Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s2.16

v2.c24.s2.16

The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* refers to Vākovākya,¹ which Śaṃkara interprets as *Tarkaśāstra*.² The *Mahābhārata* refers to *Tarkaśāstra* and *Ānvīkṣikī*,³ and states that Nārada was familiar with the Nyāya syllogism as well as the Vaiśeṣika principles of conjunction and inherence. Viśvanātha quotes from some *Purāṇa* a passage to the effect that the Nyāya is counted among the subsidiary parts (*upāṅgas*) of the Veda.⁴ Though Buddha’s system was eminently rational, we do not come across any systematic treatment of logical theory in the early canonical works. There are, however, references to men skilled in logic. The *Brahmajāla Sutta* refers to Takki (sophist), and Vīmaṃsi (casuist).⁵ The name *Anumāna Sutta* of *Majjhima Nikāya* perhaps indicates the use of the word “anumāna” in the sense of inference. *Kathāvattu* uses the terms *patiññā*, *upanaya*, *niggaha* in their technical signification.⁶ The *Yamaka* knows of the distribution of terms and the rules of conversion. The *Paṭisambhidāmagga* refers to the analysis of words and things. *Nettipakaraṇa* shows a great appreciation of logical theory. In the *Questions of Milinda* the Nyāya system is perhaps referred to under the name *Nīti*.⁷ *Lalitavistara* mentions logic under the name of *Hetuvidyā*. The Jaina Āgamas testify to the antiquity of Indian logic. *Anuyogadvāra* composed by Āryarakṣita who lived about the first century A.D. has the same division of *anumāna* into *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyatoḍṛṣṭa* as the *Sūtra* of Gautama. Āryarakṣita seems to have been only a redactor of an earlier work referred to in the *Bhagavatī Sūtra*, one of the *aṅgas* of the Jaina canon settled at the Pataliputra Council in the beginning of the third century B.C. Probably the doctrine of the three kinds of inference is earlier than the third century B.C.