Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon c24.s5.1

c24.s5.1

So far the doctrine of the Mahāyāna does not essentially depart from views which the Hīnayāna allows, however different the emphasis. But the principle, that illusion may be encouraged if it serves to dispel illusion, opens up the way to the development of new ideas, or rather the acceptance by Buddhist philosophy of ideas too popular to be banished by a sane creed, which seeks to save mankind. Popular religion believed that devotion to a god, be it Kṛṣṇa, Viṣṇu, or Çiva, would aid in securing heaven or even liberation; it believed in the divine grace which the Kaṭha Upaniṣad and the Vedānta recognize as means of salvation. The Hīnayāna could find no room for either conception; the Buddha is a dead man, not a living and gracious god; each man must accept the result of his own actions, must work out his own salvation. The Mahāyāna departs from the rigour of either dogma; it is useful and therefore legitimate for man to believe in Bodhisattvas and Buddhas² who are eager to save and who can transfer merit; it is useful for Bodhisattvas in their career to have the belief that their intention to save others is actually capable of fulfilment. The doctrines therefore are legitimate, but the question remains whether or not they are valid merely on the basis of imaginary (parikalpita) reality, or whether they can be deemed relatively real—that is, as real as the doctrines of momentariness and causation. As a religion the Mahāyāna accepted without hesitation the reality of devotion and transfer of merit; the philosophy of the school, as might be expected, follows in its footsteps with hesitation, and realization of the real incompatibility of the new faith with the old doctrines. True, it is possible to revise these doctrines, for we have now the maxim that whatever is well said is a saying of the Buddha, but it is difficult to pour new wine into old bottles, and we must bear in mind the strength of the tradition, which the Mahāyāna texts repeat: ‘the Tathāgata alone is the witness; the Tathāgata alone knows; I know not.’¹