṃvedanā), which the Vijñānavādins assert, and which is obviously essential to their view. The direct objection is the contradiction in the idea of anything acting on itself, as shown by the case of the edge of a knife which does not cut itself or the finger tip which cannot touch itself.¹ Indirectly² the argument of the Vijñānavāda, derived from comparison with a lamp which lights up itself as well as the object, is refuted by the refutation of the general doctrine of origination (utpāda), where the case of the lamp is disposed of. There is no darkness either in the lamp itself nor in the place where it is; therefore there can be no question of the lamp illuminating either itself or anything else. Nor is it any use to argue that the light destroys the darkness by coming into being, for when there is light there is no darkness; on the other hand if the light destroys the darkness without coming into contact, then it should destroy all the darkness in the universe. Moreover, the senses cannot experience themselves; the eye cannot see itself and so forth.³