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The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies v10: Volume 10

The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies v10

Language
English

Contents

Volume 10

Front matter

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The first of these, the *Gospel of the Hebrews*, was used by the Jewish Christians of Palestine, and was probably a version of the Gospel of Matthew, though it contained some traditions not found in our canonical books. The *Gospel of the Egyptians* was used by the ascetic sects of Egypt, and was marked by a strong tendency towards mysticism and asceticism. The *Gospel of Peter* was used by the Docetists, and taught that Christ did not really suffer, but only appeared to do so.

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These gospels, and others like them, were not accepted by the Church as a whole, and were gradually lost or suppressed. The Church, however, felt the need for a standard collection of writings that would serve as a guide for faith and practice. This led to the formation of the New Testament canon, a process that took several centuries to complete.

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The first step in this process was the collection of the letters of Paul, which were widely circulated among the churches. Then came the four Gospels, which were accepted as the authoritative accounts of the life and teachings of Jesus. The Acts of the Apostles and the other epistles were gradually added, and finally the Book of Revelation.

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By the end of the second century, the core of the New Testament was generally accepted by the Church. The process of canonization was not a formal act of a council, but rather a gradual recognition by the churches of the writings that were most valuable for their life and worship. It was only in the fourth century that the canon was formally closed by the councils of the Church.

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The formation of the New Testament canon was a crucial event in the history of the Church. It provided a standard of faith and practice that helped to unify the Church and to protect it from the influence of heretical sects. It also ensured that the teachings of Jesus and the apostles would be preserved for future generations.

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General Editor: Karl H. Potter

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VOLUMES ALREADY PUBLISHED I. Bibliography Sections I and II, 3rd ed. (1995)—Ed. Karl H. Potter. II. Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyāya Vaiśeṣika up to Gaṅgeśa (1977)—Ed. Karl H. Potter III. Advaita Vedānta up to Śaṃkara and His Pupils (1981)—Ed. Karl H. Potter. IV. Sāṃkhya: a Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy (1987)—Eds. Gerald James Larson & Ram Shankar Bhattacharya. V. The Philosophy of the Grammarians (1990)—Ed. H.G. Coward. VI. Indian Philosophical Analysis: Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika from Gaṅgeśa to Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (1993)—Eds. Karl H. Potter & Sibjiban Bhattacharyya. VII. Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.D. (1996)—Eds. Karl H. Potter with Robert E. Buswell Jr., Padmanabh S. Jaini & Noble Ross Reat. VIII. Buddhist Philosophy from 100 to 350 A.D. (1999)—Ed. Karl H. Potter. IX. Buddhist Philosophy from 350 to 600 A.D. (2003)—Ed. Karl H. Potter.

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VOLUMES UNDER PREPARATION X. Jain Philosophy [Part I]—Eds. Dalsukh Malvania & Jayendra Soni. XI. Buddhist Philosophy from 600 to 750 A.D.—Ed. Karl H. Potter. XII. Buddhist Philosophy from 750 to 1300 A.D.—Ed. Karl H. Potter. XIII. Yoga Philosophy—Eds. Gerald J. Larson & Ram Shankar Bhattacharya. XIV. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika from after Raghunātha to Gadadhara's Time—Eds. Sibjiban Bhattacharyya & Karl H. Potter. XV. Advaita Vedānta from 800 to 1300 A.D.—Ed. Paul Kuepferle. XVI. Advaita Vedānta from 1300 to the present—Ed. Karl H. Potter. XVII. Jain Philosophy [Part II]—Eds. Karl H. Potter. XVIII. Kaśmir Śaiva Philosophy—Ed. Navjivan Rastogi. XIX. Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta Philosophy—Eds. Stephen H. Phillips & M. Narasimhachary. XX. Dvaitādvaita Philosophy—Eds. Ram Shankar Bhattacharya & Karl H. Potter. XXI. Pūrvamīmāṃsā Philosophy—Eds. K.T. Pandurangi & Karl H. Potter. XXII. Acintyabhedābheda Philosophy—Ed. Srivatsa Goswami. XXIII. Dvaita Vedānta Philosophy—Ed. K. T. Pandurangi. XXIV. Cārvāka Philosophy—Ed. Eli Franco. XXV. Śuddhādvaita Vedānta Philosophy—Eds. Sharad Aniruddha Goswami & Shyam Manoharaji Goswami. XXVI. Viraśaiva Philosophy—Eds. Unch Sen. XXVII. Collective Glossary-Index—Ed. Karl H. Potter.

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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

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VOLUME X

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Jain Philosophy (Part I)

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EDITED BY DALSUKH MALVANIA & JAYENDRA SONI

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MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS PRIVATE LIMITED • DELHI

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First Edition: Delhi, 2007

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© MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS PRIVATE LIMITED

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All Rights Reserved

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ISBN: 81-208-3169-1 (Vol. X)

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MOTILAL BANARSIDASS 41 U.A. Bungalow Road, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi 110 007 8 Mahalaxmi Chamber, 22 Bhulabhai Desai Road, Mumbai 400 026 203 Royapettah High Road, Mylapore, Chennai 600 004 236, 9th Main III Block, Jayanagar, Bangalore 560 011 Sanas Plaza, 1302 Baji Rao Road, Pune 411 002 8 Camac Street, Kolkata 700 017 Ashok Rajpath, Patna 800 004 Chowk, Varanasi 221 001

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PRINTED IN INDIA

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BY JAINENDRA PRAKASH JAIN AT SHRI JAINENDRA PRESS, A-45 NARAINA, PHASE-I, NEW DELHI 110 028 AND PUBLISHED BY NARENDRA PRAKASH JAIN FOR MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS PRIVATE LIMITED, BUNGALOW ROAD, DELHI 110 007

Contributors

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R. S. Betai P. N. Dave J. W. de Jong K. K. Dixit Dulaharaj Erich Frauwallner Satischandra Ghoshal Bhagchandra Jain H. L. Jain K. C. Jain L. C. Jain P. S. Jaini Jambuvijaya Mahendra Kumar Ratna Lahiri Dalsukh Malvania Karl H. Potter N. J. Shah Y. S. Shastri Jayendra Soni Nathmal Tatia A. N. Upadhye

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ABBREVIATIONS xv

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PART ONE INTRODUCTION (Jayendra Soni) 3 THE JAINA CANON (Karl H. Potter) 35

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PART TWO SUMMARIES OF WORKS (Arranged Chronologically)

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1 Umāsvāti (400?), *Tattvārthasūtra* (K.K.Dixit) 45 2 Umāsvāti, *Praśamatiriprakaraṇa* (Y.S.Shastri)) 66 3 Umāsvāti, *Tattvārthasūtrabhāṣya* (K.K.Dixit) 70 4 Kundakunda (400?), *Pañcāstikāyasāra* (A.N.Upadhye) 95 5 Kundakunda, *Pravacanasāra* (Upadhye; Potter) 97 6 Kundakunda, *Samayasāra* (Upadhye; Potter) 110 7 Kundakunda, *Niyamasāra* (Potter) 120 8 Kundakunda, *Aṣṭaprābhṛta* (Ratna Lahiri) 126 9 Kundakunda, *Dvādaśānuprekṣā* (Upadhye) 138 10 Samantabhadra (600?), *Āptamīmāṃsā* (Potter) 140 11 Samantabhadra, *Yuktyanuśāsana* (Lahiri) 154 12 Pūjyapāda (480), *Tattvārthasūtra-Sarvārthasiddhi* (Potter) 159 13 Pūjyapāda, *Iṣṭopadeśa*/Commmentary 174 14 Pūjyapāda, *Samādhitantra* (Potter) 174 15 Siddhasena Divākara (550), *Dvātriṃśikā* (P. N. Dave) 177 16 Siddhasena Divākara, *Sanmatitarka* (Potter) 191 17 Mallavādin Kṣamāśramaṇa (550), *Nayacakra* (Frauwallner, Jambuvijaya, de Jong) 201 18 Jinabhadra Gaṇi (600), *Dhyānaśataka* (Dulaharaj) 210 19 Jinabhadra Gaṇi, *Āvaśyakanirukti-Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* (Dalsukh Malvania) 224 20 Siṃhasūragaṇi (600), *Nayacakra- Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* 233 21 Koṭyācārya (725), *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* 233 22 Siddhasena Mahāmati (700?), Nyāyāvatāra (Potter) 234 23 Yogīndudeva (725), Paramātmaprakāśa (Upadhye) 238 24 Yogīndudeva, Adhyātmasandoha 260 25 Yogīndudeva, Yogasāra (R. S.

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Betai) 260 26 Vādibha Siṃha, Navapadārthaniścaya 264 27 Vādibhā Siṃha, Syādvādasiddhi (Bhagchandra Jain) 264 28 Dharmadāsa Gaṇi (750), Upadeśamālā /Bālāvabodha 264 29 Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka (770), Āptamīmāṃsā-Aṣṭasatī (Satischandra Ghoshal) 266 30 Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka, Laghīyastraya (Nagin J. Shah; Lahiri) 270 31 Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka, Nyāyaviniścaya (Shah; Mahendra Kumar) 284 32 Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka, Pramāṇasaṃgraha 298 33 Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka, Siddhiviniścaya (Kumar; Lahiri) 299 34 Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka, Tattvārthasūtra-Rājavārttika (Kumar;

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Lahiri) 306 35 Haribhadra Sūri (770), Anekāntajayapatāka-Uddyotadīpikā 422 36 Haribhadra Sūri, Anekāntapraghaṭṭa 424 37 Haribhadra Sūri, Anekāntavādapraveśa 424 38 Haribhadra Sūri, Anekāntasiddhi 425 39 Haribhadra Sūri, Anuyogadvārasūtra-Laghuvṛtti 425 40 Haribhadra Sūri, Āvaśyakasūtra-Śiṣyahitā 425 41 Haribhadra Sūri, Āvaśyakasūtra-Bṛhadvṛtti 425 42 Haribhadra Sūri, Dharmabindu 426 43 Haribhadra Sūri, Jīvābhigamasūtra-Laghuvṛtti 426 44 Haribhadra Sūri, Lokatattvanirṇaya 426 45 Haribhadra Sūri, Nandīsūtra-Vivarana 427 46 Haribhadra Sūri, Pañcasūtraka-Vyākhyā (Jambuvijaya) 427 47 Haribhadra Sūri, Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya (Potter) 435 48 Haribhadra Sūri, Sarvajñasiddhi 436 49 Haribhadra Sūri, Śāstravarttasamuccaya 436 50 Haribhadra Sūri, Ṣoḍaśakaprakaraṇa 437 51 Haribhadra Sūri, Tattvārthasūtra-Laghuvṛtti 438 52 Haribhadra Sūri, Upadeśapada 438 53 Haribhadra Sūri, Yogabindu (Potter) 438 54 Haribhadra Sūri, Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya (Dixit) 448 55 Haribhadra Sūri, Yogaviṃśikā (Dixit) 454 56 Haribhadra Sūri, Yogaśataka (Dixit) 455 57 Haribhadra Sūri, Brahmasiddhāntasamuccaya 458 58 Haribhadra Sūri, Samyaktvasaptati 458 59 Haribhadra Sūri, Darśanasaptatikā 458 60 Haribhadra Sūri, Dharmasaṃgrahaṇī 458 61 Haribhadra Sūri, Viṃśaviṃśikā 459 62 Haribhadra Sūri, Tattvaprakāśikā 461 63 Haribhadra Sūri, Aṣṭakaprakaraṇa 462 64 Gandhahasti Siddhasena, Tattvārthasūtrabhāṣya (N.Tatia) 462 65 Kumaranandī Bhaṭṭāraka (750), Vādanyāya 468 66 Vīrasena and Jinasena (837), Kaṣāyaprābhṛta-Jayadhavalā 468 67 Jinasena and Guṇabhadra (870), Ātmānuśāsana (Upadhye) 468 68 Rājaśekhara (900), Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya (B.

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C. Jain) 472 69 Jinacandra (900?), Siddhāntasāra 472 70 Siddharṣigaṇi (900?), Nyāyāvatāra-Vivṛti 472 71 Amṛtacandra Sūri (925), Tattvārthasāra 483 72 Amṛtacandra Sūri, Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya (Potter) 484 73 Amṛtacandra Sūri, Pañcāstikāyasāra-Tattvadīpikā 487 74 Amṛtacandra Sūri, Pravacanasāra-Tattvadīpikā (Potter) 502 75 Amṛtacandra Sūri, Samayasāra-Ātmakhyāti 507 76 Amṛtacandra Sūri, Laghutattvasphoṭa (P.S.Jaini) 507 77 Devasena (934), Nayacakra-Ālāpapaddhati 521 78 Devasena, Tattvasāra (Soni) 527 79 Devasena, Darśanasāra (B. C. Jain) 532 80 Māṇikyanandin (940), Parīkṣāmukha (Potter) 533 81 Vidyānanda (940), Aṣṭaprābhṛta-Āptaparīkṣā /Alaṃkṛti (Soni) 542 82 Vidyānanda, Aṣṭasahasrī 546 83 Vidyānanda, Pātraparīkṣā 554 84 Vidyānanda, Pramāṇaparīkṣā 555 85 Vidyānanda, Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā (Tatia) 555 86 Vidyānanda, Tattvārthasūtra-Ślokavārttika 594 87 Vidyānanda, Yuktyanuśāsana-Ṭīkā 600 88 Anantakīrti (950), Jīvaśiddhinibandhana 600 89 Anantakīrti, Laghīyastraya-Tātparyavṛtti 600 90 Anantakīrti, Sarvajñasiddhi 600 91 Anantakīrti, Svataḥprāmāṇyabhaṅga 600 92 Amitagati I (950), Yogasāraprābhṛta (H.L.Jain;

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Upadhye) 601 93 Kanakanandin (975), Karmaprakṛti 602 94 Kanakanandin, Dravyasaṃgraha 603 95 Anantavīrya (980), Pramāṇasaṃgraha-Bhāṣya 603 96 Anantavīrya, Siddhiviniścaya-Ṭīkā 603 97 Anantavīrya, Laghīyastraya-Vivṛti 604 98 Anantavīrya, Nyāyaviniścaya-Vṛtti 604 99 Nemicandra Saiddhāntika (980), Gomatasāra (Potter) 605 100 Nemicandra, Labdhisāra (L.C.Jain) 626 101 Nemicandra, Kṣapaṇasāra 632 102 Nemicandra, Trilokasāra 633 103 Nemicandra, Traivārikācāra 633 104 Nemicandra, Tribhaṅgīsāra 634 105 Nemicandra, Dravyasaṃgraha (Potter) 634 106 Nemicandra, Upadeśasiddhāntaratnamālā 639 107 Nemicandra, Tattvārthasūtra-Vṛtti 639 108 Jayasena (998), Dharmaratnākara (Upadhye) 639 109 Amitagati II (1010), Pañcasaṃgraha 641 110 Amitagati II, Dvātriṃśikā or Sāmāyikapāṭha (Jaini) 641

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I wish to begin by offering my profound thanks to Dalsukh Malvania, who over thirty years ago agreed to take on the onerous task of editing this first Volume of the Encyclopedia to be concerned with Jain philosophy. Unfortunately he was unable to complete the task, and Jay Soni has agreed to assist by writing the Introduction and providing expert advice. Shortcomings of this Volume should not, however, be ascribed to either Malvania or Soni; they are entirely my own.

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Since it has recently been questioned, perhaps a word of explanation about the intended scope of coverage in Volumes of the Encyclopedia, which may go some way towards answering questions that may arise about the works chosen for summation in the present Volume. According to a policy that was announced in the very first edition of Volume One, the Bibliography is "intended to provide an account of works of Indian philosophical literature which are (1) of philosophical interest throughout; (2) theoretical rather than purely practical in their intended function, and (3) polemical or at least expository in a context where defence of one view among alternatives is appropriate." Readers of previous Volumes will appreciate that out of respect for those whose personal preference is for a given philosophical system I have refrained from using these strictures to preclude the appearance of favorite works which may not hew precisely to these three requirements. Some beloved works, for example, consist essentially of advice to the aspirant for liberation. To use the the three requirements listed above to exclude such favored texts would have unduly offended those readers and made the Volume somewhat less useful to them. It seems thus wisest to exercise the policy stated above in a relaxed manner, enabling inclusion of borderline cases favored by the system's followers.

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One or two words recapitulating my policies on a couple of matters. Standardization of translations of technical terms, which we have followed in this and previous Volumes, may cause the style of exposition to appear cramped and otherwise difficult to read; even possibly misleading renditions may occur in a few cases. The problem comes about as a result of the tension between two aims I have tried to follow, one to provide an accurate (although not always standard) rendition of the term where it occurs, and the other to use the same translation of the Sanskrit term throughout if this is at all possible. I apologize for any problems that may have been caused by my intentions in this matter.

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In order to make the summaries less prolix I have followed a fairly strict policy in the present Volume (I have been working toward it in previous Volumes). The chosen English rendition of a technical Sanskrit term is given (in Sanskrit, not in Prakrit) at the first occurrence of that term. The Sanskrit term, and its chosen translation (or, in a limited number of cases, alternative translations) appear in the Glossary-Index, which should be used to remind the reader of the Sanskrit term, or range of terms, that is being rendered through the English word provided.

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My thanks, once again, to Christine Keyt for her generous help in all sorts of matters having to do with this computer age, and for her assistance in making it possible to keep the Bibliography up to date and available through the Internet (at http://faculty.washington.edu/kpotter). Readers wishing to keep up with the literature on their favorite philosopher, school or topic are invited to avail themselves of this information.

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Karl H. Potter February 18, 2004

Abbreviations

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BCE = before common era CE = common era E = pages of the edition chosen for the present work GOS = Gaekwad's Oriental Series h = hetu (the term) Kapadia 1947 = H. R. Kapadia, Introduction to GOS 105 (Baroda 1947) no. = number op. cit. = previously cited p = pakṣa s = sādhya sp = sapakṣa T = pages of the translation chosen for the present work vp = vipakṣa

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By Jayendra Soni

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What is Jainism? Jainism is a word derived from "Jaina" or "Jain", which in turn is derived from the Sanskrit word *jina*, literally meaning "conqueror". In the Jaina tradition a *jina* is a unique human being who, through severe ascetic discipline, has conquered, overcome or broken the bonds of the passions which bind one to worldly life and values, and who teaches the basic doctrine of nonviolence. A *jaina* or Jain is one who follows this and other teachings of a *jina*, and for the ascetics, being a Jain means one who strives to lead a lifestyle on the model of a *jina*. Since the life and teachings of a *jina* serve as a bridge or ford (*tīrtha*) to cross over beyond the stream of worldly existences, a *jina* is also called a maker of such a ford, a *tīrthaṅkara*. The Prakrit term *niggaṇṭha* (nirgrantha in Sanskrit), literally "free from bonds," was originally used to designate such a person and the ascetics of the tradition.

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Jainism as it has survived to this day is traced back to the life and teachings of the *jina* Mahāvīra (literally, the "Great Hero"), whose given name was Vardhamāna. However, in the Jain tradition Mahāvīra is not the only *jina* and his position and significance has to be seen in the light of the Jain conception of time. Time is seen as a wheel which beginninglessly and endlessly rotates of its own accord. The wheel of time has twelve spokes which represent the different eras of time on a cosmological scale, each era being made up of thousands of years. The twelve eras are divided into two equal half-periods of the downward motion (*apasarpiṇī*) and the upward motion (*utsarpiṇī*) of the wheel of time, with six eras in each. According to the tradition twenty-four *jinas* are born as human beings in each half period of cosmological time, in the third and fourth eras of each. In the present downward motion of the time-wheel Vṛṣabha was the first and Mahāvīra, who was a contemporary of Gautama Buddha, the last *jina*. Scholars ascribe undoubted historicity to Mahāvīra and his predecessor Pārśva, the twenty-third *jina*, who lived about 250 years earlier. It is in this sense that Mahāvīra is not the founder of Jainism, but rather a reformer who based his life and teachings on those of his predecessor (e.g., adding one more "great vow" to Pārśva's four for the ascetics). Unlike the Buddhist view that the Buddha set in motion the law of beings and things with his first sermon as recorded in the famous Dharmacakrapravartanasūtra, the Jains believe that the law of beings and things is eternal and has always been so, with Mahāvīra resuscitating the basic doctrines of the tradition.

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A moot question is: In what sense can persons like Mahāvīra (or the Buddha or the Upaniṣadic thinkers) be regarded as philosophers? Nothing of what Mahāvīra taught (as with the Buddha too) is available in his original words, his life and teachings being redacted finally by others into a canon several centuries after his death. Even Mahāvīra's dates are a matter of debate, although there is clear evidence that Mahāvīra was the Buddha's contemporary, some time between the sixth and fourth centuries B.C.E. Mahāvīra can be regarded as a philosopher in the sense that his life, teachings, ideas and concepts moulded the philosophical activity of the thinkers in the tradition since then. Mahāvīra serves as a model not only for achieving the goal of enlightenment which he himself realized, the goal of nirvāṇa or mokṣa which is common to Buddhism and Hinduism as well, but also as a model for insightful thinking about human nature, life and the world.

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Everything that comes under the rubric of Jainism encompasses a vast area, because through the influence of Mahāvīra and his teachings the Jains have made major contributions in all fields of learning ranging from philosophy to literature, from rules governing religious thought and practice to temple architecture. Jainism is an indigenous, inalienable and well-represented part of Indian thought, of Indian art and literature, in short of Indian culture. This point is significant to note because, especially as far as the contribution of Jain philosophy is concerned, independent studies of specific themes are relatively few compared to what has been done in Hinduism and Buddhism. Whereas it is impossible to deal with Jain philosophy in a vacuum and to fully comprehend its significance without recourse to corresponding developments in Buddhism and Hinduism, the reverse is no less true. Several intricate philosophical problems remain obscure without an adequate understanding of Jain philosophy, e.g., the innumerable references to *anekāntavāda*, the famous doctrine of manifoldness, which is a small, albeit basic, part of Jain thought. One is led to ignore the fact that Jain philosophy has made other contributions apart from the *syād*- and *naya-vāda* aspects of *anekāntavāda*, e.g., insightful deliberations concerning *dravya*, *guṇa* and *paryāya* (substance, quality and mode). This volume on Jainism will make it evident that throughout its history Jain thinkers have kept pace with equal developments in Buddhism and Hinduism.

Ontology and Metaphysics

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Implicitly or explicitly, Jain thinkers trace back the inspiration for the source of their philosophical ideas ultimately to the essence of Mahāvīra's teachings, and the earliest source for Mahāvīra's ideas are the canonical works of the tradition, from which the thinkers drew. This is not the place to discuss the complex issue of the Jain canon. Suffice it to say that both the major groups of Jains, the Digambaras and the Śvetāmbaras, have groups of texts which they regarded as sacred because they contain Mahāvīra's basic teachings. These canonical works make laborious reading especially because of their repetitive nature (obviously based on an oral tradition); whatever is philosophically relevant in them has to be extracted out of a huge volume of material on a wide range of topics, such as the conduct of the monks and nuns and general rules for ascetics. In other words, Mahāvīra's teachings are scattered all over the canon in an unsystematic manner.

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Whereas a systematic study of the philosophical elements in the works of the Jain canon is undoubtedly a fruitful undertaking, such a study will be a restricted endeavor insofar as one will be hard-pressed to link it to later philosophical activity. A case in point is *anekāntavāda*. This famous doctrine of manifoldness, often erroneously taken as a synonym for Jain philosophy as a whole, is based on Mahāvīra's method of seeing the truths concerning all objects of inquiry from particular standpoints or perspectives. Later thinkers developed this basic idea into an elaborated systematic theory in such a way that the link to the canonical works either becomes lost or is blurred. The case is similar to taking the works of Bādarāyaṇa for Vedānta or Jaimini for Mīmāṃsā as a source, instead of directly dealing with the Vedic texts for the development of the philosophy in the respective traditions. The question then is: are there comparable works in the Jaina tradition?

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The first attempt to present Jain philosophy in the form of the classical Sanskrit *sūtras* of the other schools of Indian philosophy was done by Umāsvāti (also called Umāsvāmi) in his so-called pro-canonical work *Tattvārthasūtra* (also called *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra*). Indeed, there have been early successful attempts to deal with Jain philosophy in a similar manner in the Prakrit language as well, for example, by Kundakunda and Siddhasena Divākara. There is no conclusive dating of these pioneer thinkers in the Jain tradition, the last of whom belonged to the fifth or sixth century CE. Summaries of their works are dealt with below in this volume; hence it is not necessary here to deal with Jain ontology and metaphysics in detail in this Introduction. Rather, an attempt is being made here, with reference to Umāsvāti and Kundakunda, to deal with a basic problem related to these aspects of philosophy, namely, with the terms *tattva* and *padārtha* which are used for both the basic ontological and the metaphysical categories. The first question is whether there are seven (Umāsvāti) or nine (Kundakunda) such categories.¹

Seven or Nine Basic Categories?

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In the enumeration of the seven (sapta-) tattva and the nine (nava-) padārtha in Jainism it is clear that tattva and padārtha are both used to refer to the fundamental categories which constitute Jain ontology and metaphysics. These terms feature prominently in Indian philosophical texts from very early times. The word tattva is derived from the neuter pronominal tat with the suffix -tva, which may be added to any noun base. The neuter abstract substantive tattva thus formed bears the dictionary meanings of "true or real state, truth, reality, a true principle", including "that-ness and such-ness".2 The term padārtha literally means "the meaning (artha) of a word (pada)," or "that which corresponds to the meaning of a word", and, therefore, "a thing or material object". It is from these meanings that the term is also used to denote a category and hence one can speak of a contextual relation between tattva and padārtha.

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Reality is stated to be constituted of seven categories by Umāsvāti in Tattvārthasūtra I.4 (this is the version that is mostly quoted in works on Jainism): jīvājīvāsrava-bandha-saṃvara-nirjarā-mokṣās tattvam. In his Pañcāstikāya 108 Kundakunda enumerates the following nine padārthas (the passage is in Prakrit; we give here Amṛtacandra's Sanskrit translation): jīvājīvau bhāvau puṇyaṃ pāpaṃ cāsravas tayoḥ saṃvara-nirjara-bandhā mokṣaś ca bhavabhāvanti te arthāḥ. The word arthāḥ is to be understood as padārthāḥ, as is clear from Amṛtacandra's commentary when he says, after repeating each term in his commentary, that these are the names of the nine padārthas (...iti navapadārthānāṃ nāmāni). This sequence of the terms is repeated in Kundakunda's Samayasāra 13, and the subsequent chapters there dealing with each category corresponds exactly to this sequence.3

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Apart from the two additional categories supplied by Kundakunda, his sequence is different from that of Umāsvāti's, with the category bandha appearing before the last and puṇya and pāpa inserted after the two ontological categories of jīva and ajīva. In his commentary to the Tattvārthasūtras, the Sarvārthasiddhi, Pūjyapāda is aware of the difference between the seven and nine categories. It is useful to see what he says in the relevant section of his commentary on Tattvārthasūtra I.4.⁴

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"...All fruits are experienced by the soul. So the soul (jīva) is mentioned first in the sūtra. The non-soul (ajīva) is mentioned next as it is of use to the soul. Influx (āsrava) is included next as it concerns both the soul and the non-soul. Bondage (bandha) is added next, as it follows influx. As there is no bondage for one who practises stoppage, stoppage (saṃvara) is mentioned after bondage in order to indicate that it is the opposite. Dissociation proceeds after stoppage, and hence it (nirjarā) is mentioned after stoppage. As liberation is attained at the end, it (mokṣa) is mentioned last."

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"Here merit (puṇya) and demerit (pāpa) must be included, as others have spoken of nine categories. No, it is not necessary to include these, as these are implied in influx and bondage. If it were so, the mention of influx, etc. is unnecessary, as these are included in soul and non-soul. No, it is not unnecessary. Here liberation is the main theme of the work. So it must be mentioned. And that (liberation) is preceded by the cycle of births and deaths. Influx and bondage are the main causes of transmigration. Stoppage and gradual dissociation are the chief causes of liberation. Hence these are mentioned severally in order to indicate the chief causes and effects. It is well-known that the particulars implied in the general are mentioned separately according to needs. For instance, 'Kṣatriyas have come, Suvarṇa (a kṣatriya) also (has come)'."

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If Umāsvāti's and Kundakunda's dates could be determined precisely it would shed a great deal of light as far as the development of the ideas here are concerned. Under the circumstances one can only note the two different traditions. However, one more point may be discussed in the context here. Pūjyapāda, who was quoted above, belonged to the Digambara tradition of Jainism, as did Kundakunda as well (Umāsvāti is regarded by both Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras as being one of their own). It is obvious that Pūjyapāda knew Kundakunda's works and, as is clear from the quotation above, he was aware of the tradition of the nine categories of reality. True, he was commenting on the *Tattvārthasūtra* and he had to use the text as handed down by the tradition. What is puzzling, however, is that he did not defend his tradition when he had the opportunity to justify Kundakunda's enumeration in his commentary. Why does he not go into further details regarding the sequence of the categories? Rather, he sees the inclusion of *puṇya* and *pāpa* in the list as "unnecessary". Indeed, such speculation does not change the matter, but any detailed occupation with the texts automatically raises these issues.

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To conclude this section, it may be said that Umāsvāti's enumeration seems more "logical" if one takes into account the role of karma as soon as the *jīva*, the soul, becomes associated with *ajīva*. The association is responsible for an inflow of matter which then, in the form of karma, binds the soul. The inflow of karma can be stopped and, further, all karmas can be completely obliterated gradually, which means that the soul attains liberation. However, without explicitly mentioning *puṇya* and *pāpa* in the *sūtra* itself Umāsvāti leaves little room for the ethical role of these categories in the context of the ascetic discipline. To explicitly mention them, as Kundakunda does, would highlight their role for the aim of liberation, a role that is in any case accepted *a priori*.

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Perhaps the reason why Umāsvāti does not mention *puṇya* and *pāpa* in the *sūtra* itself is because karma is not explicitly mentioned, it being implicit in *āsrava*, the inflow of karma. But then these would be implicit in Kundakunda's work as well, which also does not mention karma explicitly, but includes *puṇya* and *pāpa* in the list of the basic categories. So the question, which we can hardly answer but nonetheless pose, would be why he does so. As for Kundakunda's sequence in which bandha appears at the end before mokṣa, it may be said that this is deliberate in order to highlight the soul's liberation from the bondage of karma. In other words, mokṣa, the goal, comes after the bandha that exists before it.

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The Jain contribution to philosophy in general, and to epistemology in particular, is often underestimated, if not completely ignored. Jain thinkers also drew from a common pool of ideas (like the assumption of suffering as a characteristic feature of human existence, knowledge of reality as crucial for liberation and the possibility of liberation), and they couched these ideas in accordance with their own ontology, metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. In each of these branches of philosophy the Jains have made significant contributions to the history and development of Indian philosophy as a whole. Here an attempt is made to show that Jain epistemology not only has its own history and differences that go with it in certain respects depending on the thinker concerned, but also to demonstrate that the Jains did not lag behind in keeping up with the mainstream concerns in Indian philosophy.⁵

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The presentation of basic Jain epistemology here is based on selected aspects of the problem in the original words of a selected number of thinkers: Kundakunda, quoting from his Pravacanasāra, Umāsvāti's Tattvārthasūtra, and Māṇikyanandin's Parīkṣāmukha. They are chosen for their systematic clarity and because they are early thinkers who are generally regarded as authoritative by the Jain tradition. Other thinkers like Siddhasena Divākara (fifth century), Akalaṅka (eighth century) and Vidyānandin (ninth century) have also made significant contributions but their views will be referred to only in passing--to enter into a critique of the interesting details of difference and to make comparisons would go far beyond the scope of what can be done here.

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A few words regarding the beginnings of Indian epistemology on the whole may not be out of place in order to show that the Jain tradition was not isolated in the Indian tradition and that its views did not evolve in a vacuum.

On the beginnings of Indian epistemology

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The desire for knowledge which basically reflects a philosophical inclination is traceable in the Ṛgveda in a general way in what sounds like inquisitive questions, for example, about the origin of existence and about what can be known. Indeed, they reflect the beginnings of constant questioning and the desire to know the answers, an attitude which makes the ground fertile and prepares the field for further philosophical thought and activity. Suffice it for the point made here to refer to the famous hymn of Ṛgveda X, 129. Even though doubts have been raised about the authenticity of certain philosophical ideas in this work, the interpolations are certainly "very early" and depict an intrinsically philosophical attitude even in the earliest records of Indian thought.

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By the time of the composition of the Upaniṣads the questions became more direct and systematic in the sense that, for instance, they show a specific desire for an understanding of the nature of the self (ātman). Moreover, especially in the Upaniṣads after the sixth century BCE and in the sūtra literature from the period shortly before the beginning of our common era, the direct or indirect mention of different views becomes usual. Particularly in the commentaries on the sūtra-works the explicit mention of Buddhist and Jaina views becomes standard, signifying an interesting and lively debate among the different schools of thought. The history of Indian philosophy goes hand in hand with the emergence and history of such a debate among all the representatives of different schools of thought and, with it, the necessity of dealing with epistemological categories. The contribution of Jainism here is perhaps also uniquely based on the Jains' attitude of collecting and copying all kinds of literature for the sake of knowing the other views.⁶

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The emergence of philosophical debate in India, not only in the commentarial literature to the basic works of each school, but also in the form of organized public contests, contributed greatly to a sharpening of the philosophical tools and to setting down rules of debate which had to be strictly adhered to in the courts, where the debates mostly took place. That epistemology has been a favorite topic from very early times is evident from a work on Indian medicine (perhaps in the first century of our era, but the ideas were surely in vogue even earlier) compiled by Caraka in his *Carakasaṃhitā*. The author (in *Carakasaṃhitā* 3, 8) advises medical practitioners to debate with others because discussion increases the zeal for knowledge, clarifies knowledge, increases the power of speech, makes one famous, removes doubt and establishes the truths already learned. Moreover, one can learn new things in a discussion, especially when, carried away with the zeal of the discussion, the other person discloses information which would otherwise be kept secret. In this very early period in the history of Indian debate it was also recognized that a discussion, which forms the basis of a debate, can be of different kinds, and Caraka distinguishes two kinds, one that is "friendly" and one that is "hostile".⁷ In view of their extreme emphasis on nonviolence the Jains were probably exemplary debaters well-acquainted with their subject matter.

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Caraka's list contains forty-four items which the physician should have a command over before accepting an invitation to enter into a debate. A cursory glance at a few terms out of this list would suffice for the point made here about the imporance of epistemological terms:⁸ (1) dispute (*vāda*), (2) substance (*dravya*), (3) quality (*guṇa*), (4) movement (*karman*), (5) generality (*sāmānya*), (6) particularity (*viśeṣa*), (7) inherence (*samavāya*), (8) thesis (pratijñā), (9) statement of the proof for the thesis put forward (sthāpanā), (10) the opposite statement of the opponent (pratiṣṭhāpanā), (11) reason (hetu), (12) application (upanaya), (13) conclusion (nigamana), (14) rejoinder (uttara), (15) example (dṛṣṭānta), (16) tenet (siddhānta), (17) communication (śabda), (18) perception (pratyakṣa), (19) inference (anumāna), (20) tradition (aitihya), (21) comparison (aupamya), (22) doubt (saṃśaya), (23) the purpose one follows (prayojana), (24) going astray (savyabhicāra), (25) inquiry or desire to know (jijñāsā), (26) ascertainment (vyavasāya), (28) the origin as a means to infer the beginning (sambhava), (29) the questionable (anuyojya), (30) the unquestionable (ananuyojya), (31) the question (anuyoga), (32) the counter-question (pratyanuyoga), (33) defect of speech (vākyadoṣa), (34) excellence of speech (vākyapraśaṃsā), (35) quibble (chala), (36) fallacy (ahetu), (37) lapse of the right time (atītakāla), (38) objection (upālambha), (39) rejection of the objection (parihāra), (40) abandonment of the thesis (pratijñāhāni), (41) admission of the opposite thesis (abhyanujñā), (42) incorrect reason (hetvantara), (43) missing the point (arthāntara), and (44) reasons for defeat (nigrahasthāna).

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The list becomes more compact later and especially when the Nyāya school, whose favorite topic was epistemology, includes them as a starting point for all the themes it deals with in its basic work. Sixteen terms are listed at the beginning of the Nyāyasūtra which are interesting to note here in order to show their relation with the emergence of philosophical debate in India, and for their special emphasis on epistemological issues: (1) the instruments of true cognition (pramāṇa), (2) the objects of true cognition (prameya), (3) doubt (saṃśaya), (4) purpose (prayojana), (5) example (dṛṣṭānta), (6) tenet (siddhānta), (7) members of the argument (avayava), (8) deliberation (tarka), (9) conclusion (nirṇaya), (10) disputation (vāda), (11) debate (jalpa), (12) wrangling (vitaṇḍā), (13) fallacious reasons (hetvābhāsa), (15) false objections (jāti) and (16) reasons for defeat (nigrahasthāna).

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Each school accepted a fixed number of instruments or means of true cognition, each of which yields a particular kind of correct awareness, and for the major schools of Indian philosophy the number ranges from one to six. So, for example, the materialist accepts only perception as the most important and reliable instrument of knowledge, the Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣika school accept inference as well, the Sāmkhya school accepts verbal testimony or scriptural authority in addition to perception and inference, etc. There are certain implicit conditions on the basis of which the number of means of cognition were accepted by each school. At least four conditions need to be fulfilled: (a) the awareness which one cognitive instrument furnishes must be new and not attainable by any other means; (b) one means of cognition may aid another in making a particular awareness possible but the means of cognition in question should not be reducible to another--so, e.g., when perception aids inference, as in inferring fire by seeing the smoke in the distance, the understading gained cannot be reduced to that obtained by perception alone; (c) the cognition obtained through one particular instrument of true cognition should not be contradicted by another instrument; (d) the accepted cognitive instrument should appeal to reason and, in the case of verbal testimony or scriptural authority, for example, one's understanding of the revealed truth must appear probable and be made intelligible in terms of human experience; otherwise such a means of cognition will fail in its purpose.¹⁰

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Jain thinkers did not lag behind in their concern with epistemological issues, and the relevant literature from the beginning of our era evinces this. What their basic epistemology is, will be seen with special reference to Kundakunda, Umāsvāti and Māṇikyanandin.

Jaina epistemology

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The Jain tradition rests on one fundamental fact that is epistemologically significant, namely, that human beings are in a position to be omniscient and that this view is based on the teaching of omniscient beings who have taught their basic ideas after having become enlightened through a strict ascetic discipline. Their teachings are regarded as reliable and authoritative and every basic idea concerning ontology, epistemology and ethics is traced back to a tradition started by such authoritative beings.¹¹

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It must be noted that epistemological issues are in fact inalienably connected with the metaphysics and ontology of a particular school. What is the intrinsic nature of the things of the world which are open to human knowledge? How can one define the subject, the knower? What is the nature of cognitive instruments like sight and hearing? All these questions are basic to the concern with epistemology. It is also a well-known fact that, apart from the materialists, the Cārvākas, the teaching of each school is aimed at liberation (mokṣa or nirvāṇa) and each has its own view of the world, an account of which forms part of the discipline which leads to the goal. Jainism made its own unique contribution to this mainstream development by also occupying itself with the basic issues concerning the nature of knowledge, how knowledge is derived and in what way knowledge can be said to be reliable. For the Jains as well the concern with epistemological issues also served two main functions: it provided the basis for an intelligible discourse on matters of common, everyday experience and, secondly, even if indirectly, it demarcated this area from what constitutes knowledge of ultimate reality.

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Explaining how errors occur in human cognition was included in the epistemological theories and it is not often noticed that epistemology dealt with theories of error as well as of truth. Indeed, the success of a theory of valid cognition is commensurate with the success with which error in our cognition is also explained. In other words, granted that we can err in our cognition, a theory of cognition should also be able to explain the source of this occurrence, or at least be in a position to account for it. This point is implicit when at the very beginning of his *Parīkṣāmukha*, Māṇikyanandin says "the proper ascertainment of an object arises out of a valid cognitive instrument (*pramāṇa*), the contrary of this happens when it is erroneous" (*Parīkṣāmukha* 1).¹² In his *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* I. 1. 7 Hemacandra says that error "is a cognition which definitely takes a thing to be what it is not."

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One superficial relation between Jain ontology and Jain epistemology is that just as there are only two fundamental ontological categories, the principles of sentience and nonsentience (*jīva* and *ajīva*), there are only two basic instruments through which we can know thngs, in a direct way (*pratyakṣa*) and in an indirect way (*parokṣa*). For the Jains the principle of sentience intrinsically possesses unlimited qualities of bliss and energy and, without the detrimental influence of matter, is omniscient. The association of the soul with the insentient principles hinders its capabilities and therefore human beings possess limited knowledge. Unique to Jainism is that direct knowledge in fact takes place through the soul.¹³

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On the basis of the twofold classification of a direct and an indirect means of knowledge, an intricate theory concerning the fundamental principles or categories (*tattva*, supplied below) is built up. The first systematic presentation of it in the classical *sūtra*-style was given by Umāsvāti in his *Tattvārthasūtra* I, 6-31 and his presentation is regarded as authoritative by all Jains. Kundakunda's views expressed in the Prakrit language are also looked upon with great respect for his pioneering attempts.

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The sentient principle is responsible for the fact that cognition takes place at all and hence for the Jains knowledge takes place in the soul; when the soul is freed or isolated from the influence of matter it has *kevalajñāna* (omniscient knowledge, which beings like the Jinas have attained). In the case of the concern with epistemology in the context of human cognition it is necessary in Jainism to clearly understand the context in which the following terms are used: *jñāna*, *pramāṇa* and *naya*. Further, the theory of manifoldness (with its two fold aspects of *nayavāda* and *syādvāda*) also has to be seen in an epistemological context because it is concerned with cognizing things. The theory of manifoldness, however, applies in a different context: it is concerned with particular standpoints (*naya*), like the common, the general, or the practical standpoint from which an object may be perceived, and the seven kinds of statements or predications that may be made about an object, where it is said that depending on the perspective (*syāt*) an object can be said to exist, not to exist, etc. What the theory of manifoldness does not do is discuss the instruments of true cognition in the Jain tradition.

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The word *jñāna*, which is regularly translated as "knowledge", is used in Jainism in the context of absolute knowledge which can be had only by beings liberated from the detrimental effects of matter in the form of karma clinging to the soul. In other contexts the word *jñāna* is used to mean any cognition. We shall reserve the word "knowledge" for absolute knowledge in order to avoid confusion. Knowledge, as we shall use the term, is by definition true. A cognition (*jñāna*) that is true is termed a *pramā*; a cognition that is not true is an *apramā*.¹ An epistemological theory (*prāmānyavāda*) deals with all these three aspects--absolute knowledge, true and false cognitions. The Jains say that there are two general kinds of instruments of true cognition, three direct (one of these being absolute knowledge) and two indirect ones. The objects cognized (prameya) are the seven basic categories of Jaina metaphysics. Both cognition and knowledge take place in the soul.

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¹ (Editor's note:) It is in keeping with these points that we have chosen, in the summaries that follow, to render the term *pramāṇa*, standardly translated as "instrument of knowledge", as "instrument of true cognition" when speaking of Jain beliefs. Where the context is the views of those professing a different philosophical school we have retained the usual translation.

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It seems that Kundakunda is the first independent thinker of the post-canonical period who dealt with epistemological issues. In this context his *Pravacanasāra*: ('Essence of the Scripture') is an insightful work, regarded as one of his philosophical masterpieces. The three sections of the work clearly show the issues he deals with: cognition, the objects of cognition, and conduct. It is interesting to see how he deals with some aspects of epistemology which have become part of the tradition, so that it can also be evident how the problem was thematised differently in the later period.¹⁴ Here are selected passages from that work that appear to deal with knowledge:

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"He who has manifested pure consciousness and is free from...karmic dust, has become self-sufficient; and fully comprehends the objects of cognition." (1, 15)

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"The soul is co-extensive with knowledge; knowledge is said to be co-extensive with the object of knowledge; the object of knowledge comprises the physical and non-physical world; therefore knowledge is omnipresent." (1, 23).

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"The knower who is beyond sense-perception, necessarily knows and sees the world neither entering into nor entered into by the object of knowledge, just as the eye sees the objects of sight." (1, 29).

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"He who knows is knowledge; the self does not become a knower with knowledge (as an extraneous instrument). The very self develops knowledge, and all the objects stand (reflected) in the knowledge." (1, 35).

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"Perception of things through a foreign agency is called parokṣa, indirect or mediate; whatever is perceived by the soul alone is pratyakṣa, direct or immediate" (1, 58).

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"The object of knowledge is made up of substances, which are said to be characterised by qualities, and with

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which, moreover, are (associated) the modifications; those who are deluded by modifications, are false believers" (2, 1).¹⁵

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"That is called a substance which is endowed with qualities and accompanied by modifications and which is coupled with origination, destruction and permanence without leaving its nature" (2, 3).

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"According to some modification or the other it is stated that a substance exists, does not exist, is indescribable, is both or otherwise" (2, 23).

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This random selection of the basic aspects of the problem in Kundakunda's own words has been supplied so as to demonstrate how the treatment of the theme is different for Umāsvāti. One of the basic differences is that Umāsvāti explicitly enumerates the different instruments of true cognition that are grouped under the rubrics of the direct and the indirect.

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In *Tattvārthasūtra* 1, 6 Umāsvāti says that true cognition can be obtained through *pramāṇa* and *naya*, and goes on to say (in 1, 9-12) that it is obtained through the five kinds of *pramāṇa* and that of these the first two, the sensory and scriptural, are indirect cognitive instruments, and the rest, clairvoyance, telepathy and omniscience are direct cognitive instruments. This list is not only much more differentiated and explicit than Kundakunda's, but it also presents the characteristic Jain view since then. Sensory awareness is defined as being indirect, whereas all other schools regard it as the only direct means of cognition; what the Jains regard as direct cognitive instruments do not at all feature as such in the other schools.¹⁶

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In elaborating the Jain view Umāsvāti continues to say that synonyms for sensory awareness are remembrance, recognition, 'induction' and 'deduction', all of which are caused by the senses and the mind (*Tattvārthasūtra* 1, 13-14). Scriptural knowledge, which is based on sensory cognition, is of two, several or twelve kinds (20), depending on which scriptural texts are regarded as authoritative. The range of sensory and scriptural cognition extends to all the six substances (souls and the five insentient substances), but not in all their modes (20). Divine and infernal beings possess clairvoyance; if the karma which hinders this kind of cognition is obliterated, or if its influence is neutralised, then animals and human beings too can have it (21-22), and through it all entities that have form can be known (27). Telepathy is of two kinds, distinguished on the basis of purity and infallibility (23-24), and its range is infinitely greater than that of clairvoyance (28). The scope of omniscience, on the other hand, extends to all substances in all their modes simultaneously (29). Sensory cognition, scriptural cognition and clairvoyance are explicitly referred to as means of cognition which can also be erroneous (31).

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Māṇikyanandin begins his treatment of epistemology in his Parīkṣāmukha by saying that "pramāṇa is valid knowledge of itself and of things not proved before" (1, 1),¹⁷ going on to say that the validity of pramāṇa "rises from itself or through another (pramāṇa)" (1, 13). After referring to the basic kinds of cognition as direct and indirect in keeping with the tradition (2, 2) he says that direct cognition is awareness "which is clear" (2, 3), with clearness meaning an "illumination without any other intermediate knowledge or illumination in details" (2, 4). Direct cognition is then divided into two kinds: one that is current in everyday life and which is partially clear (2, 5), and the other which is "supreme", not dependent on any sense organ, and is devoid of any kind of obstruction (2, 11). The indirect means of cognition consists of memory, recognition, logic, inference and scriptural testimony (3, 2). These are then defined and the final three chapters of the work deal respectively with universals and particulars, the results of inference and, finally, the fallacies of inference.

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