The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads v2.c41.s8.37

v2.c41.s8.37

⁵ In the famous passage τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἔστιν τε καὶ εἶναι Burnet insists (*Greek Philosophy*, i. 67, n. 1) that the infinitives cannot be regarded as subjects, and that the meaning must be that it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be. He leaves unexplained what Parmenides conceived to be the relation between being and thought, and his dictum is not valid. That the infinitive was not originally a subject is no proof that it could not become one, i. e. be felt as one. Cf. Gildersleeve, *Syntax of Classical Greek*, i. 132; Goodwin, *Greek Moods and Tenses*, p. 300; Herakleitos, frag. 112 τὸ φρονεῖν ἀρετὴ μεγίστη, καὶ σοφία ἀληθέα λέγειν; *Iliad*, i. 274; x. 174; Stahl, *Syntax d. griech. Verbums*, pp. 601 ff.