Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s19.27

v2.c24.s19.27

The Vaiśeṣika adopts a sixfold classification of padārthas into substance (dravya), quality (guṇa), activity (karma), generality (sāmānya), particularity (viśeṣa), and inherence (samavāya), to which a seventh non-existence (abhāva) was added by the later Vaiśeṣikas, Śrīdhara, Udayana and Śivāditya.¹ The inclusion of non-existence under padārthas suggests the transformation of an ontological into an epistemological scheme. Our beliefs are positive or negative, and not things which exist. In its initial stages the Vaiśeṣika endeavoured to determine the general characteristics which apply to existence as a whole, but soon turned its attention to the nature of beliefs and inquired what sorts of beliefs were true and what not. That something is, that something exists, is the first proposition of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. But nothing can simply be. If we stop with bare existence and refuse to go further, then, as Hegel has taught us, we are left with a mere blank, and even the first principle that something exists has to be given up. So we must push forward and assert that a thing is because it possesses certain properties besides mere existence. Whatever exists does so because it has certain qualities. Substances exist and have qualities. We have two kinds of qualities, those which reside in a plurality of objects and those which are confined to individuals. The former are the general qualities (sāmānya), while the latter are distinguished as permanent (guṇa) and transitory (karma). Inherence is a special kind of relation.²