Indian Philosophy v2.c25.s2.43

v2.c25.s2.43

Inferential argument, according to Prabhākara and Kumārila, has only three members: pratijñā, or statement of the case; the major premise, which gives the general rule with the corroborative instance; and the minor premise. These three members may be stated in any order. The Mīmāṁsakas admit the distinction between inference for oneself and inference for others. The object of inferential cognition is of two kinds: dṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇa, or that which has its specific character perceived, as the inference of fire from smoke; and adṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇa, or that which has its specific character unperceived, as the inference of the burning capacity of fire. Prabhākara holds that inference involves a previous knowledge of the general relation and refers to things already known. Kumārila makes novelty an essential feature of inference. Though it is true that the smoke is seen and the perception of smoke carries with it the generic idea of fire as related to the smoke, the object of the inferential cognition is something that is not already known, i.e. the subject as qualified by the predicate, the hill as possessing fire in the usual example.¹