Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s5.80

v2.c24.s5.80

How are universal propositions arrived at? The Naiyāyika gives us different answers. He speaks of enumeration, intuition and indirect proof. The syllogism mentions an example along with the rule. While an example may be sufficient to illustrate a rule, it cannot by itself establish a universal relation. There may be invariable concomitance of the smoke in the kitchen with the fire in it, or of the smoke in the sacrificial ground with the fire in it, but from these we cannot infer fire in a hill, simply because we perceive smoke in it, unless we establish the invariable concomitance of all cases of smoke with cases of fire. If we observe smoke and fire in a number of instances, we are perhaps on better ground. Bhūyo darśana, or frequency of experience, without a single exception (avyabhicarita sāhacarya), helps us in framing a general rule. It is not enough if we observe smoke wherever there is fire; we should also notice that there is no smoke where there is no fire. Agreement in presence and agreement in absence are both necessary.² If uninterrupted agreement (niyata-sāhacarya) is reinforced by absence of exceptions (avinābhāvarūpasaṃbandha), we have unconditional concomitances, which exclude upādhis, or adventitious conditions.¹ We do not have smoke wherever we have fire. A red-hot iron ball has no smoke in it. Only fire fed by wet fuel is concomitant with smoke. The relation of fire and smoke is a conditional one, while that between smoke and fire is an unconditional one. The principle " all cases of fire are cases of smoke " is inadmissible, while the other, " all cases of fire fed by wet fuel are cases of smoke," is admissible. A condition is not necessarily a defect, since it misleads only when it is not recognised. Whenever conditions are suspected, it is necessary for us to examine the accompanying circumstances and show that the concomitance holds even when the suspected condition is absent. The positive instances disprove the case for conditions, since they show that the middle and the major are present, while nothing else is constantly present : the negative instances support the case by showing that the middle and the major are absent even when no other material circumstance is constantly absent. Later logic laid the greatest stress on the negative instances and even defined vyāpti so as to bring out the exclusive adequacy of the sign to the thing signified.² The Naiyāyika demanded that the disciplined mind should control its fancies and bow beneath the hard yoke of facts. An accurate account of the experimental methods is possible only with the development of the experimental sciences ; and, in the absence of the latter, the Indian logician's views about scientific method are not of great interest. The Naiyāyika was aware of the general problem of induction and the method of careful observation of the facts of nature by which universal propositions are arrived at.