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Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s9: XVI Doubt

Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s9

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XVI Doubt

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The state of doubt is said to arise from : (1) the recognition of properties common to many objects, as when we see a tall object in the twilight and are not sure whether it is a man or a post, since tallness is found in both ; (2) the recognition of properties not common to any of the objects, as when we find it difficult to decide whether sound is eternal or not, since it is not found in man or beast, which are non-eternal, or in atoms, which are eternal ; (3) conflicting testimony, as when two competent authorities differ about the nature of the soul ; (4) irregularity of perception, as when we see water and are not sure whether it is real, as in a tank, or unreal, as in a mirage, since it is perceived in both; (5) irregularity of non-perception, which is the converse of the preceding.¹ According to Uddyotakara, the two last do not by themselves cause doubt, unless there is the perception of common inconclusive features. Since the element perceived is associated with more than one object, it revives simultaneously two chains of ideas, between which the mind oscillates and the state of doubt arises.² Neither idea is integrated with the percept, though both are alternately suggested.³ The state of doubt is unpleasantly toned and it arrests all activity.⁴

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¹ Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 64. V.S., ii. 2. 17.

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² Dolāyamānā pratītiḥ saṃśayaḥ (Guṇaratna's Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya-vṛtti).

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³ Laugākṣi Bhāskara defines the state of doubt as knowledge consisting in an alternation between various contradictory attributes. Tarkakaumudī: Ekasmin dharmiṇi viruddhanānākoṭikaṃ jñānam, p. 7. Cp. also Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 64; Bhāṣāpariccheda, pp. 129-130.

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⁴ Praśastapāda distinguishes two kinds of doubt, internal and external (P.P., p. 174).

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If one of the alternatives is suppressed, and the mind is inclined towards another, we have a case of ūha, or conjecture, where we tentatively accept an alternative.⁵ The suppression of one alternative is due to the strength of the other. If in a rice field we see a tall object, we conjecture that it is a tall man and not a tall post, since posts are not often met with in rice fields. While in the state of doubt, the two alternatives are equally probable; in that of ūha, one becomes more probable than the other.

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⁵ Saptapadārthī, p. 68.

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Another kind of doubtful state is mentioned, called anadhyavasāya, due to lapse of memory. We perceive a tree, but forget its name, and so ask "what may its name be?"⁶ According to Śivāditya, we have here also two alternative suggestions, though they are not present to consciousness. If we become conscious of them, we have a state of doubt. Praśastapāda, Śrīdhara and Udayana give a different account. It is said to be an indefinite perception of an object, either familiar or unfamiliar, due to absent-mindedness or desire for further knowledge. When a familiar object passes by and we fail to notice it owing to absent-mindedness or inattention, we have a case of anadhyavasāya, where we know that something passed, though we do not know what it is that passed. When the object is unfamiliar and we do not know its name, we have a state of imperfect knowledge, which is distinct from the state of ordinary doubt.¹

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⁶ See Saptapadārthī, p. 69. Cp. Mitabhāṣiṇī, p. 26: kim saṃjñako 'yam ity atrāpi, cūtaḥ panaso vety, vikalpasphuraṇād anadhyavasāyopi, saṃśaya eva.

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¹ P.P., pp. 182-183.

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Doubt is the impetus to investigation, for it creates a desire for what is not cognised. It precedes inference, though not perception or verbal knowledge. Doubt ends when our knowledge becomes precise. Doubt is not to be confused with error. So long as we know that we do not know the nature of the object for certain, we have true knowledge or pratyaya. Doubt is incomplete knowledge, while error is false knowledge.

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FALLACIES

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The logic of the Nyāya elaborates the principles by which we acquire knowledge. It adopts the standpoint of natural science, and its laws are not precepts of conduct, but general statements based on the observation of the means by which man satisfies his intellectual needs. Normally, knowledge is valid; error is adventitious and arises when the conditions under which right cognition is produced fail. Fallacies occur when the normal working of the cognitive powers is interfered with. The Nyāya deals at great length with fallacies; and it is not surprising, if we remember that liability of thought to error calls logic into existence.

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A good deal of attention is paid to jugglery with words, since logic aims at protecting us from the arts of the sophist. Three kinds of verbal quibbling (chala) are distinguished: (1) Vākchala. An ambiguous term is used and the person spoken to takes it in a sense different from that intended by the speaker. When one says, "This boy is a navakambala," possessed of a new blanket (or nine blankets), the quibbler replies, "No, he has not nine blankets, but only one." (2) Sāmānyachala. A statement made with reference to a particular is extended to the whole class. When one says, "this Brahmin has learning and conduct," the quibbler objects that not all Brahmins possess learning and conduct. (3) Upacārachala. Here a figurative expression is taken literally. When one says, "the scaffolds cry out," the quibbler objects that inanimate objects like scaffolds cannot be expected to cry out.

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Fallacies such as jāti and nigrahasthāna relate to dialectic more than to logic. Logical fallacies occur in connection with the different members of the syllogistic argument. The fallacies of the minor term, pakṣābhāsas, of the example, dṛṣṭāntābhāsas, are not so important as the hetvābhāsas, or fallacies of the middle term. Gautama¹ mentions five kinds of these: (1) Savyabhicāra, or the inconclusive, leading to more conclusions than one. From the ground of intangibility we may conclude either the eternality or the non-eternality of sound, since both eternal atoms and non-eternal cognitions are intangible. The middle term is not pervaded by the major. As the middle term is not uniformly concomitant with any one alternative, it is called anaikāntika in later logic. Three subdivisions of these are admitted, namely, (a) sādhāraṇa, or the common, where the middle term is too wide; (b) asādhāraṇa, or the uncommon, where the middle term is too narrow; (c) anupasaṃhārin, or the indefinite, where the middle term cannot be verified.² (2) Viruddha, or the contradictory, is the reason which contradicts the proposition to be established.³ (3) Prakaraṇasama, or the equivalent to the proposition, leads to no conclusion, since it raises the question which it is intended to answer. It puts forward one of two contrary characters, both of which are equally unperceived.⁴ Later logic brings it under satpratipakṣa. It is also taken as a reason which is available for both sides when it becomes identical with savyabhicāra.⁵ (4) Sādhyasama gives a reason which is not different from what is to be proved and itself requires proof. It is a case of the unproved or the asiddha, of which different kinds are admitted: (a) svarūpāsiddhi, where the nature of the middle is absolutely unknown, as when we say sound is eternal because it is visible, where the visibility of sound is something absolutely unknown; (b) āśrayāsiddhi, where the middle has no basis, as in the example, "there is no God since he has no body," where bodylessness has no substratum if there were no God; (c) anyathāsiddhi, or that which is otherwise known.⁶ (5) Kālātīta, or the mistimed, is the reason adduced when the time is past. The argument that "sound is durable because it is manifested by union as a colour,” is an example of this fallacy. The colour of the jar is manifested when the latter comes into union with a lamp, though it existed before the union took place, and will continue to exist after the union has ceased. To argue on the analogy of colour that sound existed before the union of the drum and the stick, and will continue to exist after the union has ceased, is fallacious. The reason adduced is said to be mistimed, since sound is produced immediately after the union of the drum and the stick, while colour is manifested simultaneously with the union of the jar and the lamp. This fallacy is also called bādhita, where the middle term asserts something the opposite of which is ascertained to be true by other evidence. In later logic the list of fallacies is considerably developed.

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¹ i. 2. 4. See also V.S., iii. 1. 15. Praśastapāda mentions asiddha, or unproved; viruddha, or opposed; saṃdigdha, or doubtful; and anadhyavasita, or unascertained (P.P., pp. 239-240). Dignāga mentions fourteen kinds, and Bhāsarvajña six. See also Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 52.

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² Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 53. See also Viśvanātha's N.S. Vṛtti, i. 2. 46.

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³ N.V., i. 2. 6. Vātsyāyana (i. 2. 6) gives an example from the Yoga-bhāṣya (iii. 13) to the effect that the two statements that (1) the world ceases from manifestation because it is not eternal, and (2) it continues to exist because it cannot be destroyed. See also Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 54.

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⁴ N.B. and N.V., i. 2. 7.

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⁵ Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 55.

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⁶ Vācaspati adds ekadeśāsiddhi, and Udayana adds vyāpyatvāsiddhi, where the concomitance is not known to be invariable.

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TRUTH

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The fact from which a theory of knowledge starts, is not that we have knowledge, but that we claim to have it. The task of the epistemologist is to investigate how far the claim can be sustained. In the theory of pramā, or truth, the Naiyāyika sets out to inquire how far the claim which we implicitly grant is justified. He tries to show that the content of knowledge we acquire by means of the four pramāṇas has validity or normative necessity.

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The Nyāya theory of knowledge comes into conflict with the scepticism of the Mādhyamika doctrine, which holds that we do not know the essence of things, and our thought is so contradictory that it cannot be regarded as real. Against this, Vātsyāyana urges that if the Mādhyamika is certain that nothing exists, he allows the possibility of certainty to that extent at least and thus contradicts himself. If, however, there is no proof for the contention that nothing exists, if it is but an unwarranted assumption, then its opposite may be assumed. Again, he who denies the validity of the pramāṇas does so on the basis of some pramāṇa or on no basis. If the latter, the argument is useless; if the former, the validity of the pramāṇa is accepted. Radical scepticism is unworkable. Everyone admits the principles of knowledge the moment he begins to think. Again, he who admits the functioning of thought must admit also the world of reality, for thought and reality are interdependent. Vātsyāyana says: “If an analysis of things by thought is possible, then it is not true that the real nature of things is not apprehended; if, on the other hand, the real nature of things is not apprehended, then there can be no analysis of things by thought. So that to allege that 'there is analysis of things by thought and the real nature of things is not apprehended' involves a contradiction in terms."¹ Uddyotakara paraphrases it thus: "If there can be analysis of things by thought, then things cannot be non-existent; and if things are non-existent, then there can be no analysis of things by thought."² The Nyāya believes that knowledge is significant of reality (arthavat).³

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¹ N.B., iv. 2. 27.

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² N.V., iv. 2. 27.

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³ The impossibility of certain knowledge is based by the Mādhyamikas on the ground, among others, that perception can be neither prior to nor posterior to nor simultaneous with the objects of sense. If it is prior, then it cannot be the result of the contact of sense with its object; if it is posterior, then it cannot be said that the object of sense is established by perception. If perception were simultaneous with its object, then there need not be any order of succession in our cognitions, since there is no such order in their corresponding objects. Colour and smell can be perceived at the same time, which the Nyāya does not admit. What is true of perception applies to the other pramāṇas and their relation to prameya, or objects of knowledge as well. So these means of knowledge are both invalid and impossible. This objection against perceptual knowledge is set aside on the ground that the means of knowledge may precede its object as a drum precedes its sound, succeed as an illumination succeeds the sun, or are simultaneous with it as smoke synchronises with fire (N.B., ii. 1. 8-19).

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Vātsyāyana attacks the Vijñānavada view, that the objects of experience are mere strings of presentations. Things seen in dreams are refuted as unreal, since they are not experienced in waking consciousness. If there were not a sensible world of experience, dream states could not exist. The diversity of dreams can be traced to the diversity of their causes.⁴ If there were not an existent reality, the difference between truth and error would be negligible, and there would be no explanation for the obvious facts that we cannot control our perceptions and have them at our pleasure.⁵ Nor is the Naiyāyika satisfied with the view that postulates objects, though of a momentary character. If the objects are the causes of our cognition, they must precede the effect. But, on the view of momentariness, the object which has produced the cognition has ceased to be in the next moment when it is perceived; and this cannot be allowed, since perception is only of what is immediately present. To argue that the disappearance of the object synchronises with the emergence of perception, is of no avail, since we perceive the object as present and not as past. Even inference would be impossible.¹ Again, cause and effect, being related to each other as container and contained, must exist at the same time. The fundamental character of that which really is, as distinct from that which is only imagined to be, is found in its independence of all relation to the experience of a subject. What exists at all, exists equally whether it is experienced or not. Experience is a relation of one-sided dependence. For it to exist, things are necessary; but for things to exist, no experience is necessary. Thus the Naiyāyika concludes that our ideas submit to an objective standard of facts relatively independent of the subject's will and purpose.² The existence of things does not depend on pramāṇas, though their existence as objects of cognition depends entirely on the operation of the pramāṇas.

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⁴ N.B., iv. 2. 33-34 and 37.

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⁵ N.B., iv. 2. 26-37.

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¹ See N.V., i. 1. 37; iii. 2. 14. Uddyotakara observes: "In the syllogism, 'sound is non-eternal, because it is a product like a pot,' pot, the instance, must contain non-eternality and productibility, and the former is posterior non-existence, the latter prior non-existence. How can the two coexist in a pot, if it is but momentary?"

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² N.B.; Viśvanātha: *N.S. Vṛtti*, iv. 2. 26 ff.

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Pramāṇas are so called because they give us pramā.³ Udayana in his *Tātparyapariśuddhi* says: "Cognition of the real nature of things is pramā, and the means of such knowledge is pramāṇa."⁴ What is the real nature (tattvam) of things? "It is nothing else but being or existence in the case of that which is and non-being or non-existence in the case of that which is not.⁵ That is to say, when something that is, is apprehended as being or existent, so that it is apprehended as what it really is (yathābhūtam) and not as something of a contrary nature (aviparītam), then, that which is thus apprehended constitutes the true nature of the thing: and analogously when a nonentity is apprehended as such, *i.e.* as what is not, as something of a contrary nature —then, that which is thus apprehended constitutes the true nature of the thing.”¹ Apramā, bhrama, or mithyājñāna, is the knowledge of a thing as it is not. It is that in which the thing is apprehended as what it is not,² as when we mistake the shell for silver. It is not mere absence of knowledge but positive error.³

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³ Pra, valid; mā, knowledge (iv. 2. 29).

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⁴ *Yathārthānubhavaḥ pramā, tatsādhanam ca pramāṇam.*

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⁵ *Sataś ca sadbhāvo 'sataś cāsadbhāvaḥ.*

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¹ N.B. and N.V., i. 1. 1.

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² N.B., i. 1. 4.

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³ N.B., iv. 2 1; iv. 2. 35.

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Interrogation, doubt and the like have a place in the mental history of the individual, though the question of truth and falsity does not arise with regard to them. Judgment or assertion of a content, regardless of the person asserting, is the object of logical evaluation. All knowledge is of the form of judgment where we have in the subject the viśeṣya, or the qualified and in the predicate, the viśeṣaṇa, or the qualification. In the Nyāya the judgment is analysed, not so much into subject and predicate as into substantive and adjective, the substantive being that which is characterised and the adjective that which characterises.⁴ All knowledge consists in comprehending the nature and qualities of objects. The subject tells us that a certain thing exists and the predicate determines further the nature of the given by specifying its properties. Where the determinations agree with the nature of the object, we have truth, or yathārtha.⁵ Every subject has some character in reality, and thought distinguishes the substantive and the adjective, and asserts that the two are found united in the world of reality.

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⁴ Cp. “We find that in every proposition we are determining in thought the character of an object presented to thought to be thus determined. In the most fundamental sense, then, we may speak of a determinandum and a determinans; the determinandum is defined as what is presented to be determined or characterised by thought or cognition; the determinans what does characterise or determine in thought that which is given to be determined” (W. E. Johnson : Logic, i. p. 9).

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⁵ Tadvati tatprakārako'nubhavo yathārthaḥ, tadabhāvavati tat prakarako'nubhavo ayathārthaḥ (Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 35). Prakāra is the name of the predicate, while the quality of the real denoted by the predicate is called viśeṣaṇa. Prakāra refers to the cognition and viśeṣaṇa to the object. Annam Bhaṭṭa raises the difficulty whether in the judgment, “jarness is in the jar,” jarness can be regarded as substantive and “jar” as an adjective, and answers it by saying that the predicate need not always be an attribute but should only be related to the subject. Tadvati means tat sambandhavati. See also N.V., iii. 2. 42.

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Pramāṇas are said to give us a knowledge of objects as they really are.¹

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¹ Pramāṇasya sakalapadārthavyavasthāpakatvam (Viśvanātha's N.S. Vṛtti, i. 1. 1).

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The relation between the object, jar, and our knowledge of the object, is not one of inherence (samavāya); for the knowledge pertaining to the object " jar " (ghaṭaviṣayaka-jñāna) is a quality (guṇa) of the self and not of the jar. Nor is it one of conjunction (saṃyoga), for this relation holds only between substances, while knowledge is a quality. Yet there must be some relation between the object and the knowledge of the object, in order that the particular judgment and not any other should result. Hence the only possible determining cause (niyāmaka) of our judgment is the nature of the jar itself (ghaṭasvarūpa). This relation is called svarūpasaṃbandha, which is defined in Bhīmācārya's Nyāyakośa as " the relation which must be held to exist in a case where determinate knowledge or judgment (viśiṣṭajñāna) could not have been effected by any other relation (samavāya or saṃyoga)."² It is a relation sui generis between the object and the cognition.³ The effect of knowledge, as distinct from the act or the process of knowledge, is neither the physical object in itself nor a merely mental state, it is the essence, or svarūpa, or character, the what of the object known.⁴ If the object of knowledge in outer perception is the physical existent itself, then there can be no possibility of error. It is at variance with the facts to hold that when we think of the North Pole, it actually gets into our consciousness. If it is a mere mental state, then subjectivism engulfs us. The object of knowledge is neither a physical existent nor a psychological existent, but the svarūpa or the character of the object. In all knowledge we have this "what," essence or character which claims to be real. Even in dreams we have the "what," but we discover that the dream objects have no existence. Their implicit affirmation of reality is not justified. All knowledge is of svarūpas, or character-complexes, together with an implicit attribution of existence. This implied belief is occasionally mistaken. Whether the content belongs to the object or not is not made known by the act of knowledge itself. The validity of knowledge is not self-established (svataḥprāmāṇya).¹ The Nyāya holds that the validity of knowledge is not self-established, but is proved by something else (parataḥ pramāṇa). While the Sāṃkhya thinks that validity and invalidity are inherent in the cognition itself, the Mīmāṃsakas believe that validity is due to the cognition itself,² while invalidity is due to external causes, so that a cognition must be taken as true until it is proved to be otherwise. The Buddhists hold that invalidity belongs to all cognitions, and validity will have to be established by some other means. Against all these, the Naiyāyika contends that validity and invalidity are established by something independent of the cognition itself. If every cognition were self-evident, there would be no possibility of doubt.³ So validity is determined by an appeal to facts. Suppose we perceive an object, we cannot be immediately certain that the object we perceive is of the same size and shape as it seems to have. We perceive that the sun is moving while it does not. So perception or immediate knowledge of an object does not carry with it an assurance of its own validity. The validity of our knowledge can only be arrived at by a mediate process of reflection.¹ What is true of perception is also true of knowledge gained through other means.

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² Saṃbandhāntareṇa viśiṣṭapratītijananāyogyatvam. The obvious objection to making the jar itself a saṃbandha, namely, that the distinction between the relation and the related thing is obliterated, is met by the fact that the jar as the jar is not the saṃbandha, but only the jar as the object of knowledge.

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³ Avacchedaka relation is a case of svarūpasaṃbandha. An essential constitutive attribute is an avacchedaka. In the judgment " daṇḍavān puruṣo yam," daṇḍa is an avacchedaka. Avacchedakas are of two kinds: viṣayatā, where the relation considered is that of S and P in a judgment, where the avacchedaka may be atiprasakta, or wide, as in the case " I know the jar," where jarness is not definitely limited in its application, as it is found in other jars also; pratiyogitā, where the avacchedaka is of limited scope. Gadādhara, in his Viṣayatāvāda, declares that viṣayatā is not a svarūpasaṃbandha.

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⁴ Cp. " Our data are simply character complexes, essences, logical entities, which are irresistibly taken to be the characters of the existents perceived or otherwise known " (Essays in Critical Realism, p. 5).

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¹ Cp. Drake : "All cognitive experiences are knowledge of, not posession of, the existent known (if it is an existent); their validity must be tested by other means than the intuition of the moment" (*Critical Realism*, p. 32)

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² For them the truth of the Vedas is self-evident, requiring no external sanction to prove their claim to obedience, while for the Naiyāyikas the authoritativeness of the Vedas depends on God's authorship of them.

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³ *Siddhāntamuktāvali*, p, 135. "If the validity of a cognition were self-apprehended, then there would be no doubt in regard to a cognition produced by practice. For if, in this case, the cognition and its validity are cognised, how can there be doubt? If, on the other hand, the cognition is not cognised, then, in the absence of the knowledge of something possessing a quality, how can there be doubt? Hence the validity of cognition is a matter of inference (anumeyam)."

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¹ *Tarkabhāṣa* says: “The cognition is apprehended by sense-perception . . . while its validity is apprehended by means of inference. A man seeking for water has the perception of water. The exertion he puts forth is either fruitful or not. From the fruitfulness of the cognition its validity is inferred, for that which is not valid does not give rise to fruitful exertion.”

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The Nyāya considers a number of objections to this theory. How can a pramāṇa which gives us knowledge of an object, itself become an object of another pramāṇa? Just as a balance is an instrument when it weighs a thing but is an object when it is itself weighed in another balance, so also a means of knowledge is an instrument when it establishes an object, but an object when it is itself to be established. Vātsyāyana says: “buddhi, or apprehension, is pramāṇa, or the means of cognising things; it is prameya when it is itself cognised.”² If it is said that a means of knowledge does not require another means of knowledge for its establishment, but is self-established, then even the object of knowledge may be thus self-established, and pramāṇas become superfluous. It is objected that if the validity of knowledge is apprehended by some other knowledge, and if the validity of the latter is proved by some other, then we are led to an infinite regress.³ If we stop anywhere in the middle, the pramāṇa is not proved. The Naiyāyika does not regard this as a serious objection since it is purely theoretical. For all practical purposes, we assume the validity of pramāṇas and need not go about validating one pramāṇa by another endlessly.¹ In the case of clear cognitions, as when we see a fruit in our hand, we have no doubt about the validity of the cognition. We have certain knowledge of the object through one cognition. In the case of doubtful cognitions we seek the aid of further cognitions to determine the validity of the present one, and when we come across a perfectly valid cognition, we cease to search. There are certain pramāṇas which require a knowledge of themselves to prove their objects and lead to practical action; and there are others which prove their objects without any knowledge of themselves. Smoke must be known before it can lead to a knowledge of fire, but sense-organs give us a knowledge of objects even when they are not themselves perceived or known. We may know sense-organs by other means, but that knowledge is unnecessary.

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² N.B., ii. 1. 16. Vātsyāyana uses the illustration of lamplight, which is said to illumine itself and other objects. “In the case of the lamplight, it is found that while it is itself visible it is also the means by which we see other visible things, and thus it comes to be called the object or the means of cognition according to circumstances” (N.B., ii. 1. 19). Nāgārjuna objects that a lamp cannot illumine itself, since there is no darkness in it. It illumines objects by removing the darkness that covers them (*Mādhyamika Karikā*, vii). Vātsyāyana’s view is not to be confused with the Vedāntic position of the self-evident character of the pramāṇas. The same pramāṇa does not reveal the object as well as its own validity. Uddyotakara explains that the lamplight is pramāṇa in relation to objects, while it is itself established by another perception by means of its contact with the optic nerve, so that one pramāṇa may be established by another (N.V., ii. 1. 19). See also N.V.T.T., ii. 1. 19.

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³ This objection is identical with Nāgārjuna’s in *Vigrahavyāvartanī Kārikā*. See *History of Indian Logic*, p. 257. See also N.B., ii. 1. 17-18. Śrī Harṣa quotes Dharmakīrti, the Buddhist logician, to the effect, “For him who does not accept the cognition as directly cognised by itself the cognition of the thing cannot be established.” See *Khaṇḍana*, i. 3.

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¹ N.V.T.T., ii. i. 19.

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The Naiyāyika holds that we cannot straightaway know whether our cognitions correspond to reality or not. We have to infer this correspondence from its capacity to lead to successful action. All knowledge is an incitement to action. It tells us that the object is desirable or undesirable or neither. The self is not a purely passive spectator interested in the mere contemplation of things. It is anxious to attain desirable objects and avoid undesirable ones. Thinking is but an episode in the conduct of life. "Knowledge is apprehension exciting desire and leading to action."² The Naiyāyika agrees with the school of Pragmatists in his view that knowledge has its basis in the vital needs of human nature, and issues in a volitional reaction. The agreement of our ideas with objects can be ascertained through their capacity to lead to successful action (pravṛttisāmarthyam).³ It is therefore obvious that the relation of ideas to objects is one of correspondence and not necessarily resemblance. The Naiyāyika makes the truth of our ideas depend on their relations to facts, and holds that the relation is one of agreement or correspondence, which we infer from the working of ideas.⁴

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² N.B., i. i. 2.

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³ N.B., i. i. 17. See also N.B. and N.V., i. i 1, and Kusumāñjali, iii. 18.

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⁴ Cp. the distinction between resemblance and correspondence, the copy and the picture theories of truth, in McTaggart's *The Nature of Existence*, ii. It is interesting to notice that the Critical Realists, whose analysis of knowledge is similar to that of the Nyāya, adopt the same device to overcome this difficulty. The question whether we have any right to believe in the existence of physical objects is answered thus: "Our instinctive (and practically inevitable) belief in the existence of the physical world about

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Strictly speaking, the idea is said to be true if it leads to the perceptions demanded by the idea, and enables us to act on the environment successfully. According to the Prāmāṇyavada of *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, the validity of cognitions is established through inference. When we see a horse, we have first of all a cognition of the form, "This is a horse," followed by a vague idea, "I have seen a horse"; and it is when one goes near it and actually feels it, that he infers the validity of his cognition; and if the expected perceptions do not arise, he infers that the cognition is mistaken. We see water and go near it, and if it answers our needs we call our perception of water valid, since what is not true does not induce successful activity.¹ When our desires are met, we become cognisant of the validity of our knowledge. Thus from consequences we infer causes. This theory of truth is an induction from positive instances of the successful leading of valid knowledge and negative instances of the unsuccessful leading of invalid knowledge.

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¹ Pūrvotpannaṃ jalajñānaṃ pramā, saphalapravṛttijanakatvāt; yan naivaṃ tan naivaṃ yathā apramā (Annam Bhaṭṭa's *Dīpikā*).

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This workability is only the test of truth and not its content. Some advocates of pragmatism are, however, of the opinion that the practical effects are the whole of truth, a view which has the support of Buddhist logicians. The latter hold that "right knowledge is uncontradicted knowledge. That which enables us to attain the object observed is uncontradicted knowledge."² To attain the object is to act successfully in regard to it and understand its nature.³

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² Dharmottara: *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, i. "Avisaṃvādakaṃ jñānaṃ saṃyakjñānam . . . pradarśitam artham prāpayat saṃvādakam ucyate."

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³ Pravartakatvam eva prāpakatvam . . . pravartakatvam api pravṛttiviṣayapravartakatvam eva. Dharmottara thinks that the object attained is not identical with the object known, though they belong to the same series. Though the Buddhists cannot admit the Nyāya view of the relation of facts and ideas, they accept arthasiddhi, or attainment of the object, or practical efficiency (arthakriyāsāmarthyam) as the test of truth, and indulge in vague phrases of similarity of ideas to objects as arthasārūpyam asya pramāṇam (*Nyāyabindu*, i. 1).

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us is pragmatically justifiable. This realm of appearance (*i.e.* what appears, what is given) might conceivably be merely the visions of a mind in an empty world. But we instinctively feel these appearances to be the characters of real objects. We react to them as if they had an existence of their own, even when we are asleep or forgetting them. We find that this belief, those reactions work" (*Essays in Critical Realism*, p. 6).

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For the Naiyāyika, truth is not mere workability, though it is known by it. Truth is prior to verification. A judgment is true, not because it is verified; but it is verified because it is true. Several objections to this theory are considered by the Naiyāyika. We cannot be sure that our desires are realised. Cases of illusory satisfaction are not unheard of. In dreams we have instances of apparent satisfaction, but that does not mean that dream states are to be regarded as valid. The Naiyāyika answers that what counts is not the mere feeling of successful activity, but the feeling of a normal healthy mind, which must support past experiences of successful activity. It is neither the vividness of the mental state nor the feeling of satisfaction, but conformity with experience as a whole. The objects of dreams cannot be fitted into the space-time framework of experience, and are therefore imaginary.

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Prior to fruition, our knowledge cannot be ascertained to be valid. So we cannot have that confidence without which no endeavour is possible. A valid knowledge of objects is the precondition of successful activity, and prior to successful activity we cannot have true knowledge of objects.¹ Uddyotakara urges that this question of the relative priority of activity and knowledge is meaningless, in view of the beginninglessness of the world. Besides, knowledge of the object, and not of the validity of knowledge, is necessary for action. So far as familiar objects are concerned, the difficulty does not arise. In situations presenting novel features, where a mere application of precedents is insufficient, we experiment even with inadequate knowledge. We act, sometimes, to verify hypotheses. Life generally moves on the basis of assumptions, and it is not possible to weigh every suggested line of action in a fine balance of logic before acting on it. Pressure of practical necessities compels us to act on ideas even when their evidence is incomplete. Objects of religious belief determine our action, even though they lie beyond the range of reason. The Naiyāyika admits that there are cases where complete verification is not possible. Whether we shall attain heaven or not through the performance of agnihotra cannot be ascertained until we die. He that will act only when he can fully comprehend, must have either a very long head or a very short life.

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In this difficulty, Dharmottara makes a distinction between the right knowledge which is the immediate antecedent of attainment (arthakriyānirbhāsam) and that which leads to attainment through certain intermediate stages (arthakriyāsamarthe ca pravartakam). The first leads directly to action and cannot be an object of inquiry. See Uddyotakara and Vācaspati on i. i. I.

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Later Naiyāyikas, like Vācaspati and Udayana, admit the self-evident character (svataḥprāmāṇyam) of some forms of valid knowledge. Inference free from all error and inconsistency and comparison (upamāna) based on essential resemblance are, according to Vācaspati, of self-evident validity, since there is rational necessity binding the cognition and the objects. In the case of sense-perception and verbal testimony, we cannot be equally certain.¹ Udayana admits Vācaspati’s contention, and argues that besides inference and comparison, self-consciousness (anuvyavasāya) and internal as well as external perception of mere existence (dharmijñāna) possess self-evident validity.²

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¹ N.V.T.T., i. 1. 1.

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² For a searching criticism of the Nyāya theory of truth, see Khaṇḍana, i. 13-14.

Cites (15)