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The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies v3: Volume 3

The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies v3

Language
English

Contents

Volume 3

Front matter

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But the Church did not merely provide books; it also provided the means of their dissemination. The monastic scriptoria, where monks labored in silence to copy the sacred texts, were the precursors of the printing press. And when the press finally arrived, it was the Church that first harnessed its power, using it to spread the word of God to the corners of the earth. The Gutenberg Bible, the first major book printed in Europe, was a testament to the Church's commitment to the written word.

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Yet, even as the Church championed the spread of knowledge, it also sought to control it. The *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*, or List of Prohibited Books, was a tool used by the Church to suppress ideas it deemed dangerous or heretical. This tension between the desire to educate and the need to control would define the Church's relationship with literature for centuries to come.

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It is a complex history, one that is marked by both enlightenment and suppression. But it is a history that cannot be ignored, for it is the history of the very foundation of Western civilization. The Church, in its role as the guardian of knowledge, has shaped the way we think, the way we write, and the way we understand the world around us.

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Advaita Vedānta up to Śaṃkara and His Pupils

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EDITED BY

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KARL H. POTTER

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PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS Princeton, New Jersey Copyright © 1981 by Princeton University Press Published by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, Guildford, Surrey All Rights Reserved

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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data will be found on the last printed page of this book

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This book was composed in India by Shantilal Jain at Shri Jainendra Press, New Delhi

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Clothbound editions of Princeton University Press books are printed on acid-free paper, and binding materials are chosen for strength and durability

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Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey Contributors:

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Edeltraud Harzer, University of Washington S. Subrahmanya Sastri, Varanasi Allen W. Thrasher, University of Washington the *Gesta Romanorum*, the *Legenda Aurea* of Jacobus de Voragine, and the *Speculum Historiale* of Vincent of Beauvais. These were the books that fed the imagination of the Middle Ages, and they were the books that the Church, in its wisdom, provided for the instruction and edification of the faithful.

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But the Church did not merely provide books; it also provided the means of their dissemination. The monastic scriptoria, where monks labored in silence to copy the sacred texts, were the precursors of the printing press. And when the press finally arrived, it was the Church that first harnessed its power, using it to spread the word of God to the corners of the earth. The Gutenberg Bible, the first major book printed in Europe, was a testament to the Church's commitment to the written word.

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Yet, even as the Church championed the spread of knowledge, it also sought to control it. The *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*, or List of Prohibited Books, was a tool used by the Church to suppress ideas it deemed dangerous or heretical. This tension between the desire to educate and the need to control would define the Church's relationship with literature for centuries to come.

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It is a complex history, one that is marked by both enlightenment and suppression. But it is a history that cannot be ignored, for it is the history of the very foundation of Western civilization. The Church, in its role as the guardian of knowledge, has shaped the way we think, the way we write, and the way we understand the world around us.

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PART ONE : INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF ADVAITA VEDĀNTA (*Karl H. Potter*)
1. Historical Résumé 3
2. Theory of Value 22
3. Philosophy of Language 46
4. Identity and Difference : The Theory of Relations 62
5. Advaita Metaphysics 74
6. Advaita Epistemology 92

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PART TWO : SUMMARIES OF WORKS
1. Gauḍapāda 103 Gauḍapādakārikās, or Āgamaśāstra (*Karl H. Potter*) 105
2. Śaṃkara 115 Brahmasūtrabhāṣya (*Karl H. Potter*) 119 Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya (*Karl H. Potter*) 180 Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣya (*Karl H. Potter*) 204 Upadeśasāhasrī (*Karl H. Potter*) 217 Chāndogyopaniṣadbhāṣya (*Karl H. Potter*) 254 Aitareyopaniṣadbhāṣya (*Karl H. Potter*) 270 Īśopaniṣadbhāṣya (*Karl H. Potter*) 278 Kaṭhopaniṣadbhāṣya (*Karl H. Potter*) 280 Kenopaniṣatpadabhāṣya (*Karl H. Potter*) 281 Muṇḍakopaniṣadbhāṣya (*Karl H. Potter*) 284 Praśnopaniṣadbhāṣya (*Karl H. Potter*) 289 Bhagavadgītābhāṣya (*Karl H. Potter*) 294 Māṇḍūkyopaniṣadbhāṣya with Gauḍapādakārikābhāṣya 308 (*Karl H. Potter*) Dakṣiṇāmūrtistotra (*Karl H. Potter*) 317 Pañcīkaraṇa (*Karl H. Potter*) 318 Aparokṣānubhūti (*Karl H. Potter*) 320

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Ātmabodha (*Karl H. Potter*) 323 Śataślokī (*Karl H. Potter*) 324 Bālabodhinī, or Ātmajñānopadeśavidhi (*Karl H. Potter*) 326 Ātmanātmaviveka (*Karl H. Potter*) 328 Tattvabodha (*Karl H. Potter*) 331 Daśaślokī (*Karl H. Potter*) 333 Vākyavṛtti (*Karl H. Potter*) 334 Vivekacūḍāmaṇi (*Karl H. Potter*) 335 Sarvavedāntasiddhāntasārasaṃgraha (*Karl H. Potter*) 339 Advaitapañcaratna, or Ātmapañcaka (*K. Raghavan Pillai*) 343 Vākyasudhā, or Dṛgṛśyaviveka 344 Upadeśapañcaka 344 Māyāpañcaka 344 Laghuvākyavṛtti 345 Commentaries on other Upaniṣads 345
3. Maṇḍana Miśra 346 Brahmasiddhi (*Allen W. Thrasher*) 347
4. Sureśvara 420 Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika (*S. Subrahmanya Sastri*) 420 Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika (*Karl H. Potter*) 521 Naiṣkarmyasiddhi (*Karl H. Potter*) 530 Dakṣiṇāmūrtivārttika, or Mānasollāsa (*Karl H. Potter*) 550 Pañcīkaraṇavārttika, or Praṇavavārttika (*Karl H. Potter*) 560
5. Padmapāda 563 Pañcapādikā (*Karl H. Potter*) 564
6. Toṭaka, or Troṭaka, 598 Śrutisārasamuddhāraṇa (*Karl H. Potter*) 598
7. Hastāmalaka 601 Hastāmalakaślokāḥ (*Edeltraud Harzer*) 601 NOTES 603

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This volume, the third in the *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, is the first of those devoted to the philosophy of Advaita Vedānta. It covers the writings of Gauḍapāda, Śaṃkarācārya, Maṇḍana Miśra and Śaṃkara’s pupils: Sureśvara, Padmapāda, Toṭaka, and Hastāmalaka (the last according to traditional authorities only).

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The remarks offered in the preface to volume two in this series relating to the general intent of the *Encyclopedia* apply to this volume and others to follow. To review briefly: this volume is intended, not as a definitive study of the works summarized, but as an invitation to further philosophical attention to them. The plan has been to make available the substance of the thought contained in these works, so that philosophers unable to read the original Sanskrit and who find difficulty in understanding and finding their way about in the translations (where such exist) can get an idea of the positions taken and arguments offered. The summaries, then, are intended primarily for philosophers and only secondarily for Indologists, and certain sections of the works have been omitted or treated sketchily because they are repetitious or deemed less interesting for philosophers, though they may be of great interest to Sanskritists. I might also add that the summaries are not likely to make interesting consecutive reading; they are provided in the spirit of a reference work. It is hoped, on the other hand, that the editor’s Introduction will provide a readable account of some of the pertinent features of Advaita Vedānta for those hitherto unacquainted with that system of thought.

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Preparation of this volume has been assisted materially by the gracious assistance provided by several agencies and individuals. The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the U.S. Department of State, represented by Ms. Evelyn Barnes, kindly provided the project a generous grant in PL-480 rupees to cover preparation of this and other volumes. This grant made possible contacts with Indian colleagues and provided honoraria for a number of the summaries here included. The grant has been administered through the American Institute of Indian Studies, which has provided generous assistance in easing administrative details connected with the gathering of summaries, in arranging editorial travel and consultation, and in providing secretarial assistance and supplies. I wish especially to thank Pradip R. Mehendiratta and Edward C. Dimock for their good offices. In 1975 I received a fellowship from the American Council of Learned Societies through the Joint Committee on South Asia of the American Council of Learned Societies and Social Science Research Council that enabled me to make use of the unparalleled collections at the India Office Library and British Museum in London, without which opportunity a number of the summaries could not have been completed and much scholarly information could not have been conveyed or alluded to through references. I wish to thank James Settle of the American Council of Learned Societies as well as the authorities and staff members at the libraries mentioned. Finally, there are several individual scholars who are probably not aware of the extent of their contribution to this volume through their helpful and provocative conversation with me over the years in connection with Advaita. I wish especially to record my appreciation and debt to Anthony J. Alston, Daniel H. H. Ingalls, T. R. V. Murti, and Allen W. Thrasher for sharing their scholarship and thought with me. I am, needless to say, responsible for all misinterpretations of the materials that have crept into what follows.

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1980 KARL H. POTTER

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INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF ADVAITA VEDĀNTA the *Gesta Romanorum*, the *Legenda Aurea* of Jacobus de Voragine, and the *Speculum Historiale* of Vincent of Beauvais. These were the books that fed the imagination of the Middle Ages, and they were the books that the Church, in its wisdom, provided for the instruction and edification of the faithful.

v3.c18.24

But the Church did not merely provide books; it also provided the means of their dissemination. The monastic scriptoria, where monks labored in silence to copy the sacred texts, were the precursors of the printing press. And when the press finally arrived, it was the Church that first harnessed its power, using it to spread the word of God to the corners of the earth. The Gutenberg Bible, the first major book printed in Europe, was a testament to the Church's commitment to the written word.

v3.c18.25

Yet, even as the Church championed the spread of knowledge, it also sought to control it. The *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*, or List of Prohibited Books, was a tool used by the Church to suppress ideas it deemed dangerous or heretical. This tension between the desire to educate and the need to control would define the Church's relationship with literature for centuries to come.

v3.c18.26

It is a complex history, one that is marked by both enlightenment and suppression. But it is a history that cannot be ignored, for it is the history of the very foundation of Western civilization. The Church, in its role as the guardian of knowledge, has shaped the way we think, the way we write, and the way we understand the world around us.

Historical Résumé

I. What is Vedānta?

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The Vedic literature represents the thought of the Aryans, Indo-European-speaking folk who perhaps entered India in the middle of the second millennium B.C. Consisting of a wide variety of materials, notably hymns and directions as to the proper performance of ritual, this literature also contains the beginnings of the philosophical and theological speculations that flowered eventually in classical Hinduism. Many of these speculations, usually reported in the form of discussions between teachers, pupils, and interlocutors, sometimes encased in mythological or didactic stories, are to be found in those portions of the Vedic corpus which reflect the later stages of philosophical development. These sections are termed ‘Upaniṣads’ (a term of doubtful etymology). The distinction between Upaniṣads and other parts of the Veda such as Āraṇyakas and Brāhmaṇas likewise seems to follow no established rules; presumably it is a matter of tradition. One must always remember that the Vedic ‘literature’ represents what primarily was, and is even today, an oral tradition.¹ Brahmin families pass from father to son that portion of the Veda which has been entrusted to them to preserve since ancient times.

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The Upaniṣads are literally “the final sections of the Veda,” which is what the term ‘Vedānta’ also means. Thus Vedānta philosophy, properly speaking, is that philosophy which takes its lead from the Upaniṣads. However, since the meanings of Upaniṣadic utterances are ambiguous, there came to be several Vedānta philosophies, corresponding to differing interpretations of the essential genius of the texts that inspired them. Despite an evident similarity in terminology, which is derived from their common allegiance to the same basic literature, these Vedānta philosophical systems vary substantially among themselves, and there is a polite but perfectly clear rivalry among them as to which system 'really' represents the teaching of the Upaniṣads. It is an issue that, in the nature of the case, may well be insoluble.

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Vedānta philosophers are a particular section of those who specialize in mīmāṃsā, or exegetics of the Vedic scriptures. Mīmāṃsā is sometimes divided into Pūrvamīmāṃsā, the school of exegetics that interprets the 'older' scriptural hymns, and Uttaramīmāṃsā, which interprets the 'later,' Upaniṣadic materials. The two exegetical systems differ in the emphasis they place on the injunctive and ritual aspects of the Vedas as opposed to those passages that apparently convey information, especially information about things beyond immediate sensory awareness. The style of the oldest Vedantic philosophical works is overwhelmingly influenced by the exegetical tradition. Great portions of these works are concerned with the niceties of language, and it is mainly in later times that philosophers make bold to compose independent treatises (prakaraṇa) in which the elements of Vedānta philosophy are set forth according to the logic of the views themselves, rather than in an order determined by that of scriptural authority.

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Much of the Vedānta literature is composed following the tradition of sūtra and commentary that reflects the oral tradition in which it was born. Sūtras are aphoristic phrases designed to remind their memorizer of the elements of the literature so summarized. Both Pūrva and Uttaramīmāṃsā have their sūtras, one set for each being known to us now, though others may have existed at an earlier time. The (Pūrva)mīmāṃsāsūtras of Jaimini form the basis of the older variety of Vedic exegesis, as well as provide a taking-off point for commentators such as Śabara, Kumārila, and Prabhākara, who pioneered systematic Mīmāṃsā philosophical systems through their commentaries. It is difficult to date the Mīmāṃsāsūtras—the tradition they represent must go back at least to the time of the writing of the Upaniṣads themselves, that is, to before 600 B.C., but the sūtras as we now have them need not be credited with such antiquity: it seems unlikely that they are earlier than 200 B.C. The set of sūtras ascribed to Bādarāyaṇa, variously called Vedāntasūtras, Brahmasūtras, or Śārīrakamīmāṃsāsūtras, provides the corresponding vehicle for the 'later' (Uttara) exegetical tradition. Since the two sets of sūtras refer to each others' authors one might suspect they are of roughly the same age, although one cannot rule out the very real possibility of multiple authorship.

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Various sorts of commentaries are composed on sūtras, and then subcommentaries and further commentaries on those. Traditionally, a *bhāṣya* is an extensive explanation of the meaning of the *sūtras*, a *vṛtti* is a briefer explanation, a *vārttika* a critical treatment of a *bhāṣya*, and so on. Frequently a writer will compose verses of his own for ease of memorization on the part of his reader or pupil, then provide his own commentary on those stanzas.

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In addition to the Vedic scriptures, notably the Upaniṣads, and the *sūtras* that are intended to capture the essence of scripture, Vedānta philosophers will on occasion cite as authoritative, and occasionally even write separate commentaries on literary monuments that are not commonly accounted as part of Vedic scripture. Sometimes this tendency represents particular sectarian religious movements, as in later times led members of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta system to comment on old Tamil works of Pañcarātra persuasion. Far and away the most important instance of this phenomenon concerns the famous *Mahābhārata* poem, the *Bhagavadgītā*. Although the epics (the *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyaṇa*) are not accounted as *śruti*, that is to say, as works having unquestioned scriptural authority, they are pre-eminent among those works generally regarded as *smṛti*, ‘tradition.’ To both older and later Mīmāṃsakas *śruti*, connoting that which is ‘heard,’ is either authorless or of divine authorship; not being a human production, it cannot be mistaken, though we may be mistaken about what it means—thus the necessity of exegetics. By contrast *smṛti*, what is ‘remembered,’ comprises works of admitted human authorship, and thus there is the possibility of human error contaminating what they say, although this possibility is rendered academic by the venerability and sagacity of those who composed them. Vyāsa, the alleged author of the *Mahābhārata*, is one of the hoariest of sages, and the didactic portions of that epic, among which the *Bhagavadgītā* stands foremost, have an authority for all practical purposes equivalent to the scriptures themselves. Thus it is that many Vedantic philosophers have written commentaries on the *Bhagavadgītā*, finding in Kṛṣṇa’s teachings an appropriate foil for expressing their particular slant.

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The Upaniṣads—at least the oldest of them—the *Gītā*, and the *Brahmasūtras*, then, comprise what is considered to be the triple basis (*prasthānatrayī*) for Vedantic philosophy.

II. What is Advaita Vedānta?

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So far we have been discussing the general background that all Vedānta philosophy shares. However, the present volume deals with only one Vedānta system, and indeed with only the earliest part of its literature. This system is properly known as Advaita Vedānta, though so important has it become in the eyes not only of scholars but also of those who have been influential in molding the attitudes of enlightened Hindus toward India's past, that one will frequently find the term ‘Vedānta’ used to indicate *only* Advaita Vedānta. This tendency is a confusion to the uninitiated as well as a constant source of irritation to those who are affiliated with one of the other Vedānta systems. Still, it serves to emphasize the importance that is now attributed to Advaita among the Vedāntas, and especially that attributed to its most famous figure, Śaṃkarācārya, a thinker with whom we shall be dealing at length in this volume.

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Just as it is a mistake, though a common one, to identify all Vedānta with Advaita, so it is also a mistake, and a common one, to identify all Advaita with Śaṃkarācārya's philosophy. Through the efforts of a number of diligent scholars, we can now safely say that Śaṃkara did not found Advaita Vedānta and that there are points of interpretation on which others—also properly called Advaitins—differ from Śaṃkara. These points of distinction will become clear as we proceed. First, however, it will be well if we attempt to state as clearly as possible what is shared by and constitutive of the Advaita Vedānta philosophical position. I shall do this in rather summary form here; a fuller explanation is in the sequel.

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We may divide the Advaita philosophy, rather arbitrarily for the moment, into a theoretical and a practical basis. Some propositions that characterize the theoretical basis are:

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1. The purpose of philosophy is to point the way to liberation (*mokṣa*) from the bondage of rebirth (*saṃsāra*).

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2. Bondage is a product of our ignorance (*avidyā*); the true Self (*ātman*) is not bound, does not transmigrate, is eternally liberated.

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3. Bondage is beginningless and operates with regularity as long as ignorance is not removed.

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4. Since bondage depends on ignorance, liberation is manifested upon the removal of ignorance by acquiring its opposite, namely, knowledge (*vidyā*).

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5. The operation of ignorance consists in its creating apparent distinctions (*bheda*) where none actually exist.

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6. Therefore, knowledge involves the awareness that all distinctions are false, especially the distinction between the knower and the known.

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7. This awareness, which constitutes liberating knowledge, which is free from subject-object distinctions, is pure, immediate consciousness (*cit, anubhava*).

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8. The true Self is itself just that pure consciousness, without which nothing can be known in any way.

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9. And that same true Self, pure consciousness, is not different from the ultimate world Principle, Brahman, because if Brahman were conceived as the object of Self-awareness it would involve subject-object distinction and, as said above, this is a product of ignorance.

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10. The real is that which is not set aside as false, not sublated (*bādha*), in contrast to products of ignorance, which are eventually sublated.

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11. Assuming the above criterion of reality, it follows that Brahman (= the true Self, pure consciousness) is the only Reality (*sat*), since It is untinged by difference, the mark of ignorance, and since It is the one thing that is not sublatable, for sublation itself depends on there being consciousness.

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12. Pure consciousness is experienced during deep sleep; since we awake refreshed, it is inferred that pure consciousness (reality, Brahman, the true Self) is also the ultimate bliss.

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This is by no means an exhaustive list of Advaita tenets, but it will serve for the moment to indicate the tenor of the theory. Now for some ‘practical’ propositions.

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13. Since all distinctions are the product of ignorance, any positive account of a path to liberation, involving distinctions, must be ultimately false.

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14. However, some false views are less misleading than others. By criticizing worse views one arrives by stages at better ones.

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15. For example, the view that effects are different from their causes (*asatkāryavāda*) is worse than the view that the effect is essentially identical with its cause (*satkāryavāda*); within the latter, the view that the cause transforms itself into its effect (*pariṇāmavāda*) is worse than the view that it manifests its appearance as effect without itself changing in so doing (*vivartavāda*); still, all views that take causation seriously are inferior to nonorigination (*ajātivāda*), since causal relations, as any relations, involve differences and are thus tinged with ignorance.

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16. Or, for example, the view that one needs a distinct judgment to verify or justify true knowledge (*parataḥprāmāṇyavāda*) is worse than the view that true knowledge justifies itself (*svataḥprāmāṇya*); however, both these views are ultimately inferior to the view that truth is not to be found in judgments, that therefore one cannot attain ultimate understanding or truth through the *pramāṇas* or ‘instruments of knowledge.’

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17. Or, again, atheism and agnosticism are worse views than theism; within theism, again, monotheism is preferable to polytheism; but ultimately preferable to all theisms is monism.

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18. Or, again, the skeptical or materialist view (Cārvāka or Lokāyata) is inferior to those views which accept the authority of scripture; among the latter, those views (Buddhism, Jainism, etc.) which accept as authority scriptures other than the Vedas are inferior to those views which accept the Vedas as authoritative; among the latter, the view that holds that only the injunctive sections (karma-kāṇḍa) of scripture are authoritative (or that scripture is exhausted in injunctions) is inferior to that which holds that both the injunctive and declarative (jñānakāṇḍa) sections are authoritative; within this last, those who think that both sections speak of liberation—that both actions enjoined and knowledge conveyed in scripture are directly relevant to gaining liberation—hold an inferior view compared to those who believe that the two sections speak to different ends—injunctions leading one to heaven, declarations to liberation, Ultimately, however, scripture can provide no positive key to liberation, because the key lies in removing ignorance, a negative step; so the highest view of all is that of apavāda, that reality is "not this, not this" (neti neti).

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The 'dialectical' aspects of these last four examples of stages along the way toward understanding explain why so many apparent contradictions—paradoxes, if you will—are apparently condoned and indeed frequently celebrated in Advaita. No contradictions are ultimately acceptable to Advaita, to be sure, because contradictions are clearly in the scope of ignorance, if only because they involve language and so distinctions. But it doesn't follow that any contradiction is as good as any other: some are instructive paradoxes, puzzles, which inspire questions from pupils that sympathetic gurus can turn to advantage in bringing their pupils to a higher stage of understanding. Frequently Advaita texts read as verbatim reports of teacher-pupil interviews.

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The feature illustrated in the last four examples likewise suggests the kind of richness that makes Advaita so impressive when contrasted with philosophies such as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, which believe that the ultimate truth can and should be literally expressed in language. It must also produce feelings of irritation among nonbelieving Advaita scholars, for apophasis coupled with dialectic renders it difficult at all times to know with what degree of seriousness one should construe what is being said at any moment.

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Of particular relevance for our present purposes, the 'dialectical' features of Advaita also make it especially difficult to distinguish an Advaita Vedantin from other Vedantins, especially in cases where we only have fragmentary passages or references to go on in determining his views. A good deal of scholarship—to be reviewed below and in the historical introductions to the philosophers whose views are summarized in the body of this volume—has been expended in attempts to establish how Advaita developed prior to the time of Śaṃkara. But which were the Advaitins? Who are the philosophers that this volume should treat?

III. Who Were These Philosophers?

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As we have seen, Vedānta in general can be safely stated to have arisen in the Upaniṣads. It was later epitomized in the Vedānta-sūtras. Commentators on these writings interpreted them in different ways and with different emphases: one finds old commentators referred to frequently in Śaṃkara, Rāmānuja, and the other great Vedantins, as well as in their commentators in turn. Unfortunately, the dictates of style and manner entailed that these references do not necessarily identify by name the old teacher-commentator whose opinion is being quoted or reported; frequently it was left to a much later writer, removed from the time of the old commentator by more than a millennium in many instances, to tell us that Śaṃkara meant so-and-so by "they say" in a given passage. As a result, one views these identifications with a mixture of gratitude and skepticism.

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Our business is with Advaita Vedantins, however. Did an Advaita tradition exist in the first half of the first millennium A.D.? Śaṃkara certainly thinks so: he refers to his 'tradition' (*sampradāya*) and quotes certain old writers with the reverence appropriate to the elders of a tradition one accepts. He even goes so far as to say that even a man wise in all the sciences is still like a fool if he has no tradition.⁸ Despite this, scholars of pre-Śaṃkara Vedānta have had little success in identifying beyond question more than one or two names of writers who may have been associated with an Advaita tradition.

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One could, of course, argue that the great teachers whose instruction is reported in the Upaniṣads, men such as Yājñavalkya and Uddālaka Aruṇi, were Advaita Vedantins, since they propounded views and arguments that are interpreted by Advaita as expressing the philosophy outlined above. This would be tendentious in the extreme, however, since important representatives of other Vedānta systems—notably Viśiṣṭādvaitins and Dvaitins—also claim the authority of those very teachers. Thus the truth of such a claim seems to rest on the acceptance of the truth of Advaita in contrast to other Vedāntas, not on historical arguments of a nondoctrinal sort.

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The same consideration weighs against our uncritically counting Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the *Brahmasūtras*, as an Advaitin, although it doesn’t stop Advaitins from doing so. In any case, we know nothing of Bādarāyaṇa, not even his date or place of origin, and a summary of his Advaita leanings, if they existed, will arise naturally from the commentaries of his Advaita interpreters, which *are* summarized below.

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Bādarāyaṇa mentions on occasion views of others by name. In one passage³ he contrasts the views of three old teachers—Āśmarathya, Auḍulomi, and Kāśakṛtsna, in that order—on the question of the relation between the individual self and the true Self. Śaṃkara interprets Kāśakṛtsna’s position indicated in the *sūtra* in question as representing the monistic Advaita position, and one might therefore wish to count Kāśakṛtsna—whoever he may have been—as an old Advaitin. Unfortunately, once again other Vedantins claim him too: Rāmānuja does so by interpreting the *sūtra* in a way consistent with Viśiṣṭādvaita. Since the *sūtra* in question consists of precisely one word⁴ it is not hard to construct divergent readings.

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The date of the *Brahmasūtras* is not closely identified—the best scholarly guesses put it a century or two before or after Christ.⁵ It seems safe to say, for reasons of the sort mentioned, that we have no firm evidence at this time of an Advaita tradition prior to the time of the *Brahmasūtras*, though there were doubtless Vedantins of some sort, and the *sūtras* do on occasion suggest that older teachers had offered differing interpretations of the Upaniṣads, quite possibly in the form of systematic treatises. Once past the time of the *sūtras*, however, we hear of a few names that may perhaps be linked with Advaita.

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The dislike Indians had for identifying people by name is a constant headache in this connection. Instead of naming previous commentators, or even their traditional affiliations, it is characteristic of Indian philosophers to introduce an opponent’s view by a laconic “some say.” Indeed, we are lucky to get even that; the bane of the efforts of the translator of Sanskrit philosophical texts is making sure when one is dealing with an opponent’s view, since so frequently no signal whatsoever is given. Slightly better chances for identification are afforded in passages where an author is making passing reference to someone’s position. Unfortunately, even here the given name is either not known or not deemed sufficiently respectful; the person in question may well be identified by the work he wrote. Even this wouldn’t be so problematic if we had the whole name, but as the work is likely to be a commentary and the author is addressing a knowledgeable audience, the identification may well be only to the *type* of commentary the person is reputed to have written. For example, Śaṃkara is frequently referred to by his disciples as the *Bhāṣyakāra*, since he wrote a *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*.

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The relevance of all this to our present context is that, in many Vedānta works by Śaṃkara and his pupils, in those of some Mīmāṃsakas, of Rāmānuja and his followers, and of Bhāskara and others, there are constant references to one or more persons called ‘Vṛttikāra.’ A Vṛttikāra is someone who wrote a brief commentary (*vṛtti*), but the simple allusion to that fact fails to distinguish those who commented thus on one work from those who commented thus on another. Presumably there were *vṛttis* on many of the Upaniṣads, on the *Bhagavadgītā*, and on the *Brahmasūtras*, all of which are now lost; there were also *vṛttis* on other works—for example, on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*—which in a given context may be the work alluded to.

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Śaṃkara speaks frequently of Vṛttikāras. He speaks, more specifically, of a *Śārīrakamīmāṃsāvṛtti*, that is, a commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*, whose author he names as Upavarṣa.⁶ His reference there implies that Upavarṣa also wrote a commentary on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*, and this is confirmed by Śabara, author of the major existent commentary on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*, who summarizes some of Upavarṣa’s views.⁷ It is also indirectly confirmed by the fact that Bhāskara also quotes Upavarṣa in the same connection as does Śaṃkara, although under different sūtras.⁸ Later commentators such as Padmapāda, Govindānanda, Ānandagiri, and even the Naiyāyika Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, have also cited certain views they attribute to Upavarṣa.⁹ It seems from all this that there must have been an Upavarṣa who wrote commentaries on the *Mīmāṃsā* and *Brahmasūtras* (or perhaps, some scholars¹⁰ have suggested, a single commentary on both), and furthermore that Śaṃkara, who refers to Upavarṣa as ‘Bhagavān,’ counted Upavarṣa as a member of the tradition he follows.

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Upavarṣa’s date has been hazarded as between 100 B.C. and A.D. 200, since Śabara’s date is around A.D. 200.¹¹ Viśiṣṭādvaita writers, notably Rāmānuja himself, speak of a Vṛttikāra named Bodhāyana,¹² and Vedānta Deśika, the great Viśiṣṭādvaita scholiast, identifies Bodhāyana with Upavarṣa.¹³ For various reasons that identification seems suspect, and it is more likely that Bodhāyana wrote a different *vṛtti*, and quite possible that Śaṃkara is criticizing that in places.¹⁴ Padmapāda, for instance, speaks of ‘another *vṛtti*’ (*vṛttyantara*) with which Advaita differs.¹⁵ There is no reason to identify either Upavarṣa or Bodhāyana with the Vṛttikāra who is cited in Śaṃkara’s commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā*, although Ānandagiri, many centuries later, seems assured that not only are the *vṛttis* on *Brahmasūtras* and *Bhagavadgītā* by the same hand, but that the same author also wrote *vṛttis* on several *Upaniṣads*.¹⁶

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Śaṃkara, in commenting on some of the oldest *Upaniṣads*, makes three references to old teachers who apparently addressed themselves to the interpretation of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. Ānandagiri identifies these as referring to Draviḍācārya, who, according to Sarvajñātman (a pupil of Sureśvara’s), wrote a *bhāṣya* on some *Chāndogya* "sentences" (*vākya*) ascribed by him to Brahmanandin.¹⁷ On these rather flimsy bases one may take Brahmanandin and Draviḍācārya as two more early Advaitins, since Śaṃkara once again seems highly respectful toward the author of the views he makes reference to. Not all modern scholars have been willing to accept these two as Advaitins. There are authorities and arguments, though by no means conclusive ones, for identifying Brahmanandin with Ṭaṅka, an old teacher mentioned by Yāmunācārya as an opponent but by Rāmānuja as a forerunner in his own tradition.¹⁸ Again, the dates of these two commentators on the *Chāndogya* are almost entirely uncertain.

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A final name to be mentioned here is that of Sundara Pāṇḍya, who seems to have written a *vārttika* on Upavarṣa’s *vṛtti*.¹⁹ Scholars have identified some passages in Advaita and Mīmāṃsā works that are identified by later Advaitins as referring to Sundara Pāṇḍya,²⁰ but little or nothing is known of his identity or date.

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Other old Vedantins, such as Bhartṛprapañca, Brahmadatta, and Bhartṛmitra, appear not to have been Advaitins, although Brahmadatta may have had strong leanings in that direction despite his espousing theses at odds with those we listed above.²¹

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So far we have been dealing with figures who, except for Bādarāyaṇa, wrote works now apparently lost. The first complete Advaita philosophical work is all, or at least a large part, of some stanzas (*kārikās*) that Advaita tradition construes as constituting a kind of commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. The same tradition identifies the author of these stanzas as Gauḍapāda. Śaṃkara speaks of Gauḍapāda as his *paramaguru* and teacher’s teacher.²² The stanzas are called by several names: *Māṇḍukyakārikās*, *Gauḍapādiyakārikās*, or *Āgamaśāstra*.

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Modern scholarship has blossomed forth in vast controversy over a variety of matters relating to Gauḍapāda. The details must be gathered from the literature itself;²³ here we merely mention the problem areas as they affect our general understanding of Advaita development.

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First, there is the question of the date of the *Māṇḍukyakārikās*. If Śaṃkara’s identification is to be accepted one would naturally place the *Kārikās* no more than fifty to one hundred years prior to Śaṃkara’s date, which many scholars feel should be fixed at A.D. 788-820. On this understanding the *Kārikās* can date from no earlier than the end of the seventh century. On the other hand, a Buddhist philosopher, Bhāvaviveka, appears to allude to several of the *Kārikās* and quotes one verbatim, and Bhāvaviveka’s date is clearly fixed as prior to 630, since one of his works was translated into Chinese around that year. Thus the *Kārikās* must date not later than the early seventh century. But if we place the *Kārikās* in the sixth-seventh century we must either reinterpret Śaṃkara’s remark about his teacher’s teacher, or else recompute Śaṃkara’s date.

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Second, there is the name ‘Gauḍapāda.’ ‘Gauḍa’ is an old term referring to the northeast portion of the subcontinent, roughly North Bengal. It has been suggested that the *Kārikās* really constitute more than one work, but that the collection came to be known as *Gauḍapādakārikās* because the several authors came from that region, or perhaps because the tradition they pioneered flourished in that region. Predictably, this view has not found favor among proponents of the Advaita tradition, who believe the entire set of stanzas constitutes a single Advaita treatise. Nevertheless, given the pronounced Buddhistic flavor of the fourth book of stanzas, which contrasts in terminology with the rest, the possibility that we are dealing with more than one work and/or author cannot be ruled out.

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Third, there is the matter of the alleged Buddhistic leanings of the *Kārikās*. Even the most ardent Advaitin can hardly deny that the terminology used, especially in the last book, is redolent of Buddhism. That fact alone does not bother those who are willing to admit Advaita’s affinities with certain Buddhist systems (Vijñānavāda, Mādhyamika) and who thus have no objection to allowing a general ‘influence’ on Advaita by Buddhism. Not all Advaitins are so tolerant, however, especially when their opponents have raised what Advaitins consider to be the malicious charge that Śaṃkara was a ‘crypto-Buddhist,’ citing Gauḍapāda as evidence. There is little reason to doubt that Śaṃkara viewed Buddhism as one of the worst of heresies and criticized it as roundly as any opposing philosophy of which he was aware. This issue, more than any of the others discussed in the scholarly literature, has raised as much heat as light.

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Fourth, there is the very interesting question of the relation between the stanzas and the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* itself. The accepted Advaita tradition is that the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* consists of a dozen sentences explaining the syllable *aum/om* as having four parts (waking, dream, deep sleep and the ‘fourth’) and as being symbolically identical with Brahman, the Self. The first twenty-nine *kārikās*, constituting the first book of Gauḍapāda’s treatise, provide explicit commentary on these twelve sentences: the relationship between sentences and stanzas is indicated in the commentary attributed to Śaṃkara. The remainder of the Kārikās—the last three books—are not specifically comments on the Upaniṣad, although it is contended that they are relevant to its subject matter in a general way. This is not the only relationship that has been suggested, however. The great Dvaita Vedāntin Madhva and his followers consider the twenty-nine kārikās of the first book, though not the remaining kārikās, to be scripture (śruti), although they think the Upaniṣad and the stanzas were separate treatises. Rāmānuja also thought those kārikās were scripture. It has even been suggested by one modern scholar that the first book of kārikās antedated the Upaniṣad itself, so that the Upaniṣad was based on the stanzas rather than the reverse.

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There are other issues surrounding Gauḍapāda and the Kārikās. However, no one really doubts that there are one or more works preserved in what we call the Gauḍapādiyakārikās and that at least one of these works (say, the second and third books) teach Advaita Vedānta in clearcut terms. And since Śaṃkara and Maṇḍana Miśra both know these stanzas they must have been written prior to the time of those philosophers. Thus, despite the many interesting questions raised by scholarship it still seems safe to say that the kārikās of at least the second and third books constitute the earliest extended Advaita treatise that has been preserved for us.

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Gauḍapāda is according to tradition supposed to have taught Govindabhagavatpāda, Śaṃkara’s teacher. Tradition also makes Govinda a Kashmiri who, while traveling south toward Cidambaram happened on Gauḍapāda on the banks of the Narmadā River and became his pupil. It was also on the Narmadā that Śaṃkara subsequently studied with Govinda. These traditions are embellished with interesting stories but can in no way be authenticated at this time. We know nothing at all about Govinda except that he was Śaṃkara’s teacher. He apparently wrote little or nothing.

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This brings us, then, to the time of Śaṃkarācārya. As mentioned above, many scholars tend to believe that he flourished around the end of the eighth and beginning of the ninth century, but this date is not conclusive, and we favor placing him a century earlier. It is extremely difficult to differentiate traditional stories from fact in his case—no other Indian philosopher has been celebrated in so many legends, and these are reported as unquestionable by his followers. He is reputed to have lived a very short life of only thirty-two years, yet if in that time he was indeed responsible for the vast quantity of literature that is attributed to him, he must have been composing every hour of the day!

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The basic problem however, not only for arriving at Śaṃkara’s date but also for arriving at reasoned conclusions about much else about him and his philosophy, concerns the authenticity of the works attributed to him. If we could be certain which works are by Śaṃkara we could then draw up a list of references found in those works, and provided we could identify their sources or the authors they presuppose, we would then be able to provide at least an upper limit for his date.

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It is difficult if not impossible to be sure which works Śaṃkara wrote. We may start by assuming that he wrote the Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya—the Śaṃkara we are interested in is, by definition, the one who wrote this work. No one seems anxious to question the same person’s authorship of the Bhāṣyas on the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and Chāndogya Upaniṣads. Beyond these, the questions begin. We shall not try to deal with these questions at this juncture—the issues will be summarized later when the data and arguments are reviewed.

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Even in the three works mentioned, there are enough references to give us some purchase on Śaṃkara’s date. The author of these works clearly knows Kumārila and Prabhākara, the two philosophical Mīmāṃsakas. They are usually held to have flourished in the seventh century. Advaita traditional accounts of Śaṃkara’s life relate a meeting between Śaṃkara and Kumārila. It seems likely that Śaṃkara also knew Dharmakīrti’s work. These facts are enough to insure that Śaṃkara did not flourish before the seventh century but do not determine whether he lived in the seventh, eighth, or even the ninth century.

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The situation is further complicated by uncertainty about the identity of Maṇḍana Miśra, whose Brahmasiddhi constitutes an extremely important source of Advaita. Maṇḍana wrote several Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā works and is reputed to have studied with Kumārila. Tales are told about Śaṃkara’s meeting with Maṇḍana and his wife, and their eventual conversion. According to the Advaita tradition, Maṇḍana then changed his name to Sureśvara and became a pupil of Śaṃkara. Some scholars have thought it evident that both Advaitins were aware of each other’s works, which confirms their contemporaneity.

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The reader will find a review of the arguments concerning Śaṃkara’s date in the body of this volume at the outset of the section assigned to that writer. For reasons given there I incline to believe that he flourished at the beginning of the eighth century.

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Śaṃkara is said by some of his biographers to have been born in Kalāḍi, a small town in the Malabar region now included in the state of Kerala. His father died when Śaṃkara was very young, and he developed as a child prodigy, very learned and very religious. At an early age he left home, studied with Govinda, and eventually, arrived at Banaras where he attracted some followers, notably Padmapāda, Hastāmalaka, and Toṭaka. On a journey to Allahabad, he is supposed to have met Kumārila, then very old, who sent his pupil Maṇḍana to debate with Śaṃkara. Maṇḍana brought his wife along, and after Śaṃkara had defeated Maṇḍana (so goes the story) the wife took up the cause. During the course of their further discussion, the wife, Bhāratī by name, pointed out that Śaṃkara was not fully experienced in worldly ways, not having mastered kāmaśāstra or the science of passion. Śaṃkara then asked for a month’s delay in the proceedings, occupied the body of an amorous king and quickly mastered kāmaśāstra. After the month was over, he returned to the debate, defeating Bhāratī, who along with her husband became Śaṃkara’s devoted disciple. Maṇḍana, according to tradition, was renamed Sureśvara and proceeded to compose several important Advaita treatises.

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The entourage then returned to Kerala by way of Śṛṅgeri, where a maṭha was founded. When Śaṃkara’s mother died, he fulfilled his childhood promise by performing the last rites despite the fact that he was an avowed saṃnyāsin, that is, he had renounced all religious ritual acts.

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Śaṃkara then began extensive journeying that took him throughout India. At Dwarka in the west he founded another maṭha; he founded a third maṭha at Badrinath in the Himalayas and a fourth at Puri in the east. He founded the sect of the Daśanāmis, the “ten-named ones,” and installed his most important followers as the heads of the four maṭhas. Some stories have it that he met the famous Kashmir Śaiva savant Abhinavagupta, who cursed him with an ulcerous disease of which he eventually died, but not before Padmapāda had transferred it back to its donor, who also died of it. At the age of thirty-two then, having lived a remarkably full life in such a few years, Śaṃkara passed away.

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The above account draws a few stories and traditions from the indefinite number found in the many traditional biographies. It is hardly possible to discriminate fact from fiction among these at this late date. Their number attests the particular reverence felt for Śaṃkarācārya by Advaitins in particular, but also to a remarkably great degree by Indians of all walks of life, whether or not their philosophical and/or religious persuasions agree with his.

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Overshadowed as an object of traditional reverence, Maṇḍana Miśra must not be underrated as a philosopher. His alleged identity with Sureśvara has been severely questioned by scholars.²⁴ As mentioned, tradition makes him a pupil of Kumārila and an elder contemporary of Śaṃkara’s. His single Advaita work, the *Brahmasiddhi*, is an independent treatise developing the major tenets of Advaita. The sources of the thought expressed in this work have been the subject of speculation. Yet it seems to have been quite original. There is some reason to think that for several centuries following Śaṃkara’s and Maṇḍana’s lifetimes it was Maṇḍana who was viewed by other schools as the major figure in Advaita.²⁵ Vācaspati Miśra is said to have continued Maṇḍana’s brand of Advaita in a commentary, now lost, on the *Brahmasiddhi* and in his *Bhāmatī* on Śaṃkara’s *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*.

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Śaṃkara had many pupils, but only four of them are remembered by name. Padmapāda, a native of Cidambaram (?), is supposed to have been one of his first followers. Padmapāda’s *Pañcapādikā* is a commentary on Śaṃkara’s commentary on the first four *Brahmasūtras*; it is not clear whether Padmapāda’s work carried beyond that point—in any case it is all we have. Although there are one or two other works attributed to Padmapāda, his authorship of them is doubtful.

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Sureśvara is now associated especial’y with the history of the Kāma-koṭi Pīṭha at Conjeeveram (old Kāñchi), which may or may not have been one of the original *maṭhas* established by Śaṃkara but which has become since then one of the great centers of Advaita activity. Tradition, as we have seen, makes him Maṇḍana before conversion; we have no hard evidence about any other facts pertaining to his life. Śaṃkara is said to have assigned to him the writing of sub-commentaries (*vārttikas*) on two of his own *Upaniṣadbhāṣyas*, those on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the *Taittirīya*. The former is a truly vast work—Mahadevan says it is about half the length of the *Rāmāyaṇa*! Sureśvara also wrote an independent treatise of great beauty and skill, the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*. Other works attributed to him are probably spurious.

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A third disciple of Śaṃkara’s was, according to tradition, originally named Giri but was given the name of Toṭaka when he joined Śaṃkara’s group. He is supposed to have been very devoted but was apparently not a quick learner until one day after Śaṃkara, to the irritation of the other pupils, had delayed lessons so that Toṭaka might attend. He eventually arrived and amazed all by producing first a poem of eight verses, *Toṭakāṣṭaka*, and then a longer work, entitled *Śrutisārasamuddhāraṇa*, which is supposed to have been spontaneously composed in the presence of his teacher and fellow pupils.

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