The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads v1.c11.s3: § 3. The Origin of Religion
The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads v1.c11.s3
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§ 3. The Origin of Religion
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A further error engendered by the belief in the uniformity of religious development is the theory that it is possible on empirical grounds to determine the origin of religion. The mistake is again a logical one: the origin of religion is a question of philosophy,² and a fundamental one, the solution of which is far from probable. The hopelessness of any decision on empiric grounds may be seen from the diametrically opposite results which can be attained by arguing from the same facts. One theory, that of animism in one of its aspects,³ as expounded by Herbert Spencer, which was perhaps most interestingly developed by Hugo Elard Meyer, and which in recent times has found a most determined supporter in Prof. Ridgeway and S. Eitrem,¹ holds that all religion originates in the honour and respect shown to the spirits of the dead: from this belief and respect for these spirits is easily derived the view that there are potent spirits in natural phenomena, whence develops nature worship. It is, on the other hand, asserted with equal insistence that, while no doubt honour is paid to the spirits of the dead and this source has been a fruitful one in the development of religion, none the less religion is more than that and springs from a direct recognition in nature of powers akin to but superior to those of men.² Such a view can arise prior to any clear discrimination of spirit and body: that view is later in development and more reflective: prior perhaps to animism, and in any case independent of it, there is in fact a stage preanimistic or animatistic or naturalistic, when man conceives of natural objects as living powers, not as objects filled with souls *ab extra*.³ Logically⁴ the second view appears in itself the more plausible, but it is obvious that the reconstruction is purely hypothetical, and admits of no proof. We do not know of any religion existing at any time of which we could certainly and convincingly affirm that an idea of the deity had been framed when a knowledge of the difference between body and spirit was not known,⁵ and Dr. Marett’s own treatment⁶ of religion as including the whole field of the supernormal is so vague as to be of no positive value, a criticism equally applicable to Mr. Clodd’s⁷ conception of power, or rather many powers, as the basis of nature and spirit worship alike.
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² Cf. Dieterich, *Mutter Erde*, p. 4.
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³ Animism is often used merely as equivalent to the recognition of living powers in nature; for this sense some adopt animatism, reserving animism for specific connexion with the worship of the dead and beliefs therein derived; others distinguish naturalism from both animism and manism, perhaps better spiritism. On this view naturalism (animatism) denotes the recognition of external phenomena as identical with the powers revered, animism holds that objects are ensouled, and manism (spiritism) holds that they are ensouled by spirits of the dead. Animism in the second of these senses is accepted for Egyptian religion by W. Max Müller, *Egypt. Mythology*, pp. 10, 15 ff. In the view adopted in this work animatism and spiritism are accepted as sources of religion, animism is regarded as a secondary development. The wider use of animism to denote indwelling power is defended by Alexander, *Myth. of All Races*, x. 269.
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¹ *Opferritus und Voropfer der Griechen und Römer* (1915); cf. Keith, JHS. xxxvi. 107 ff.
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² Cf. Lang, *Modern Mythology*, pp. xi ff.; *Anthropological Essays presented to E. B. Tylor*, p. 10; Helm, *Altgerm. Rel.* i. 13 ff.; Hopkins, *Origin of Religion*, chap. i.
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³ Marett, *Threshold of Religion*, pp. 1–32; Ridgeway’s criticism (*Dramas and Dramatic Dances*, pp. 47 ff.) is in part merely captious and irrelevant. Feist (*Kultur der Indogermanen*, pp. 322, 334, 344) still seems to hold Tylor’s view that the process is from regarding a spirit as animating a tree to the worship of the tree (*e. g.*) *per se* and so with the sun. This is clearly open to grave objection.
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⁴ Cf. Keith, JRAS. 1916, pp. 335, 336.
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⁵ Cf. Marett, *Threshold of Religion*, p. x.
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⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 138 ff.
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⁷ *Trans. Third Int. Cong. Hist. Rel.* i. 33–5. Cf. the neo-vitalist theory of R. Dussaud, *Introduction à l'histoire des religions* (1914).
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It is clearly erroneous to ascribe to primitive religion the conception of *mana* as something universal of which part is possessed by the objects of his worship. Rather matter is sentient and has mentality, the whole forming a unity, not a spirit abiding in something not spiritual, and each object has a specific power of its own. In this as in other cases progress must be from the concrete and individual to the formulation of the universal, from individual powers to the belief in one power, *mana*, *manitou*, *brahman*, or whatever other name it bears, through sharing in which the individual objects possess their force.¹
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¹ Van Gennep (*L'état actuel du problème totémique*, pp. 47 f., 86 ff., 321) defends the universal aspect of *mana* as primitive, but, though his view is valid as against Ridgeway's effort (*Dramas and Dramatic Dances*, pp. 385 f.) to show that *mana* is later than spirit worship, it does not meet the obvious objection that so wide a conception cannot be treated as primitive. The conception is the basis of Indian philosophy, though it is primarily not philosophic, but popular, as among the North American Indians; Alexander, *Myth. of All Races*, x. 269.
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From these sources, naturalism and spiritism, it is easy to imagine the development of the spirits or demons whom Wundt² classifies in five groups. Thus we have ghosts or spooks, which have no connexion with any special object, and which, therefore, have a close resemblance to the spirits of the dead; not unlike in character, though of quite different origin, are those which express the tricky or sometimes terrifying aspects of nature, abiding in the house, the air, the waters, the forest or the waste, elves or cobolds, dwarfs or giants. There are also vegetation spirits, the simplest being those animating the individual tree or plant, while in more complex cases we have spirits of the wood or the corn field or more vaguely of the life of vegetation as a whole; sometimes these spirits may be derived from souls of the dead, as the spirit which ensouls the plant growing from the grave of the dead, but more often they are nature spirits proper. Further there are spirits of heaven, of the air, the clouds, the waters, and the earth, the external vegetation demons of Wundt,³ who emphasises by this name their relation to the growth of the crops. Akin to spirits of vegetation regarded as a whole, we have spirits entrusted with the care of whole fields of activity; spirits of the hunt, of seafaring, housebuilding, commerce and industry, war, marriage, government and law. Lastly there is the vast group of spirits of disease and madness, whose origin may be traced in part to spirits of nature and in part to the souls of the dead, and even more often to the creative imagination which extends indefinitely the number of such spirits.
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² *Völkerpsychologie*, IV. i. 457 ff.; Helm, *Altgerm. Rel.* i. 30 ff.
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³ *Ibid.* 515 ff.
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With external vegetation demons in Wundt's sense and the spirits which preside over departments of activity, we attain something approaching gods, and, bearing in mind the fact that the souls of the dead are not fettered by connexion with any definite aspect of nature, it is possible to believe that the idea of a god not merely as superhuman but also as supermundane could develop itself easily. A definite theory of this process is evolved by Usener,⁴ who postulates as the first stage momentary gods (Augenblickgötter), spirits which preside over any specific activity in the moment it takes place, and which, therefore, are real only for that moment and for him who then invokes their aid. The next stage is when, in lieu of these momentary deities, man advances to the conception of a single deity presiding over all similar activities, a Sondergott of sowing in general, for instance; deities of this kind are asserted to exist in Greek, Roman, and Lithuanian religion. The final step to give a god personality and permit him to be developed thus in myth, cult, poetry, and art is furnished by language; if the progress of phonetic change, or the disuse of a root in ordinary speech, leaves the proper appellation of the Sondergott isolated and no longer readily intelligible, then he can easily assume a wider character than can ever be his as long as his name betrays his real nature. So in India Dyaus never developed a real personality comparable to Zeus or Jupiter, because the word remained in living use to denote the sky in India, while it died out in Greek and Latin; hence also the reason why the names of gods are so often difficult to interpret etymologically.
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⁴ *Griechische Götternamen*, pp. 75 ff., 279 ff. Cf. Carnoy, *Les Indo-Européens*, pp. 216-18.
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Usener’s views are not wholly convincing; his momentary gods¹ are not established by any historical evidence of value, and can only be regarded as a possible, but not necessary, stage of imagination. His Sondergötter are more real, and some gods of this type may be traced in Vedic religion.² But he certainly much exaggerated the value of his evidence which has been severely criticized for Greek, Roman, and Lithuanian religion by Farnell,³ Wissowa,⁴ and Warde Fowler⁵ among others. It is in fact plain that the elaboration of the Sondergötter often represents the priestly working up of simpler ideas, and that they are later developments of naturalism under the influence of animism, and not really primitive. Nor can the argument from names be treated as of decisive importance; in fact the disuse of a word may often rather be because it had become a divine name and, therefore, was too sacred for indiscriminate ordinary use. Allowance in the development of personality must be made for several other factors, the cult certainly in high measure. Wundt⁶ again insists on the importance of the hero as suggesting the development of the personal god, though he clearly exaggerates the importance of this factor. The practice of making images of the deity, which is in part an outcome of personification, at the same time must have aided in the development of that feature. Importance also must be attached to the influence of ethical considerations, though precisely how these operated is by no means easy to decide.
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¹ Cf. Wundt, *op. cit.* IV. i. 560 f.
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² Below, Part II, Chap. 11, § 3.
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³ *Anthropological Essays presented to E. B. Tylor*, pp. 81 ff.; *Greek Hero Cults*, pp. 78 ff.
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⁴ *Gesam. Abhand.*, pp. 306 ff.
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⁵ *Religious Experience of the Roman People*, pp. 158 ff. For an attempt, not specially successful, to resuscitate the view of Sondergötter, see Rose, JRS. iii. 233–41.
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⁶ *Op. cit.* II. iii. 420 ff.
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While many authorities are content to hold that in the interworking of these two forces, nature- and spirit-worship, there may be found the explanation of the origin of religion, others, conspicuous among whom is von Schroeder,⁷ urge that a further source is essential, and that its existence is supported by an impartial examination of the account of observers of the religions of primitive tribes. This source is the belief in a highest being whose nature is goodness; the Australian tribes, the Andaman islanders, the savages of the Tierra del Fuego, among others, are held to believe in such a being, whose commands are the moral principles which they obey. In other cases this belief has become faint and blurred, but it reveals itself in the ordeal which is an appeal to the decision of such a power. In some cases the belief in this deity pictures him as creator of the world and of men. Religion involves essentially the recognition of the existence of such a being, of man's dependence on him, and the desire to enter into relations with him. The conception is obviously not primitive; it is due to reflection by man on the fact of the self-sacrificing instinct which is seen among animals in the love for offspring and which manifests itself in an increasing number of ways with the advance of man. The existence of this impulse can be explained by man only on the theory that there must be one whose will it is that men should so act, a view which easily is added to by the conception of that one as the creator. When, whether after a long period or possibly comparatively early through the effort of a specially gifted intellect, this idea came into being, it may be said that man was truly born as man, religion truly came into being and with it morality. Inevitably, of course, this conception blends with the other two sources of religion; thus in India Rudra, in von Schroeder's view a spirit in origin, assumes both the features of a god of nature and of the high god; similarly Viṣṇu, a god of nature, assumes the characteristics of the high god and of a spirit.
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⁷ *Arische Religion*, i. 81 ff., 106 ff., 139 ff. See also below, p. 51.
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Von Schroeder strengthens his case by his care not to attempt to claim for his source of religion as great antiquity as for the others, and it is clear that he emphasizes an extremely important element in religion, its connexion with ethical principles. Apart from questions of origins, it is plain that by the Indo-Iranian period, and very probably even in the Indo-European period, this element had come effectively into operation as powerfully affecting the nature of the gods, so that it is a question of minor importance, for practical purposes, whether we assume this belief as a third source of religion or hold that ethical motives have been introduced *ab extra* into a religious scheme which came into life independent of ethics. What is clear is that many of the gods have no original ethical character, and fear often seems to have been more prominent than love or friendship as regards the spirits of the dead.
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An instance of generalization on insufficient grounds is afforded by S. Reinach's¹ theory of totemism: he insists that the traces of the reverence paid to animals is always to be accounted for in one simple way: at one time the animal was the god: men revered animals by an excess of philanthropy, by a hypertrophy of the same instinct which made human society a possibility: but at stated intervals the animal god was devoured in order to renew the tie of blood between the clan and the animal, which was then replaced by another specimen of the species, the god being the species, not the mere individual. To this feeling of man for the animal he attributes the domestication of wild animals and the greatest possible help to the progress of civilization. In later times, as the process of religious development proceeded, the animal gods faded away and appeared as animals in the train of anthropomorphic deities, or enemies of these deities. There is some obscurity in the conception of the mode of the introduction of anthropomorphism, which in Greece¹ at least Reinach seems to regard as a new element introduced from without the original religion, but the real objection to the theory is that it ignores many other possibilities explaining reverence paid to animals. The hunter who pays a semblance of reverence to the animal which he has killed does so often to avoid the anger of the spirit of the dead beast, and the revenge of the relatives of the slain, and no sacramental relation is involved. Again there is an essential distinction to be drawn between theriomorphism and actual worship of animals for themselves. The early religious imagination, it is clear, was not capable of the distinctions between human and animal which we draw so sharply: the innumerable legends of the transmutation of men into animals and *vice versa* show a certain instability of view, and a god like Indra or like Dionysos may be conceived as bull shaped, as well as in human or mixed form. Closely allied with this thought is the conception that the god may take actual embodiment in the form of the animal, more especially when the animal is led up to be offered to him in sacrifice: the classical example of the Bouphonia,² the flight of the priest, and the condemnation of the weapon with which the fatal blow is given to the ox can thus best be explained. For the time being, and in a certain sense, the victim may be said to become a fetish, and like a fetish it is an object filled with the holy power, but not abidingly, and, what is more important, not in and for itself sacred. There is at least as little difficulty in understanding this aspect of religious belief as in accepting the theory that totemism is a universal stage of religious faith.
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¹ *Cultes, Mythes et Religions*, i. 47 ff. On totemism see A. van Gennep, *L'état actuel du problème totémique* (1920); Hopkins, *JAOS.* xxxviii. 145-58; Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy* (1910); Reuterskiöld, *Archiv für Rel.* xv. 1-23; Goldenweiser, *Journ. of Am. Folklore*, 1910, pp. 179 ff.; Wundt, *op. cit.* IV. i. 327 ff.
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¹ So for Egypt, Wiedemann, *Der Tierkult der alten Aegypter* (1912).
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² Frazer, *Spirits of the Corn*, ii. 4-7; Farnell, *Cults of the Greek States*, i. 88 ff.; cf., however, Stengel, *Opferbräuche der Griechen*, pp. 203-21; van Gennep, *op. cit.*, pp. 307 ff.
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A like one-sidedness mars the theories of Mannhardt and of Sir J. Frazer regarding the nature of sacrifice, which the latter in the most clear terms reduces to a magic device to prolong the life of the crops, men, and animals. From this position Sir J. Frazer³ has advanced to the definite assertion that all religion is derived from magic: that in the first instance the primitive savage conceives of himself as all powerful over the course of nature, and that he wields the means of magic to bring about the results he desires, but that in the long run, finding that his magic arts do not prevail to accomplish all his desires, he has instead recourse to the belief in unseen beings in whom abide the powers which he is denied, and of which he confesses himself barren, and seeks to win the favour of these beings by offerings and prayer, though continuing of course at the same time the practice of his old magic devices. Apart from objections to the attempt to reduce sacrifice to one primitive type alone, and to prove that the gift theory of sacrifice is late, the theory of the priority of magic rests upon the fundamental assumption that primitive man believes in his power to control by his arts the whole proceedings of the universe. It is difficult to conceive how such an idea can be deemed primitive, or how it could have developed in the mind of primitive man, whose experience from the first must have sternly checked any such high belief in the powers of mortal efforts. Magic and religion are to all appearance in essence distinct and irreconcilable things, as different in essence as science and religion as a philosophy, and the fact that they are inextricably conjoined in practically every religious system known to us does not in the slightest degree prove their identity, or render probable the derivation of one from the other.
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³ *The Golden Bough*³ (1911-15). See Keith, JHS. xxxv. 281-4. Warde Fowler, who insists on the distinction of religion and magic, nevertheless appears to believe that magic precedes religion in order of time (*Religious Experience of the Roman People*, pp. 47-9, 188, 223, 224). See also N. N. Law, *Ancient Indian Polity*, chap. ix. For a criticism of Wundt's belief in the original magic character of the sacrifice (*op. cit.* IV. i. 423 ff.) see R. M. Meyer, *Altgerm. Rel.*, p. 408.
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Yet another view of the same false generalization is that of O. Gruppe,¹ which would make the whole of the theology of religion later than the cult and derive all myth from cult: thus in India the fire and Soma ritual would be the starting-point for the Vedic mythology, an idea which receives some support from the views of Bergaigne. The theory hardly admits of serious discussion when stated as a general rule. There are indeed, especially in Greek religion, not a few cases where the cult, for instance that of Dionysos, has begotten myths such as the death of Pentheus,² and the same principle may certainly be allowed to be applicable in India, but to go further than that is to leave all proof and probability behind.³ The myths of the Rigveda in particular are usually simple and direct enough, and reflect too clearly the actual phenomena of nature to allow us to imagine that they have any other origin than the expression by man of the ideas which naturally occur to him from the observation of such things as the daily movement of the sun or the bursting of the monsoon with all that it means for Indian life.⁴ To the worship of the gods the cult stands of course in the closest relation, but normally it takes in India the form of prayer or sacrifice in order to win the favour of the god: only when we leave worship proper and come to magic do we as a rule find a mimicry of the mythic action of the deity.
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¹ *Griech. Myth.*, pp. 547 ff.
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² Bather, *JHS.* xiv. 244 ff. Cf. Rohde, *Psyche*³, i. 137 ff. on the Hyakinthos myth.
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³ Myths created by misunderstandings of pictorial representations which are not rare in Greece and Rome are excluded in Vedic religion by its aniconic character.
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⁴ Helm, *Altgerm. Rel.* i. 56 f. See also Lang, *Myth, Ritual, and Religion* (1906); Fox, *Greek and Roman Myth.*, pp. xliv ff.
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Another aspect of the same view is to be seen in the theory of totemism presented by Durkheim,¹ who lays stress on the part played in religion by the tribal consciousness, and sees in the god the creation of that consciousness as a hypostasis of itself, the object chosen to render the conception present to the senses being often, but not necessarily always, an animal. He declares that animism or animatism cannot explain religion, but it is wholly impossible to concede to his arguments against either theory conclusive weight, while his own expression for the fundamental character of religion is obviously wholly incapable of proof, being purely a psychological theory, which has no strong support other than the postulate, which he never attempts to prove, that the mind of the Australian aborigine is the mind of a really primitive man.² He rejects the theories of totemism adduced by other scholars such as Tylor, Hill Tout, and Andrew Lang, but in no case are his own arguments convincing or even in the main plausible, nor can it be said that any real explanation of totemism is to be derived from them.
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¹ *Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1915). Cf. J. E. Harrison, *Epilegomena to the Study of Greek Religion* (1921), chap. i.
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² For a very different view of Australian beliefs as the result of race mixture see Rivers, *Essays and Studies presented to W. Ridgeway*, pp. 480 ff., and see van Gennep, *L'état actuel du problème totémique*, pp. 40 ff. Cf. Dixon, *Myth. of All Races*, ix. pp. xiii f.
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Yet another view of religion is that taken by Gilbert Murray,³ who finds the first deity in the medicine man himself, a theory which obviously stands in very sharp contrast, though apparently its author does not recognize the fact, with the view of Durkheim. The medicine man with his control over the fertility of the earth and his other superhuman powers is held gradually to abandon his claims to deity, and to invent other gods whose agent and spokesman he is. But if the earliest deity is human there is an easy road for theriomorphic conceptions to creep in: men are prone to devour animals for the sake of securing their power or cunning or some other quality, and in some undefined way this passes into the belief in theriomorphic and even animal gods: the dance of the tribesmen wearing the skin of the animal slain developes the goat-formed deity and so on.⁴ These speculations are acute and ingenious, but serious discussion they can hardly demand. The growth of a god from a magician, or from a rite, as the origin of religion, is a wholly superficial and unnatural conception: vegetation ritual cannot be said to create the conception of the dying and reviving god: the ritual rests on the conception of the death of the god and is inconceivable without the belief in a vegetation spirit, a conception for which Murray with Miss Harrison would substitute the monstrosity of an Eniautos Daimon, a view which yields the logical result that Here is found to be a old year spirit, her name being equated with the word ‘year.’¹
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³ *Anthropology and the Classics*, pp. 74 ff.; *Four Stages of Greek Religion*, pp. 39 ff. Contrast P. Ehrenreich, *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*, xxxviii. 536 ff.
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⁴ The 'projection' theory of religion is carried to its logical conclusions in a most amusing, because serious, work by Miss J. Harrison, *Themis* (1912). The author has a personal animus against the Olympians as non-matriarchal, and now interprets religion in terms of sociological epistemology.
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¹ Leaf, *Homer and History*, p. 266 *n.*
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Certainly no more satisfactory is the belief that gods are sprung from kings or other famous and distinguished men, apart from any connexion with magic. This doctrine has always been a favourite one in connexion with Indian religion, a theory based on hasty generalizations from observation of modern instances, masquerading under the semblance of an unprejudiced study of Indian nature. The absurdity of interpreting Vedic religion of the period 1400 to 1000 B. C. by the light of investigation of the modern Hindu, separated by great differences in blood and tradition, would seem self-evident, and it is to be regretted that we have serious suggestions² made to prove the historical character of Indra as a great king, and even to localize his exploits, and not even the suggestion of primitive Euhemerists of India excuses the attempt³ to discover two ancient kings in the Açvins, a view which is ludicrous in face of the widespread recognition of similar dual divinities, a fact which shows that their worship, whatever its exact cause, cannot be put down to the suppositious existence of two specially distinguished princes. The theory wholly omits to explain why these persons should be described in terms of solar or storm mythology, or why in many parts of the earth savages are found worshipping natural phenomena so frankly as to render belief in the phenomena being really dead men ludicrous. It is somewhat unfortunate that we should have escaped from the theory of Herbert Spencer which makes the Vedic Dawn-Goddess the ‘ghost of a former Miss Dawn’ into one which makes a warrior king out of so naturalistic a god as Indra, and which, if it is consistent, ought to find in Uṣas a degeneration from the worship of some distinguished Vedic hetaira, seeing that her nature in the Rigveda suggests a distinct lack of Puritanism. On this issue the opinion of Hopkins⁴ is clear and fundamentally correct: ‘No one who reads the Rig-Veda impartially can question for a moment that Fire and Dawn and Wind were phenomenal gods from the beginning and a wider outlook only confirms this fact.’
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² Konow, *The Aryan Gods of the Mitani People* (1921).
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³ BSOS. III. i. 167 f.
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⁴ *Origin of Religion*, pp. 51 f. Cf. also N. N. Law, *Ancient Indian Polity*, pp. 112 ff.
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An important practical result follows from the refusal to adopt as final and exclusive any of these theories of religion. It becomes impossible to adapt an order of exposition based on the different age of the religious phenomena presented, as for instance is done by Dr. Warde Fowler in his valuable exposition of Roman religion, in which he starts from survivals of the primitive magic, in which he sees the first expression of the relation of man to the mystery of the universe, and then proceeds to discuss the development of that attitude through the religion of the settled life of the agricultural family, and the faith of the city state, to its later development under Greek influence. Attractive as this method of procedure at first appears, it is perfectly clear that it cannot be justified as a scientific mode of exposition. The difficulty appears clearly when the figure of Jupiter comes under discussion. It is impossible for Dr. Warde Fowler to question the fact that he is a great god, a sky god, and a god who was not developed by the Roman people independently: indeed Dr. Fowler shows some disposition¹ to favour the view of Lang,² Jevons,³ and others who accept the primitive belief of many peoples in one great god, which is anterior to polytheism, and which is often held to be the origin of Chinese religion.⁴ But he never tries to connect this view with his other principle of the priority of magic to religion, nor to explain how the two ideas stand in relation to one another. It is, therefore, only possible in dealing with religion to indicate the diverse elements involved in it, and to trace the development of these several elements and their interaction and intermingling. To derive one element from the other is a task too difficult, too speculative, and ultimately too philosophical to be dealt with in the account of any individual faith, while to base on such theories the order of development of any individual religion is only misleading.
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¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 142.
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² *Making of Religion*, p. 206. Contrast C. H. Toy, *JAOS.* xxiii. 29–37.
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³ *Idea of God in Early Religions*, p. 30.
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⁴ Ross, *Original Religion of China*, pp. 128 ff.; cf. *ERE.* v. 395 (Japan); Petrie, *Religion of Egypt*, ch. i; Carnoy, *Les Indo-Européens*, pp. 163 ff.; L. von Schroeder, *VOJ.* xix. 1 ff.; P. W. Schmidt, *Der Ursprung der Gottesidee* (1912); above, p. 45. For North America see Alexander, *Myth. of All Races*, x. 271 f.
Linked texts (1)
- Ṛgvedasaṃhitā — Sanskrit