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Indian Philosophy v2.c26.s26: XXXV The Individual Self

Indian Philosophy v2.c26.s26

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XXXV The Individual Self

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The aim of the Vedānta is to lead us from an analysis of the human self to the reality of the one absolute self. The passages of the Vedānta possess this dual application.¹ The individual self is a system of memories and associations, desires and dislikes, of preferences and purposes. Though it may not be possible for us to take in at a single glance this whole system, its general structure and predominant elements are open to our inspection. This system is the vijñānātman, which is subject to change, while the paramātman is free from all change.² The jīva is said to be in essence one with the Ātman. That art thou.³ "Nor is there any force in the objection that things with contrary qualities cannot be identical; for the opposition of qualities can be shown to be false."⁴ Śaṁkara distinguishes carefully the self that is implied in all experience from the self which is an observed fact of introspection, the metaphysical subject or the "I" and the psychological subject or the "me." The object of self-consciousness (ahampratyayaviṣaya) is not the pure self, the sākṣin, but the active and enjoying individual (kartṛ) endowed with objective qualities. When the psychologists speak of self, they treat it as an object of introspection. While the Ātman is purely cognitive,⁵ our individual consciousness is essentially an active striving towards some end. The sense of activity is for each of us our most intimate experience. This empirical self is the agent of all activities.⁶ If activity (kartṛtva) were the essential nature of the soul, there would be no delivery from it—any more than of fire from heat—and as long as man has not freed himself from activity, he has failed to attain his highest end, since activity is essentially painful. "The activity of the soul depends only on the qualities of the upādhis being ascribed to it and not to its own nature."¹ The individual soul is essentially an agent; otherwise the Vedic injunctions, etc., would become purposeless. There are many passages in the Upaniṣads which attribute agency to the soul.² Agency really abides in the upādhi or limitation, of vijñāna or understanding. The jīva is subject-object, self and not-self, reality and appearance. It consists of the Ātman limited or individuated by the object.³ It is the Ātman in association with ajñāna. In Emerson's language, "Every man is God playing the fool."⁴ Avidyā or logical knowledge, causes the sense of individuality of the empirical self, which is "alike deceiving and deceived." The distinctive characteristic of the individual soul is its connection with buddhi or understanding, which endures as long as the state of saṃsāra is not terminated by perfect knowledge.⁵ The soul's connection with buddhi continues even after death. It can be broken only by the attainment of freedom. During deep sleep and death this connection is potential, while it becomes actual on waking and rebirth respectively. If we do not assume a potential continuance of this kind, the law of causality will be violated, since nothing can arise without a given cause.⁶

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¹ S.B., ii. 3. 25.

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² S.B., i. 3. 24. Cp. also Kaṭha Up., iii. 1; Muṇḍ., iii. 1. 1; Śvet. Up., iv. 6. 7.

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³ Cp. with this the well-known doctrine of the Quakers, according to which there is in every man's inmost being the Inner Light, the radiance by which all dogmas and doctrines are to be judged.

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⁴ S.B., iv. 1. 3.

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⁵ S.B., ii. 3. 40.

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⁶ S.B., i. 1. 4.

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¹ S.B., ii. 3. 40. Tasmād upādhidharmādhyāsenaivātmanaḥ kartṛtvaṃ na svābhāvikam. See also S.B. on Kaṭha Up., iii. 4. Both the Advaita and the Sāṃkhya regard the Ātman or puruṣa as unconditioned by the activities of the doer. It is regarded as the doer when confused with the limits of individuality. This confusion or non-discrimination is the work of avidyā in Advaita and prakṛti in Sāṃkhya.

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² Bṛh. Up., iv. 3. 12; Tait., iii. 5. See also S.B., ii. 3. 33.

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³ S.B., ii. 3. 40.

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⁴ Sureśvara compares the jīva to a prince carried away by a cowherd and brought up in rural associations. When he became acquainted with his royal descent he gave up his other occupations and realised his kingly nature.

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⁵ S.B., ii. 3. 20.

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⁶ It is said that the souls connected with buddhi reside in Īśvara when the connection is potential, though it is also urged that the souls at death and deep sleep enter into Brahman itself (Chān. Up., vi. 8; S.B., ii. 3. 31).

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The psychophysical organism consists of the organic body,⁷ made up of the gross elements, which the soul casts off at

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⁷ Deha, sthūlaśarīra, annamayakośa.

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Rājasūnoḥ smṛtiprāptau vyādhabhāvo nivartate
Yathaivam ātmano 'jñasya tat tvam asy ādivākyataḥ.

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death, the life organs (prāṇas)¹ and the subtle body,² made up of the subtle portions of the elements which compose the seed of the body.³ The subtle body⁴ consists of the seventeen elements, viz., five organs of perception, five of action, five vital forms, mind and intellect.⁵ This subtle body, while material, is also transparent, and so is not seen when the jiva migrates. While the subtle body and the vital forms persist as permanent factors of the soul until liberation, there is the varying factor of moral determination (karmāśraya), which accompanies the soul in each life as a new form not previously existing.⁶ The basis of individuality is to be found, not in the Ātman or the upādhis, but in moral determination, which is a complex of knowledge (vidyā), works (karma), and experience (prajñā).⁷ The vital forces continue to exist, like the subtle body which carries them, as long as saṁsāra endures, and accompany the soul inseparably even if it should enter a plant, in which case the internal organ and the senses cannot naturally unfold themselves. As saṁsāra is beginningless, the soul must have been equipped with this apparatus of vital forms from eternity. A third, kāraṇa-śarīra, is sometimes mentioned and identified with the beginningless indefinable avidyā. The causal self (kāraṇa-ātma) is the relatively permanent human self, which persists through successive rebirths determined by the law of karma. This account of the psychological organism is identical with that of the Sāṁkhya, except in the matter of the five vital forces.

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¹ The life organs are of two kinds: those of the conscious life, as the five organs of sense (buddhīndriyāṇi), five of action (karmendriyāṇi), and manas, which controls perception and action; those of the unconscious life. The mukhyaprāṇa, which is the chief breath of life, is divided into five different prāṇas, subserving the different functions of respiration, nutrition, etc. Though having a limited size, it is invisible (S.B., i. 4. 13).

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² Sūkṣmaśarīra, liṅgaśarīra, bhūtāśraya.

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³ Dehabījāni, bhūtasūkṣmāṇi.

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⁴ It corresponds to the liṅgaśarīra of the Sāṁkhya.

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⁵ Kartṛtvabhoktṛtvaviśiṣṭajīvo manomayādīpañcakośaviśiṣṭaḥ. Its elements are determined by mechanical causality. See S.B., Bṛh. Up., i. 4. 17.

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⁶ S.B., ii. 4. 8-12; D.S.V., pp. 325-6.

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⁷ See Bṛh. Up., iv. 4. 2.

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The five organs of perception, the five of action and manas are created objects,⁸ minute (aṇu or sūkṣma) and limited (paricchinna). They are not of atomic size (paramāṇutulya), since their pervading the whole body would then be unintelligible. They are regarded as subtle, since, if they were gross, they could be seen passing at death. They are of limited size and not infinite, since in the latter case there can be no passing or going or returning for them. Śaṁkara, in this whole account, has in view the sense-functions and not their material counterparts. The senses are not all-pervading, but are of the same extent as the bodily regions where they function.¹ The several organs are, as usual, traced to the different elements,² and the gods who control the elements are said to control the organs as well. The mukhyaprāṇa is the supporting and animating principle of life. Even the psychical apparatus depends on it. The senses are sustained by the mukhyaprāṇa, and so are called prāṇas.³ The Ātman clothed in the upādhis is the jīva, which enjoys and suffers (bhoktṛ) and acts (kartṛ), from both of which conditions the highest soul is free.⁴

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⁸ S.B., ii. 4. 1-4.

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¹ ii. 4. 8. 13.

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² S.B., ii. 4. 14–16; Bṛh. Up., i. 3. 11; iii. 2. 13; Ait. Up., i. 2. 4.

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³ ii. 4. 1–6.

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⁴ Param brahma . . . apahatapāpmatvādidharmakam, tad eva jīvasya paramārthikaṁ svarūpam . . . itarad upādhikalpitam (S.B., i. 3. 19). Plato has a similar view, which he illustrates by the striking simile of Glaucus plunging into the depths of the sea. If we see him there, we fail to recognise him, for he is so overgrown with seaweeds, mussels and other creatures of the deep. Each individual soul is a lost soul, and we cannot recognise its true nature until we recover it from the ocean of saṁsāra and strip it of its overgrowth of weeds, shells and slime.

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The jīva rules the body and the senses, and is connected with the fruits of actions. Since its essence is the Ātman, it is said to be vibhu or all-pervading, and not aṇu or of atomic size. If it were the latter, it could not experience the sensations extending over the whole body.⁵

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⁵ S.B., ii. 3. 29.

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Those who hold that the soul is atomic argue that an infinite soul cannot move, whereas it is seen to leave one body and return to another. This passage, according to Śaṁkara, does not touch the soul as such but only its limitations.⁶ The objection that if the soul be atomic, it can only be in one place in the body, and so cannot perceive throughout the body, is set aside by the example that even as a piece of sandal-wood refreshes the body all over, even though it touches the body only at one spot, so the atomic soul can feel throughout the body by means of the sense of touch which pervades the whole body. Śaṁkara refutes the suggestion by urging that the thorn on which one treads is also connected with the whole sense of feeling, though the pain is felt only on the sole of the foot and not on the whole body. The advocates of the atomic view suggest that the atomic soul pervades the whole body by means of the quality of spirit or caitanya, even as the light of a lamp placed in one spot extends from there to the whole room. Śaṁkara declares that quality cannot extend beyond substance. The flame of a lamp and its light are not related as substance and quality. Both are fiery substances; only in the flame the parts are drawn closer together, while in the light they are more widely separated. If the quality of caitanya or spirit, pervades the whole body, then the soul cannot be atomic. The passages of the Upaniṣads which refer to the soul as aṇu¹ have in view not the Ātman but the nucleus of the qualities of understanding and mind. They are intended to show the subtlety of the Ātman which escapes perception.² It is admitted that the empirical self, bound down by manas, etc., is not infinite, while the supreme reality is infinite.³ If it is said to be atomic, it is because empirically it is associated with buddhi.⁴ All the statements about the soul’s abiding in the heart are due to the theory of the location of the buddhi in it. Again, what is everywhere can certainly be in one place, though what is confined to a place cannot be everywhere.⁵ In this way Śaṁkara explains all the passages of the Upaniṣads, which assert a spatial limitation of the soul.⁶ The whole life of religious obligation is founded on the relative reality of the empirical ego. The entire field of practical existence, with its scheme of merit and guilt, its body of sacred law, with its commands and prohibitions, its prospects of happiness in heaven and suffering in hell, all assume the identification with the self of the body, the senses and the variety of conditions surrounding it. In all the successions of life it is not the Ātman, but the shadow of it, that grieves and complains and acts out the plot on the world-stage. The soul, until its separation from the upādhis, is subject to pleasure, pain and individual consciousness.⁷

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⁶ Ibid.

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¹ Muṇḍ. Up., iii. 19; Śvet., v. 8–9.

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² S.B., ii. 3. 29.

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³ See S.B., ii. 3. 19–32.

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⁴ ii. 3. 29.

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⁵ S.B., ii. 1. 7; ii. 3. 49.

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⁶ See S.B., i. 3. 14–18 i. 2. 11–12.

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⁷ Viśeṣavijñāna.

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Śaṁkara gives an account of the different states of the soul. In the waking condition, the whole perceptual mechanism is operative, and we apprehend objects by means of the mind and the senses. In dream states, the senses are at rest and only the manas is active. Through the impressions left on the senses by the waking condition, it knows objects. The dreaming self is not the ultimate spirit, but the same limited by adjuncts. That is why we are not able to create at will in a dream. If we could do so, no one would have an unpleasant dream.¹ In the state of deep sleep, the mind and the senses are at rest, and the soul is, as it were, dissolved in its own self and regains its true nature. Śaṃkara mentions continuity of karma as an argument for the continuity of self. There is also remembrance. Consciousness of personal identity (ātmānusmaraṇa) proves that the same soul awakes as went to sleep. Scripture affirms it, and would lose its meaning if deep sleep disturbed the continuity of the self. If one goes to sleep as A and wakes up as B, there will be no continuity of acts. Even the liberated might awake. Evidently even in deep sleep, as at death, the nucleus of individuality is kept up. In spite of loose statements to the contrary, it is admitted that even in deep sleep the upādhi, which limits the jīva to saṃsāra, exists potentially. If, in deep sleep as in liberation, there is an entire absence of special cognition, how and in what does the sleeping person retain the seed of avidyā on account of which waking takes place? Śaṃkara draws a distinction between the temporary union with Brahman in deep sleep and the permanent one in mokṣa. “In the case of deep sleep, the limiting upādhi exists, so that when it starts up into being, the jīva must start up into existence.”² In the state of mokṣa, the seeds of avidyā are all burnt up.³

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¹ S.B., iii. 2. 6.

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² S.B., iii. 2. 9.

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³ See S.B. on Gauḍapāda’s Kārikā, iii. 14.

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The state of swoon is given a separate place, since it is different from waking, inasmuch as the senses no longer perceive objects. This indifference to the object world is not the result of concentration of attention on other objects. It is different from dreams since there is not any accompanying consciousness, from death since there is life in the body, and from dreamless sleep since there is unrest in the body. A fainting person cannot be roused so easily as a sleeping one. The state of swoon is said to be intermediate between deep sleep and death. “It belongs to death in so far as it is the door of death. If there remains any (unrequited) work of the soul, speech and mind return to the senseless person; if no work remains, breath and warmth depart from him.”⁴

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⁴ S.B., iii. 2. 10.

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Each man is in essence the supreme reality, unchanging and unmodified and partless, and yet we speak of the rise and growth of the soul. For when the adjuncts are produced or dissolved, the self is said to be produced or dissolved.¹ The limiting adjuncts give individuality to the different souls of the world.² They determine the nature of the body, the caste of the jīva, the duration of life, etc.³ The souls are different on account of these adjuncts, and there is no confusion of actions or fruits of actions.⁴ Even if the individual soul is regarded as an ābhāsa or reflection only, like that of the sun in water, the individuality of the souls is not prejudiced.⁵

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¹ S.B., ii. 3. 17.

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² S.B., iii. 2. 9.

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³ Sureśvara's Vārttika, pp. 110-113.

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⁴ S.B., ii. 3. 49.

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⁵ "As when one reflected image of the sun trembles, another reflected image does not on that account tremble also, so when one soul is connected with actions and results of actions, another soul is not on that account connected likewise. There is therefore no confusion of actions and results" (S.B., ii. 3. 50).

Cites (9)