Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s2.18

v2.c24.s2.18

² See also *Subāla Up.*, ii. Some of the later Upaniṣads use the term *pramāṇa* in the technical sense. See *Maitrī Up.*, 6. 6, 24; *Nṛsiṃhottaratāpanī*, 8; *Sarvopaniṣadsāra*, 4; *Kālāgnirudropaniṣad*, 7; *Muktikopaniṣad*, 2. The *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* refers to *smṛti* or scripture, *pratyakṣa* or perception, *aitihya* or tradition, and *anumāna* or inference as the four sources of knowledge. See also *Rāmāyaṇa*, v. 87-23; *Manu*, xii. 105. Many Nyāya terms, such as *Tarka* or reasoning (*Kaṭha Up.*, ii. 9; *Manu*, xii. 106; *M.B.*, ii. 153), *Vāda* or discussion (*Manu*, vi. 50; *Rāmāyaṇa*, i. 13-23; vii. 53-60), *Yukti* or continuous argument (*Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, vi. 23; *Rāmāyaṇa*, ii. 1. 13), *Jalpa* or wrangling (*M.B.*, xiii. 4322), *Vitaṇḍā* or cavilling (*M.B.*, ii. 1310; vii. 3022; and *Pāṇini*, iv. 4. 102), *Chala* or quibbling (*Manu*, viii. 49; *Rāmāyaṇa*, iv. 57. 10), *Nirṇaya* or ascertainment (*M.B.*, xiii. 7553, 7535), *Prayojana* or purpose (*Manu*, vii. 100; *M.B.*, i. 5805), *Pramāṇa* or proof (*Manu*, ii. 13; *Rāmāyaṇa*, ii. 37. 21; *M.B.*, xiii. 5572), *Prameya*, the object of knowledge (*Rāmāyaṇa*, i. 52. 13; *M.B.*, i. 157; vii. 1419), are to be met with in earlier works. See Vidyābhūṣaṇ’s *History of Indian Logic*, p. 23.