Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s2.59

v2.c24.s2.59

It is possible to distinguish different stages in the development of logical studies in India. We have first of all Ānvīkṣikī, which is given a separate place along with the Nyāya in the Mahābhārata. It soon becomes blended with the Nyāya, and in the classical texts of the ancient school we have in addition to logical theory a metaphysical view of the universe as a whole. As Vātsyāyana says, “ The highest good is attained only when one has rightly understood the real nature of (1) that which is fit to be discarded (i.e. suffering along with its causes in the shape of avidyā and its effects), (2) that which puts an end to suffering, in other words, jñāna (knowledge), (3) the means by which the destruction of suffering is accomplished, i.e. philosophical treatises, and (4) the goal to be attained or the highest good.”¹ Ancient Nyāya discussed logical questions, though not for their own sake. The contributions of the Jaina and the Buddhist thinkers bring about a change in the outlook. The modern Nyāya, with its exclusive interest in the theory of knowledge, forgets the intimate relation between logic and life. The ancient Naiyāyika had a more adequate idea of the relation of logic and metaphysics. Logic can ascertain the normative forms of thought only in relation to the content of thought. The modern Naiyāyika devotes great attention to pramāṇa or the means of knowledge and the theory of definition,² and discards altogether the question of prameyas or the objects known. The scholastic subtleties, the logical legerdemain, the fine hair-splitting in which the works of the successors of Gaṅgeśa indulge, terrify many, and even those who have grappled with them cannot be sure that they have comprehended their ideas. Many of those who have waded through these works are impressed by their brilliant dialectical feats, but find them often more confusing than enlightening. Plain issues are obscured by over-subtlety. The fondness of the logical mind for drawing distinctions often degenerates into a love of formulas, and leaves on the mind the impression of a formalism rather poor in content. Elaboration of terminology takes the place of inquiry into subject-matter. Terms which ought to define distinctions are sometimes employed to circumvent difficulties. Of some at least of these works it may be said that they merely succeed in showing how learned one can be about one knows not what. Even those who believe that the mill of their intellect grinds exceeding small cannot help admitting that it is not always fed with a sufficiency of grain.¹ The value of Navya Nyāya as a training-ground for the intellect can hardly be overestimated.