The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads v2.c41.23.1

v2.c41.23.1

When these resemblances are pointed out, however, all that can be said for the theory is said: there is no ground to assume borrowing: the clearness of the position of Parmenides regarding the nature of the one is much more pronounced than the view of the Upaniṣads, and the identification of thought and the object is carried beyond the views of the Upaniṣads, while by his view of truth and opinion as distinct Parmenides anticipates Indian thought. It is, therefore, far more probable that the Greek and the Indian views were of independent origin: the Greek bears already the mark of definiteness which is only evolved centuries later in the Indian thought, and it is also aided by its freedom from the mythological connexions, which weigh so heavily on the thought of the Upaniṣads. The fact that the Brahman is identified with thought is by no means the same thing as the idea that thought and its object are identical, a doctrine of Parmenides² which duly modified is brought to its most complete form in the theory of Aristotle.³ Nor is it of any value to cite the fact that Thales's view of the origin in water of everything is much later than the Vedic conception of the waters as the primeval form of existence. The idea is not only Babylonian but is a singularly simple one, as found in primitive religion, and must have been natural to primitive man: it is even possible to trace in theory the mode in which he arrived at this result.