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The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies v3.c18.s8: Śaṃkara (Śaṃkarācārya, Śaṃkarabhagavatpāda)

The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies v3.c18.s8

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English

Contents

Śaṃkara (Śaṃkarācārya, Śaṃkarabhagavatpāda)

v3.c18.s8.1

As noted in the introductory essay, the date of Śaṃkara is not agreed on by scholars. A great deal of traditional lore has been built up around Śaṃkara’s name; some of it may well be accurate, but much of it surely is not. To be able to defend a hypothesis on Śaṃkara’s date, one must have weightier evidence than mere tradition. Without any inscriptional evidence to rely on, internal evidence deriving from references in Śaṃkara’s writings is critical in arriving at his *terminus a quo*. But which are Śaṃkara’s writings?

v3.c18.s8.2

Tradition is at work here also. Śaṃkara is credited with a great many works, most of which are highly unlikely to be by him. The most careful work on the criteria for deciding which works are Śaṃkara’s has been done by Paul Hacker, with applications by Sengaku Mayeda.¹ In the following discussion we follow these authors wherever possible.

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Hacker and Mayeda propose the following tests, all of which are satisfied by the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* (by common consent the work of the Śaṃkara we are interested in): (1) Use of the term *avidyā* to mean superimposition (*adhyāsa*), and not as synonymous with such terms as *jaḍa*, *bhāvarūpa*, *āvaraṇa-* or *vikṣepa-śakti*, or *anirvacanīya*, which identifications Hacker and Mayeda find non-Śaṃkaran; (2) use of the term *nāmarūpa* to mean the original world stuff, like Sāṃkhya’s *prakṛti*; (3) relatively infrequent use of the term *māyā* in comparison with *avidyā*; (4) frequent occurrence of the term *īśvara* (it is found less frequently in later Advaitins, including Śaṃkara’s pupils); (5) reluctance or refusal to accept *ānanda* as a positive property of Brahman; and (6) nonoccurrence of the term *vivarta* in its “illusionistic” sense as the relation between a cause and its only apparent, unreal effect. These are among the main tests; various others are also proposed. Using these tests Mayeda has argued for Śaṃkara’s authorship of the *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, *Upadeśasāhasrī*, *Gauḍapādakārikābhāṣya*, and *Kenopaniṣadbhāṣya* (as well as the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, of course). The method is highly scientific and does not give completely unambiguous results; in particular, the *Gītābhāṣya* and *Gauḍapādakārikābhāṣya*, whose authenticity has been questioned by some scholars, show both similarities and differences with the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*.

v3.c18.s8.4

Different but rather clearer evidence is available for those *Upaniṣadbhāṣyas* on which Sureśvara comments, that is, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-* and *Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣyas*. Unless we find the ascription of the subcommentaries to Sureśvara spurious—and no one has—we have no reason to refuse to ascribe these commentaries to Śaṃkara.

v3.c18.s8.5

The same tests are appealed to by Hacker and Mayeda to support the rejection of other *prakaraṇa* works frequently ascribed to Śaṃkara, notably the *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* and *Ātmabodha*, both very popular in Advaita circles. Ingalls has also contributed additional reasons to reject the *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*.² Fuller evidence on the various ascriptions is reviewed in the material provided below.

v3.c18.s8.6

The upshot of the most careful scholarship to date on the works of Śaṃkara, therefore, is that the following may without question be accepted as the work of the author of the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*: the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya*,³ the *Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣya*, and the *Upadeśasāhasrī*.⁴ There seems no real reason to question the inclusion of the *Aitareyopaniṣadbhāṣya*, the *Chāndogyopaniṣadbhāṣya*, the *Muṇḍakopaniṣadbhāṣya* and the *Praśnopaniṣadbhāṣya* on this list. Beyond this point, however, is only speculation. Therefore, we shall limit ourselves to these works in arriving at an estimate of Śaṃkara's date.

v3.c18.s8.7

Authors whom Śaṃkara, the author of the above works, presupposes include Kumārila, Bhartṛhari and Dharmakīrti,⁵ and, of course, Gauḍapāda, to whom Śaṃkara refers deferentially.⁶ Now Bhartṛhari lived in the middle of the fifth century, Gauḍapāda (as we saw), in the sixth century, and Kumārila and Dharmakīrti, most likely in the seventh century. As a result Śaṃkara cannot precede the middle of the seventh century. No firm evidence forces us to date Śaṃkara any later than mid-seventh century, however. The arguments of Belvalkar⁷ and, more recently, Kunjunni Raja⁸ are not conclusive for a later date. Finally, very recent work by Allen Thrasher based on a study of Maṇḍana Miśra confirms the dating of Śaṃkara in the late seventh and early eighth centuries rather than the frequently cited 788–820 date of Dasgupta and others.⁹

v3.c18.s8.8

So far we have confined ourselves to scholarly data of a relatively firm sort. There is a vast traditional literature on Śaṃkara's life and times that any Śaṃkara scholar must be aware of, whatever he may decide to do with it. Thrasher, for instance, argues that much of what we know on scientific grounds agrees nicely with the traditions. Given what we know, it is possible that Śaṃkara was the pupil of Gauḍapāda’s pupil, met Kumārila, and debated with Maṇḍana Miśra. Other traditional theses, for example, that Maṇḍana was defeated and became Sureśvara, are less clear from the evidence and in all likelihood are not true, although the particular thesis of the Maṇḍana-Sureśvara identity is still being argued in the journals.¹⁰

v3.c18.s8.9

Of the traditional accounts of Śaṃkara’s life—Śaṃkaravijayas by Ānandagiri, Mādhava, Cidvilāsa, and Sadānanda¹¹—all except Ānandagiri agree that Śaṃkara was born in Kaladi, a small village in modern Kerala. Ānandagiri insists that the birthplace was Cidambaram in Tamil Nadu. There are various stories, clearly apocryphal, about the circumstances surrounding Śaṃkara’s birth. His father is identified as Śivaguru, son of Vidyādhirāja, and is said to have died shortly after the child Śaṃkara was born. A famous story concerns the taking of vows of *saṃnyāsa* by the child who, then eight years or so old, assured his despairing mother that he would return to give her the last rites even though this is not required—and possibly not even allowed—for a *saṃnyāsin*. There is also a story, regarded by some as infamous, that Śaṃkara tricked his mother into consenting to his taking the vows by pretending a crocodile was about to swallow him in a river and would not release him except to a religious life.¹²

v3.c18.s8.10

After leaving home the young Śaṃkara is said to have met his guru Govinda on the banks of the Narmadā river, but he soon continued to travel and began his teaching in Banaras. There he attracted disciples, initially Padmapāda, and with Padmapāda he went on pilgrimage to Badrinath, the headwaters of the Ganges. He remained there for four years and, according to one account, though not yet sixteen he wrote his major works. He then returned to Banaras for more teaching and converting. After several more years he was off to Prayāga (Allahabad), where he met the elderly Kumārila, who sent him on to Maṇḍana. A popular story ensues: debating with Maṇḍana with the understanding that the loser would become the winner’s pupil, he defeated that Mīmāṃsaka, but Maṇḍana’s wife Bhāratī challenged him to further debate and temporarily embarrassed Śaṃkara by pointing out to him that he was woefully inexperienced in worldly ways, specifically in first-hand knowledge of sex. Śaṃkara is supposed to have asked for a temporary leave of absence from the debate to gain the necessary experience, which he did by entering the body of a powerful king for a few months.

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Returning, he defeated Bhāratī, and both she and her husband are supposed to have become his disciples, Maṇḍana taking the name of Sureśvara.

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After returning to his birthplace to attend to his mother’s funeral Śaṃkara set out on a far-flung tour during which he established the four great monasteries of Advaita in the four corners of India—at Śṛṅgeri in the south, Dwarkā in the west, Badrināth in the north, and Puri in the east. (A powerful tradition claims a fifth pīṭha at Kāñcī, that is, Conjeeveram.13) At each of these āśramas he appointed one of his favorite disciples as pontiff.

v3.c18.s8.13

Another story tells of his meeting with the Śaiva philosopher Abhinavagupta, who cursed Śaṃkara with a nasty disease,14 but Padmapāda caused the curse to rebound to Abhinavagupta himself, who died of it.

v3.c18.s8.14

Those who take the vows of Śaṃkarācārya’s order of the Daśanāmīs, or “ten-names,” receive one of ten names—Giri, Puri, Bhāratī, Sarasvatī, Tirtha, Āśrama, Vana, Āraṇya, Pārvata, Sāgara. The order also designates four grades of realization—brahmacārin, daṇḍin, parivrājaka, and paramahaṃsa.

v3.c18.s8.15

Śaṃkara’s life is agreed by all to have been a very short one in years, though remarkable in productivity. He died at the age of thirty-two in the Himalayas according to most sources, although Ānandagiri again disagrees, locating his place of death at Kāñcī.

v3.c18.s8.16

The foregoing has been based, as has been said, on traditional accounts. At least two Western scholars of modern times have offered suggestions toward reconstructing some features of the development of Śaṃkara’s thought. Daniel Ingalls, studying the relations between Śaṃkara and Bhāskara, a rival Bhedābhedavādin commentator on the Brahmasūtras and Bhagavadgītā, suggests that Śaṃkara began his career as a Bhedābhedavādin, then was influenced by Gauḍapāda’s thought, taking certain elements of Buddhism through Gauḍapāda (the “two truths”), others from Bhartṛhari (vivarta), and still others from Sāṃkhya (superimposition).15 On Ingalls’ interpretation, Śaṃkara’s philosophical polemics are mainly directed toward Pūrvamīmāṃsā. Paul Hacker proposes an even more startling intellectual biography for Śaṃkara.16 Basing himself on the ascription to Śaṃkara of a commentary on Vyāsa’s Yogabhāṣya, which Hacker finds reason to accept, he suggests that Śaṃkara started as a follower of Pātañjala Yoga, was brought by an Advaita master to study Gauḍapāda’s “new doctrine of Oṃ and new Yoga,” and was moved to prepare a commentary on the Māṇḍukyakārikās—the Gauḍapādakārikābhāṣya—from which he moved through composition of the *Taittirīyabhāṣya* and part of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* (section II.19 at least) into his mature works such as the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*.

v3.c18.s8.17

Hacker has also studied Śaṃkara’s probable religious affiliation, which he finds to have been Vaiṣṇava,¹⁷ despite the widespread adoption by Śaivites of Advaita philosophy.

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The works summarized below are not ordered by any attempt at reconstructing the order in which they were written. Rather, they are arranged in two groups: first, the works argued above as likely to be authentic; then, and more briefly, summaries of a number of works that are probably not the work of the author of the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, but that are important in Advaita literature because they have some intrinsic interest or are widely commented on by later Advaitins and are regularly ascribed by tradition to Śaṃkara. We have not tried to summarize all such works, whose number runs into the hundreds.

Brahmasūtrabhāṣya

v3.c18.s8.t1.1

This is Śaṃkara’s major and most authoritative work. It is safe to say that it is the single most influential philosophical text in India today, a status it has enjoyed for at least a century, possibly much longer. Countless Indian adepts commit portions of this text to heart, especially the introduction to and commentary on the first four *sūtras*, known as the *Catuḥsūtrī*, in which Śaṃkara sets forth some of his most characteristic and striking views and arguments.

v3.c18.s8.t1.2

Influential as it is, neither Indian nor Western scholars agree on the accuracy of Śaṃkara’s interpretation of Bādarāyaṇa’s *Sūtras*. The *Sūtras*, as one of the fundamental works of all Vedānta systems, is interpreted in appropriately disparate ways by each of those systems. Several works in English indicate the disparity among the interpretations of a single *sūtra* by the various Vedānta authors.¹⁸ Among “impartial” scholars, mostly Westerners without suspected doctrinal affiliation, there has been continued debate over whether (in particular) Rāmānuja or Śaṃkara is the more faithful interpreter of Bādarāyaṇa’s thought, debate stemming at least in part from Thibaut’s remarks in the introduction to his standard translation of the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, in which he expresses the opinion that Śaṃkara’s philosophy is closer to that of the Upaniṣads than Bādarāyaṇa’s own, but that Rāmānuja’s reading of Bādarāyaṇa is more accurate than Śaṃkara’s.¹⁹ Numerous writers have expressed reservations about Śaṃkara as commentator, some finding him careless, confused, or even downright dishonest.²⁰ However that may be, there can be little question that the work stands at the pinnacle of Indian philosophical compositions.

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In the following summary, “E” refers to the edition by Narayana Ram Acarya, (Bombay : Nirnayasagara Press, 1948). “T” refers to George Thibaut’s translation in the Sacred Books of the East (republished, New York : Dover Press, 1962).

v3.c18.s8.t1.4

First Chapter (Adhyāya), First Section (Pāda)

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Introduction (E1-4; T3-9). It is evident that “I” and “That” are different, as are their properties. So it is erroneous (*mithyā*) to superimpose (*adhyāsa*) upon the subject (*viṣayin*), whose nature is awareness (*cit*) and whose sphere is the notion of “I,” the object (*viṣaya*), whose sphere is “That”; it is also an error to superimpose the subject on the object; furthermore, superimposition of the properties of each on the other is also erroneous. Nevertheless it is a natural propensity of men to do just that, superimposing the nature and attributes of each upon the other when they say, for example, “I am that” or “that is mine.”

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Now what is superimposition ? It is the appearance (*ābhāsa*), in the form of a memory, of something previously experienced in some other place. Other philosophers define superimposition in slightly different ways. Some say it involves the nongrasping of the distinction of two things leading to one being superimposed on the other. Others say it is the attribution to a thing of properties contrary to those belonging to that thing. In any case all agree that it involves the appearance of the properties of one thing in another. And this agrees with ordinary experience as reflected in the reports of illusions such as “the shell appears as silver” or “the single moon appears double.”

v3.c18.s8.t1.7

*Objection* : How can one superimpose an object on the interior Self (*pratyagātman*), which is not an object? One can superimpose an object only on another object that is before him, and you have just told us that the Self is entirely different from “That.”

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*Answer* : The Self isn’t nonobject in an absolute sense, for It is the object of our notion of “I” and is directly known to everyone. Furthermore, your alleged rule that one can superimpose an object only on another object that is before him has exceptions: we superimpose blue color on *ākāśa* (the sky), which is not an object of perception. So our position is not inconsistent.

v3.c18.s8.t1.9

Superimposition is *avidyā*; understanding the true nature of reality by discrimination is *vidyā*. Since it is so, faults present in an *x* that is superimposed on a *y* are not transferred to *y*. Superimposition, that is, *avidyā*, provides the necessary condition on which all distinctions of practical speaking (*vyavahāra*) are based, whether such speaking is ordinary or scriptural. Such distinctions involve means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), their objects (*prameya*), injunctions and prohibitions, and even liberation (*mokṣa*).

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How is it that means of knowledge, that is, perception, inference, etc., operate only in dependence on *avidyā*? It is because they can operate only if there is a knower (*pramātṛ*), and the existence of a knower depends on notions of "I" and "mine" with respect to the body, sense organs, and such, which notions in turn depend on the operation of the senses, the body, and the superimposition of the Self on that body, so that without all this the Self cannot become a knower. Men become attracted or repelled by sense objects just as animals do in depending on their senses; since it is evident to everyone that animals do not discriminate their Self from what is not their Self, it follows that the same applies to men. In the same way, though a man who sacrifices following scriptural injunctions realizes that the Self has a relation to other worlds, still his activity does not depend on his understanding the difference between his Self and what that Self is not; indeed, once he understands that difference he realizes the uselessness of such actions. Thus even the Vedic texts have as their purport that which is dependent on *avidyā*. Texts enjoining sacrifices presuppose that on the Self is superimposed caste status, stage of life, age, etc. Attributes reflecting notions about a man's relations with others, with his body, his senses, or with his internal organ, are superimposed on the Self, which is in actuality the witness (*sākṣin*) of all, and that witnessing Self is in turn superimposed on the internal organ, sense, and so on. This natural, beginningless, and endless superimposition, taking the form of erroneous notions, is why everyone supposes himself to be agent and enjoyer.

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It is in order to get rid of these false notions and to acquire understanding (*vidyā*) of the unity of the Self that the study of the Vedānta (texts) should be taken up.

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I.1.1 (E4-6; T9-15). The *sūtra* reads: "Then, therefore, the desire to know." "Then" in the *sūtra* does not mean that something new is being started, nor is it merely an invocation (*maṅgala*). Rather it means that this teaching is intended to follow immediately upon acquaintance with the Vedas, although it is not necessary that a man has inquired into *dharma* in order to undertake the inquiry about Brahman. "Then" does not mean "following performance of (certain kinds of) acts," since the inquiry into *dharma* and that into Brahman differ not only in themselves but also in their results. Understanding of dharma results in prosperity that is dependent on acts; understanding of Brahman results in liberation or perfection (niḥśreyasa) that depends on no actions. Dharma is something to be accomplished in the future by action; Brahman is already existent, since eternal, and so not dependent on human activity. Dharmic injunctions instruct man in order to make him act in certain ways to achieve results; scriptural texts relating to Brahman merely instruct man without enjoining him, the results following directly upon understanding the texts.

v3.c18.s8.t1.13

Then what is it that constitutes the unique antecedents of the inquiry into Brahman? It is discrimination of what is really eternal from what is not; nonattachment to enjoyments of objects both now and hereafter; acquisition of tranquillity, restraint, and other instruments; and the desire for liberation. When these conditions exist a man may successfully inquire about Brahman, whether or not he has already inquired about dharma.

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The word "therefore" in the sūtra indicates that one should inquire into Brahman for the reason that the Veda indicates that the results of that inquiry constitute the highest aim of man.

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The meaning of the word "Brahman" will be explained in the next sūtra.

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Objection : Is Brahman generally known to us or not? If It is known we need not inquire about It; but if It is not, we cannot inquire about It.

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Answer : Brahman is known to us, because once we understand that the word "Brahman" connotes something that is "great" (an understanding we derive from etymology) and realize that Brahman is therefore omniscient, omnipotent, eternally pure, intelligent, and free, we know Brahman exists; and because Brahman is known to each person as his Self : no one ever says (or thinks) "I do not exist," but if the Self's existence were not generally known we would think and speak that way.

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Objector : Then, since Brahman is already known, we need not inquire about It.

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Answer : No, since there are mistaken opinions about Brahman. Ordinary people and Lokāyatas believe the body qualified by awareness is the Self; others, that It is the organs plus awareness; others that the internal organ is the Self; others again, that the Self is momentary cognitions; and still others, that It is the void (śūnya). Some say there is an agent and enjoyer different from the body and that it transmigrates; some say that that being is enjoyer only, not agent;

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others think that in addition there is a God; and still others think that God is the Self of the enjoyer. So there are all these conflicting opinions, based on both reasoning (*yukti*) and authority but which are only apparently authoritative. That is why one should proceed to study Brahman, that is, the Vedānta texts, using the help of arguments (*tarka*) and aiming for perfection.

v3.c18.s8.t1.21

I.1.2 (E7-9; T15-19). The *sūtra* says “[Brahman is that] from which birth, etc. (proceed).” “Et cetera” in the *sūtra* includes maintenance and destruction. The sense is that Brahman is the omniscient, omnipotent cause from which proceed the beginning, maintenance, and destruction of the world of name-and-form, of agents and enjoyers, of fruits of actions that are determined spatially, temporally, and causally, of a world that is not thinkable through the internal organ. Only from such a God as has just been described can the birth, etc., of the world arise; it cannot arise from an unconscious *prakṛti*, or from atoms, or from a transmigrating being. And it cannot arise, etc., from the world’s own nature, because natural causation needs special spatial and temporal occasions.

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This last argument is by itself not sufficient to prove the existence of God, however. Though inference, as well as sense perception, can help in providing understanding of Brahman insofar as it does not contradict scripture, still it is the proper understanding of the Vedānta texts (that is, the Upaniṣads) that alone produces that understanding. Not that this excludes arguments (*tarka*), for scripture itself tells us that, for example, the Self is to be considered (*mantavya*) as well as heard (*śrotavya*).

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Scripture (*śruti*) as well as immediate awareness (*anubhava*), etc., are both to be used in appropriate ways in the inquiry into Brahman, unlike the inquiry into *dharma* in which only scripture is pertinent. The reason is that Brahman, unlike *dharma*, already exists. Again, the arising of *dharma* depends on man’s efforts and so involves injunctions, prohibitions, rules, exceptions, etc., but the existence of something that already exists is not dependent on man’s efforts. The truth of a judgment concerning a matter of fact depends on the world, unlike the truth of a judgment concerning what is to be done.

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Objection : Since Brahman exists other *pramāṇas* can provide knowledge of it as well as scripture; so we need not study the Vedānta texts after all.

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Answer : No, since Brahman is not an object of the senses. We might know that Brahman is the cause of the world by perception or inference if we could see both Brahman and the world with our sense organs, but we only grasp the world that way and not Brahman.

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The *sūtra* does not provide an inference to show Brahman’s causality, but rather reflects scriptural passages (found at *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* III.1 and 6). As for the omniscience of Brahman, it follows:

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I.1.3 (E9-10; T19-20). “From (1) (Brahman’s) being the source of scripture (or, as an alternative reading) from (2) scripture’s being the source (of knowledge of Brahman).”

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On interpretation (1), we must take it that scripture itself is omniscient, and so how much more so its author, Brahman. On interpretation (2), the passage is to be understood as showing that *sūtra* 2 does not present an inference to God’s existence independent of scripture.

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(E10-12; T20-23) *Objection*: Scripture is not the means of knowing Brahman, for, according to *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* I.2.1, all scriptural passages have actions as their purport. Either scriptural texts enjoin actions or else they provide supplementary information to someone intending to perform actions. Scripture is not needed to give information about existing things, since perception, etc., can do that; in any case, even if it could give information, the information would *ex hypothesi* be irrelevant to action and so of no use to us. All scriptural passages are directly or indirectly injunctive, and one cannot enjoin the existence or nature of an already existing thing. Thus if the texts you have in mind do not themselves enjoin they must either supply ancillary information in aid of such injunctions or, if you insist that their subject matter is different, they must concern meditation (*upāsana*) and other actions mentioned in those particular texts.

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I.1.4. *Answer*: “But that (is so, that is, Brahman is known from scripture), because (the passages in question) are connected (to Brahman) through (their) meaning.” These texts cannot merely provide ancillary information, since many of them clearly preclude any reference to action (e.g., *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* II.4.13 : “Then by what should he see whom?”). Again, scripture is needed to give information about some already existing things, for example, the information that the Self is Brahman (“that art thou”). And some information is relevant even though it does not speak of what is to be gained or avoided : the Self, Brahman, which is not something to be gained or avoided, is such that understanding of It produces an end to all frustration. And though some texts do concern meditation those concerning Brahman cannot, since once knowledge of Brahman occurs there is no longer anything to be gained or avoided, all conceptions of difference are destroyed.

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(E12-14 ; T23-29) *Objection*: Just as the Vedas give information about the implements of the sacrifice, information not known in common parlance, to those who are enjoined to perform sacrifices if they desire to get to heaven, so information about Brahman, not known in common life, is imparted by the Vedas to those who are enjoined to learn to understand Brahman if they wish to attain immortality, that is, liberation. But information irrelevant to any action, merely stating facts about what already exists without any reference to any possible action, is senseless and cannot occur in scripture.

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Answer : If someone says “this is a rope, not a snake” intending to remove the fear of another person who has mistaken the one for the other, it is not senseless; likewise it is not senseless for the Vedānta passages to make statements about the Self intending to remove the error of one who thinks that It transmigrates.

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Objector : The analogy fails, because though fear of snake is dispelled by hearing that it is a rope, merely hearing that the Self doesn’t transmigrate doesn’t stop men from undergoing transmigration. And in fact it is for this very reason that the scriptures enjoin us to consider and meditate on the Self in addition to hearing of It.

v3.c18.s8.t1.34

Śamkara : The objector’s whole line of argument fails because it depends on the fallacious assumption that liberation, like dharma, is something not yet existent that is to be obtained. But in truth liberation is eternal and disembodied (aśarīra). It is eternal, not in the sense (pariṇāminitya) that a continuant undergoing change may be said to be, but in the sense (kūṭasthanitya) that it doesn’t undergo any changes at all, that it is omnipresent, partless, absolutely self-sufficient, self-luminous. Since liberation is eternal in that sense, as well as not involving any body, it cannot be an effect of actions enjoined in scripture. In fact, liberation follows immediately upon knowledge of Brahman, and thus that knowledge cannot be viewed as a means conducive to some action designed to gain liberation.

v3.c18.s8.t1.35

(E14-16; T29-31) Śamkara now shows by citing appropriate passages that the identity of Self with Brahman cannot be dismissed as a mere figure of speech or as a kind of imaginative association constituting an element in meditation. Knowledge of Brahman is, like knowledge of an object by perception, dependent on its object, not on human activity. Brahman has no connection whatsoever with actions.

v3.c18.s8.t1.36

(E16-18; T31-34) Brahman is not even the object of an “act” of knowing or other activity of mind or speech.

v3.c18.s8.t1.37

Objector : If so, scripture cannot tell us about Brahman.

v3.c18.s8.t1.38

Answer : True, scripture does not speak of Brahman as an object but rather turns aside all distinctions produced by avidyā. Scripture in fact tells us that Brahman is always subject, never object. Realizing this one realizes as well that liberation is not transitory but is rather the very nature of the eternally liberated Self. Those who believe that liberation is a result of actions of mind, speech, or body, or who think it to be a modification (of something), properly conclude that liberation is noneternal, for in experience we find that modifications such as curds, as well as effects such as jars, are noneternal. Liberation is not something to be obtained, since it constitutes (a person's) Self and is all-pervading, thus ever present to everyone, like ākāśa. Nor is it a thing to be acted toward by ritual activities of purification (saṃskāra), for purification involves either the adding of some quality or the removal of some fault, but neither is relevant in the case of liberation, for liberation is just Brahman, to which no quality can be added and which is without fault.

v3.c18.s8.t1.39

Objection : Liberation may be a quality of the Self that needs purifying action to manifest it, just as a dusty mirror needs the action of rubbing to clear it.

v3.c18.s8.t1.40

Answer : No, the Self is not the locus of any action, since an action must modify its locus; if actions could modify the Self It would be noneternal, and this contradicts scripture. And it cannot be purified by actions relating to something else, since the Self does not bear any relation to anything else.

v3.c18.s8.t1.41

Objector : Surely the embodied Self is purified by ritual actions such as bathing.

v3.c18.s8.t1.42

Answer : No, for what is purified there is not the Self but a self joined to the body through avidyā, that is, the ego principle (ahaṃkāra). Common sense will tell you that when we say, having recovered from a disease, "I am well," we are speaking of the ego and not the Self. And since there are no other ways in which liberation could be connected with action than those mentioned here, it follows that liberation stands in no relation to action.

v3.c18.s8.t1.43

(E18-19; T34-36) Objection : But knowledge (which you claim produces liberation) is itself a mental act.

v3.c18.s8.t1.44

Answer : No indeed. An action is something not dependent on what now exists but on human intelligence, whereas knowledge is (just the reverse) dependent on what exists and not dependent on human intelligence. Thus even though some actions such as meditation, as well as knowledge, are, if you like, "mental," they are entirely unlike each other. Therefore one's meditative object is something that depends on human action and so can be enjoined, but Brahman is not dependent on human action and so cannot be enjoined, since it cannot be gained or avoided.

v3.c18.s8.t1.45

*Objection* : Then what about the Upaniṣadic passage that enjoins us that the Self should be seen and heard?

v3.c18.s8.t1.46

*Answer* : The purpose of this injunction is to divert men's thoughts from the objects of ordinary activities and toward the Self. Many passages (which are quoted) tell us that Brahman is not an object to be sought or avoided.

v3.c18.s8.t1.47

(E19-21; T36-40) *Objection* : There is nothing in the Vedic scriptures that speaks only to describe existing things; all scriptural texts are either injunctions, prohibitions, or supplements to those two.

v3.c18.s8.t1.48

*Answer* : No, because the Upaniṣads are surely about the Self, and the Self cannot be an aspect (*śeṣa*) of something else. If someone should claim that the Self, since it is made known by other means (that is, perception, inference), is only incidentally referred to by scripture, we reply that the Self is again being confused with the object of self-consciousness; the Self with which we are here concerned cannot be the object of self-consciousness but is rather the witness of all that. It is inconsistent to deny that Self, for it is that very Self that would do the denying! So those (*Mīmāṃsā*) authorities who first made the claim that all scriptures consist of injunctions must have been speaking about that portion dealing with injunctions. And when they aver that whatever Vedic passages that do not refer to actions are without purpose, it would mean, if strictly construed, that all information (given there) is without purpose (which is absurd); if it is not taken strictly but is relaxed to allow that information may be conveyed about things that are related to possible actions, then why shouldn't it give information about the Self, since to do so wouldn't require objects, for example, the Self, to be acts.

v3.c18.s8.t1.49

Furthermore, some Vedic passages (for example, "don't kill Brahmins") enjoin avoidance of certain kinds of acts. Avoidance of action is neither action nor instrumental to action, so it would follow from your (*Mīmāṃsā*) principle that those Vedic passages are without purpose, which is absurd. And you can't assume that the "not" (in "do not kill Brahmins") itself denotes some other (opposed) action, for that's not the way the word "not" is used in contexts such as this: what "not" means is passivity—inaction, except in special cases, such as vows.

v3.c18.s8.t1.50

(E21-24; T40-45) As for the objection (at E12-14 above) that although a man who is told that something is not a snake but a rope no longer is under an illusion, when he is told that his Self is Brahman, he still remains in *saṃsāra* : we hold that the latter man is not in *saṃsāra* in the same way as before. He is no longer subject to frustration and fear. It is like a person who is proud of his earrings while he has them; after he loses them he may lose his pride and his pleasure in his ownership; when a person loses his body he loses his concern for pleasure or pain.

v3.c18.s8.t1.51

Objector : Only a dead person loses his body.

v3.c18.s8.t1.52

Answer : No, because the cause of embodiment is false awareness. The Self is eternally disembodied; thus when wrong knowledge is corrected by the understanding of the Self, he "loses his body" and is no longer in *saṃsāra* in the same way.

v3.c18.s8.t1.53

Objector : Embodiedness is caused by merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*).

v3.c18.s8.t1.54

Answer : But merit and demerit are caused by embodiment, so there will be the fallacy of mutual dependence (*itaretarāśraya*) as well as of a beginningless chain of blind leading blind. Anyway since the Self cannot be an agent this view is invalid.

v3.c18.s8.t1.55

Objection : The Self is "agent" in the same sense that a king is, by (producing action by) Its mere presence.

v3.c18.s8.t1.56

Answer : No, because kings get action by offering wages, whereas the Self can do nothing analogous. It is false awareness alone that can explain the notion of the Self as agent.

v3.c18.s8.t1.57

Objection : The notion in question is not false but is, rather, figurative (*gauṇa*).

v3.c18.s8.t1.58

Answer : A figurative use of a word that primarily means *x* to apply to *y* can only be appealed to if *x* and *y* are known to be different. If they are not known to be different we assume instead that there is an illusion present. For example, a man who, seeing something in the dusk, calls it a "post" when it is in fact a man, does not use figurative language, but, rather, uses language expressive of his error.

v3.c18.s8.t1.59

Finally, with respect to the argument (at E12-14 above) that merely hearing "the Self is Brahman" doesn't stop men from transmigrating, since the scriptures enjoin us to consider and meditate on the Self in addition to hearing It, Śaṃkara claims that the meditation and the consideration are parts of the process by which Brahman comes to be known; they are not additional acts.

v3.c18.s8.t1.60

(E24-25; T45-47) The Sāṃkhya philosophers use inference to prove that there is a material cause of the world called *pradhāna* (or *prakṛti*) and interpret scripture as referring to that. They say that the cause of the creation of the world is the contact between selves (*puruṣa*) and the material cause (*pradhāna*). *Pradhāna* is, according to them, a nonconscious (*acetana*) composite of the three *guṇa*s. They contend that the Upaniṣadic passages that the Advaitin interprets as referring to Brahman can be interpreted consistently as applying to *pradhāna*. It is omnipotent, since all objects arise as modifications of it. Although nonconscious it can be said in a figurative sense to be omniscient; since what you think of as "knowledge" is really a property of the *guṇa sattva* and since it is only the *pradhāna* (and not *puruṣa*) that can be held to know something or everything, *pradhāna* is said in scripture to be "omniscient" as a way of praising its supreme *sattvic* nature. Omniscience can only mean the potentiality (*śakti*) for knowing everything: if Brahman were to know everything always he would depend on the act of knowing, but if Brahman's knowledge is not permanent (and knowledge is the essence of Brahman) then when knowledge ceases Brahman would also cease. Again, Brahman prior to the creation of the world is without instruments of action, and knowledge cannot occur without the presence of the appropriate instruments of the act of knowing, that is, the body, senses, etc. Finally, *pradhāna*, being composite, can become modified and thus be a material cause, whereas Brahman, being noncomposite, cannot be so.

v3.c18.s8.t1.61

In answer, the *Sūtra* (I.1.5) says: Since (the cause of the world is said in the Upaniṣads) to "see" (*ikṣati*), (the *pradhāna*) is not (that cause, because) it is not based on scriptural authority.

v3.c18.s8.t1.62

(E25-28; T47-52) The Upaniṣads attribute consciousness to the cause of the world. The Sāṃkhya argument that the *pradhāna* is omniscient because knowledge is a property of *sattva* won't do because *pradhāna* is a state, not of pure *sattva*, but of balance among all three *guṇas*. So we would have to call it "little-knowing" (because of the other *guṇas*) as well as "all-knowing"! As for the argument about Brahman's depending on his knowledge unless he is only capable of omniscience, there is no difficulty in Brahman's knowledge being essential to Him, any more than the fact that the sun gives off light by nature makes the sun depend on its light. As for what Brahman knows prior to creation, He knows name-and-form, and He needs no body, senses, etc., to know, any more than the sun needs anything else in order to shine. On the other hand the transmigrating self requires a body before knowledge can arise, since it is governed by *avidyā*.

v3.c18.s8.t1.63

*Objection*: Scripture says there is no transmigrating self other than God. How then can you say that the one requires a body for knowledge but not the other?

v3.c18.s8.t1.64

*Answer*: True, they are not different in reality. But just as *ākāśa* is limited by adjuncts (*upādhi*) such as jars, caves, etc., but the resulting spaces are not different from *ākāśa*, so the Lord is limited by the body, senses and so on, but the result (the transmigrating self) is not different from the Lord. The ideas that there are separate spaces or separate Selves respectively are just false ideas, born of our failure to discriminate the Self from its adjuncts.

v3.c18.s8.t1.65

To return for a moment to the last of the Sāṃkhya’s original objections, to the effect that only a composite like *pradhāna* can be material cause, we reply that *pradhāna* is not endorsed by scripture; our positive arguments for Brahman’s being the material cause will come later (in Book Two).

v3.c18.s8.t1.66

(E28-29; T52-54) *Sāṃkhya*: Nonconscious things are sometimes figuratively spoken of as conscious (“the riverbank is inclined to fall”); in the same manner *pradhāna* is spoken of figuratively as conscious since it performs actions, just as in scripture fire and water are figuratively spoken of as (if) conscious (“the fire thought; the water thought”).

v3.c18.s8.t1.67

*Answer* (I.1.6) : If (the consciousness of the world-cause is) said to be figurative, no, because of the use of the word “Self” (in scripture to apply to the world-cause).

v3.c18.s8.t1.68

Scripture, for example, *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VI.8.7 and elsewhere (“that art thou, Śvetaketu”), identifies the world-cause as the Self and affirms the identity of that Self with Śvetaketu, who is certainly conscious. As for the attribution of consciousness to fire and water, that certainly is figurative, since there is no independent reason—as there is in the case in question—for retaining the literal sense, and good reason, from common sense, to adopt a figurative one.

v3.c18.s8.t1.69

(E30-31; T54-57) *Sāṃkhya*: The fact that the word “Self” is used to denominate the world-cause is not sufficient for your purpose, since that word itself is frequently used figuratively, as when a king says of his servant “that man is my (other) ‘Self’ ”; since *pradhāna* is the servant of the *puruṣa* it may be termed “Self” in that sense.

v3.c18.s8.t1.70

*Answer* (I.1.7) : (*Pradhāna* is not the Self) because it is taught that there is release for one who takes his stand on That (that is, Brahman or Being.)

v3.c18.s8.t1.71

If the *pradhāna* were truly the Self, then scripture, when it teaches Śvetaketu “that art thou,” would be telling him that he is nonconscious, and he would conclude that liberation is not possible for him. We should not suppose that scripture would provide such a misleading teaching. Furthermore, we should not assume figurative meaning unless there is a clear-cut and well-recognized distinction between the primary object and its analogue.

v3.c18.s8.t1.72

I.1.8 (E31-32; T57-58). And (the *pradhāna* cannot be the Self) because it is not referred to (in scripture) as something to be avoided.

v3.c18.s8.t1.73

If *pradhāna* is Being (Brahman) but not the Self, and if "that art thou" refers to the *pradhāna*, the teacher (speaking through scripture) would eventually say that one should distinguish the two; but in fact he says the opposite.

v3.c18.s8.t1.74

I.1.9 (E32-33; T59-60). Further, (the Self is not the *pradhāna*) because it is said to "go to" (the Self in sleep). *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VI.8.1 tells us that in sleep a man's self (*jīva*) becomes united with Brahman. (There is an etymological explanation involved.) But the conscious Self cannot become united with the unconscious *pradhāna*.

v3.c18.s8.t1.75

I.1.10-11 (E33-34; T60-61). Further, because (the Vedānta texts) agree (that the world-cause is conscious Brahman, that cause cannot be *pradhāna*), and (sūtra 11) because scripture (states it, that is, that Brahman is the cause of the world). Compare *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* VI.9.

v3.c18.s8.t1.76

(E34-43; T61-77. This section is known as the *Ānandamayi* section.), Question : Since the main thesis of Vedānta is now established why does the work go on further ?

v3.c18.s8.t1.77

Answer : Brahman is understood in two ways : as qualified by adjuncts—different kinds of name-and-form; and as the opposite of that, that is, free from all adjuncts. Many passages show this. The first is Brahman viewed from the perspective of *avidyā*; the second is Brahman viewed from the perspective of *vidyā*. We are taught that in worshiping the first we get different results according to the mode of worship determined by the adjuncts distinguishing the Lord. Now when we turn to the question of liberation, the question arises which form of Brahman must be known to gain liberation, and whether it is devotion or knowledge that leads us to release, and how that can be. Further refutation of opposing views will also be set forth.

v3.c18.s8.t1.78

I.1.12 (E36-37; T64-66). (The Self) consisting of bliss (is the Highest Self) because of the repetition (of the word "bliss"). In *Taittiriya Upaniṣad* II.1.5 scripture says that the Self consisting of knowledge (*vijñāna*) is different from the Self consisting of bliss (*ānanda*). This Self of bliss is said to experience joy and be embodied, so it may be thought that it must be merely the transmigrating self and not the Highest Self. But, because scripture repeatedly uses the word "bliss" to describe the Highest Self, we must assume that in this passage too the Highest Self is being mentioned, and we shall have to explain the references to experiencing and to embodiment as applying to the self of knowledge, etc., or as being a secondary usage.

v3.c18.s8.t1.79

*Objection*: A self "consisting of" bliss cannot be the Highest Self since it is composite.

v3.c18.s8.t1.80

I.1.13-19 (E37-43; T66-77). *Answer*: The objection does not stand, since the word "consisting of" (*maya*) need not involve composition but instead may suggest "being full of (bliss)." Scripture says Brahman is the cause of bliss, and the context of the passage leaves no doubt which Brahman is meant, namely, the supreme Self and not the other (individual self [*jiva*]). That the reference is not to the *jiva* is shown by the explicit declaration of scripture. Incidentally, the attribution of consciousness, indeed of desire, in the passage in question (from the *Taittiriya Upanisad*) shows that we surely cannot be talking about *pradhana*. Finally, since scripture teaches that the *jiva* gains union with That, that is, the Self of bliss, that Self cannot be either *jiva* or *pradhana*.

v3.c18.s8.t1.81

Samkara's exposition of these *sutras* initially clarifies the meaning reflected in the exposition given above, but in his comments following *sutra* 19 he provides a different interpretation and debates the first one at some length. According to this alternative interpretation *sutras* 12 through 19 are addressed to *Taittiriya Upanisad* II.5.1, which mentions Brahman as the "tail" and "support" of the Self of bliss. The problem is: how can Brahman be a mere member of the Self—isn't it the principal, not the appendage? The *sutras* answer yes, because scripture says so. The suffix-"*maya*" is analyzed as involving *pracurya*, which the previous interpretation took as meaning "being full of" but on this second interpretation is a technical term meaning a stylistic device. The point of the *sutra* in which it is mentioned is to explain why II.5.1 speaks of Brahman as "tail": the answer is that it's merely a manner of speaking, a device, and not to be taken seriously. Since Brahman is spoken of as the cause (the *sutras* go on) it cannot be a mere appendage. And so forth.

v3.c18.s8.t1.82

I.1.20 (E43-46; T77-81). (What is spoken of in *Chandogya Upanisad* I.6.6ff. as) the one within (the sun and the eye is the Highest Lord), because (His) properties are taught (in that passage).

v3.c18.s8.t1.83

*Opponent*: That *Upanisad* is speaking of some transmigrating self, since it attributes hair, fingernails, and eyes to this person, since he is spoken of as spatially located, and since his power appears to be limited.

v3.c18.s8.t1.84

*Answer*: No, it refers to the Highest Lord. "Freedom from all sin (*papma*)" can only be attributed to God, as well as being the cause of all. As for the attribution of bodily qualities, a location and limited powers, these are appropriate descriptions of that same God when He presents Himself as an object of devotion and meditation with a body formed out of *maya*.

v3.c18.s8.t1.85

I.1.21 (E46; T81). And (God is) other (than an individual transmigrating self whose body is the sun), because the difference is taught (in scripture). The scripture in question is *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* III.7.9.

v3.c18.s8.t1.86

I.1.22 (E46-48; T81-84). *Ākāśa* (is Brahman) since its marks (are mentioned in *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* I.9). *Opponent*: In this passage the word “*ākāśa*” means a particular elemental substance, since that is what the word commonly means and since the properties attributed to it in the passage fit the properties ascribed to that elemental substance. *Answer*: No, because the passage doesn’t say that *ākāśa* is the cause of only some things but of all things, and only Brahman can be so described, certainly not that elemental substance.

v3.c18.s8.t1.87

I.1.23 (E48-50; T84-87). For the same reason the life breath (*prāṇa*) (in *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* I.10-11) (is Brahman). The passage in question once again speaks of characteristic marks of Brahman qualifying what is referred to by another word here “*prāṇa*.”

v3.c18.s8.t1.88

I.1.24-27 (E50-56; T87-97). (In *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* III.13.7, the word) “light” (indicates Brahman) because of the mention of feet. If it be objected that (Brahman is) not (the subject of this passage) because the meter (*chanda*) is named, no!—because by that (naming) consciousness is directed (toward Brahman); it is so also elsewhere. So Brahman is the subject, since Brahman is the only thing that can have beings, etc., as its feet. There is no reason to suppose that both passages (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* III.12.6 and III.13.7) do not refer to Brahman.

v3.c18.s8.t1.89

I.1.28-31 (E56-62; T97-106). The life breath is Brahman, because that is what is indicated (in *Kauṣitaki Upaniṣad* III.1) and in many different passages. Just because Indra says that he is breath doesn’t disprove this: just like Vāmadeva, he must have gained insight through scripture.

v3.c18.s8.t1.90

First Chapter, Second Section

v3.c18.s8.t1.91

I.2.1-8 (E62-69; T107-116). (The one who consists of mind, spoken of in *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* III.14, is Brahman) because what (that passage teaches) is well known everywhere; because the passage attributes qualities appropriate to Brahman though not to the *jiva*; because agent and act are separated; because the words used for each are different; and because of *smṛti*. *Objection*: The passage talks about a self “in the heart”—that must be the *jiva*, not Brahman.

v3.c18.s8.t1.92

*Answer*: No, because Brahman "in the heart" is a form in which we are to meditate upon Brahman, and because it is like the case of *ākāśa*.

v3.c18.s8.t1.93

*Objector*: But *jiva* and Brahman are said to be identical.

v3.c18.s8.t1.94

*Answer*: No, they are different. Although Brahman and *jiva* are in a certain sense identical, it does not follow that Brahman enjoys anything. In respect to the possibility of enjoyership they are opposite.

v3.c18.s8.t1.95

I.2.9-10 (E69-70; T116-118). The eater (in *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* I.2.25) (is Brahman), because he is said to "eat" what is both movable and immovable, and because of the context.

v3.c18.s8.t1.96

I.2.11-12 (E70-74; T118-123). The two in the cave (in *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* I.3.1) are the *jiva* and the Highest Self, because it is seen and because of the qualities (mentioned in the passage).

v3.c18.s8.t1.97

*Objector*: In the passage the two in the cave are said to drink the results of their actions, and this makes it impossible to suppose the passage refers to either the *buddhi*, which is nonconscious, or to the Highest Self, which cannot drink anything.

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