Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s19.30

v2.c24.s19.30

The first three categories of substance, quality and action possess a real objective existence.¹ Kaṇāda calls them artha, and declares, in treating of yogic insight, that we can have an intuition of them.² The other three, generality, particularity and inherence, are products of intellectual discrimination (buddhyapekṣam).³ They are logical categories. Praśastapāda observes: "they have their sole being within themselves (svātmasattvam), have the intellect as their indicator (buddhilakṣaṇatvam), they are not effects (akāryatvam), not causes (akāraṇatvam), have no generality or particularity (asāmānyaviśeṣavattvam), are eternal (nityatvam), and are not expressible by the word 'thing' (arthaśabdānabhidheyatvam)."'⁴ The proof of the reality of the last three categories is said to be logical,⁵ the implication being that these are not capable of direct apprehension, a view which was modified when the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika principles got mixed up. In early Vaiśeṣika, while all categories are said to possess the feature of existence in general (astitva),⁶ a distinction is made between two kinds of being, sattāsaṃbandha, ascribed to substances, qualities and actions, and svātmasattva, or the being of generality, particularity and inherence.⁷ Udayana in his Kiraṇāvali defines the former as subsistence of being by the