The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads v2.c41.23.3

v2.c41.23.3

In the case of Herakleitos the argument is even more unsatisfactory: the doctrine of the constant flux of things (πάντα ῥεῖ) is certainly comparable with the movement of nature in the Sāṅkhya system and to some degree in Buddhism, and his belief in the innumerable annihilations and re-creations of the universe may be compared with the view of the Sāṁkhya of the destruction and re-creation of the world.¹ But, apart from the fact that the comparison of the doctrine of constant movement with the Sāṁkhya system of the development of Prakṛti is far from important, in view of the complete distinction between the two ideas of development, it must be pointed out once more that the Sāṁkhya system is not proved to be, and most probably was not by any means, as early as the system of Herakleitos, and the doctrine of the periodic destruction of the universe, which is probably caused in India by the doctrine of transmigration, is not recorded in one of the older Upaniṣads, and is clearly a late development; Garbe himself rejects the theory that it is known to the Atharvaveda.² It is hardly necessary to add that it is quite out of the question to regard Empedokles as borrowing from India his view that nothing can arise from nothing: the same view is undoubtedly held by the Sāṁkhya, but is as emphatically not normally held by the Upaniṣads.