Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s19.33

v2.c24.s19.33

relation of inherence, and the latter as self-sufficient existence independent of all being. Śaṃkara Miśra is more helpful, for in his Upaskāra he defines sattāsambandha as liability to destruction and capacity to produce effects from out of its nature. This seems to have been the technical way of stating existence in space and time. Svātmasattva, or self-sufficient existence, is independent of space and time, and therefore something which belongs to the timeless categories. Though the latter are products of abstraction, they are regarded as more real than the things themselves from which they are abstracted. The Vaiśeṣika insists on the timeless and non-causal character of the categories of generality, particularity and inherence, and warns us against the natural tendency to attribute existence in space and time to the results of abstraction.