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The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies v4.c22: The Philosophy of Sāṃkhya

The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies v4.c22

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The Philosophy of Sāṃkhya

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1. K. C. Bhattacharya, *Studies in Philosophy*, edited by Gopinath Bhattacharya (Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1956), vol. 1, 127.

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2. Garbe B6227; RB9527, passim; Dasgupta B7653; RB11305, vol. 1, 208-273; Frauwallner B8590;; RB12160, vol. 1, 275-450; and K. C. Bhattacharya, "Studies in Sāṃkhya Philosophy" in *Studies in Philosophy*, vol. 1, 127-211.

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3. Garbe B6227; RB9527, iv.

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4. Dasgupta B7653; RB11305, vol. 1, 221 and 223.

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5. Frauwallner B8590; RB12160, vol. I, 298ff. Cf. also Frauwallner B6431A; RB9627, 84-137 and especially 130-137.

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6. K. C. Bhattacharya, *Studies in Philosophy*, vol. 1, 127.

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7. For Wittgenstein's own laconic discussion of a "complete system of human communication," "form of life," or "language game," see L. Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books* (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1965), 165 ff. For a useful interpretive expansion of Wittgenstein's insights see Norman Malcolm, *Thought and Knowledge* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1977), 191-216.

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8. The ancient texts are unanimous in considering Kapila as the first teacher or "founder" of the Sāṃkhya tradition, and Kapila is referred to variously as the "supreme seer" (*paramarṣi*) (*Yuktidīpikā*, *maṅgala*, vs. 2), the "great seer" (*maharṣi*) (*Māṭhara-vṛtti* on SK 1), the "primal knower" (*ādividvān*) (*Yogasūtra* (YS) I.25), the "son of Brahmā" (*brahmasuta*) (*Gauḍapādabhāṣya* on SK 1) and an "incarnation of Viṣṇu"

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(viṣṇor avatāraviśeṣaḥ, Tattvavaiśāradī on Y.S I.25). In epic and Purāṇic texts his name is directly linked with Agni, Sūrya, Śiva, Nārāyaṇa, Svāyambhuva, and Hiraṇyagarbha. He is a “mind-born” (mānasaputra) “son of Brahmā,” who appears at the beginning of each cycle of creation perfectly equipped from the moment of birth with the fundamental predispositions of knowledge (jñāna), merit (dharma), nonattachment (vairāgya), and power (aiśvarya), and capable of assuming an appropriate apparitional form (nirmāṇacitta, YS I.25) so that he can transmit his knowledge of Sāṃkhya to Āsuri and thereby initiate the guruparamparā in each cycle of manifestation. Vācaspati Miśra in the Tattvavaiśāradī goes so far as to call Kapila “God of all the descendents of Svayambhū” (svayambhuvānām... īśvara iti bhāvaḥ, on YS I.25). For an interesting discussion of Kapila as the “God of Sāṃkhya,” see Albrect Wezler’s intriguing article (RB3984), “Der Gott des Sāṃkhya: Zu Nyāyakusumāñjali 1.3”, Indo-Iranian Journal, 12 no. 4 (1970): 255-262.

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9. Throughout this section on “Sāṃkhya as Enumeration,” the various Sāṃkhya components are being set forth as quantifiable “sets” with little or no attention to the philosophical issues involved. Detailed discussions of the philosophical meaning of the “sets” are to be found in the sequel, namely, in the sections entitled “Sāṃkhya as Process Materialism,” “Sāṃkhya as Contentless Consciousness,” and “Sāṃkhya as Rational Reflection.”

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10. See for example, K. C. Bhattacharya’s discussion of the tanmātras and mahābhūtas in Studies in Philosophy. vol. 1, 176-177. Compare also Richard Robinson’s discussion of “universals and particulars” (and the predilection of Indian philosophies not to be concerned about such matters) in his “Classical Indian Philosophy” in J. W. Elder, ed., Chapters in Indian Civilization, vol. 1 (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1970), 189-191.

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11. For a useful discussion of the Sāṃkhya emanation scheme vis-à-vis the Upaniṣadic, early Buddhist, Vaiśeṣika, and later Sarvāstivāda Buddhist emanation schemes, see Richard Robinson, “Classical Indian Philosophy,” 161-177. Robinson provides a series of comparative charts that reveal at a glance how the various emanation schemes relate to one another.

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12. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, trans. (B742; RB1322) The Sāṃkhyakārikā of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa (Madras: University of Madras, 1948), xxvi-xxviii, presents three comparative charts of Sāṃkhya emanation schemes: (a) that of the Sāṃkhyakārikā itself; (b) that of the Chinese commentary on the Kārikā, translated by Paramārtha; and (c) that of the Śaiva Siddhānta. Robinson, “Classical Indian Philosophy,” p. 174, also provides a chart of the emanation scheme in the Chinese commentary of Paramārtha.

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13. These East Asian (Chinese) variants may be found in Taisho 25, 546c 17-29 (Ta-chih-tu-lun) and Taisho 30, 170c 13 (Pai-lun), both of which are charted and discussed in Robinson, “Classical Indian Philosophy,” 171-174. Robinson became aware of these variants from the following: Ryusho Hikata, Suvikrāntavikrāmi-paripṛcchā Prajñāpāramitāsūtra (Fukooka, Japan: published by the Committee of Commemoration Program for Dr. Hikata, 1958), lxv.

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14. As the chart indicates, Sāṃkhya philosophy appears to intend that the various pentadic sequences correlate, recapitulate, or are cognate with one another, so that, for example, hearing correlates with speaking, sound, and space, and again, touching correlates with grasping, touch, and wind, and so forth. A possible problem arises, however, regarding the last two components of the karmendriya series, namely, excreting and procreating. It is not immediately apparent how excreting correlates with tasting, taste, and water, and how procreating correlates with smelling, smell, and earth. One possible solution is to suggest that excreting is linked with taste and water in the sense that the motor capacity of excreting has to do with the digestion and assimilation of food, and that procreating is linked with smell and earth in the sense that the motor capacity of sexual functioning has to do with characteristic animal sexual odors that generate mutual attraction. Moreover, for complete reproduction it is perhaps reasonable to assume that the process would encompass all five mahābhūtas, thereby necessitating linkage of procreating with the earth element. Another, perhaps somewhat better solution, is to reverse the order of the last two karmendriyas, so that the sequence is speaking, grasping, walking, procreating, and excreting. The motor capacity of sexual functioning then correlates with taste and water in the sense of the ejaculation of semen, menstrual periods, and so forth. The motor capacity of excretion then correlates with the expulsion of material waste from the body. This latter solution is preferable mainly because there is textual evidence for it. In Manusmṛti 2.90, Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā 7, Matsyapurāṇa III.20, and Aśvamedhaparvan 21.2 of the Mahābhārata, such a reversal of the last two components of the series is specifically mentioned. The Matsyapurāṇa sequence, for example, is ālāpa, ādāna, gati, ānanda, and utsarga. In the epic passage the sequence is vākya, kriyā, gati, retas and utsarga. The only problem with this latter solution is that it violates the order of the indriyas as set forth in Kārikās 26 and 28. This is not a crucial problem, however, for the order set forth in the Kārikās itself appears to reflect the dictates of the ārya meter more than it does a specific philosophical meaning. The same is true for the sequence of the sense capacities in Kārikās 26 and 28. Gauḍapāda, for example, reads Kārikā 26 as giving the sequence seeing, hearing smelling, tasting, and touching, as does Vācaspati Miśra. The Māṭharavṛtti and Yuktidīpikā, however, read Kārikā 26 with the correct philosophical sequence of hearing, touching, seeing, tasting, and smelling. Regarding Kārikā 28, the matter becomes even murkier. The Māṭharavṛtti and Yuktidīpikā, which had maintained the correct philosophical order of senses in Kārikā 26, proceed to read Kārikā 28 as beginning “rūpādiṣu . . . ” instead of “śabdādiṣu . . . ” which latter would have been the obvious reading given their reading of Kārikā 26. By the same token, Gauḍapāda and Vācaspati read Kārikā 28 as beginning “śabdādiṣu . . . ” instead of “rūpādiṣu . . . ” which latter would have been the obvious reading given their reading of Kārikā 26. Herein, of course, is an interesting problem for a critical text editor. The relevant issue in this discussion, however, is that the order of the indriyas in the Kārikā itself cannot be considered determinative in interpreting the philosophical meaning of the indriyas within the overall Sāṃkhya system.

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15. This interpretation of āharaṇa, dhāraṇa, and prakāśakara follows that of the Yuktidīpikā (RB1370, 113). It is to be noted, however, that other interpretations are also possible. The Yuktidīpikā itself (RB 1370, 113) refers to an alternate interpretation wherein āharaṇa refers to the karmendriyas, dhāraṇa to manas and ahaṃkāra, and prakāśakara to the buddhindriyas and buddhi. Vācaspati assigns āharaṇa to the karmendriyas dhāraṇa to the antaḥkaraṇa, and prakāśa to the buddhindriyas. Māṭharavṛtti assigns āharaṇa to all the indriyas, dhāraṇa to ahaṃkāra, and prakāśakara to buddhi. Gauḍapāda assigns both āharaṇa and dhāraṇa to the karmendriyas, and prakāśakara to the buddhindriyas. There is also disagreement as to the term “tenfold” in Kārikā 32, with some commentaries (for example, Vācaspati, the Candrikā, the Yuktidīpikā) arguing that “tenfold” refers to objects apprehended either in terms of “human” (adivya) and “divine” (divya) or in terms of “specific” (viśeṣa or gross) or “nonspecific” (aviśeṣa or subtle), and with other commentaries (Gauḍapāda, the Māṭharavṛtti, the Jayamaṅgalā) arguing that “tenfold” simply refers to the functions of the five sense capacities and the five action capacities in the aggregate. The variety of views seems to indicate clearly that such epistemological issues were very much at issue within the Sāṃkhya tradition itself.

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16. It might be noted here, however, that Vijñānabhikṣu argues in his Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya on sūtra III.9 that the “subtle body” (liṅgaśarīra) is “seventeenfold” or a “set of 17.” The sūtra itself reads as follows: saptadaśaikam liṅgam. According to Vijñānabhikṣu, the sūtra is to be construed to mean “the seventeen as one (makes up) the subtle body,” and the seventeen are the eleven capacities, the five subtle elements, and buddhi (with ahaṃkāra to be included within the buddhi). Aniruddha in his Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti construes the same sūtra in a different manner, namely, “the seventeen plus one (make up) the subtle body,” indicating, in other words, that the subtle body is eighteenfold, which, of course, is the standard view of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and his commentators. Aniruddha’s interpretation is undoubtedly correct, but it must be admitted that Vijñānabhikṣu’s view may well preserve a pre-Kārikā view of the matter. Reference has already been made to pre-Īśvarakṛṣṇa forms of Sāṃkhya in which the makeup of the subtle body was at issue (see, for example, the discussion of the views of Paurika, Pañcādhikaraṇa, and Vindhyavāsin in the preceding chapter).

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It should be remembered also that Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya reduces the threefold internal organ to the notion of citta and does away with the notion of subtle body by arguing that the citta is all pervasive, a view that appears to come close to Vindhyavāsin’s position (and has led Frauwallner and Chakravarti to suggest that Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya may represent an extension of the older Vārṣagaṇya-Vindhyavāsin interpretation of the Sāṃkhya system). We also know that Vindhyavāsin argued that the standard Sāṃkhya “thirteenfold instrument” (namely, the ten capacities, manas, ahaṃkāra, and buddhi) should be reduced to an elevenfold instrument (namely, the ten capacities plus manas, with ahaṃkāra and buddhi functions being encompassed by the manas). Traces of this view appear to be present in the Sāṃkhyasūtra, for in sūtras I.71, II.40 and VI.25 the term manas is clearly used in the sense of buddhi or citta. It would appear, then, that there were a variety of views within Sāṃkhya regarding the structure of internal cognition and, corollary to that, the precise makeup of the subtle body. One view (on the evidence of Vijñānabhikṣu’s interpretation of sūtra III.9) evidently reduced ahaṃkāra to a dimension of buddhi. Another view (on the evidence of references to Vindhyavāsin in the Yuktidīpikā together with the use of the term manas at I.71, II.40 and VI.25 of the Sāṃkhyasūtra) evidently reduced both buddhi and ahaṃkāra to manas.

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Yet another view (on the evidence of Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya) introduced the notion of citta, which encompasses the functions of manas, ahaṃkāra, and buddhi. Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s own view, of course, is that buddhi, ahaṃkāra, and manas each perform distinct internal functions (SK 29) but together perform the common function of maintaining life (the circulation of prāṇa, and so forth), either by themselves (if one follows the interpretation of Vācaspati and Vijñānabhikṣu) or in concert with the other ten capacities (if one follows the interpretation of Gauḍapāda and Jayamaṅgalā). Regarding the corollary issue of the subtle body, if one follows the interpretation of Vijñānabhikṣu in sūtra III.9, the subtle body is seventeenfold. If one follows Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s own view, the subtle body is eighteenfold (namely, the thirteenfold instrument together with the five subtle elements). If one follows the view of Vindhyavāsin or Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya, there is no need for a subtle body for transmigration. For Vindhyavāsin, manas is central and the sense capacities are all-pervasive; hence, a subtle body is unnecessary. For Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya, citta is all-pervasive; hence, a subtle body is unnecessary. There are yet other views concerning the problem—e.g., the so called prāṇāṣṭaka or eightfold medium made up of the five breaths, manas, pur, and vāc, and the vaivartaśarīra, presumably made up of the five subtle elements plus buddhi, ahaṃkāra, and manas—all of which are conveniently discussed by P.

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Chakravarti (B6381; RB9596, 269-270 288-298).

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At the risk of complicating matters even further, attention might also be drawn to an early Vedāntin reference, namely, the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, verses 3 and 4, in which the “waking” and “dreaming” quarters of Om, Brahman, and ātman are described as having “seven limbs” and “nineteen mouths.” According to Śaṃkara’s Bhāṣya, the “seven limbs” refer to heaven (dyuloka), the sun, space, air, fire, water, and earth. The “nineteen mouths” are called by Śaṃkara the “doors of perception” (upalabdhi-dvārāṇi) and are made up of the five sense capacities (buddhīndriya), the five motor capacities (karmendriyas), the five breaths (vāyu, prāṇa, and so forth), plus manas, buddhi, ahaṃkāra, and citta. In this formulation, instead of reducing the internal cognitive functions to one another (with manas or buddhi or citta encompassing the others), all four internal functions stand as distinct components.

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17. See the preceding note.

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18. For a fuller discussion of the *karmayonis* in prephilosophical and non-Sāṃkhya texts, see P. Chakravarti, B6381; RB9596, 270-277.

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19. The correlation of the five *viparyayas* of Sāṃkhya with the five *kleśas* of Pātañjala-Yoga is specifically made by Vācaspati Miśra in his *Tattvakaumudī* on *Kārikā* 47. The correlation is also made by Vijñānabhikṣu in his discussion of *viparyaya* in *Yoga-vārttika*, under *Yogasūtra* I.8. For the full discussion of the *kleśas* in Yoga philosophy, see *Yogasūtra* I.5, I.8, and II.2-9 together with the comments of Vyāsa, the so-called Śaṃkara (of the *Vivaraṇa*), Vācaspati Miśra's *Tattvavaiśāradī*, and Vijñānabhikṣu's *Yogavārttika*.

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20. It must be admitted that the set of 50 *padārthas* represents one of the most obscure problems in Sāṃkhya studies. The origin, role, and function of the set within the Sāṃkhya system as a whole have puzzled not only modern scholars but the native commentarial tradition as well. Especially vexing are the peculiar technical names that have been given to the "contentments" (*tuṣṭi*) and the authentic "spiritual attainments" (*siddhi*). The names of the five "misconceptions" (*viparyaya*), namely, *tamas*, *moha*, *mahāmoha*, *tāmisra*, and *andhatāmisra*, though obviously difficult in terms of the words themselves, are nevertheless reasonably intelligible in terms of content because of the testimony of the Yoga tradition that they are archaic names for the well-known five *kleśas*, namely, *avidyā*, *asmitā*, *rāga*, *dveṣa*, and *abhiniveśa*. By the same token, the first eleven of the twenty-eight "dysfunctions" (*aśakti*) are reasonably intelligible in terms of content, since they refer to the inadequate functioning of the eleven capacities, that is, the five sense capacities, the five motor capacities, and mind. The remaining seventeen "dysfunctions" are not as clear, however, since they are only characterized as being the opposites of the nine contentments and the eight spiritual attainments. According to the *Kārikā* (along with *Tattvakaumudī* and *Yuktidīpikā*), the manifest names of the *tuṣṭis* are *prakṛti*, *upādāna*, *kāla*, *bhāgya* (internal) and *arjana*, *rakṣaṇa*, *kṣaya*, *bhoga*, and *hiṃsā* (external, according to *Yuktidīpikā*). The manifest names of the *siddhis* are *ūha*, *śabda*, *adhyayana*, *duḥkhavighātās trayaḥ* (the "triad" of ways for overcoming the threefold frustration), *suhṛtprāpti*, and *dāna*. All of the commentaries to the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, however, then proceed to offer archaic technical names for these *tuṣṭis* and *siddhis*. Unfortunately, however, there are a number of variants, the more important of which are charted on p. 632.

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A century ago Richard Garbe (in the introduction to B3574; RB5524, xiv-xv) offered the following interesting observations regarding the problem:

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I have already.... pointed out the peculiar figurative way in which the different stages of acquiescence (*tuṣṭi*) are named, viz., water, wave, flood, rain, excellent water, most excellent water, crossing, happy crossing, perfect crossing (*pāra*, *supāra*, *pārapāra*). Add to this the synonymous denominations of the first three perfections (*siddhi*): *tāra*, *sutāra*, *tāratāra*. All Sāṃkhya commentaries have preserved these strange denominations...., beginning with Gauḍapāda who has found them in "another compendium" (*śāstrāntara*). Wilson....does not know what to do with these expressions which, in his opinion, have quite different meaning than they usually bear, in this connection; he regards them as "slang or mystical nomenclature" and ends his remarks on them with these words: "No explanation of the words is anywhere given, nor is any reason assigned for their adoption." Thus all commentators of the *Kārikās* as well as of the *Sūtras* find themselves here before a riddle which they do not even try to explain, while they believe they are able to expound everything else. This speaks in favour of the assumption that these obscure words represent a very old tradition which has become totally unintelligible. I have no doubt that these denominations are based on the same metaphor which is current in Buddhism, viz., on that of passing over the ocean of mundane existence into the harbour of liberation. The "acquiescences" (*tuṣṭi*) of the Sāṃkhya system are, as preliminary stages of liberation, compared with smooth waters which facilitate the passage of those who have reached them.

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| | tuṣṭis | GB | YD | STK | M | J |
| 1. | *prakṛti* | *ambhas* | *ambhas* | *ambhas* | *ambhas* | *ambhas* |
| 2. | *upādāna* | *salila* | *salila* | *salila* | *salila* | *salila* |
| 3. | *kāla* | *ogha* | *ogha* | *ogha (megha)* | *ogha* | *ogha* |
| 4. | *bhāgya* | *vṛṣṭi* | *vṛṣṭi* | *vṛṣṭi* | *vṛṣṭi* | *vṛṣṭi* |
| 5. | *arjana* | *sutamas* | *sutāra* | *pāra* | *tāra* | *sutāra* |
| 6. | *rakṣaṇa* | *pāra* | *supāra* | *supāra* | *sutāra* | *supāra* |
| 7. | *kṣaya* | *sunetra* | *sunetra* | *pārāpāra* | *sumarīca* | *(?)* |
| 8. | *bhoga* | *nārika* | *sumarīca* | *anuttama-ambhas* | *uttama-ambhas* | *anuttama-ambhas* |
| 9. | *hiṃsā* | *anuttama-ambhas* | *uttamābhaya* | *uttama-ambhas* | | *uttama-ambhas* |
| | | | | | | |
| | *siddhis* | | | | | |
| 1. | *ūha* | *tāra* | *tāraka* | *tāra* | *tāra* | *tāra* |
| 2. | *śabda* | *sutāra* | *sutāra* | *sutāra* | *sutāra* | *sutāra* |
| 3. | *adhyayana* | *tāratāra* | *tārayanta* | *tāratāra* | *tāratāra* | *tāravi (?)* |
| 4. | *duḥkhavighāta* I | *pramoda* | *pramoda* | *pramoda* | *pramoda* | *pramoda* |
| 5. | *duḥkhavighāta* II | *pramudita* | *pramudita* | *mudita* | *pramudita* | *pramudita* |
| 6. | *duḥkhavighāta* III | *pramodamāna* | *modamāna* | *modamāna* | *mohana (modamāna ?)* | *modana* |
| 7. | *suhṛtprāpti* | *ramyaka* | *ramyaka* | *ramyaka* | *ramyaka* | *ramyaka* |
| 8. | *dāna* | *sadāpramudita* | *sadāpramudita* | *sadāmudita* | *sadāpramudita* | *sadāpramudita* |

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A. B. Keith in (B6291; RB9548) *The Sāṃkhya System* (Calcutta: YMCA Publishing House, 1949), 104-105, exercising his characteristic Anglo-Saxon common sense, dismisses the whole problem as “hopeless” and suggests that verses 46 to 51 of the *Kārikā* (or that portion of the text dealing with the 50 *padārthas*) are a later interpolation. Erich Frauwallner, B590; RB12160, vol. 1 319ff., argues that the 50 *padārthas* were added to the Sāṃkhya system by Vārṣagaṇya and his followers after the time of Pañcaśikha, which latter figure first formulated, according to Frauwallner, the basic evolutionary theory of Sāṃkhya (that is to say, the theory of *prakṛti*, *triguṇa*, and *satkārya*). Frauwallner argues further that the 50 *padārthas* represent an innovation regarding the psychology of the Sāṃkhya system and have very little philosophical significance. Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s own doctrine of eight *bhāvas*, according to Frauwallner, is a great improvement over the older formulation of 50 *padārthas*, but Īśvarakṛṣṇa allowed the older set of 50 *padārthas* to remain in his summary, since it had become authoritative in the tradition and could not be deleted. Frauwallner’s treatment (as he himself readily admits) is highly speculative. There is no clear evidence that Vārṣagaṇya and his followers were responsible for the set of 50 *padārthas*, and there is no evidence whatever that Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s doctrine of 8 *bhāvas* was meant in any sense as an improvement over the set of 50 *padārthas*. Quite the contrary, the *Yuktidīpikā* clearly indicates that the 8 *bhāvas* refer to a realm (the *pravṛtti* realm) that is clearly distinguished from the realm of the 50 *padārthas* (the *phala* realm). Frauwallner’s treatment, therefore, cannot be taken seriously. Most recently, Gerhard Oberhammer in (RB9925) *Strukturen yogischer Meditation: Untersuchungen zur Spiritualität des Yoga* (Vienna: Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Nos. 13, 1977) has discussed the 50 *padārthas* in an intriguing chapter entitled “Die sāmkhyistische Struktur der Meditation” (pp. 17-56), in which he argues, largely on the basis of references in the *Yuktidīpikā*, that the scheme of 50 *padārthas* represents an archaic method of meditation that focused mainly on the first three *siddhis* (namely *ūha*, *śabda*, and *adhyayana*), or, in other words, meditation as rational reflection, while relegating nonattachment (*vairāgya*) to the lower status of “contentment” (*tuṣṭi*). Fortunately, Oberhammer refrains from speculating whether this ancient system of meditation was originally Sāṃkhya or whether it can be attributed to Vārṣagaṇya, and so forth, and thereby avoids the implausible excesses of Frauwallner. Indeed, Oberhammer’s treatment tends to bring the discussion back to Garbe’s observations of almost a century earlier (as quoted above).

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My own view regarding the interpretation of the 50 *padārthas* comes through very clearly in my introductory essay in the main text on the Philosophy of Sāṃkhya. Far from being an embarrassment, I tend to see the *pratyayasarga* as a fundamental structure of the full Sāṃkhya system. I would agree with Oberhammer that it does function as a system of meditation, but I would go much further as well. The *pratyayasarga*, in my view, represents the Sāṃkhya interpretation of the phenomenal, empirical world of ordinary life that is clearly to be distinguished from the “noumenal” or “causal” realm of the *tattvas*. The *pratyayasarga* is, therefore, important for the epistemology as well as for the ethics of Sāṃkhya, making Sāṃkhya a critical realism instead of a naive realism or a confused idealism. Finally, regarding the peculiar technical names for the *tuṣṭis* and *siddhis*, I am inclined to agree with Garbe and Wilson that there is a “slang or mystical nomenclature” operating here that uses a metaphor that is fundamental in early Buddhist literature. By the same token, however, comparable metaphors are common in the older Vedic literature. For example, V.S. Agrawala in his *Sparks from the Vedic Fire: A New Approach to Vedic Symbolism* (Varanasi: Chowkhamba, 1962) sets forth a symbolic network of terms relating to the notion of *soma* (including *ṛta*, *āpas*, *asura*, *ambhas*, *salila*, *samudra*, *tamas*, *rātri*, and so forth, which he contrasts with another network relating to *agni* (Indra) (including *sūrya*, *manu*, *deva*, *jyotis*, *hiraṇyagarbha*, *ahar*, and so forth). “Crossing” in such a symbolic environment may refer not only to crossing a body of water but also to the sun and moon crossing the heavens, the sequence of day and night, and the symbolic boundaries of life and death. It is my suspicion that if the ancient Sāmkhya terms can ever be deciphered, it will be in some such symbolic network of "crossing,".

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21. Somewhat analogous conceptions of creation or manifestation by progressive deterioration may be found in Udayana's Nyāyakusumāñjali II.3 and in Vāyupurāṇa VIII. 72-88, both of which are mentioned briefly in Chakravarti B6381; RB9596, 287-288. Similar notions are also present in Buddhist literature. See Alex Wayman's chapter entitled "Buddhist Genesis and the Tantric Tradition" in his The Buddhist Tantras: Light on Indo Tibetan Esotericism (New York: Samuel Weiser, 1973), 24-29, for a good general discussion of possible Buddhist parallels. Buddhist references, however, appear to link deterioration with the ingestion of progressively coarser food. The ancient Sāmkhya sequence focusses, rather, on progressively different activities thereby linking the deterioration with the unfolding of the karmendriyas.

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22. Tattvasamāsāsūtravṛtti (also called Kramadīpikā) in V. P. Dvivedi, ed. (B3714; (RB1862), Sāmkhyasamgraha (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1969), 81-82.

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23. The correlations here and following are only speculative suggestions. The linkage of Brahmā, Prajāpati, and Indra with such tattvas as prakṛti, buddhi, ahaṃkāra, and manas is plausible enough in view of comparable linkages prevalent in the cosmological portions of the Purāṇas, and so forth. I am not as sure about the correlations of tanmātras and bhūtas with pitṛs, gandharvas, and so forth.

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24. Ibid.

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25. Ibid.

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26. But see above, note 16, in which the seventeenfold set is linked with the subtle body.

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27. I am using the terms "adhidaiva," "adhyātma" and "adhibhūta" in the Kramadīpikā sense and not in the Kārikā sense of the three kinds of duḥkha, although I am inclined to think that the two senses are clearly cognate.

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28. The Sanskrit is as follows (Yuktidīpikā, p. 21): tatra rūpapravṛttiphalalakṣaṇam vyaktam. rūpam punaḥ mahān ahaṃkāraḥ pañca tanmātrāṇi ekādaśendriyāṇi pañca mahābhūtāni. sāmānyataḥ pravṛttir dvidhā: hitakāmaprayojanaṃ ca, ahitapratiṣedhaprayojanaṃ ca. viśeṣataḥ pañca karmayonayo vṛttyādyāḥ prāṇādyāś ca pañca vāyavaḥ. phalaṃ dvidhām: dṛṣṭam adṛṣṭam ca. tatra dṛṣṭam siddhituṣṭyaśaktiviparyayalakṣaṇam; adṛṣṭam brahmādau stambaparyante saṃsāre śarīrapratilambha ity etad vyaktam.

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29. The Sanskrit is as follows (Yuktidīpikā, p. 140): tattvākhyo mahadādir bhāvākhyo dharmādir bhūtākhyo vyomādiḥ.

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30. Bhagavadgītā III.28. The Sāmkhya conceptualization of mūlaprakṛti as triguṇa and guṇapariṇāma obviates the need for separate treatments of such traditional philosophical notions as time, space, or God. Put another way, these latter categories have no place in the Sāmkhya philosophical analysis, since mūlaprakṛti as triguṇa represents the functional equivalent. Space and time are derived correlates of a beginningless process of combination (saṃghāta) and change (pariṇāma). The measurable space and time of ordinary experience, therefore, are not tattvas, but only phenomenal appearances, presumably generated by the projections (pravṛtti) of the buddhi that bring about the "consequent" (phala) realm of the pratyayasarga and the bhautikasarga. Moreover, because both prakṛti and puruṣa are beginningless and all pervasive, there could never be a "time," therefore, when puruṣa is not in proximity to prakṛti (in any given cycle of manifestation). It would appear to be the case, then, that the emergence of the causal tattvas is not a temporal process in the sense of measurable time. Putting the matter another way, the process of combination and change has neither a beginning nor an end. The notions of "beginning" and "end" are relative constructs within the combination and change of manifestation occasioned by aviveka or nondiscrimination. Regarding the problem of God, Sāmkhya argues that prakṛti is both the material (upādāna) and efficient (nimitta) cause of the manifest world; hence, there is no rational need for a doctrine of God (īśvara). To be sure, one might conceive of buddhi as Hiraṇyagarbha, Brahmā, and so forth, or one might assign a crucial revelatory (or teaching) role to sages such as Kapila or Āsuri, but all such formulations are derivative of *mūlaprakṛti* in its *buddhisattva* modality (or, in terms of Yoga philosophy, *īśvara* as *puruṣaviśeṣa*). The older Sāṃkhya literature does not directly mention space, time, or God. The notions are mentioned in the later *Sāṃkhyasūtra*, at II.12, I.92-99 and V.1-12. See also the discussion of "Time, Space and Causality" in K. C. Bhattacharya, *Studies in Philosophy*, 165-172.

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31. By "reductive materialism" is meant a philosophical view that construes or "reduces" mind, thought, ideas, feelings, and so forth, in terms of some sort of material stuff or energy or force. The expression "reductive materialism" has been used in recent philosophical writing, especially in the area of philosophy of mind—for example, in the work of Kai Nielsen, J.J.G. Smart, and others. For an older but still useful collection of discussions, see V. C. Chappell, ed., *The Philosophy of Mind* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962). For a popular and entertaining approach to the issues in a recent collection, see D. R. Hofstadter and D. G. Dennett, eds., *The Mind's I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982). See especially the useful bibliography in "Further Reading," pp. 465-482.

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32. K. C. Bhattacharya, *Studies in Philosophy*, vol. 1, 158-164.

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33. It is generally the case in Indian philosophy that a sharp distinction is not drawn between analytic and synthetic statements or between *a priori* and *a posteriori*. The Sāṃkhya treatment of *triguṇa*, therefore, is not at all anomalous in its context.

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34. K. C. Bhattacharya, *Studies in Philosophy*, vol. 1, 182.

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35. In the preface to *The Phenomenology of Mind* (in the J. B. Baillie translation, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1931, p. 80) Hegel comments, "In my view—a view which the developed exposition of the system itself can alone justify—everything depends on grasping and expressing the ultimate truth not as Substance but as Subject as well."

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Or, again, near the end of *The Phenomenology of Mind* (p. 790), Hegel comments: "Consciousness... must have taken up a relation to the object in all its aspects and phases, and have grasped its meaning from the point of view of each of them. This totality of its determinate characteristics makes the object *per se* or inherently a spiritual reality; and it becomes so in truth for consciousness, when the latter apprehends every individual one of them as self, i.e., when it takes up towards them the spiritual relationship...."

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36. K.C. Bhattacharya, *Studies in Philosophy*, vol. 1, 162ff. and 187ff.

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37. ...*calatā, kriyā; sā ca davidhā pariṇāmalakṣaṇā praspandalakṣaṇā ca. tatra pariṇāmalakṣaṇayā sahakāribhāvāntarānugṛhitasya dharmiṇaḥ pūrvadharmāt pracyutiḥ. praspandalakṣaṇā prāṇādayaḥ karmendriyavṛttayaś ca vacanādyāḥ*. Pandeya, RB1370, 60.

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38. Again, it should be noted that I am using *adhidaiva*, *adhyātma*, and *adhibhūta* in the *Kramadīpikā* sense.

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39. Cf. G. J. Larson RB1378, 115ff. and 167ff.

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40. Cf. Richard Robinson, "Classical Indian Philosophy," 167-177.

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41. Cf. G. J. Larson RB1378, 167ff.

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42. By "ghost in the machine" I am, of course, referring to Gilbert Ryle's famous essay, *The Concept of Mind* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949), in which he debunks the notion of a separate or distinct "self" or "soul."

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43. E. S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, trans., *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, vol. 1, 240.

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44. Ibid., 190.

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45. Kai Nielsen, *Reason and Practice* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 333.

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46. See above, note 31.

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47. As has been noted since the time of Deussen, there is a striking similarity between *Kārikā* 3 and the opening passage of Johannes Scottus Eriugena's *Periphyseon* (*De Divisione Naturae*), which reads: "It is my opinion that the division of Nature by means of four differences results in four species, (being divided) first into that which creates and is not created, secondly into that which is created and also creates, thirdly into that which is created and does not create, while the fourth neither creates nor is created." (critical ed.: I. P. Sheldon-Williams and L. Bieler, eds. and trans., *Periphyseon*, *De Divisione Naturae*, Book I, opening passage; Dublin: Scriptores Latine Hiberniae, vii, 1968).

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48. Some of the commentaries on the *Kārikā* explain the terms in the sequence variously. For example, there is divergence of views regarding the interpretation of *eka* and *aneka*. Vācaspati passes over the problem (perhaps thereby suggesting that the terms can be taken to mean simply "simple" and "complex"), but Gauḍapāda, the Chinese commentary, the *Jayamangalā*, and the *Māṭharavṛtti* take the terms as meaning "one" and "many." If *eka* means "one" in this context, however, then it is not correct to apply the term to both *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. The commentaries handle the difficulty by arguing (somewhat lamely) that this one component in the sequence is not to be applied to both *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*.

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49. Unfortunately, a portion of *Kārikā* 10 and all of *Kārikā* 11 are missing from the extant manuscripts of the *Yuktidīpikā*. This is very much to be regretted, because it is the *Yuktidīpikā* that most often offers the most cogent interpretations of the kinds of technical terms that one finds in these verses.

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50. I should hasten to add that this is my own view of the matter, and there is no textual support for my view other than Vijñānabhikṣu's comments under *Sāṃkhyasūtra* I.154, which, alas, is not much supporting evidence. All of the commentaries on the *Kārikā* do imply that *puruṣas* are somehow countable entities. If such is the case, then it must be conceded that the ancient *Sāṃkhya ācāryas* allowed themselves to fall into an insuperable difficulty. In my view, however, such elementary errors are not at all characteristic of the *Sāṃkhya* system. In almost every instance of the so-called weaknesses of the *Sāṃkhya* system, the weakness is traceable to later misunderstandings and distortions by subsequent interpreters (both in the commentarial tradition itself and in modern scholarship). This is why I agree so often with K. C. Bhattacharya who has argued that *Sāṃkhya* is a bold speculative philosophy the original arguments for which have been largely lost and must, therefore, be reconstructed from what remains. From a methodological point of view, this means some thing like the following: when one finds a glaring discrepancy in any given presentation of *Sāṃkhya*, one strong possibility is that the given issue has not been carefully thought through by the later transmitters of the system. Instead of pouncing on the discrepancy as polemical ammunition for showing that *Sāṃkhya* is a hopeless "bundle of contradictions" (per Śaṃkara in the native tradition, or per A. B. Keith in modern scholarship), a better approach might be to ask if possibly the discrepancy represents a misunderstanding or distortion of what the ancient *Sāṃkhya* thinkers intended. This approach presupposes that the ancient teachers were not stupid and were fully as capable of apprehending contradictions as their later opponents. It also presupposes that an ancient system of thought may be as sophisticated within its contextual framework as other later systems are within theirs. In any case, returning to the issue at hand, my suspicion is that the "plurality of *puruṣas*" (*puruṣabahutva*) has not yet been properly understood by interpreters of *Sāṃkhya* (in the extant native textual tradition and in modern scholarship). One possible way of thinking through the problem is to approach the issue as having to do with the epistemology of the *buddhi* rather than the ontology of the *puruṣas*.

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51. See the preceding chapter for a fuller discussion of the differences between Vācaspati Miśra and Vijñānabhikṣu.

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52. It should be noted that the metaphors and similes in the *Sāṃkhya* literature are by and large not technical inferential *dṛṣṭāntas*. They are closer in intention to the sorts of figurative language one finds in Plato—for example, in the *Timaeus*. The old creation myths in the *Yuktidīpikā* are to be construed in a similar manner, in my view.

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53. Frauwallner puts the matter as follows:

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Das Sāṃkhya hat also eine doppelte Bedeutung. Es wirkte bahnbrechend in der Entwicklung der klassischen Philosophie Indiens und hat wesentlich dazu beigetragen, diese Philosophie auf ihre Höhe zu führen. Ferner hat es durch seine enge Verbindung mit brahmanischen Kreisen das gesamte indische Geistesleben ungewöhnlich weit durchdrungen und hat bis in die neueste Zeit sein Bild in wesentlichen Zügen mitbestimmt. Wenn also seine rein philosophische Bedeutung auch geringer ist als die mancher anderer Systeme, so ist seine historische Bedeutung um so grösser. Und man kann mit Recht behaupten, dass ohne Kenntnis der Sāṃkhya-Philosophie ein volles Verständnis der indischen Geistesentwicklung nicht möglich ist. (B8590; RB12160, vol. 1, 450.)

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54. Chakravarti, for example, B6381; RB9596, 123, quotes xii.29 of the Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā as evidence that there were many versions or variants for the ṣaṣṭitantra, namely, “. . . ṣaṣṭitantrāṇy atha ekaikam eṣāṃ nānāvidham . . . .”

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55. See, for example, the following: E. Frauwallner B6431A; RB9627, 84-139; G. Oberhammer, “On the ‘śāstra’ Quotations of the Yuktidīpikā,” Adyar Library Bulletin 25 (1961): 131-172; G. Oberhammer (B1046D; RB2210), “The Authorship of the Ṣaṣṭitantra,” Wiener Zeitschrift für des Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens 4 (1960): 71-91; N. Nakada (RB2212), “Word and Inference in the Yuktidīpikā”, pts. 1, 2, 3, in Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu, 18.2 (1970): 36, 41-45; 19.2 (1971): 38, 25-31; 21.1 (1972): 41, 19-22; A. Wezler (RB2213), “Some Observations on the Yuktidīpikā,” Deutscher Orientalistentag, suppl. 2 (Wiesbaden), 434-455. See also A. Wezler, “Studien zum Dvādaśāranayacakra des Śvetāmbara Mallavādin: I. Der sarvasarvātmakatvavāda,” in Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus: Gedenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf, edited by K. Bruhn and A. Wezler (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, n.d.). It should also be noted that Dr. E. Harzer, of the University of Washington, Seattle, has recently completed a dissertation having to do with the epistemology of Sāṃkhya with special reference to the Yuktidīpikā. I might add, finally, that I am indebted to Dr. Harzer for drawing my attention to the above-cited work of N. Nakada on Sāṃkhya epistemology.

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56. Frauwallner B6431A; RB9627, 84-139.

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57. I should like to make clear that my comments through this section on “philosophical methodology” and “Sāṃkhya numbers” are entirely my own and admittedly highly speculative. They represent a variety of intuitions that I have reached over many years of pondering what could possibly be a deeper rationality in the Sāṃkhya predilection for enumerations. Since, to my knowledge, no one has ever attempted to explain the significance of Sāṃkhya numbers, there has been no way to proceed other than by way of my own intuitions regarding the problem. I fully recognize that I may well be wrong and that the Sāṃkhya numbers may not have any rational significance whatever. By the same token, however, I also recognize that I may well be right, but naively so. That is to say, my own lack of knowledge of the history of ancient mathematics, music, and astronomy may be preventing me from understanding a great many mathematical and astronomical allusions in the Sāṃkhya literature. In any case, I invite those with greater expertise in such matters to respond to my groping intuitions.

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58. I first noticed the Sāṃkhya predilection for prime numbers when working with the Tattvasamāsasūtra and its commentaries, and I published some of my preliminary findings in an article entitled “The format of technical philosophical writing in ancient India: inadequacies of conventional translations” (Philosophy East and West 30, no. 3 (July 1980): 375-380). Then, in April of 1981 I attended a Conference on Sāṃkhya-Yoga, sponsored by the Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions in Stony Brook, New York. I read a paper at the conference entitled “An Eccentric Ghost in the Machine: Formal and Quantitative Aspects of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga Dualisim,” (published in *Philosophy East and West* 33, no. 3 (July 1983): 219-233 and available in typescript through the Proceedings of the Conference, prepared by the IASWR), and the respondent to the paper was Ernest McClain, Professor Emeritus of Music at Brooklyn College of the CUNY and author of *The Myth of Invariance* (New York: Nicholas Hays, 1976), *The Pythagorean Plato* (New York: Nicholas Hays, 1978), and so forth. McClain suggested that my intuitions concerning Sāmkhya enumerations were probably more on target than I suspected, and he directed me to read R. S. Brumbaugh’s *Plato’s Mathematical Imagination* (New York: Kraus Reprint, 1954) and O. Neugebauer’s *The Exact Sciences in Antiquity* (New York: Dover, 1957/69). He suggested, furthermore, that I might well find that the first three prime numbers were especially important in Sāmkhya since these numbers are especially important in Pythagorean tuning theory. Moreover, it appeared to him that the Sāmkhya numbers probably bear some relation with the sexagesimal system of counting (as opposed to the decimal system). My own subsequent work confirmed that, indeed, the numbers 2, 3 and 5 (the first three prime numbers) are especially prominent in the Sāmkhya system. I have also been struck by the possible parallel between the sexagesimal system of counting and the old Sāmkhya term, *ṣaṣṭitantra* (“the system of 60”). In any case, for those interested in mathematical allegorizing among the Babylonians, Sumerians, Pythagoreans, Hindus, and so forth an issue of the *Journal for Social and Biological Structures*, 1982, no. 5 (London Academic Press) has been given over to publishing a symposium on the topic, the lead paper of which is Ernest G. McClain’s “Structure in the Ancient Wisdom Literature: The Holy Mountain” (pp. 233-248). My own contribution to the symposium appeared in the next issue of the journal, entitled “McClain’s Mathematical Acoustics and Classical Sāmkhya Philosophy.”

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59. See the earlier exposition of the 50 *padārthas* in the present chapter, and see also note 20, supra.

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60. For useful and brief summaries of Indian views concerning astronomy and the calendar, see A. L. Basham, *The Wonder that was India* (New York: Evergreen 1959), 489-495. For more detailed treatments, see O. Neugebauer, *The Exact Sciences in Antiquity*; and A. Pannekoek, *A History of Astronomy* (New York: Interscience Publishers, Inc., 1961).

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61. The best discussion of the sexagesimal system is to be found in O. Neugebauer, *The Exact Sciences in Antiquity*.

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62. Ernest McClain, *The Myth of Invariance*, 13.

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63. Ibid., 12-17.

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64. Ibid., 13.

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65. Ibid., 33-42.

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66. Ibid., 73-93.

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67. Cf. Gerald J. Larson, “A Possible Mystical Interpretation of Ahaṃkāra and the Tanmātras in the Sāmkhyas” in *Sri Aurobindo: A Garland of Tributes*, edited by Arabinda Basu (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Research Academy, 1972), 79-87.

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68. Parallels between ancient Indian philosophy and ancient Greek philosophy have been noted and debated for well over a century, and A. B. Keith’s comments (in *A History of Sanskrit literature*, London: Oxford University Press, 1920, 500) are still very much to the point, namely:

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Parallels between Indian and Greek philosophy are well worth drawing, but it may be doubted whether it is wise thence to proceed to deduce borrowing on either side. The parallelism of Vedānta and the Eleatics and Plato is worth notice, but it is no more than that, and the claim that Pythagoras learned his philosophical ideas from India though widely accepted rests on extremely weak foundations. The attempt to prove a wide influence of the Sāmkhya on Greece depends in part in the belief in the very early date of the Sāmkhya, and if, as

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we have seen, this is dubious, it is impossible to assert that the possibility of influence on Herakleitos, Empedokles, Anaxagoras, Demokritos, and Epikuros is undeniable. But what is certain is that there is no such convincing similarity in any detail as to raise these speculations beyond the region of mere guesswork. An influence of Indian thought on the Gnostics and Neoplatonists may be held to be more likely, and it would be unjust to rule it out of court.

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There is evidence, of course, for historical contacts between ancient Greeks and Indians, some of which were extensive and involved considerable detail, as Jean Filiozat has shown (in his *La doctrine classique de la medicine indienne*, Paris, 1949, and in other writings). Moreover, such contacts may well have occurred already in the fifth and fourth century B.C.E. in the Persian courts, and increasingly thereafter. Furthermore, there is little doubt that there was some awareness among the Greeks and Indians concerning the philosophical and religious views of one another. In almost every instance, however, whether it be Pythagoras, Pyrrho, Plotinus, and so forth, on the Greek side, or the Buddhists, Sāṃkhya, Vedānta, and so forth, on the Indian side, the views of a given thinker or system can be most satisfactorily dealt with in their own specific historical contexts. Regarding specifics, after the fifth century B.C.E. there is neither sufficient evidence nor, even more than that, a pressing need to posit any kind of external borrowing. If such is the case, then the question naturally arises: how are the parallels to be explained? One avenue of approach would be to push the matter further back, to the research of Georges Dumézil and his followers and to look for a common proto-Indo-European ideology from which the later Greeks, Iranians, Indians, and so on derived many of the basic categories and notions concerning corporate life. This is still basically a historical approach but a much more sophisticated one (albeit fraught with the problem of even less evidence!). Another approach would be along the lines of what social scientists have called "independent invention" (whether in terms of Jungian "archetypes" or one or another form of structuralism). Yet another approach, which interestingly combines historical perspectives and "independent invention" perspectives, is that represented currently in the work of Ernest McClain who wishes to argue that certain principles of ratio theory, mathematical acoustics, astronomy, and music were widely known in the ancient Near East, the Mediterranean world, South Asia, and Central Asia (and extending even into China) and that these principles formed the basis of much ancient ritual and myth and remain as latent residues in many later cultural productions (for example, Pythagorean speculations about numbers and things, number references in Plato, the numerical relations between the *kalpas* in Purāṇic texts, and so forth). McClain hypothesizes, in other words, that there was a sophisticated "structure of ancient wisdom" (related to mathematics, music, and astronomy), that, if cogently reconstructed, would go a long way toward explaining the striking "parallels" that one finds in ancient thought.

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Returning now to Sāṃkhya philosophy, my own inclination is to argue along the latter lines (namely, the approaches of Dumézil, structuralism, or an archaic tradition of mathematical allegorizing) by way of explaining parallels, rather than the former (namely, some kind of historical borrowing between India and Greece). Put another way, my own view is that Sāṃkhya in ancient India is an interesting and context-specific variant of the kind of one finds in Pythagoreanism as a context-specific variant in Greek thought. Both provide intriguing glimpses of the birth of philosophy in their respective contexts, and both proved to be profoundly influential for the subsequent development of their respective intellectual traditions.

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⁶⁹ Paul Hacker B8877; RB12428, 54-83; Frauwallner B6431A; RB9627, 84-37.

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⁷⁰ Variant listings of the ten *mūlikārthas* are conveniently summarized by E. A. Solomon RB1387, 182-185.

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71. A useful and brief discussion of these attributions may be found in the *Kramadīpikā*, 86.
72. Frauwallner B6431A; RB9627, 84-137.
73. Ibid., 131.
74. Ibid., 126-130. Here and following I am providing an English paraphrase of Frauwallner's German translation of the reconstructed fragments.
75. Ibid., 126-127.
76. Ibid., 128-129.
77. *Yuktidīpikā*, pp. 40-41.
78. The expression "*puruṣārtha*" in the Sāṃkhya literature always refers to ordinary "experience" (*bhoga* or *upabhoga*) and the extraordinary "experience of release" (*apavarga*). The usual translation "for the sake of the *puruṣa*" (*puruṣārtha*), therefore, simply refers to the inherent teleology of *prakṛti*.
79. See especially Vācaspati's treatment of *Kārikā* 23, 24, and 27.
80. See above, note 35.
81. For an interesting discussion of Sāṃkhya as critical realism, see M. Hiriyanna (B6316; RB9566), "The Sāṃkhya View of Error," *Philosophical Quarterly* (Amalner, 1929): 99-105.
82. The comparisons and contrasts with Kant have been nicely formulated by S. K. Maitra (B6416; RB9617), "Sāṃkhya Realism: A Comparative and Critical Study", in *Recent Indian Philosophy*, edited by Kalidas Bhattacharya (Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1963), 130-143. Some passages of Maitra's analysis are worth quoting in this context:

First 87 of 97 passages. Read on

Cites (18)