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The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies v9.c85: Sthiramati (560)

The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies v9.c85

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Sthiramati (560)

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"It is said that Sthiramati originated from Lāṭa country (Gujarat Central and South). He was a disciple of Guṇamati but probably turned away from his teacher as he had established himself in Valabhī. It seems that Sthiramati was not always in perfect doctrinal agreement with the school in Nālandā for the Chinese comentators very often point out the differences, if not the open contradictions, with the opinions of Dharmapāla. He must have succeeded his master in Valabhī: we know from the inscription that the king Guhasena of Valabhī (ruled 558-566 A.D.) presented a monastery to Sthiramati. Sthiramati's dates as given by e.g., Masaaki Hattori and Erich Frauwallner as 510-570 are accepted by scholars at present. Since both Sthiramati and Dharmapāla criticize Bhavya's views Sthiramati must postdate Bhavya. The tradition that Sthiramati was a direct disciple of Vasubandhu is unlikely.

175. Sthiramati, Tattvārthaṭīkā on Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa

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Summary by Robert E. Buswell Jr.

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The Chinese title of this work is *Chi-she-fun shih-i shu*. The Chinese text appearing in the Taisho Tripiṭaka is a reprint of a Tun-huang manuscript (Pelliot no. 3196), belonging to the French collection of the Bibliotheque Nationale. No other Chinese recensions are known, but a fragment of a Uighur translation of portions of the Chinese text has been discovered 2²⁰ A prefatory note to the extant Chinese text states that the commentary comprises a total of 28,000 *ślokas*, which corresponds closely to the size of the Tibetan recension of the commentary. Only fragments of the first five fascicles (*chuan*) of the Chinese text are extant, covering the first three fascicles of Hsüan-tsang's Chinese translation of *Abhidharmakośa* (T.1558); this treats part of the first and second *Kośasthānas*. The commentary cites 15 full and two half-verses of the 48 *kārikās* in the Sanskrit recension of the first *Kośasthāna*, *Dhātunirdeśa*, and eight of the 73 *kārikās* in the Sanskrit of the second chapter, Indriyanirdeśa.²¹ Such important texts as Mahāvibhāṣā (T 1545) and Saṃghabhadra's Nyāyānusāra (T 1562) are quoted by Sthiramati (though without citing his sources by name), and there is little in the extant fragments that can be considered particularly innovative.

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²⁰ text of the note

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Based on the existing evidence, it is impossible to determine the original size of the complete translation of the commentary. We are on equally unsure footing as to when and by whom the translation was made. There are, however, close affinities between the translation style and terminology of this text and that found in parallel Abhidharma works rendered by Hsüan-tsang and his associates; this could suggest that this translation also was done by Hsüan-tsang, probably sometime after the completion of the translation of the Mahāvibhāṣā in 659 A.D. The contents of the Chinese-Uighur and Tibetan recensions seem to have little in common, the former apparently being a much abridged rendition of the commentary.

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Fascicle One: Dhātunirdeśa (T1561.29.325a.5-326a.1). Sthiramati begins with an invocation, which he then explicates in the following manner: Because of one's reverence toward the dharma, one constantly enjoys hearing the dharma; this produces learned knowledge (śrutamayiprajñā), which gives rise successively to understanding generated through reflection (cintamayiprajñā), wisdom deriving from spiritual development (bhāvanāmayiprajñā), and finally wisdom which is free from any associations with the outflows (anāsravajñāna). Thanks to this last one is able to bring an end to all the proclivities and thus realize enlightenment. Sthiramati subsequently uses a similar chain of relationships to explain the dependence of Abhidharma on instinctive knowledge and learned knowledge.

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Based on Saṃghabhadra's explanation in Nyāyānusāra (T 1562.29.329a) the seven purposes of the text are next treated, which are explicated in terms of the invocatory verse of Kośa 1.1. These are the perfection of knowledge, forsaking, benefitting others, skill in means, acting as a spiritual guide, resolution, and the title. "He who has dispelled all darkness entirely" (1.1a) refers to the perfection of knowledge. "Dispelled all of it" (1.1a) is the perfection of forsaking. "He has pulled all beings out of the mire of saṃsāra (1.1b) refers to the perfection of benefitting others. "Having paid respects" (1.1c) is the perfection of skill. "The teacher who teaches things as they are (1.1c) refers to the perfection of skill, i.e., the Buddha's ability to use

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skill-in-means to explain the dharma in such a way that sentient beings will benefit. "I will explain the śāstra (1.1d) is the perfection of resolution, because one has the resolute intention to write this śāstra. "Treasury of Abhidharma" (1.1d) refers to the perfection of the name.

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Sthiramati then continues on to discuss the five classifications of factors (matter, consciousness, mental associates, dissociated and unconditioned), and explains why only a Buddha, not a seeker or a self-enlightened one, may fully understand their significance. This is illustrated with tales of the inability of Śāriputra and Mahāmaudgalyāyana to match the extensive knowledge of the Buddha. Śāriputra had refused ordain a certain postulant because the elder had been unable to find any affinities with monastic life in the man over the last two uncountable eons; the Buddha, however, was able to discover that still farther back in the past, that person had such affinities and allowed him to ordain. Maudgalyāyana, despite his reputation as an adept in spiritual powers, was unable to determine where his mother had been reborn; only the Buddha was able to discern her destiny outside the Trichiliocosm.

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The third verse, on the value of the analytical investigation of factors in bringing an end to the defilements is also illustrated by Sthiramati with a story from Kāśyapa Buddha's time, about a monk whose constant criticisms of his fellows ordained and lay had led him to rebirth as a large fish. After being landed by a fisherman, the Buddha came to realize the being's previous state, and preached the dharma for him. Becoming repentant at his past conduct, the fish refused all food and drink, and starved himself to death. He was reborn in heaven, where he was able to hear the dharma and benefit from it. These treatments are typical of Sthiramati's nontechnical approach to most of the kārikās.

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Fascicle Two (T1561.29.326a.2-b.16). The major focus of the fragment remaining of this chapter is an examination of the meaning of unmanifested matter as given in 1.11. The Kośa had defined unmanifested matter as that stream which was the product of the material elements and which occurred even in the mind of a distracted or unconscious person. Sthiramati cites a verse, taken verbatim from Saṃghabhadra's Nyāyānusāra, which instead describes unmanifested matter as a physical element which is unimpeded and which is found in either an active, concentrated or absent state of mind. Sthiramati unfortunately gives no further explication of unmanifested matter such as is found in his commentary to Vasubandhu's Pañcaskandhaka. This fascicle concludes with the verses in the *Kośa* summarizing the five aggregates (1.13, 14c-d, 15, 16), but without any further explication.

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Fascicle Three (T1561.29.326b.17-c.21). The three classifications of factors as aggregates, organs, and elements are discussed, and their meanings of aggregation (*rāśi*), gate for coming into being (*ayadvāra*), and element (*gotra*) are given, following the explanation of *Kośa* I.20a-b. A simile for the meaning of element is related: just as a single mountain may contain many types of ore, such as copper, iron, gold, and silver, so too does a single body or a single continuum (*saṃtāna*) contain 18 elements--the 18 elements. Four verses (*Kośa* I.25, 28, 29, 33) are then given with no further explication, and the discussion on the three types of construction (*vikalpa*) (*Kośabhāṣya* 1.33) is cited verbatim from Hsüan-tsang's translation (T1558.29.8b.2-4). Sthiramati adds that an eightfold division of construction is incorrect.

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Fascicle Four (T1561.29.326c.22-327a.21) The following verses from the *Kośa* are cited without explication: AK 1.37, 38, 41c-d, 42, 46, 47. The commentary continues by citing verbatim Hsüan-tsang's translation of the *Kośa*'s listing of the 22 senses (T. 1558.29.13a.20-23), Sthiramati adding only the relevant *sutra* passage where this list appears.

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Fascicle Five: *Indriyanirdeśa* (T1561.29.327a.220-328a.²⁷) This fascicle begins the treatment of the second *Kośasthāna*. After citing *Abhidharmakośa* II.1 and three explanatory verses from *Nyāyānusāra* (T 1562.29.377b.18-23), Sthiramati then continues on to show how the mind predominates over the physical and verbal activities. He illustrates this with the example of a fetal libido: even in that unborn state, a male embryo will lust after the mother and hate the father, while a female fetus will have the opposite feelings.

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Six more verses are then cited in succession (*Kośa* ii.2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9), after which Sthiramati continues with a discussion on the fact that only the last three senses in the list are free from the outflows--i.e., the faculties of "I shall come to understand the not yet understood" (*anājñātājñāsyāmīndriya*), understanding (*ājñendriya*) and having achieved full understanding (*ājñātāvīndriya*). He illustrates this point with a long excerpt from a scripture in which the Buddha's reticence to teach the *dharma* after his enlightenment is overcome through the intercession of the god, Brahmā Sahampati. The Buddha surveys the beings of the world

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with his enlightened eye and discovers that there are sentient beings of all different capacities, some of whom would be capable of understanding his teaching. He thus consents to turn the wheel of the *dharma*. ²²⁷

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²²⁷ text of the note

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Sthiramati then turns to a consideration of the faculty of life-force (*jīvitendriya*), which AK II.10 had classified as the only sense which was always resultant (*vipāka*), i.e., the product of actions in previous rebirths. Sthiramati cites a verse which shows the differences in the possible lifespans of various regions; our realm was of indeterminate lifespan, as was shown from the Buddha's statement that the lifespan of humans in Jambudvipa had varied from 80,000 years during the time of the Buddha Vipaśyin to 20,000 years during the Buddha Kāśyapa's age, to only 100 years during Gautama's own era. Hence, lifespan was definitely dependent upon one's previous karma, and could be extended through meritorious deeds, such as building *stūpas* and monasteries.

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176. STHIRAMATI, *Bhāṣya on Asaṅga's Abhidharmasamuccaya* (560)

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Summary by Paul Griffiths

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Author: The colophon of the only extant Sanskrit manuscript does not give the author's name. The Chinese tradition suggests that the work is by one Buddhasimha and was later revised by Sthiramati. The Tibetan tradition, in contrast, unanimously states that it is by Rgyal Ba'i Sras - probably best reconstructed as Jinaputra. There is now no external evidence to resolve this issue; extensive discussion was given to it by Prahlad Pradhan in 1950 and much of the relevant material may be found in his analysis. Internal evidence shows that there are substantial similarities--to the point of precise verbal parallels--between this (ASBh) and other works that are clearly attributed to Sthiramati. While the existence of such parallels is by no means clear evidence, it may suffice to adopt, as a provisional solution, Sthiramati's name as the author of the work. If in fact the ASBh was by either Buddhasimha or Jinaputra this is not terrible enlightening since we know little about either figure.

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Editions: A single complete manuscript of the Sanskrit original of this text was discovered by Rahula Sankrtyayana in 1934 during his first major journey into Tibet in search of Buddhist Sanskrit texts. An edition of this manuscript was produced by Nathmal Tatia in 1976, ²⁷ and it is on this edition that the following summary is largely based. Tatia's edition appears reasonably accurate, though there is no doubt that it would have benefited from greater use of the Chinese and (especially) Tibetan translations.

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²⁷ text of the note

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Translations: (i) Tibetan: the entire work was translated into Tibetan by Jinamitra, Ilendrabodhi and Ye Shes Sde (Tohoku #4053, D Sems-Tsam LI 1b1-117a5; Peking #5554, P Sems-Tsam SHI 1b1-143b2). The translation is, as far as can be judged, faithful and accurate. It provides a useful check upon Tatia's Sanskrit edition and has been so used in the summary that follows. The Tibetan canonical collections also contain a work entitled *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* (ASV), translated from a Sanskrit original also attributed to Rgyal Ba'i Sras (Jinaputra) by Jinamitra and Ye Shes Sde (Tohoku #4054, D Sems-Tsam LI 117a5-293a7; Peking #5555, Sems-Tsam SHI 143b2-362a8). This text is essentially a conflation of the AS and the ASBh, though there are some minor differences with the material found in those texts; also, the Tibetan translation found in ASV is often different from those found in the Tibetan versions of AS and ASBh, while undoubtedly reflecting an identical Sanskrit original. These differences will not be significant for the summary that follows.

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(ii) Chinese: there is extant in Chinese only a complete translation of the AS - that is to say, a Chinese version of a text that is substantially identical to the AS and ASBh taken together. This translation, like that of the AS, was made by Xuanzang (i.e., Hsüan-tsang) (Taisho #1606, Vol. 31, 695a-774a).

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(iii) Other languages: there is no complete translation extant in any language other than those noted above. Various short sections have been translated and commented upon by contemporary Western, Indian and Japanese scholars.

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Form and Influence: The ASBh is a commentary to the AS, designed to elucidate many of the terse definitions found in that text. Many of its comments therefore simply gloss key terms in the AS with synonyms or near-synonyms and give grammatical analyses of Sanskrit compounds. But there are also occasional longer and more systematic philosophical discussions. Not every section of the AS receives discussion in the ASBh, but, like the text upon which it comments, the ASBh expounds the philosophical system of Indian Yogācāra. The text has close links with the other major texts of that tradition: there are parallels with, for example, the 182. *Trimśikābhāṣya*, the

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*Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya* of Vasubandhu and Asvabhāva's *Upanibandhana*; Vasubandhu's *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya* and Asvabhāva's *Ṭīkā*, Asanga's *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and *Viniścayasamgraha*. Some of the more important of these parallel passages will be pointed out.

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The structure of the ASBh follows that of the AS. The section numbers given here correspond to those in the summary of the AS. The absence of a section number in this summary may indicate either that the ASBh has no comment on that section or that I judge the comment given to be of only philological or historical interest. The abbreviation T refers to page and line of Tatia's edition of the Sanskrit text.

A. Compendium of Characteristics

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(Lakṣaṇasamuccaya) (E1.1-48.17)

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The introductory section (T 1.1-9) describes the purpose with which the text was composed in terms of the twofold advantage which results from the attainment of intellectual skill in handling the categories programmatically defined by the AS. The advantages are those of attention and analysis of debate, relating respectively the development of concentration and insight and that of skill in logic and philosophical debate.

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A5 Characteristics of the Aggregates, Elements and Spheres (E 2.10-3.2). Physical form is defined as being characterised by changeability; sensation is defined as experience resulting from good or bad actions committed in the past, and is connected to the functions of the store-consciousness as receptacle for the effects of both good and bad actions; conceptualization is defined as the expression in language of what is experienced through the senses; no comment is offered on either of the aggregates of traces or consciousness.

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The store-consciousness is also given a key role in the operations of the sense-consciousnesses. It is the store-consciousness that accumulates the karmic seeds from previous operations of the sense-consciousnesses and, as a result of the ripening of these seeds, enables them to operate in the present and future.

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A6 Arrangement of Aggregates, Elements and Spheres (E3.3-20.2)

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A6.1 Arrangement of the aggregate of form: here the ASBh expounds the five types of cause which define the senses in which physical form is dependent upon the four great elements (earth, water, fire and air). The first is the cause of arising, the second is the cause of existence, the third is the cause of similarity, the fourth the cause of endurance, and the fifth the cause of increase.

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A6.2 Arrangement of the aggregate of feeling A6.3 Arrangement of the aggregate of identification A6.4 Arrangement of the aggregate of traces: a detailed exposition of the fifty-three Yogācāra mental concomitants. The ASBh discusses in detail the five errors contained in the view that there is an existent individual, errors which were simply mentioned in the AS. The first error (dosa) is that of identifying any of the aggregates with the self: this is incorrect because the aggregates do not possess the defining characteristics (permanence and so forth) of a self. The second error is that of locating a self among the aggregates; this is incorrect because the aggregates are impermanent, and the idea of basing a (permanent) self upon non-(permanently) existent aggregates makes no sense. The third error is that of thinking that the self possesses (the qualities of) any of the aggregates, since this would mean that the self (which is by definition permanent, uncaused and existent) must not be self-dependent. The fourth error is that of thinking that the self is something quite separate from the aggregates: this would mean that the self must be bodiless (since the physical body comprises one of the aggregates, that of matter), and no such bodiless self is in fact apprehended. The fifth error has to do with spontaneous liberation: if a self entirely separate from the aggregates exists then it would automatically be liberated since liberation is defined as separation from bondage to the aggregates. And this is not seen to occur.

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Substantial attention is also given to the six kinds of distraction as one of the mental concomitants.

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The definitions of the twenty-three traces dissociated from mind amount to little more than grammatical and schematic glosses on the very brief definitions found in the AS.

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A6.5 Arrangement of the aggregate of consciousness: the ASBh begins with a discussion of the nature of mind, identifying it with the store-consciousness and providing brief definitions of the key terms used in the AS.

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The ASBh then gives an eightfold proof of the existence of the store-consciousness, quoting explicitly the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī, another important Yogācāra text. The proofs are framed as negative conditionals; if the store-consciousness does not exist, then certain absurd

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consequences can be seen to follow: (i) If the store-consciousness does not exist then the operation of the effects of previous karma could have no locus (five subsidiary reasons are given for this); (u) If the store-consciousness does not exist there could be no first functioning of the six sense-consciousnesses since there would be no basis from which they could arise. Also, as the ASBh points out, the fact that the different sense-consciousnesses (visual, auditory, etc.) sometimes function simultaneously - as when they are all directed to an identical object - indicates that they must have a common locus, which must be the store-consciousness. Denial of the store-consciousness leads to denial of the possibility of the simultaneous operation of different consciousnesses; (iii) If the store consciousness does not exist then there could be no clear mental images in the mind (mamas, mental organ, in this case). This is so because, for one who denies the existence of the store-consciousness, the sense-consciousnesses can operate only serially and not simultaneously (see argument (ii) above), and this would mean that whenever the mental consciousness is operating only that consciousness can be operating. The result would be the abandonment of any distinction between memory - which, according to this system, possesses less clear mental images than does mental cognition of a present object - and mental awareness of a (metaphysically and epistemically) present object, which operates simultaneously with the apprehension of the given object by one of the other sense-consciousnesses; (iv) If the store-consciousness does not exist there is nothing of which the quality of seedness can be predicated. This is because the six sense-consciousnesses mutually condition one another from moment to moment and do not plant seeds - that is, perform actions the results of which need not occur for some time. Another locus is required for such seeds, and this can only be the store-consciousness. Also, it is only the store-consciousness which can account for the renewed operation of a given mental continuum after a period of quiescence since it is precisely the store-consciousness which holds the seeds that make such a renewal possible; (v) If the store-consciousness does not exist then action cannot occur. The argument here suggests that since action (karma) is apprehended as operating under a number of different aspects at once, and since this can only be the case if a number of different sense-consciousnesses can operate simultaneously (see arguments (ii) and (iii)), the store-consciousness is a necessary postulate; (vi) If the store-consciousness does not exist then physical experience (kāyikānubhava) cannot occur. The argument here is that the physical experience of a person in a wide variety of mental states goes on, in its richness and variety, largely independently of those mental states. This can only be explained on the basis of store-consciousness; (vii) If the store-consciousness does not exist, emergence from the attainment of meditative states which are entirely without consciousness is inexplicable. This is because the only cause for the re-emergence of consciousness would be the body - a manifest absurdity for the Yogācāra; (viii) If the store-consciousness does not exist then there could be no transmission of consciousness from one body to another at the time of death. The only other possible candidate for such transmission is the mental consciousness - one more reductio ad absurdum for the Yogācāra.

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The ASBh concludes section A6 with a long series of grammatical glosses on compounds from the AS. It also includes, as part of its discussion of the meaning of the term "aggregate" (skandha), a list of the eleven kinds of greedy desire to which the eleven modes of existence appropriate to physical form (already mentioned in outline in the AS) correspond.

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A7 Division of the Aspects of Aggregates, Elements and Spheres (E 20.3-46.4) Here a series of categories is applied by means of question-and-answer (see the summary of section A7 of the AS) to the aggregates, elements and spheres. The ASBh states that the point of this method of analysis is the removal of false attribution and delusion pertaining to objects and their defining characteristics. Each of the categories is then briefly discussed. Most of these discussions take the form of the provision of synonyms and grammatical glosses for terms and compounds of philosophical prose. Perhaps the greatest space is devoted to a discussion of the scheme of dependent origination and the causal system which underlies it (sections A7.24-A7.25), though even here only detail is added to the outline AS account.

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A8-A10 Analyses of Collection, Conjunction and Concomitance (E 46.5-48.17)

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B. ANALYSIS OF THE TRUTHS (satyaviniścaya) (E 49.1-94.15)

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B2 The Truth of Suffering (E 49.1-55.4)

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B2.3 The ASBh analyses the third defining characteristic of suffering - that of emptiness - in the following terms: emptiness of

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essential nature is equated with constructed nature (parikalpitasvabhāva) because it is without any defining characteristic of its own (svalakṣaṇa); emptiness which consists in nonexistence in any particular manner is equated with dependent nature (paratantrasvabhāva) because any mode of existence that is imagined to exist does not in fact do so; and natural emptiness is equated with perfected nature (pariniṣpannasvabhāva) because such existence is naturally empty.

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B2.4 On momentariness. The momentariness of mental events is taken as established and is used as a framework for the demonstration of the momentariness of physical form. The ASBh therefore attempts to show that physical form is in all important senses dependent upon awareness (citta); this is done through a series of categories which explain from all angles the complete dependence of the physical upon the mental: the physical is grasped or appropriated by the mental; it is given continued existence by its association with consciousness; it is based upon mind and its modes of existence depend upon those of the mental continuum upon which it is based; since mind is momentary and physical form acts as the material support of mind, physical form too must be momentary since a material support cannot be different in kind from that which it supports.

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B3 The Truth of Origin (E 55.5-74.9)

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B3.3 The ASBh gives long analyses of the AS's brief outline of the types of action; the basic division, as in the AS, is that between volitional action (cetana) and action that occurs subsequent to volition (cetayitva). The latter is in turn subdivided, as is standard in almost all Buddhist texts, into three: physical, vocal and mental. These three in turn can be either good or bad. There are ten kinds of bad action, ranging from murder through sexual misconduct to the holding of false philosophical views. Each of these actions in turn has five aspects: its object, its intention, its application, its defilements, and its final accomplishment. The ASBh gives examples of these aspects in the case of murderous action: here, the object of the action is the being to be killed; the intention is the intention to kill; the application is the murderous action proper; and the final accomplishment is the bringing about of the death of the being concerned. All these aspects are necessary in order for a karmically productive action to occur, and the same schema is applied to the other types of good and bad action. The remainder of this section of the ASBh consists of a multiplication of subcategories of action and its results - much of which can be directly paralleled in the Abhidharma texts of other schools, for example the lengthy discussions of action in the fourth chapter of the Abhidharmakośa and of comments upon the catena of sūtra quotations found in the AS.

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B4 The Truth of Cessation (E 74.10-76.4) The ASBh provides very sparse and incomplete commentary upon this section of the AS; of the twelvefold division of the truth of cessation offered in that text, only three (B4.2, B4.8 and B4.12) are commented on at all, and only the last - the extensive list of synonyms - in any detail. Even here we find only lists of synonyms and brief grammatical comments.

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B5 The Truth of Path (E 76.5-94.15)

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B5.4 The ASBh explains how it is that upon the path of vision the practitioner is enabled to perceive objects without using either of the two kinds of conventional designation - that which describes an object as a being or a thing. This occurs, according to the ASBh, because during the practise of this path the practitioner does not mentally construct images of selves or things, but instead perceives the world as it actually is, completely without subjects and objects. Extensive discussion is given to the standard division of the path of vision into patiences and knowledges.

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B5.5 The path of cultivation is defined as the obtaining of the complete comprehension of the four truths on the part of noble seekers.

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B5.5a The description of the mundane path of cultivation, upon which the meditations and immaterial states are practised, is largely given over to a detailed analysis of the psychological components of these meditative states and their functions in removing passions and depravities. An especially interesting feature of the ASBh s discussion of this issue - which in most respects is not significantly different from the corresponding discussions in Abhidharma texts of other schools - is the occurrence of a sevenfold list of acts of attention by means of which the meditative stages are obtained. The seven are, first, that which recognizes characteristics - which means that the practitioner recognizes the characteristics of the state in which he finds himself as a result of hearing the doctrine and considering its meaning; the second goes beyond such hearing and considering and zealously applies itself to the development of tranquility and insight; the third separates itself from the passions appropriate to the stage upon which the practitioner finds himself; the fourth cultivates pleasure in the idea of abandoning passions beyond those which have already been abandoned; the fifth investigates

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closely the mechanisms by which passions occur in the mind of the practitioner; the sixth acts as an antidote to all the passions below the stage of the relevant meditative level; and the seventh and final act brings the practitioner to the attainment of the meditative stage under consideration. There are seven such acts belonging to each of the four meditations and the four formless states.

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B5.5b In its discussion of the relationship between the condition of being freed from the passions proper to the material level (as part of his analysis of the transcendent path of cultivation) and the condition of attaining the peaceful liberations of the immaterial levels, the ASBh provides a good example of the use of the tetralemma in order to unpack all the possible alternatives; there are conditions under which the practitioner can have become free from the passions proper to the material realm and yet not attain the immaterial states. Similarly, there are conditions under which he can attain the latter but not the former, both, and neither.

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B5.5f The ASBh gives an interesting analysis of the four applications of mindfulness from a Yogācāra point of view, placing a great deal of stress upon the importance of manipulating mental images in one's contemplation of body, sensation, mind and mental objects. According to the ASBh four errors are abandoned by the practise of mindfulness: the error of thinking that there is something pure within the individual mental continuum; of thinking that there is something pleasant therein; of thinking that there is something permanent therein; and of thinking that there is a self therein. Also, as a result of these practices, the practitioner enters in a further understanding of the truths: the four objects of mindfulness are correlated with the four truths. Finally, as a result of these practises the practitioner realizes separation from attachment to body, sensations, mind or mental objects. Similarly detailed commentary is given to the other practises contained with the thirty-seven qualities which aid enlightenment.

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B5.6 Analysis of the final path.

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B5.6a The ASBh provides detailed definitions of each of the twenty-four types of depravity.

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B5.6c A detailed discussion of the threefold division of the continuous revolution at the basis. The first division consists in the continuous revolution belonging to one who has attained the path of the adept, and is defined in typically Yogācāra-Tathāgatagarbha terms as the removal of those adventitious defilements which belong to the naturally radiant mind. The other two divisions concern the transformation of the mundane path into the transcendent and the complete removal of all depravities. This section of the ASBh provides a useful insight into the Yogācāra psychology of enlightenment.

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C. ANALYSIS OF DHARMA (E 95.1-116.12) C1 Divisions of the Canonical Literature (T 95.1-98.7). Brief definitions of the major divisions of the Buddhist canon, together with some discussion of the functions and goals of each type of literature. C2 Dharma considered as the Object of Mental Activity (E 98.8-99.6) C3 Reasons, Methods and Results of Studying Dharma (E 99.7-102.4).

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C3.1 The ASBh explains the four reasons for studying dharma in the following terms: (i) the reason of dependence, since dharma explains what depends upon what - for example, just as the arising of conditioned phenomena is dependent upon causes and conditions, so the arising of shoots is dependent upon seed-bearing fields; (ii) the reason of cause and effect, since dharma explains what causes what; (iii) the reason of establishing a conclusion, since dharma teaches proper conclusions with regard to things that need to be established; (iv) the reason of the true nature of things, since dharma establishes the truth about the way things really are.

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C3.2 The four methods of studying dharma: (i) the method of studying words, which consists in the investigation that realises the true nature of language as being simply a designation; (ii) the method of studying things by means of language - the language of the doctrine - and the concomitant realization that things also have no independent existence; (iii) the method of studying the putative essential nature of things as consisting simply in the means used to designate them. This has to do with the relation between propositions and their referents, and the concomitant realization that there is an irreducible mutuality between that which designates and that which is designated. This necessarily means, from the Yogācāra point of view, that essential nature actually has no existence outside of the fact that it can be the object of an act of designation; (iv) a method similar to (iii) except one that is concerned with particulars (viśeṣa) rather than abstract essences. The same points about the referential relationship are made.

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C3.4 The five stages of spiritual practice belonging to one

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who studies dharma in a concentrated manner: all except the fourth - dharma considered as radiance (āloka) are given cursory exposition by the ASBh.

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C3.4d Dharma considered as radiance: here the ASBh describes the practitioner's progress from a perception of sense-contents (viṣaya) to a realization that appear to be sense-objects are actually nothing other than the practitioner's concentrated mind; on the basis of this realization the practitioner directly perceives the absence of both subject and object.

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C3.4e The process culminates in revolution at the basis, the complete rejection of all mental depravities.

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C4 On the Meaning of Vaipulya and the Nature of the Perfections (E 102.5-112.7) As the major part of the discussion here the ASBh includes an extensive outline of the nature of pāramitā practise - the practise of the six perfections (of charity, ethics, forbearance, meditation, zeal and wisdom. Most of the material here does not differ from that to be found in any of the major Mahāyāna expositions of the practise of the perfections. The ASBh expounds the pāramitās under the headings of number, characteristics, order, etymology, meditative development, divisions, grouping, opposed qualities, advantages, and mutual analysis.

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C5 Twenty-Eight Wrong Views of the Mahāyāna Doctrine (E 112.8-114.13) There is also a substantial analysis of the twenty-eight false views which result from a superficial and literalistic examination of the doctrines found in the Vaipulya ( Mahāyāna) scriptures: (i) the first has to do with excessive attachment to signs, which here means the verbal formulation of the doctrine. This happens to someone who reads in a sūtra that, "all dharmas are without essential nature" and becomes attached to that form of words without understanding the indirect intention behind the words. It may be possible to recognise a polemic against some excessively doctrinaire followers of Nāgārjuna here; (ii-iv) these wrong views have to do with casting aspersions upon the doctrines of designation and the three essential natures basic to Yogācāra ontology; (v-vi) these views have to do with incorrectly grasping the sense of the sacred literature and warping its meaning to suit one's own purposes, essentially by the application of an incorrect hermeneutic; (vii-viii) these views - concerning the irreproachability of one's views and actions and the certainty of one's attainment of nirvana - are also the product of incorrect understanding and tend to lead to inappropriate practises; (ix-x) these views, which lead to despising those who have a different view from one's own and to being angry with them - especially those who follow the way of the seekers - spring from excessive confidence in and attachment to one's own views; (xi-xii) these views consist in misapprehending key Mahāyāna doctrines - such as that of emptiness - and thinking to develop merit as a result of holding such misapprehended views; (xiii-xiv) these views have to do with ignoring arguments against one's own views and using incorrect argument-forms in support of one's own views; (xv) a view that considers only one's own position as doing honour to the Buddha and all others as inferior; (xvi) the view of profound illusion, which considers one's own view to be unassailable; (xvii) this has to do with the proclivities and depravities which accompany all the previous views. In turn, these proclivities and depravities influence the following views; the remaining eleven views in fact are essentially variants on some of those already mentioned.

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C6 The Implications and Indirect Intentions of Doctrinal Formulae (E 114.15-115.25)

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This section of the ASbh gives a reasonably detailed commentary on the hermeneutical categories outlined in the AS. The discussion centers upon two key terms--*abhiprāya*, here translated implication, and *abhisamdhi*, here translated indirect intention.'

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Four kinds of implication are distinguished: (i) the implication of sameness, which is illustrated by the Buddha's saying that he was at one time Vipaśin (a former Buddha) in virtue of the undifferentiated nature of the Dharma-body. (This is not entirely clear, but seems to stress the idea of identifying two separate things (in this case Buddha and Vipaśin) in order to bring out a feature that they share, in this case the undifferentiated Dharma-body); (ii) the implication of different times (*kalātara*), illustrated by the future effects of past religious vows, like those involving a wish to be reborn in Sukhāvati. (The point here seems to be simply that a present event (the religious vow) needs to be understood not simply in terms of its present effects but also in terms of its future results); (iii) the implication of different meanings (*arthāntara*), which refers to the fact that statements such as "all dharmas are without essential existence" should not be understood *au pied de la lettre* but in accord with a more sophisticated hermeneutic (see the discussion of indirect intention, below); (iv) the implication of the inclinations of individuals, which is illustrated by the teaching of different doctrines to individuals of different temperaments.

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Four kinds of indirect intention are distinguished: (i) indirect

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intention which leads to entry, explained as the teaching of (false) doctrines such as the existence of physical form in order to encourage seekers to enter the Mahāyāna; (ii) indirect intention as regards defining characteristic, explained as the relation of the (apparently straightforward) teachings of the essencelessness of defining characteristic, the essencelessness of nonarising, and the ultimate essencelessness to the threefold-essence teaching of the Yogācāra. he point here seems to be simply that an apparently univocal teaching can often be, if not equivocal, then at least multi-levelled; (iii) indirect intention of antidote. This is the use of a specific (apparently univocal) doctrinal formula in an attempt to correct a specific fault in a hearer; (iv) indirect intention of transformation. The basic idea here is that some (apparently clearly false) doctrine may be used to alter the complacent ideas of some practitioners. But the meaning of this final category is not entirely clear.

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C7 Criteria for Recognizing Competence in Meditative Practice Related to Dharma (E 115.26-116.12)

D. Analysis of Obtaining (E 117.1-140.5)

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D1 Classification of Individuals (E 117.1-122.8). Section D1 consists almost entirely of brief grammatical and semantic glosses on the complex classificatory system set out in the AS. There is little or nothing here of philosophical interest.

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D2 Classification of Realization (E 122.9-140.5)

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D2.3 The ASbh gives detailed analyses of the nineteen special qualities. Many of these detailed discussions find precise or almost-precise parallels in other commentarial literature of the Yogācāra school, notably in Asvabhāva's commentaries on the *Mahāyānasamgraha* and the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*. Many of them also reproduce standard definitions from early Buddhist canonical literature. Much of this material is relatively easily available elsewhere; a list of the qualities may be found in the relevant section of the AS summary.

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D2.4c The explanations given by the ASbh of the ten kinds of conceptual construction or discrimination are thus:² (i) the basic discrimination is identified with the store-consciousness; (ii) discrimination of images relates to such things as physical form, which are characterised as being a content of cognition; (iii) discrimination of the appearance of an image refers to the six sense-consciousnesses, which are defined as performing this function; (iv) discrimination of an image refers to cognition which has as its object things - such as the human body - which by their nature undergo alteration; (v) discrimination of the transformation of an appearance of an image refers to those cognitions which are transformed by the addition of affective tones - pleasure, displeasure and so forth; (vi) discrimination caused by someone else refers to discriminative thought evoked by hearing the doctrine taught by someone else; (vii-viii) incorrect and correct discrimination resulting from hearing incorrect or correct expositions of the doctrine; (ix) discrimination consisting in attachment to the sixty-two species of false view; (x) distracted discrimination; this last category is itself given a detailed tenfold subdivision.

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E. ANALYSIS OF DEBATE (E 141.1-156.29) E1 Definition and Subdivisions (E 141.1-2) E2 Analysis of Meaning (E 141.3-142.4) Brief glosses on the sixfold division outlined in the AS.

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E3 Analysis of Explanation (E 142.5-147.26) E3.1 The six types of explanation are explained thus: the object to be explained consists of such things as the aggregates; the meaning to be understood consists in such qualities as impermanence; the approach to what needs to be understood is the practise of morality and guarding the doors of the senses--preliminary meditative practices; the essential nature of understanding consists in those qualities which aid enlightenment; the result of understanding consists in liberation itself; and the experience of that liberation consists in the knowledge and vision of liberation.

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E3.2 The fourteen methods for interpreting sacred texts - listed already in the AS - are here given brief definitions rather than extensive discussion. This material is of interest for the history of Buddhist hermeneutical theory, and operates within the framework laid out in section C6. The concern here, though, is more for the purely mechanical questions of exegesis and the proper arrangement of systematic texts than it is for purely theoretical interpretive questions. E4 Analysis of Analytical Demonstration (E 148.1-149.16) E5 Analysis of Questions (E 149.17-150.7) E6 Analysis of Grouping (E 150.8-19) E7 Analysis of Argument (E 150.20-155.5) E7.3 On objects of proof and methods of proof: E7.3a The object of proof, the thing to be proved, is divided into two. The first has to do with essential nature and is

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concerned to demonstrate whether persons or things in general possess any such putative essence. The second has to do with specifics, and is concerned to ask whether specific persons and things possess such qualities as permanence/impermanence, form/formlessness and so forth.

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E7.3b The method of proof (see AS summary) is divided into eight kinds. The definitions are quoted from the AS and commented on word-by-word; they add little to our understand-ing of Buddhist logic at this period, ⁹ with the exception of the ASbh's detailed presentation of a proof of the proposition "there is no self" as a demonstration of the methods outlined in the AS (compare section A6.4). The proposition mentioned is defined as the thesis (*pratijñā*). The reason (*hetu*) for accepting that proposition is the apprehension of the fourfold error in asserting (the existence of) a self among the aggregates. Briefly outlined, the four errors consist in asserting that the self is the same as the aggregates, in which case it would possess all the standard characteristics of the aggregates - such as being caused, arising and passing away - and therefore would not be a self, which is by definition permanent and unchanging; that it occurs "among" (locative case) the aggregates, in which case it would also have to take on the characteristic of impermanence, since it makes no sense to postulate something permanent based on something impermanent; that it is located elsewhere than the aggregates, which would mean that the self would be bodiless, something that it apparently regarded as unlikely; and that it is something quite other than the aggregates, in which case all selves would be spontaneously liberated, since it is (according to many of those who hold to some form of the self-theory) inherent to the nature of selves to be liberated. The example (*dṛṣṭānta*) is that of the relationship between past and present, where the past plays the part of the self and the present that of the aggregates. The same four errors are distinguished, and the discussion of each stresses that past and present are correlative concepts; to designate the one is to designate it in relation to the other and therefore to deny, ultimately, that there is any separate enduring principle which might be called the "self" of the past or the present. The application (*upanaya*) of the arguments here developed is said to be the demonstration of the nonapplicability of other concepts--such as permanence--to the aggregates. The final conclusion (*nigamana*) is that the five aggregates are appropriately qualified by a series of adjectives, beginning with "impermanent" and ending with "without a self."

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In its brief discussion of the three instruments of knowledge the ASBh stresses that the third, authoritative tradition is valid only if it does not come into conflict with the first two--direct perception and inference. In the later (Dignāga and after) Buddhist epistemological tradition this category of authoritative tradition was dropped altogether as a separate reliable means of obtaining knowledge. E8 Analysis of Indirect Intention (E 155.6-156.22) E9 The Meaning of the Title *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (E 156.23-29)

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177. STHIRAMATI, Commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamakakārikās* (560) It is said this is available in Chinese.

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178. STHIRAMATI, *Ṭīkā (Agamānusāriṇī)* on Vasubandhu's *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya* (560) Summary by Karl H. Potter

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This text has been edited several times, and its first chapter has been translated twice. For the purpose of this summary by the Editor "E" references are to the edition by Ramchandra Pandey, Delhi 1971, and our "T" is the translation in Th. Stcherbatsky, Soviet Indology Series No. 5, which originally appeared as Volume 30 of the *Bibliotheca Buddhica*, Moscow-Leningrad 1936. In summarizing the first Chapter David Friedman's translation (Utrecht 1937) has also been consulted. In numbering the *kārikās* we follow the numbering used in the earlier summaries, so that the Introductory section does not constitute a numbered section. E's numbering, which counts the Introduction as the first verse, consequently numbers each section one higher than our numbering indicates. The summary tries to bring out only those points which mark fresh ground beyond what is found in the summaries of Asaṅga's and Vasubandhu's works in Volume Eight of this Encyclopedia. We have provided materials from the commentary on the first few verses to give an impression of its style and complexity.

Chapter ONE

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(E3-9; T11-37) Sthiramati explains each word in the Introduction at length.

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(E9-12; T38-54) Some (Madhyamakas) say that all factors are without essential natures like the horns of a hare. To repudiate this *kārikā* I says "Construction of what was not exists". This does not contradict (Buddhist) *śāstra* since he adds "There is no duality in it", i.e., the construction is not divided into object apprehended and subject apprehender.

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Objection: Then why aren't we liberated?

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Answer: That is why Asaṅga says "Emptiness does exist there". I.e., since emptiness exists in the construction of what was not, *you* are not liberated, you do not understand it.

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Others (Abhidharmists) claim that not only consciousness and mental concomitants exist but matter, etc. as well. To refute them it is said: "Construction of what was not exists", i.e. it really exists, and there are not such things as matter, etc., since "There is no duality in it", i.e., it is neither grasper nor grasped.

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Objection: But if so there can be no liberation, since there is no supporting object (of the liberating awareness).

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Answer: No, since "Emptiness does not exist there", i.e., emptiness itself is the pure supporting object itself.

First 97 of 373 passages. Read on

Cites (35)