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Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon c24.s5: 5. Devotion and the Transfer of Merit

Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon c24.s5

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5. Devotion and the Transfer of Merit

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So far the doctrine of the Mahāyāna does not essentially depart from views which the Hīnayāna allows, however different the emphasis. But the principle, that illusion may be encouraged if it serves to dispel illusion, opens up the way to the development of new ideas, or rather the acceptance by Buddhist philosophy of ideas too popular to be banished by a sane creed, which seeks to save mankind. Popular religion believed that devotion to a god, be it Kṛṣṇa, Viṣṇu, or Çiva, would aid in securing heaven or even liberation; it believed in the divine grace which the Kaṭha Upaniṣad and the Vedānta recognize as means of salvation. The Hīnayāna could find no room for either conception; the Buddha is a dead man, not a living and gracious god; each man must accept the result of his own actions, must work out his own salvation. The Mahāyāna departs from the rigour of either dogma; it is useful and therefore legitimate for man to believe in Bodhisattvas and Buddhas² who are eager to save and who can transfer merit; it is useful for Bodhisattvas in their career to have the belief that their intention to save others is actually capable of fulfilment. The doctrines therefore are legitimate, but the question remains whether or not they are valid merely on the basis of imaginary (parikalpita) reality, or whether they can be deemed relatively real—that is, as real as the doctrines of momentariness and causation. As a religion the Mahāyāna accepted without hesitation the reality of devotion and transfer of merit; the philosophy of the school, as might be expected, follows in its footsteps with hesitation, and realization of the real incompatibility of the new faith with the old doctrines. True, it is possible to revise these doctrines, for we have now the maxim that whatever is well said is a saying of the Buddha, but it is difficult to pour new wine into old bottles, and we must bear in mind the strength of the tradition, which the Mahāyāna texts repeat: ‘the Tathāgata alone is the witness; the Tathāgata alone knows; I know not.’¹

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² ‘Those who worship the Bodhisattvas and read the Mahāyāna Sūtras are called the Mahāyānists’; I-Tsing (trans. Takakusu), p. 14.

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¹ Ç., p. 55.

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Hence we find a curious medley of aspects presented in the Mahāyāna. The doctrine of the act is asserted in full force, and refined: the injuries suffered by a Bodhisattva are no longer penalties of past crime; they are opportunities earned for him by his merits to display his perfections of virtue² and goodness. But the matter may be carried farther; we owe it to the law itself that we are able to attain salvation, for even if it is our own past action which has won for us our voyage in the ship of humanity across the ocean of misery, under the rule of the law, still without the law this fate could not be ours. To the law, therefore, to the Buddha who taught the law, and to the order in which it is visibly embodied, we owe respect and devotion, and in paying homage to the three jewels and to the relics and shrines of the Buddha we strengthen our intention of following in the footsteps of the master, just as we strengthen our meditations by every exercise of our powers.³

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² BCA. vi. 106. Cf. KV. xvi. 3: no one can give happiness or misery to another.

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³ BCA. vi. 112 ff. ; vii. 14 ; ix. 37 ; BCAP. ii. 49.

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This is in accord with even the Hinayāna, but the Mahāyāna recognizes in the Bodhisattvas, who are alive, the qualities which permit of true devotion. It is, indeed, asserted that these holy beings can do us no good that we have not merited, though they are styled as ‘loving without cause’ and ‘givers of fruits not asked’; but the essential fact is that we can profit ourselves by acts towards them which are openly and avowedly acts of pious worship and devotion. We owe them homage and adoration; we confess to them our sins: the misery we have caused to men is misery to the Bodhisattvas, the compassionate ones, and we admit our wrongdoing that the saints whom we have injured may pardon it.⁴ We rejoice in the merits acquired by the Bodhisattvas; we supplicate the Buddhas to light the lamp of the law, and beg them to delay their entry into Nirvāṇa in order that they may continue to save creatures. We apply also our merit for the benefit of others; we cannot in any other way serve the Bodhisattvas, who have no need of our devotion for themselves, but rejoice in the work of salvation. The culminating act of this devotional service or Bhadracaryā¹ is an action, the surrender of oneself to the Bodhisattvas and Buddhas (ātmabhāvaniryātanā),² a rite interesting because it is mentioned by the orthodox Buddhaghosa. The formula in Sanskrit is decisive of the spirit of the action: ‘I hand myself over to the Jinas, and to their sons, all in all. Accept me, ye sublime beings. With devotion (bhakti) I become your slave.’ We have in this the fullest acceptance of theism; the Bodhisattvas and their spiritual fathers, the Buddhas or Jinas, conquerors, are regarded as powerful to save, endowed with the power of forgiving sins. But we must not be deceived into believing that we are on the ground of relative truth; there is nothing to prove that we are in anything more than the region of imagination.

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⁴ BCA. vi. 119, 122, 124. Cf. Ç., pp. 160 ff.

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¹ See the Bhadracarīpraṇidhānagāthā (Leipzig, 1912); Ç., p. 290, emphasizes the features as confession of sin (pāpadecanā); delight in merit (puṇyānumodanā); and solicitation of the Buddhas (buddhādhyeṣaṇā); BCA. ii. 24 ff. ; iii. 1 ff. ; v. 98 f. ; x; Dharmasaṃgraha, 14 ; Adikarmapradīpa (in Poussin, pp. 106, 226 ff.) ; Srayambhū Purāṇa, pp. 117 f. ; MKV., p. 292, n. 4 (triṣkandhaka).

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² BCA. ii. 8 ; Sumaṅ. i. 231 ff.

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It is less certain if the transfer of merit (puṇya-pariṇāmanā) is to be deemed purely imaginary, or if it belongs to the realm of relative truth. For the transfer may be regarded as nothing more than the carrying to the logical extremity of the perfection of generosity; it is certainly no true gift that is given for one’s own advantage, and it is a logical result to conclude that the giver should will that the fruit of his giving, which accrues as the result of his unselfish gift, should pass to the recipient of the gift also.³ But a strongly religious aspect is introduced by the doctrine that by the transfer of merit one can best please the merciful Bodhisattvas and Buddhas; the sincerity of this belief in Śāntideva is unmistakable, and it is clear that the borderland between imaginary and apparent truth is reached in his view. The importance of the idea is capital; it is carried even to the grotesque;

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³ Cf. the Vedānta doctrine of indifference to the fruit of deeds (ihāmutraphalabhogavirāga). For the Hīnayāna denial of the Hetuvādin precursor of Pariṇāmanā see KV. xvi 3; on the term cf. Mahāyānaśraddh., p. 146; JRAS. 1908, p. 887. Cf. Ç., pp. 28 f., 170, 213, 296.

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nothing whatever—save enlightenment itself which reconciles altruism and egoism—should be sought for the self; even food which the layman enjoys, which the adept of the Hinayāna takes as nourishment, should be consumed merely to gratify the eighty-four thousand animalculae which live in the human organism. True, it is Buddhas alone who can be certain that they can transfer merit with success, but that does not prevent us from seeking to transfer ours, even if we err in our aim. The excellence of the cause excuses failures in performance.¹

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¹ BCAP. vi. 50. As to eating cf. Mil., pp. 367, 378; BCA. v. 85; Ç., p. 127.

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